The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an organization of countries from North America and Europe and its member states are unified in defense. It is headquartered in Brussels, Belgium and it was established with the signing of the 1949 treaty known as the North Atlantic Treaty. It has interests in the vast East Asia countries because some of its goals include fighting terrorism and restoring the world order. The East Asian countries include China, Japan, Vietnam, Mongolia, Serbia, North Korea, South Korea, and Russia. Experts have lobbied for the inclusion of these countries into NATO citing that the unification could bring about more success in some of NATO’s objectives like fighting terrorism and restoring the world order.
Reasons for East Asia partnership with NATO
East Asia has some of the world’s superpowers which include Japan, China, Russia, and South Korea. Many of the countries in this region are fully developed and hence command some of the best military forces in the world. NATO on its part also has in its membership the most developed countries in the North America region and Europe. A combination of these forces can deliver a lot of success in their objectives. There is also an important fact to consider because there is a great likelihood that Russia and China will have an alliance very soon. These two countries are forces to reckon with in the world and hence there is a great possibility the unification of these two countries will bring another force in the world.
It is important to note that there has existed a rivalry between Russia and the Members of NATO. If Russia is to be left out of NATO there is a likelihood that Russian militarists and Nationalists will have an upper hand in the control of arms. This will only help in threatening world peace and hence the reason for the unification of NATO and countries of the East Asian Region. Failure to that East Asia will start its conflicts especially started by the Russian Militarists and Nationalists and the other countries in the region cannot be able to handle the conflicts. This will deteriorate the world peace as it is of now.
The effects to the US if Japan’s economy collapsed
For a long time in history, the United States and Japan have shared a good relationship until Japan attacked the United States Pearl Harbor in 1941. However, things would later come back to normal after the end of the Cold War era and nowadays Japan and the United States share one of the closest relationships in the world in terms of economic and military relationships. The United States of America is one of Japan’s economic partners and this is evident because Japan’s 22.7% exports are taken by the United States and the United States exports 14% of its exports to Japan. In this respect, one of the effects that the United States would feel if the Japanese economy collapsed is a trade blow which would mean that it would suffer from trade deficits before other allies are formed to cover for the loss.
It is also important to note that Japan’s military relationship with the United States has put the United States in a more formidable position in the East Asia Region. This means that Japan is used by the United States to further the American interests in the region. The economic might of Japan has ensured that it is respected by other states in the region. An ally with Japan and America ensures that American interests are furthered because of the Japanese effect on any issue in the region. With the collapse of the Japanese economy, other countries in the region would not be so much willing to follow its directives hence the American interests would be jeopardized in the region.
China’s interest in North Korea
One of the Chinese policies is to restore the Korean Peninsula region peace and this is because one of its basic interests is the development of the economy and currently it is hoping for stability at home. China does not need and has never supported North Korea weapon’s acquisition because such acquisition of nuclear weapons could spark off events that would jeopardize China’s basic interests. Although China has not supported Washington’s stand on the North Korea weapon acquisition, it does not support North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons. China would not support the UN’s robust approach to the North Korean issue just because it does not want the country to collapse.
China is currently supporting North Korea on all fronts that include economically and politically and this is because it wants to enforce its stand on North Korean policies and in this way, North Korea cannot harm China in any way nor can it harm South Korea. This means that the Korean Peninsula will be peaceful for a long time to come. Chinese primary goal in the country is that it does not start a war and hence ensures that economic prosperity thrives in the Korean Peninsula. This is the primary reason why China is supporting North Korea as well as giving its financial aid and most importantly hosting the North Korean President regularly in China.
Bibliography
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Becker J. Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (2005) New York: Oxford University Press.
Ahearn D. Report: China won’t curb the North Korean missile program. In: Defense Daily International (2006) 7 21.
Hunter, Robert E. NATO-Russia Relations after 11 September. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 3, no. 3, 2003, p. 28-54.
Packard, III, George R. – Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 (Princeton, NJ, 1966).
Schaller, Michael – Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (New York, 1997).
Smith, Martin A. A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination? NATO-Russia Relations, 1991, 2002. European Security, vol. 11, no. 4, 2002, p. 59-77.
Wellfield, John – An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System—A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1988).
Zwack, Peter B. A NATO-Russia Contingency Command. Parameters, vol. 34, no. 1, 2004, p. 89-103.
Archnar analyzes the situation in Libya thoroughly through his article. He takes a closer look at the thoughts of the Transitional National Council (TNC), the Muammar Gaddafi’s government and the Western Powers. He goes ahead to compare past NATO operations that happened in different countries. He notices that in Libya, the operation happened differently and with a purpose.
NATO and Western Forces, “Achcar et al.” have not supported the insurgents fully. There were accusations that the insurgents only wanted to partition their country, but these claims got disputed since the rebels continued to fight for liberation of the whole country form Gaddafi’s dictatorship. They have done this even with poorly trained, poorly armed and amateurish insurgents’ forces. Civilians have also joined the fighters for their country’s liberation.
“Achcar et al.” points out that the Western countries do not want to work directly with the Libyan rebels. There is mutual mistrust between the rebels and NATO. The Libyan rebels barely trust NATO. They only wanted NATO to provide arms and fighting equipment.
The main points of this article are as follows:
The two NATO’s Libyan paradoxes
The mutual distrust that exists between Western powers and Libyan rebels
Nato’s plans for Libya
Dissension in opposition ranks
The two NATO’s Libyan paradoxes
The first paradox was that, in Iraq and Afghanistan, US-led fights put emphasis on ‘nationalization’ of the conflict. The rebels in Libya were not even armed so they had to seek NATO’s help in provision of weapons. They even assured NATO that, with the weaponry and adequate armament, they could finish the problem of liberating the country. NATO refused to arm them. The insurgents were willing to pay. This happened despite the fact that NATO used to make deals with Gaddafi.
The Mutual Distrust
The Western powers did not trust the Libyan rebels. Their attitude was different from the attitude they had towards the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) or the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. There was an emphasis on the role of ‘Islamists’ in the Libyan rebellion as a reason for not supplying the rebels with weapons.
There is a strong suspicion that echoes a feeling that was expressed by Libyan rebels themselves. One of the spokes person of Libyan rebels felt that NATO was performing slow military operations against Gaddafi’s brigades. This would maintain Gaddafi longer in service. This would then increase the price that the opposition would be requested to pay to the world powers.
Libya’s roadmap
There was a plan to shift location of NATO strikes in Libya. They sometimes ask the TNC to negotiate with Gaddafi, but the rebels stuck to their mission of removing Gaddafi and his sons from power. There was a plan on how post- Libyan country would be on issues of security and justice. They felt that, in Libya, there was a possibility there would be no post-Gaddafi ‘orderly transition’. It was designed in such a way as to satisfy the western powers. There was a mass defection by high-ranking Gaddafi officials.
Dissension in Opposition Ranks
NATO had no problem incorporating the past regime officials in the post- Gaddafi Libya. Many rebels resented taking orders from or working alongside those who held military security positions in Gaddafi’s regime and later shifted sides to join the rebellion. Some influential leaders of the Libyan rebel group had called for preventing regime loyalists from any future force. They wanted to give priority to those who fought against Gaddafi. This rebel’s strength of mind is the main means in understanding NATO’s paradoxical conduct explained above.
What I have learnt from the article
I have learnt about the possible plan of NATO and western powers to control Libya after the liberation. The author clearly explains how this plan had to be implemented. NATO does not fully support the Libyan rebels because of the hidden plans they have against Libya.
I have not learnt about the ways used by Gaddafi’s government in the fight against the insurgents. In addition, there is no clear indication of what would happen in case the rebels did not win.
Strengths and weaknesses of the article
The article clearly explains what has not been tackled by most authors. He is brave in his explanations on how there is a conspiracy by NATO against the Libyan rebels. He also backs up the claims using different materials, meaning that the author read widely. The weakness is that it shows only one side as defective other than explaining the issues for all the parties involved. Achcar should have written about the Gaddafi’s government’s take and the rebel’s plans. The article has dwelled so much on the negative aspect of NATO and western powers.
Conclusion
As compared to other countries, it has taken longer for NATO to back the Libyan rebels in the liberation of the country. It has taken longer for sorties to be sent over to Libya than the time taken for them to be sent to other countries. NATO is not competent in backing up Libyan rebels. All this has been a plan for NATO to take control over Libya after the liberation. Nato wants to work together with people involved in Gaddafi’s regime rather than working with rebels after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi.
Works cited
Achcar, Gilbert. NATO’s “Conspiracy” against the Libyan Revolution. Jadaliyya, 2011.
Neorealist theory views power distribution as a factor which determines the behavior of states. Usually states are compelled to seek policies of “self help” to avoid excessive threats when such a need arises. This comes as a means of survival and lack of authority that is overarching. This competition makes the institution weak hence irrelevant, and cooperation becomes impeded. Neorealist theory does not go against formation of international institutions. Indeed, it supports their formation where necessary, or where the states share a common interest. The institutions prove to be essential, but when the common interest is achieved or appears unlikely to happen, the institutions must be discarded. Neo-realists do not feel that institutions render long-term cooperation, especially when some actors wish to benefit more than others (Snidal 2005, p. 76).
Most activities carried out by NATO pose challenges to both neoliberals and neo-realists. NATO as an international organization which is getting involved in different areas in terms of peacekeeping missions. The organization, therefore, conforms to neoliberal thinking, but neorealist theorists still try to explain NATO’s intra-state involvements. Neo-realist theory believes that states operate in agreement with their nationalized interests. Some NATO members did not show any concern that the crises would spill over. The US showed much concern that the conflict would destabilize the country since the Balkans had, according to history, an effect on European security. These fears, however, did not serve as a determining factor. For example, in case of Bosnia, Italy and Greece would have suffered the most. Surprisingly, these two nations were reluctant to get involved with NATO. Neo-realist theory cannot explain why some nations would be more involved than others, in the Balkans conflict.
To understand this, an individual must focus on neoliberal theory for an explanation on alliance intervention. In analyzing reaction of NATO to the conflicts of Balkan, policy communities must be get involved. These are networks of experts who are in authority, and operate in national and international bureaucracies. These communities played a crucial role in bringing Kosovan and Bosnia conflicts to the states’ agendas. They raised concerns of NATO’s member states over the issues that affected each individual state. This direction came from groups and individuals from NATO and, therefore, some states had no interest in that crisis.
Neorealists, however, make some grounds when it comes to substantial differences within NATO as an alliance. In response to Bosnia conflict, NATO was lethargic while responding. The institution got subjected to considerable divisions in deciding the course of action. This brings us back to the idea of coming together with a common interest, which governs the institution’s cohesion. Worth noting is that, in the case of Kosovo, the two parties involved had the willingness to resolve their issues. However, an institutional motive was behind this, to maintain credibility of NATO. Once again, this demonstrates the role of an international institution in considering the policies of an individual state. The dual nature of NATO comes out clearly in its activities. The organization shows both neorealist and neoliberal behavior (Sorensen 2007, p. 52).
Game theory
Game theory is an approach of decision making grounded on the assumption of actor rationality in a competition situation. In this case, each actor tries to minimize losses and maximize gains. The conditions in such a case are usually of incomplete information and uncertainty. An actor, therefore, should rank the preferences in order, discern what the other actor is likely to do, and estimate probabilities. In a two-person game, when one person wins, the other one loses in equal terms i.e. if one actor wins five, the other actor loses five. In a variable sum game, both lose, and the gains do not have to be equal. Possibilities exist that both sides may gain. In some other cases, both parties may lose with different amounts. Models of deterrence have been developed as a contribution of Game Theory. This has become the basis of how collaboration of competitive states can be achieved in an anarchic world. The problem comes when one state decides to defect other than collaboration with the other actor state. This brings a problem on international relations and conflict resolution, as well as international regimes (Keohane 1986, p. 63).
Prisoners’ dilemma
Game theory came from economists after World War II. It became formal from long held views of international relations. This model refers to interactions whereby the behavior of one actor depends on the behavior of another actor. One game is the Prisoners dilemma. This game involves two actors. Each of the actors in this case has two strategies; one is a cooperative and the other one is a competitive/ defect. The come has four outcomes; reward from cooperation, defection in the present of cooperation, losing as a result of cooperation, and penalty from mutual defection. Prisoner’s dilemma comes from a commonly told story. In the story, a police officer has two thieves, which he catches separately for questioning. Each of them receives a plea bargain if he confesses against the other. In case they fail to confess, they will obtain a conviction on a charge. The dilemma comes in when the police officer asks the two thieves whether they will confess or defect. The only sensible strategy in this situation would be mutual defection, though the two persons would be left in a sub-optimal position (Myerson 1997, p. 65).
Strategy of defection seems to be crazy as it leaves the two actors worse if they cooperated. The two actors reaching a mutual agreement to cooperate can evade the dilemma. They will, therefore, establish an enforcement mechanism, hence increasing the likelihood of cooperation. This will, in turn, reduce the chances/ risk of being suckered. This is likely to occur in a criminal partnership to bring a profitable interaction. Another solution would be altering the preferences of the two actors. To overcome the dilemma; however, there must be a structure of interaction. Realism, therefore, is a theory that brings out prisoners dilemma as necessary in international relations. International anarchy must have cooperation agreements, since they are marked by competition, completion, and insecurity (Zara 2010, p. 67).
When one actor takes a security measure, he is seen by others as a threat, since each party’s intentions are not well known. The other actors also take measures to protect themselves. Best intentions can be defeated by anarchy. Prisoners’ dilemma emphasizes the political distance between achievement and desire. Competition cannot be avoided even though the parties prefer the outcome which is cooperative. Any international institution must have insurance schemes and agreements explaining division of cooperation benefits. This would help avoid being locked in a cycle of competition.
A compelling test is provided by the small states in international relations. Debates have been triggered on an international alliance theoretical models. Weak states show weak behavior when it comes to military coalitions. This shows that neorealist theory is insufficient as a perspective. More institutional and domestic factors need to be considered to get a better understanding of alliance patterns. This weak behavior means that the state can choose to bandwagon instead of balancing against a potential threat. International institutions, national politics, and cultural affinities play a little role according to neorealist theory (Patomaki & Wight 2000, p. 224).
Case study
The case study to be used here will be that of Iceland membership to NATO. The two main theoretical models to be used will be balancing and band wagon. Balancing comes in when a state wishes to find security while resisting or defeating a threat. Band wagon, on the other hand, comes when a state wants security through appeasing its threat. Regardless of the theoretical approach, a state can either balance or bandwagon. These two can also occur against both internal and external threats. Neorealist holds that external pressures outweigh domestic pressures since leaders choose foreign policies that minimize risk in security in an international system. It is believed that empowered leaders will overcome domestic constraints that may affect their global interactions (Edgar 2002, p. 71).
The other approach is the liberal approach. Attributes of the states and their societal conflicts affect international choice of policy. This makes the United Nation unable to respond to the international exigencies. A limit is also placed by institutionalism on the premise of neorealist to the fully self-interested and rational leaders who seek minimization of risk. Constraint comes when ideological and political ties become forged within by the United Nations, which is the international institution in this case.
When it comes to balancing, the truth lies between the extremes. To author certain international politics, rational leaders must be included in the process. These leaders must be people with political stake in their states/ nations. However, they should not be preoccupied with their nations’ politics. This is because this would affect the process of policy making due to absenteeism. They must develop their strategies while giving a thought to the external conditions. To come up with a leading global institution, there must be an effect on the thoughts of the leaders. This will help compel the leaders to take the necessary actions to counter their self-interests. It is, therefore, crucial to cooperate and to forget self interest which may affect the activities of an international institution (Snidal 2005, p. 42).
It is fascinating that Iceland laid down its arms in the 14th century. According to the Ambassador of the United States, it is questionable how such a country can obtain NATO membership. Since the country lies in the North Atlantic, the geographic location should have no significance in NATO membership criterion. This had been attested by Greece. The argument comes in because Iceland as a country lacks military yet it participates in the United Nations, a powerful military coalition.
Iceland’s lack of a military force does not mean that the country contributes nothing to NT. The coalition has a base at Keflavik, a location strategic for defending Atlantic. This serves as a strategic location, to protect Atlantic against threats by Soviet. When the Soviet Union was dissolved, the location has not been providing significant advantage, but it accommodated forces who should have been stationed somewhere by NATO. NATO prefers to hold its meetings and NATO summit in the capital city of Reykjavik, the place that has a political symbolism since the 1986 Summit. The summit was between Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet Prime Minister, and Ronald Reagan who was the United States president wt that time. This helped promote the public image of peace seeking and reconciliation after the Cold War. NATO had defended Iceland from attacks although the cost of defending the country was negligible.
Conclusion
Neorealist theory cannot account fully for NATO’s development after the Cold World War ended. This theory is the most appropriate to understand the formation of the alliance. Neoliberals’ theory cannot also account for its development. However, it can offer an explanation to the events that took place in 1990’s. Neorealist theory has elements of the traditional notion, and this explains the treatment of Russia by NATO. In 1990’s, when the security risks had reduced, institutionalism took the lead to direct NATO alliance. When there was international terrorism that considered to be dangerous to national security, a course of neorealist became alleged. Neorealist cannot, therefore, explain the behavior of international institutions when it comes to policy making. It cannot also explain the intervention of the institutions when there are no immediate threats (Baldwin 2000, p. 18).
NATO has gone ahead to admit former nations that were communists. This process is seeking questions of the theory of Neorealist. The admission of “lesser” members brought doubts on whether the institution focused on relative gains. By granting “lesser” countries membership, the countries benefit more, whereas the old members benefit less. This behavior goes against “the mechanism of a lancing of power”.
Enlargement of NATO shows the unchecked power of the United States being exerted. America wants to maintain leadership in the region. Exclusion of Russia by NATO can only be explained by neorealist theory. The valid assessment here is that NATO would view admission of Russia as different from admission of other nations. Involvement of Russia in NATO would mean heightening of European stability, and in turn, Russia would enormously benefit. Neorealist views enlargement of NATO in the regional context. In this case, the Eastern countries/ states are balancing locally against power. This can also be explained as bandwagon by America where the states side with short term gains (Rauchhaus 2001, p. 67).
When the Cold War ended, the expectations by theorists, that NATO would disintegrate having served its purpose. This was expected to happen either consciously or through the lack of relevance. According to neorealist theory, dissolution would have worked out naturally. Engaging in an international institution leads to loss of policy control, significant costs, and loss of resources, among others. This loss happens due to collective commitments by nations. These costs are considered to be high. In fact, Article V of NATO’s constitution states that the sole purpose of the institution is no longer the war decision. It adds that the interest of member states must be strong in a way to accept the high costs. According to NATO, the threat was the external power, which was being balanced against a common interest. The level of the threat, according to theorists, would determine the level of cohesion of the institution (Chris 2005, p. 47).
Some authors refer to Soviet Union as “the glue holding NATO together”. Without Soviet Union, the states would have no reason for remaining united in NATO. In another view of the theory of neorealist, dissolution of NATO alliance would be striking. The Cold War left America as the only super power in the world. The theory of balancing power would explain that European Nations would actively try to balance against unchecked United Nations of America. After the war, however, most NATO states had their military forces reduced. The Europeans, on the other hand, looked for alternative provisions to their military forces.
References
Baldwin, D. A 2000, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the contemporary debate, Columbia University Press, New York.
Chris, B 2005, Understanding International Relations, 3rd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Edgar, D 2002, The prisoner’s dilemma, Nick Hern Books, London.
Keohane, R 1986, Neorealism and its critics, Columbia University Press, New York.
Myerson, R. B 1997, Game theory: analysis of conflict, New York: Harvard University Press.
Patomaki, H & Wight, C 2000, ‘After post positivism? The promises of critical realism’, International Studies Quarterly, 44 (2): 213-237.
Rauchhaus, RW 2001, Explaining NATO enlargement, Routledge, London.
Snidal, D 2005, Rational choice and international relations’ Handbook of International Relations, Sage, London.
Sorensen, G 2007, Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches, Oxford University Press, London.
Zara, S 2010, History and Neorealism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
According to Forster and Wallace, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a Cold War relic1. This organization was able to survive the end of the Cold War since it went on serving several helpful purposes for the members and also because the members totally came to an agreement that they would not define the core post-Cold War objectives of the organization quite precisely. Since June 1950, at the time South Korea was invaded, the alliance has been reshaped by unforeseen crises. The 1991 “outbreak” of conflict in the former Yugoslavia offered a learning process that was quite painful and very long for the U.S as well as the European allies.
From this learning process, there has been evolving of new concepts of “joint task forces and peace-enforcement operations”2. The September 11 terrorist attacks, which caused the NATO council to hold the first ever discussion under the Article 5 terms; “will spark a further process of adaptation and innovation”3. However, before the September 11 incident, the growing impact of enlargement and the Balkan involvement had offered a powerful European focus to NATO, “even as the security priorities of its leading member were shifting away from Europe”4. Forster and Wallace point out that NATO is turning out to be more inclined towards being a European security organization and being less inclined towards being an alliance5.
It is reported that the future of NATO was up in the air when the Cold War came to an end. Being an alliance that was created with a purpose of offering collective defense against the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, this organization was required to give a definition to new mission so that it could go on serving as a significant actor in the global politics. The United States of America was the main muscle behind the organization but it was not clear as to whether or not this country would go on guaranteeing security even to the alliance members that were there, “let alone whether NATO would provide a security umbrella to new members”6.
Several years later, by the year 2008, the organization had growth and there were ten more members who had joined. In the year 1997, three more members had joined NATO and seven joined in 2002. It is pointed out that “Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty now bounds the United States to come to the defense of former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet republics”7. The territory that is protected by NATO has reached the borders of Russia.
The United States has been in the lead in making NATO to enlarge from within. The question has however been that, “why the U.S extended security guarantees to new members and consistently pushed for NATO enlargement under the last three presidential administrations”8. To give an answer to this question, this paper is going to consider the issue of international relations and under this, there is going to be considering the issues of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and collectivism. These theories in international relations aim to give a description to the general behavior of all nations.
International Relations
The main theories under international relations are utilized to give an explanation to and prediction of the general behavior of nations within the international systems, encompassing the behavior concerning interstate alliances. As mentioned earlier, in this paper, there is going to be a highlighting of three common theories which include neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and collectivism. The predictions made by each of these theories about the support offered by the United States of America for the expansion of NATO are also going to be looked at.
Neorealism
Realism was a theoretical tradition that dominated all through during the Cold War. It portrays the international affairs as being a struggle for power among the “self-interested” states and is, in general terms, negative about the potential for doing away with conflict and war. There was a domination of this theory in the course of the Cold War for the reason that it offered simple but strong explanations for “war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other international phenomena, and because its emphasis on competition was consistent with the central features of the America-Soviet rivalry”9.
That theory was not a single one and there was evolution of realist thought to a considerable level in the course of the entire period of the Cold War. Some ‘classical’ realists like Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr held a belief that states, in a similar manner as human beings, possessed an inborn desire to have domination over others, which caused them to engage in fighting wars. Morgenthau as well put emphasis on the “virtues of the classical, multi-polar, balance-of-power system and saw the bi-polar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union as especially dangerous”10.
Contrary to this, Kenneth Waltz came up with the “neorealist” theory which ignored the human nature and put focus on the effects of the international system. For this theorist, the international system comprises several great powers and each of these powers is looking for ways to survive. Since the system does not have a central power that serve to protect states from each other, each individual state has to survive on its own. He presented an argument that that condition could bring about a situation where the states that are weaker seek to balance against, instead of to bandwagon with, the states that are more powerful. In addition, he also contradicted with Morgenthau by presenting claims that there was more stability in bipolarity than in multipolarity11.
The structural condition of anarchy serves as the biggest constraint on the behavior of the state, “demanding a self-preservation policy”12. Basing on these reasons, the neorealists have expectations of having cooperation between nations not to be uncommon and not easy to achieve. The cooperation is crowded out by the “relative power” gains. There will be a formation of alliances at a time there is a situation where the risks of cooperation are outweighed by a third party external threat. These may include the worries concerning relative gains, absence of independence and absence of trust.
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact as well the Soviet Union tended to many neorealists, to be NATO’s end. The absence of a major threat implied either “dissolution of NATO or, at best, maintenance of the status quo in terms of membership”13. According to Zarin-Rosenfeld, putting in to consideration the big relative gains which such countries as Estonia or Poland receive at a time NATO guarantees its security, and the likelihood that enlargement could imply “more confrontation with Russia without offsetting benefits, realists would have a hard time arguing that their theory offers the most explanatory perspective on the U.S preference for NATO enlargement”14.
Although, in his research, Zarin-Rosenfeld ruled out neorealism as an inadequate theory for giving an explanation of the policy, and does not test its major theoretical concepts, later in his take on the history of enlargement, he points out that there exists one specific realist response which deserves attention. The argument presented by realists sees NATO enlargement as a way that leads towards power gains relative to Russia, enlarging NATO from Western Europe to the borders of Russia in an effort to take over the old Soviet “sphere of influence”15. Zarin-Rosenfeld argued that this take on NATO enlargement does not account for all the rest of security motivations driving the support of the United States of America sufficiently.
Neoliberal Institutionalism
A large number of studies which have indicated the difficulties of neorealism in accounting for NATO enlargement as well offer a more promising, but eventually an unsatisfying, answer on whether or not “neoliberal institutionalist perspective helps to explain the U.S policy to expand NATO”16. Even if neoliberal institutionalism is indeed not contradicted by the persistence as well as enlargement of NATO, these studies indicate that it does little in providing an answer which is specific to a question of why it happened17.
The focus of neoliberal institutionalism is on the “complex interdependence” and possibility for cooperation among nations, as a response to the dire forecast of neorealists18. According to the neoliberal institutionalism theory, the fear of states lies more in the issue concerning maximizing their absolute gains instead of the relative gains, and therefore see more potential which the realists would forecast for international cooperation through institutions. It is pointed out that “rather than the realist focus on balance of power, neoliberals argue states hold a balance of interests without a specific hierarchy”19.
When the states engage in the sharing of those areas of common interest, there are expectations among the neoliberal institutionalist of the states to engage in compromising and cooperating through institutions so that they can obtain gains which would not be there in the absence of cooperation.
An argument is presented by Robert Keohane in his discussion about the views of neoliberal institutionalism on relations after the Cold War coming to an end that, “the theory would expect NATO to use its organizational resources to persist, by changing its tasks”20. He further goes ahead to point out that “there is no reason why the defeat of the Soviet Union would prevent western institutions from continuing to provide states with opportunities for mutual absolute gains”21.
The persistence and enlargement of NATO does not bring in a contradiction with the theory to any level. However, being a systematic theory of international relations, this theory does not seek to give a description of any specific conception of the interests of the states. Where there is no prediction of these interests, we can not have a real explanation of their development and therefore, whereas the continuation of NATO fits with neoliberal institutionalism, this theory can only predict so much: “NATO will continue if its members continue to share undetermined common interests”22.
Specifically looking at NATO enlargement, the issue of undefined state interests remains to be an obstruction. And as the theory serves to justify the belief held by the United States of America that an institution like NATO could have an effect on the interests of non-members in a manner to qualify them to have later membership, “the emphasis on economic interdependence and sunk costs as the major reasons for institutional continuity certainly seems to weaken neoliberalism’s explanatory power for why the U.S would advocate integrating a small country in to NATO, for what is likely to be a higher economic cost”23.
Constructivism Theory
Unlike the realism and liberalism theories that emphasize on material factors like trade or power, the constructivist approaches focus on the impact of ideas. Rather than taking the state for granted and making an assumption that it just looks for ways to survive, the constructivists consider the interests as well as identities of states as “a highly malleable product of specific historical processes”24. They are very attentive to the current discourse within the society because a discourse serves as a reflection of the interests and beliefs and sets up behavior norms, which are acceptable. As a result, constructivism is particularly attentive to the “sources of change and this approach has largely replaced Marxism as the preeminent radical perspective on international affairs”25.
Due to the end of the Cold war, the constructivist theories became legal as they were greatly affected by the result of the war. It happened because realism and liberalism did not participate in the leading events and, what is more interesting, there are no proper explanations to it. On the other hand, it is also possible to say that constructivist had an explanation: “specifically, former president Mikhail Gorbachev revolutionized Soviet foreign policy because he embraced new ideas such as ‘common security’”26.
The world is constantly developing and there are more new rules, norms and normal technologies with the each passing day. In addition, basing on the fact that we live in an age where old norms are facing challenges, once apparent boundaries are undergoing dissolution, and issues concerning identity are turning out to be more and more salient, it is almost not shocking that researchers have been attracted to approaches which put these issues front and middle. In fact, from the constructivist point of view, the core issue in the “post-Cold War world” is the way various groups consider their interests as well as identities.
Even if power is not irrelevant, the constructivist theory put emphasis on the way the ideas as well as identities are brought about, the way they undergo evolution and the way they give shape to how the states understand and offer response to the situations in which they are. Thus, it matters whether Europeans give definition to themselves basically either in continental or national terms: “whether Germany and Japan redefine their pasts in ways that encourage their adopting more active international roles; and whether the United States embraces or rejects its identity as a ‘global policeman’”27.
The perspective of constructivism on international relations looks at the behavior of states as well as their interactions through the” lens of subjective identities”28. Alexander Wendt points out that “the focus on structural forces of anarchy, so prominent in neorealism, is flipped on its head by the constructivist view that anarchy is what states make of it”29. The constructivist theory puts its focus on the shared identities as well as values and does not focus on the material interests and anarchy. The states do not just have a ‘national interest’; they had various interests and relations with other states instead which arise from the social interactions formed by the actors themselves just as Wendt points out that “states act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not”30.
Basing on this viewpoint, the interests that are socially created offer meaning to the “anarchical relations” between states as well as power distribution among them and not vice versa as in the case of realist formulation.
For those who believe in this theory, institutions are a representation of the relatively stable sets of interests as well as identities31. Although institutions may be formalized by rules, they still eventually serve to represent a ‘collective knowledge’, in a manner that when the institutions continue to be there, the constructivists have an expectation that the basic reason to be is because of the shared values. Of importance, the shared value is not supposed to be cooperative: “mutual recognition that two states are ‘enemies’ represents a shared social identity, and can form a ‘self-help’ or ‘competitive’ institutional relationship”32.
The state relationships can as well be ‘cooperative’ in which the states positively identify themselves with each other so that there is perception of each other’s security, to a particular level, as the responsibility of the whole group. Basing on how well build up these cooperative and collective identities are, “security institutions can range from the limited joint action all the way to the full blow form seen in cooperative security arrangements”33.
The focus put on shared meanings by the constructivism theory makes a collective action made via institutions to depend less on existence of active threats and it as well assists in restructuring of conceptions of state goals in regard to shared norms and not relative power34.
The constructivist answer to the question of whether or not NATO would go on at all after the Soviet threat vanishing is vitally similar to the neoliberal answer: “perhaps it won’t, but certainly it will if allies have reasons independent of that threat for identifying their security with one another”35. But through its assertion on “identities independent of power gains”, this theory provides an answer that is more specific than the other theories that have been looked at: NATO went on being there after the Cold war because of the “allies’ shared values of democracy, markets, and liberal principles of sovereignty”36.
Zarin-Rosenfeld points out that the enlargement of NATO can specifically be looked at as an effort to promote “the institutionalization of these shared meaning to so-called ‘bad-apple’ states that do not share them yet – a social process that constructivism accounts for far more effectively than either the previous IR theory”37. The huge amount of the ‘values-based argument’ for NATO enlargement which the policy makers in the United States presented serves as a confirmation of this perspective being viable. Basing on these reasons, this theory tends to be high in the line with the policy of the United States to enlarge NATO after the Cold War was over, and it receives a more comprehensive testing within the enlargement “empirical history” later in time. A prediction is offered by constructivism that a state is given NATO membership “if reliably shares the liberal values and multilateralist norms of the Western community… [and if] the faster it internalizes these values and norms, the earlier it becomes a member”38.
According to Zarin-Rosenfeld, constructivism is convincing on NATO enlargement policy to this end. In being different from other international relations theories, the argument based on this theory in regard to enlargement would face a direct contradiction from the history in which NATO decided not to encompass nations which shared this organization’s values. Considering the fact that the organization opened its doors beginning from the year 1994 and apparently presented the democratic norms as well as democratic values as an overall standard by which to judge the prospective future members of the organization is what exactly a constructivist viewpoint would predict. In addition, the “socialization process” set up in to enlargement policy is greatly in line with constructivism – “using NATO membership as an incentive to further pursue democratic reform and consolidation of the transformation of their domestic systems and to spread the norms of multilateral international law”39.
Conclusion
In this paper, the theories accounting for the continual existence and expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were looked at. The theories that were considered are specifically those that deal with international relations and they include neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism theories. Each of these theories has its own strengths and weaknesses. Over time, the existing theories in particular field have been continuously improved upon in order to help deal with particular situations effectively.
In this paper, it has been established the best theory that accounts for the continual and expansion of NATO to be the constructivism theory. This conclusion has been arrived at after carefully considering each of these theories individual and carrying out a comparison. The weaknesses that can be seen in each of them were analyzed as well as the strengths that are depicted by each of the theories.
Looking at neorealism, even though some scholars in their research ruled out neorealism as an inadequate theory for giving an explanation of the policy, and did not test its key theoretical concepts, in their take on the enlargement history, they pointed out that there existed one definite realist response that required to have attention. The argument given out by the realists looks at NATO enlargement as an avenue to power gains relative to Russia, expanding NATO from Western Europe to the Russian borders in an effort to take over the old Soviet “sphere of influence”. However, this takes on NATO enlargement does not take in account all the remaining security motivations that drive the support of the U.S adequately.
The other theory that was considered is the neoliberal institutionalism theory. Many studies which have given an indication of the complexities of neorealism in accounting for NATO enlargement and also a more hopeful, but eventually an unproductive, answer on the question of whether neoliberal institutionalist standpoint assists to give an explanation to U.S policy to enlarge NATO. Even though neoliberal institutionalism is, with no a doubt, not contradicted by the continual existence and enlargement of NATO, the studies show that it does not do much in offering an answer that is precise to a question of why it happened.
Basing on the neoliberal institutionalism theory, the fear of states lies more in the issue concerning taking full advantage of their total gains rather than the relative gains, and thus see more potential which the realists would forecast for international cooperation through institutions. Instead of the realist focusing on power balance, those who believe in this theory present an argument that states to hold a balance of interests with no precise chain of command. When there is sharing of the common interest areas by the states, the neoliberal institutionalist expect the states to engage in negotiation and combining forces through institutions for them to receive gains that would not be there where cooperation is lacking.
The continual existence and enlargement of NATO does cause a disagreement with the theory to whatever degree. Yet, being an organized theory of IR, the theory does not seek to explain any definite conception of the interests of the states. Where prediction of these interests is lacking, there can be no real explanation of their advancement and thus, as on the one hand, the continual existence of NATO fits with neoliberal institutionalism, on the other hand, the theory can only predict so much: “NATO will carry on in case the members go on sharing the common interests which are undetermined.
On the other hand, the constructivism theory offers an answer to the question of whether NATO would carry on at all after the Soviet threat fading is fundamentally alike to the neoliberal answer. But through its affirmation on identities autonomous of power gains, the constructivism theory offers an answer which is more precise than the answers offered by the neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism theories. NATO went on existing and enlarging after the Cold War because of the shared values of democracy of embraced by the allies as well as the markets, and liberal principles of power.
It has been established that NATO enlargement is specifically considered to be an endeavor to support the institutionalization of these shared significance to what is referred to as ‘bad-apple’ states which do not engage in the sharing them yet; a social process that constructivism accounts for is far more successful than either the neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism theories. The enormous amount of the arguments based on values for NATO enlargement that the policy formulators in the United States of America gave out serves as a substantiation of this viewpoint being practical. Putting these reasons to consideration, the constructivism theory is seen to be greatly in line with the policy of the United States to expand NATO after the Cold War coming to an end, and it receives a more all-inclusive testing within the enlargement “empirical history” later in time.
A forecast is provided by this theory that a given state becomes a NATO member if it consistently shares the Western community liberal values and multilateralist norms and if it is quicker at internalizing these values and norms, in order to get membership earlier. In conclusion, the constructivism theory is the best accounting theory for the continued existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Bibliography
Forster, Anthony and Wallace William. “What is NATO for?” Survival, 43, No. 4 (2001): 107-127. Web.
Keohane, Robert.“Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism The Contemporary Debate, ed. David Baldwin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Web.
Keohane, Robert. After Hegemony. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984. Web.
Mearsheimer, John.”Why we will soon miss the Col War.” The Atlantic Monthly, 266, No. 2 (1990): 35-50. Web.
Walt, Stephen M. “International relations: one world, many theories.” Foreign Policy, 1, No. 110, (200): 29-35. Web.
Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of international politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. Web.
Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, 46, no. 2 (1992): 391- 420. Web.
Zarin-Rosenfeld, Jack. “The Republican security logic of NATO enlargement.” College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, 5, No 2, (2009): 3-10. Web.
Footnotes
1 Anthony Forster and William Wallace. “What is NATO for?” Survival, 43, No. 4 (2001): 107.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 John Mearsheimer.”Why we will soon miss the Col War.” The Atlantic Monthly, 266, No. 2 (1990): 35 – 50.
7 Jack Zarin-Rosenfeld. The Republican security logic of NATO enlargement. College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, 5, No 2, (2009): 3.
8 Ibid.
9 Stephen M. Walt. “International relations: one world, many theories.” Foreign Policy, 1, No. 110, (200): 29.
10 Ibid.
11 Walt. International relations: one world, many theories. 29.
12 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of international politics. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 30.
13 Zarin-Rosenfeld. The Republican security logic of NATO enlargement, 5.
14 Ibid 5
15 Ibid 6
16 Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation”. Security Studies, 8, no. 2-3 (1998), 198-234.
17 Ibid 199
18 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984),40.
19 Zarin-Rosenfeld, The Republican security logic of NATO enlargement, 6.
20 Robert Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War,” Neorealism and Neoliberalism The Contemporary Debate, ed. David Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 287.
21 Ibid 287.
22 Ibid 273.
23 Zarin-Rosenfeld, NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation, 211.
24 Walt, International relations: one world, many theories, 31.
25 Ibid 32.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. 32.
28 Zarin-Rosenfeld, The Republican security logic of NATO enlargement, 9.
29 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, 46, no. 2 (1992), 391.
30 Ibid 397.
31 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), p 399.
32 Ibid 399 – 400.
33 Ibid, 400 – 401.
34 Ibid, 401.
35 Ibid 408
36 Zarin-Rosenfeld, The Republican security logic of NATO enlargement, 9.
37 Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 409.
38 Zarin-Rosenfeld, NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation, 216.
The codification system used in NATO is rather complex. Often considered the essential element of NATO’s Codification System (NATO, 2014), the ID-related processes presuppose that the minimum data required for the correct IoS should be obtained. As the organization’s current safety motto says, “One IoS, One NATO Stock Number (NSN)” (NATO, 2014, para. 1). NATO’s headquarters are located in Brussels, Belgium (NATO, 2014).
The purposes of the organization are quite numerous. Among the key objectives, which NATO is supposed to fulfill, the following ones must be mentioned;
sharing the responsibilities that the integration into a single economic entity entails;
taking the risks associated with the political and economic cooperation of the states, as well as the support for the members;
maintaining collective security by complying with the key principles of human rights and democracy;
preventing the members of NATO from signing any agreement that may conflict with the goals and objectives of the organization.
Apart from the objectives specified above, NATO also pursues the goal of attracting new members to the idea of an internship. As far as the Internship Programme is concerned, the objectives can be characterized as directed towards proper information management and, therefore, revolve around the process of NATO databases organization and access, as well as the process of learning from the NATO community. To be more specific, the key goals of the program include:
promotion of the latest technological advances, as well as theoretical knowledge, among the NATO members so that this knowledge could be applied to the solution of specific political, economic, or cultural problems;
the opportunity for interns to learn from the organization and, thus, improve their economic and financial state;
introduction of diversity in the NATO workforce and the creation of a proper environment for intercultural communication, as well as a successful negotiation process;
expansion of the understanding of NATO among both the members of the Alliance and the governments of other states.
As it has been stressed above, NATO is currently preoccupied with the recruitment and training of new members. Numerous programs, including the above-mentioned internship program, are a graphic example of the specified endeavors. In addition to training sessions, which NATO offers to all those concerned, the organization also embarks on a range of missions, including diplomatic missions.
As far as the membership requirements are concerned, there is a specific threshold for the states that may join NATO, both in terms of economy and politics. To be more specific, to become a NATO member, a state must have a constitution based on the key principles of democracy. Moreover, new NATO members must have their economy geared towards the global market, The last, but not least, the necessity to appreciate the sovereignty of the state’s neighbors is an essential criterion for accepting the state in question in NATO (Minimum requirements for NATO membership, 2014, para. 1).
It is worth mentioning, though, that the participation in the so-called Membership Action Plan, which was designed by NATO as well, includes a set of less stringent rules. Allowing the states that for some reason cannot pursue membership in NATO to obtain the protection that they need from the organization, the specified set of rules follows the open door policy of the North Atlantic Treaty (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2014).
Reference List
Minimum requirements for NATO membership. (2014). U.S. Department of State. Web.
NATO. (2014). The NATO codification system. NATO. Web.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2014). NATO Enlargement. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Web.
Lord George Robertson was known as an independent-minded leader who takes personal decisions seriously. For instance, he opposed the decision to unilaterally disarm nuclear weapons.1 However, it is pertinent to mention that some of the decisions made by Robertson have been quite illogical. He was expected to support the disarmament proposal after joining NATO even though he never showed any interest or willingness to do so. To a large extent, Roberson was heavily inclined towards supporting American interests at the expense of NATO affairs.
Nonetheless, he took a firm position in the fight against terrorism especially after the September 11 terror attacks in the United States. As a matter of fact, conjuring the fifth article on mutual defense was a pragmatic step in the right direction for the NATO Secretary General. The fight against terrorism received a new boost during his reign. Some of his critics believed that he could have done better in his leadership style than he portrayed while at the helm of NATO.2
NATO involvement in Afghanistan could be deemed as one of the failures of Lord Robertson because he permitted the action. The gross humanitarian crisis created by NATO involvement could not be equated to the skewed objectives of the move. On the other hand, Lord Robertson played a crucial role in the campaigns to keep Scotland under the United Kingdom. This followed attempts by some leaders in Scotland to separate the country from the United Kingdom.
In reference to Robertson, the union is important for the economic development of Scotland. It can also be recalled that the decision to avail war assets to Turkey was a crucial move when Robertson was the Secretary General of NATO. Although the move was initially meant for a good purpose, Turkey was eventually ravaged by war courtesy of the NATO decision under the leadership of George Robertson.
The most profound leadership initiative demonstrated during his leadership was the termination of the civil war that was about to take place in Macedonia. Robertson made every attempt to avert the war through the use peace keeping troops from NATO.
According to NATO, effective crisis management requires a comprehensive approach that incorporates both the military and non-military constituents of the organization. Political engagement is also recognized as an important component under the comprehensive approach3. A vital prerequisite that guided the comprehensive approach is the development of extensive cooperation among all the members. The fourth obligation was the analysis of the military, non-military and the economic factors required to ensure the success of the comprehensive approach in the field. However, the introduction of the approach has been complicated by several factors4.
According to NATO, military, civilian, and political approaches should be put in place in order to manage emerging crises effectively. In regards to the military approach, NATO proposes that crisis management can be effective if military force is applied in certain circumstances. Nonetheless, it is crucial to underscore the fact that several security challenges faced by the Euro-Atlantic bloc may not be solved through military action.
There are indeed complex problems faced by NATO member states. Unless reasonable measures and policy programs are initiated, the popular military approach may not be successful at all. As it stands out, the processes of stabilizing and reconstructing war-torn nations that belong may demand a lot of consultation from the civilians. Needless to say, political approaches are even worse than military action bearing in mind that politics has been a major setback towards realizing long term peace and stability. A comprehensive approach should largely involve the input by civilians since they form the soft target for rogue politicians and unpopular regimes.
A shared sense of responsibility coupled with concerted effort among NATO member states are crucial milestones that constitute comprehensive approach towards the reconstruction of peace and stability. Besides, transparency, determination and accountability among NATO members should form part and parcel of the required comprehensive approach. It is almost impossible for the organization to make a major stride in the right direction if politics and forceful military action are permitted to take the center stage.
The US-Russia relations have been bitter since the First World War and it may not end soon5. NATO is a well-established regional body that can indeed play a vital role to harmonize the working relationship between the two countries. Unfortunately, the latter is not the case. For example, NATO is believed to be a major architect in the current political crisis in Ukraine. NATO has also been accused of condoning the proliferation of nuclear weapons especially among nations that are considered to be unfriendly to the United States. A case in point is Iran. Although the latter state is not part of NATO, the organization has apparently played major underhand deals to worsen the state of peace and security between Iran and her neighbors.6
In spite of these grave accusations, NATO can still foster a cordial relationship between United States and Russia. To begin with, NATO ought to remain no-partisan in the internal divisive politics and foreign policy of the United States. In any case, Russia may not feel comfortable to accommodate NATO as a peace broker after being suspected to be impartial in the affairs affecting the region. It is fundamental to recall that a formidable relationship between the United States and Arab world has proven to be impossible mainly due to the veto power of the US and the overwhelming support of the latter from major political organizations such as NATO and the various organs of the United Nations7.
The NATO alliance should also strive to steer discussions between Russia and the United States. Moreover, there is urgent need to re-examine the United States’ foreign policy toward Russia. NATO should ensure that the United States clarifies its policy through close talks with Russia as since it is currently marred by misunderstandings
NATO and Europe may be reading from different scripts in regards to the US retrenchment. It is a common knowledge that the United States plays a central role in the operations of NATO. Perhaps, the reality on the ground is different altogether. Retrenchment by the US is not a welcomed move especially at a time when most of its troops are required to sever in several peace keeping missions.8
Ever since the United States began to withdraw its troops from Iraq, there is a growing concern that the American military intervention in countries around the world is gradually drawing to a halt. Moreover, the defense budget under the Obama administration has ended the robust annual spending on international military activities. There have been concerns over the future of NATO due to the shift by the United States.
The organization can only survive if Europe starts to take a more active role with regard to international security. Europe may be required to take the position of the United States especially in terms of the number of troops deployed in foreign missions. In the case of NATO, the alliance might be compelled to a play a more diplomatic role towards the United States so that it may rescind its earlier decision9.
The current action by the United States can be equated to Russia’s defiance to leave Crimea. Whereas a sovereign nation like the United States cannot be forced to belong into any regional alliance, the retrenchment action came at the most inappropriate time. The US should have reconsidered its verdict bearing in mind that it still belongs to the global community. Furthermore, the retrenchment means that the military giants in Europe such as the United Kingdom will take up central roles in the international military interventions. NATO will also be required to devise its guidelines on the countries that will be involved in future military intervention.
NATO’s expansion is definitely expected to present both challenges and opportunities. A critical analysis of the anticipated expansion would fuel insecurity among certain member counties especially if the alliance opts to remain partial.10 For example, the gradual withdrawal of the US and troops from both Iraq and Afghanistan is ushering a new era of peace in the aforementioned nations. In the event that the US eventually withdraws all its armies from these nations, a rapid pace of socio-political and economic development will be realized by the civilians.
From this brief narrative, it is clearly evident that NATO’s expansion poses a major threat to world nations particularly in light of undemocratic governance of the alliance. The worst challenge can be experienced by NATO if rebellious nations decide to pull out from the common pact and act in their independent styles.
Second, the survival of NATO can only be feasible if Europe starts to take a more active role with regard to international security. During the Libyan war in 2011, the United States undertook limited role and allowed the European countries to take a more central responsibility in security and peacekeeping. The actions of the United States took the European countries by surprise11.
The best opportunity for NATO’s expansion can be witnessed if its policies and governance philosophies are overhauled. It is prudent to mention that peace and stability are common and most demanded entities by countries across the globe. If NATO’s decides to expand its horizons to other regions, it may as well be hugely accredited for maintaining peace and stability since the UN’s Security Council scorecard on international peace and security is below average.12 Furthermore, military giants in Europe might take up central roles in the international military interventions. NATO may equally be presented with vast opportunities to draft new security guidelines among partner states. As a result, over-dominance by countries such as France and the United Kingdom will be minimized or completely eliminated.
The United States and Europe have enjoyed a cordial political relationship since the last century. This partially explains why the two political blocs have managed to forge a close relationship for several decades. In other words, the US and Europe are historical allies who have prevailed against common enemies as a unified force.13
Nonetheless, there is more than meets the eye on the continual support of Europe by the United States. To begin with, the two transatlantic partners share a lot in common in terms of mutual benefits. For instance, they are strategically invaluable to each other in terms of wealth and security14. However, issues regarding climate change and terrorist detention processes have created conflicts in the past. Over the decades, the United States has been seen to protect Europe from the radical Islamic terrorists. This can be explained by the fact that Europe is a strategic spot that can be easily targeted by external insurgency.
Both the United States and Europe are also potential targets of terrorists. If terror activities are directed in Europe, it is highly likely that the United States will suffer similar social and economic repercussions. Better still, Europe is a major springboard for economic progress of the United States. It is against these backdrops that the United States compels itself to protect Europe as part of its foreign policy. 15.
It is noble responsibility of NATO invite the two countries into a common negotiation table so that bilateral cooperation can be fostered. Additionally, NATO must ensure that the plans to expand the alliance are halted until the two nations reach a consensus on the matter. As already pointed out, taking a neutral position on the conflicts between the two nations would definitely expedite the process of reconstructing the relationship between the two sovereign nations.
There have been mutual agreements between the two partners over the promotion of non-proliferation activities in the Middle East. In case of attacks, the military capability of some European nations would be of great importance to the United States.
‘Global NATO’ indicates the attempt by the organization to extend its membership to countries beyond the transatlantic region16. This was started due to the introduction of global politics during the post-cold war era. If the concept of ‘Global NATO’ will come into force, the alliance may be faced by myriads of opportunities and threats. The eventual outcome of the initiative largely relies on the framework adopted. The failure rate of such an expansive plan can be high.
For instance, when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the African Union (AU), the performance of the new has remained below par contrary to the expectations of the international community. Currently, there are a number of independent African states (Southern Sudan, Somali and the Democratic Republic of Congo) that are in political turmoil even in the presence of the perceived strengths and powers of the union. Expanding the geographical coverage and mandate of NATO may not necessarily generate the desired outcomes. The current NATO policies and operating framework should be made more robust before the initiative is rolled out.
The global challenges that exist today might be solved through the establishment of a viable global alliance. Currently, NATO has established the ‘contact countries’ that help in its operations. They include Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. These countries have been identified as potential contributors to the activities of the organization. The shape of the global security environment can only be explained by analyzing the long-term viability of NATO. Member countries that support the ‘Global NATO’ argue that international security can only be enhanced when an inclusive approach is adopted.
Global NATO might be desirable only under certain well-defined circumstances. First, the proposed global NATO can be desirable if the organization does not duplicate its roles with those of the UN Security Council. Duplication of roles and responsibilities among continental or regional alliances is a major setback in the effective delivery of services. Second, the landmark plan can be desirable if the alliance strictly remains non-aligned. Most of the rebellious attitude from the current member states has predominantly been caused by the partisan nature of the organization17.
Bibliography
“A Comprehensive Approach to crisis management.” 2013. Web.
Carpenter, Ted Galen. US Security Retrenchment: The First Effects of a Modest Shift. 2014. Web.
Daalder, Ivo, and James Goldgeier. Global NATO. 2006. Web.
Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations. 2008.
Mix , Derek. The United States and Europe: Current Issues. Washington D.C: Congressional Reserch Service, 2013. Web.
Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is known as a powerful alliance to promotes the freedoms and security of its members by establishing equal political and military standards. Since 1994, NATO has initiated the Mediterranean dialogue, and Israel is one of the non-NATO countries interested in developing such international relationships. [1] Although Israel could benefit from joining this organization, there are serious controversies that should not be ignored.
The reasons for choosing Israel as a NATO applicant are closely connected to the ambiguity of the situation. First, this country is located outside the North Atlantic region, and the extension of the boundaries for peaceful relationships is always beneficial. [2] Second, Israel is known for its multiple conflicts and short-term wars. NATO may be a solution for the population to stop damaging military activities and establish international peace. Finally, there is no clear position about the worth of the cooperation between Israel and NATO at the moment. Regardless of common self-differentiation and non-discrimination goals, Israel cannot offer a lot to the NATO members, and NATO is not able to meet all expectations.
NATO-Middle East interaction may be developed in a variety of ways. It is the responsibility of the alliance to support its members in all military and political disagreements. The example of the Israel wars shows that the country is usually involved in short-term conflicts, and NATO needs time for analysis and strategic planning. Such interaction with the Middle East does not bring evident benefits for Israel due to its inconsistency. Besides, NATO maintains equality concepts and human freedoms, and Israel continues committing human rights abuses because of geographical causes. Therefore, the consideration of ambitious and expanded cooperation must be enhanced in this dialogue.
Israel is a small country in the Middle East, known for its beaches and diverse population. On the north, the country’s neighbor is Lebanon, on the east – is Syria, and Jordan, on the south – is Egypt, and the Mediterranean Sea is on the west. The length of the coastline is 273 km, its maritime claims include 12 nm of the territorial sea and its continental shelf covers to exploitation depth. Natural resources include timber, natural gas, and sand. In some regions, copper ore, phosphate rock, and magnesium bromide may be found. There are three major directions in land use: 23% for agriculture, 7% for forests, and 70% for other purposes, depending on human interests and needs. [3] Current environmental issues are desertification, restricted freshwater resources, air pollution, and the production of chemical fertilizers. Israel is characterized by limited arable land because more than half of the country is a desert area with poor water resources.
Israel has a highly technological free market, and the access to solid natural resources allowed surviving several economic crises. In addition, the country is known for its prudent fiscal policy. Even though there is an uncertain security situation that hurts the gross domestic product (GDP) growth (between 2-3% only), its resilient banking sector focuses on the regulation of national and international business relationships. [4] Major agricultural products are citrus, vegetables, dairy products, and cotton. Crude oil (390 bbl/day) and natural gas (9.826 billion cu m) are the best production achievements. As well as many European and Asian countries, Israel is challenged by trade deficits from time to time, but the tourism industry and service exports compensate for losses. Israel’s export partners in equipment, diamonds, chemicals, and textiles are the United Kingdom, China, and Hong Kong. Import of raw and military equipment, fuels, and grain is from Britain, China, and Switzerland. America is the largest trade partner for Israel in terms of telecommunication equipment and agricultural products. [5] This economic cooperation promotes positive cultural and scientific exchanges.
The role of military authorities must be underlined in the country since the regulations of administrative and territorial relationships between the 1960s and 1970s. Both men and women are obliged to military service in Israel, and their fit for military service is about 1,500,000 per gender group. Today, the Israel Defense Forces, along with ground forces, air forces, and naval forces, include more than 173,000 active personnel. [6] These numbers are crucial for controlling the international boundaries (disputes with the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement). Multiple attempts are made to build a seamline in the West Bank region and control social discontent in the Gaza Strip. [7] The population of the country is diluted by about 14,000 citizens from Eritrea, 8,000 from Ukraine, and 442 stateless individuals. [8] However, regarding the current crises and conflicts, these numbers may be dramatically changed.
One of the issues that should be mentioned in the possible cooperation between NATO and Israel is the creation of a nuclear planning group. Regarding the recent NATO achievements, the main goal of this group is to develop and specify policies associated with nuclear forces and constantly review the positions of the official participants. At this moment, the Israeli government continues improving its nuclear weapons program based on its arsenal includes about 90 plutonium-based warheads. [9] However, the country prefers to support an opaque position, under which the leaders do not want to deny or confirm their nuclear power intentions. Israel does not find it necessary to hide its opportunity to create solid nuclear weapons due to the access to the required natural resources. At the same time, it is not the only country that demonstrates its attempts to introduce some weapons to the Near East. [10] Therefore, the chosen position may be considered a serious nuclear threat that is poorly investigated by other countries. To reduce the number of unexpected decisions from Israel, NATO and other countries’ neighbors are interested in enhancing nuclear weapon tests.
The development of geopolitical strategies in Israel is closely related to the activities of the current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This politician admits that Israel has to face multiple domestic struggles because of its unstable relationships with Iran. [11] In fact, many other Arab countries want to stop this military conflict in the region. Therefore, the country expects support from other Middle East neighbors to obtain global opposition and avoid the threats that the Iranian government frequently prefers. NATO could play a leading role in the establishment of nuclear control in the Middle East. This organization strengthens its capabilities for defense and deterrence, and the possibility to disarm Iran and explain the need for non-proliferation could become a great benefit for Israel because of the lack of official data about its nuclear weapon presence. Nuclear threats in Israel cannot be ignored as it is one of the crucial steps in the promotion of international peace by NATO or other similar alliances.
The growth of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, in particular, is commonly studied by the representatives of different nations. For Israel, they create several good opportunities to carry some chemical or biological weapons over different distances, which is beneficial for extremist groups. However, this threat terrorizes civilians and influences political relationships and national stability. Therefore, NATO’s and Israel’s geopolitical strategies are similar and directed to the establishment of safe environments for the locals and the lack of threats to neighbors.
The concept of safe and equal relationships with neighbors is high promoted by the leaders of many NATO and non-NATO countries, including Turkey and Egypt. As one of the oldest NATO members, Turkey holds a considerable part of American nuclear weapons. This decision served as a reliable backup for the United States to obtain support during the Cold War. The conflict with the Islamic State shows that Turkey could easily become a friend or a foe, relying on its nuclear reserves. Egypt has been invited to join NATO several times since 1994, but its leaders are not ready to support the international dialogue on equal conditions. The question about whether Egypt should possess nuclear weapons remains open today and is characterized by specific threats. However, compared to Israel which does not show its true intention to pursue nuclear weapons or not, Egypt shares its negative attitude toward such power. The main reasons that explain such a position of Egypt include peace with its neighbor, Israel, and security support from the United States.
However, from time to time, the chosen countries (Israel, Egypt, and Turkey) have to deal with potential nuclear threats. The issues that could bother the representatives of the Middle East are nuclear power control, the avoidance of military conflicts, and the strengthening of their regional interests. [12] Regarding the analysis of recent political and social changes in the media and press, Israel can understand the importance of the chosen issues for Turkey and Egypt. However, the Israeli government should realize that the international positions of both countries are better compared to the local situation because of evident geographical supremacy, relationships with other countries, and foreign policies.
Close relationships between Egypt and Israel explain the similarities between attitudes toward nuclear weapons and threats. If Egypt starts discussing the possibility of a new nuclear weapons program, past hostility and distrust could be reignited between the states. Besides, the nuclear independence of Egypt might question the necessity of American support and protection in the global arena. Therefore, Israel and Egypt do not find it necessary to change their current nuclear neglect. However, Turkey demonstrates another position concerning the possession of nuclear powers, relying on the outcomes of its conflict with Iran. Turkey cannot allow Iran to obtain significant nuclear powers as it may lead to an aggressive foreign policy.
In the Mediterranean region, countries aim at establishing definite maritime boundaries and claims. Turkey has to deal with the impact of Greece and Cyprus and the necessity to respect their sovereignty under such conditions as sanctions and diplomatic isolation. NATO could spread its impact on the international relationships between the chosen countries. On the one hand, regardless of the strategies and action plans, both Egypt and Turkey have to investigate the opportunities of their neighbors, and NATO defines the criteria that include inequality and trust. On the other hand, being close to Egypt, Israel continues to experience pressure and control. Ceasefire obligations, nuclear control, and social isolation cannot be disregarded today. However, as soon as one of the Mediterranean countries breaks its promises or demonstrates neglect of responsibilities, it is normal to raise worries and invite additional facilities to control the situation. Nowadays, NATO does not have enough background to invite Egypt or Israel, but Turkey’s memberships and priorities play an important role in the international arena.
Foonotes
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue,” NATO, Web.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue.”
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Middle East: Israel,” CIA, Web.
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook.”
U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Israel,” State.gov, Web.
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook.”
Ibid.
Ibid.
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Fact Sheet: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal,” ArmsControlCenter, Web.
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Fact Sheet.”
Ibid.
Mohamed Maher and Irina Tsukerman, “Tensions Between Egypt and Turkey Are on the Rise,” The Washington Institute, Web.