Category: Moral

A society is supposed to be in harmony. Individuals within a community are expected to behave in accordance to what would be beneficial to majority of the populace. In order to achieve such harmony, individuals need to have a sense of morality.

As described by Ayn Rand, morality is having the judgment to distinguish between what is right and what is wrong. A variety of factors can influence our motives and actions. Some of these are religion, science, societal demands and other established institutions. Pondering upon the fact that every one of us has a unique identification, our judgment may differ. My religious beliefs are not the same as to others. My cultural practices may even be offensive to some. There are those rooted to the belief of God as an almighty being and there are also those who do not worship any god at all.

These facts reiterate the concept of individuality. However, despite of variations in our personal perspectives, there are still universal principles that govern us no matter where we are in the world. One great example would be the right to life. This right is innate and is entitled to every person on earth. We need to follow certain universal standards to be able to coordinate with others and do things for the common good.

Being moral is a representation of self-respect. When we do good to others, we also do good to ourselves. Hume stated that moral concerns were about questioning which motives are righteous and the answers will come from other human beings. It is necessary for a human to be a social individual. We interact with others on different platforms therefore we need to understand how our relationship with other people matters. For me, it somewhat a social responsibility. The first universal law states that we are one. We are connected to everything and everyone. What we decide to do on a particular situation will have its ripple effect. Basing from the 5th universal law that one’s action will correspond to a certain reaction, the actions we make will definitely affect us and the society we belong to.

Imagine a world where no one seems to care about whether an action is right or wrong or good or bad. Restrictions will not be available in place. Murder will not be considered as a crime. People will not care about speed limitations and road courtesy. Theft will be rampantly evident. We can do whatever we want. No one is going to stop us. Do you think these things will have a positive effect on the future of every individual in that kind of society? No. We are given the capacity to think critically so that we will assess our situations and provide the appropriate actions. Being blindsided by a disguised freedom will only hinder us from further growth and development; not only individually but also as a whole.

Morality is not just about the individual concepts of religion, science, societal demands, or other established institutions; it’s a melting pot of all those concepts. Doing what is right and good reflects how we are concerned about humanity.

The Oxford Dictionary defines the word moral as “A lesson that can be derived from a story or experience, or Standards of behaviour; principles of right and wrong” (Oxford University Press [online] 2019). When this is mixed with religion does having faith really determine if you have more morals that someone who doesn’t? A practising Christian would argue that the moral code as defined by the Christian Bible teaches them the difference between what is morally right and wrong. Whereas non-religious people would argue that morals are something you learn or are taught by different people through life skills.

Within the Christian faith, it is taught about the importance of moral code. This teaches them about two important things, loving God and loving people. Through life a Christian makes many sacraments showing their loyalty and trust in God. Following the Christian faith gives you a set moral values and beliefs which are followed through every day. This makes you a ‘good’ Christian. From birth you are taught what is right and what is wrong, but does this actually put pressure on them as a human being to be perfect in an non idealistic world. “We know that everyone who has been born of God does not keep on sinning, but he who was born of God protects him, and the evil one does not touch him.” (1 John 5:18).

This is a set of morals and values that were developed over hundreds of thousands of years ago, before technology, conflict and an overall change in society. Something that is deemed morally wrong in past tense compared to something from today’s generation could be completely contradictive to the current society of Christians. In today’s society there is a sense of worry involved as people do not want to let their family, priest or most importantly God down. With current mental health problems arising in this generation it is understandable why many Christians feel this way. They almost feel like if they are not good they are automatically sinners and will live with that guilt even once apologised for. Things from childhood can make adults act out in an aggressive manner towards others, this is when people start to believe this is normal behaviour. Is it the parents fault that the child has been subjected to traumatic experiences or is it then the child’s fault that they think their rights are wrong and wrongs are rights? Are religious people who have been jailed for their crimes still more moral than non-religious people? If they are taught the real differences between right and wrong, then are they expected to not make mistakes so bad they are imprisoned. Following this belief shows how people are subjected to not really have freedom of thought as they are told from a very young age that certain things are right and certain things are wrong.

Richard Dawkins is an English ethologist, biologist and author. He believes morality has no ties to religion what so ever, and he states that “we clearly do not get our moral compass from religion”. (Richard Dawkins, 2015). A moral compass is someone’s ability to distinguish the difference between what is right and wrong.

Up until the 2000s slavery was a normal thing that wasn’t frowned upon and although it was banned in a lot of counties it still happens today with a different outlook. Years ago slavery was just something that happened, but as society changes the moral compass moves when people start to realise that is it actually wrong to do such things and stop it. As the years pass and generations move on, people start to develop their own moral ideas of what is right and wrong which has nothing to do with religion. If the moral compass had anything to do with religion we would still be murdering people for crimes, they did not commit and inequality between men and women would still be an ongoing issue. The moral compass is how generations and societies move on from old beliefs and start to develop their own ways of living the way they believe is right to do. They start to realise and create their own pathways which is a group or individual thing that doesn’t have any connection to religion. Believing in the moral compass gives people more diverse thoughts and allows them think more freely. However, it can be said that this can allow more people to have ‘evil’ thoughts and actions without the consequence of disappointment.

There will always be strong arguments for each side as it is a very controversial subject of conversation. Personally, as someone been raised a Christian and has been subjected to all the sacraments in the religion. I still strongly believe an atheists point of view and I would consider myself an atheist. I have been confronted by many mental health and other challenging problems throughout my life which has made me question how moral our society actually is and will one-day religion be a thing of the past?

Bibliography

1. Oxford University Press, online 2019 [accessed 30.01.2019] https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/moral
2. 1 John 5:18 Biblia.com, online 2019 [accessed 30.01.2019] https://biblia.com/bible/esv/1%20John%205.18
3. gotquestions.org, online 2019 [accessed 30.01.2019] https://www.gotquestions.org/how-old-is-the-Bible.html
4. Daniel C. Dennett, online 2012 [accessed 30.01.2019] https://twitter.com/dennetsdouble/status/224033052865724416
5. Richard Dawkins interview, online audio 2015 [accessed 30.01.19] https://www.businessinsider.com/richard-dawkins-religion-morality-2015-10?r=US&IR=T
6. Psychology Today, Gregg Henriques Ph.D., 2012 [accessed 31.01.2019] https://www.psychologytoday.com/gb/blog/theory-knowledge/201201/finding-our-moral-compass

Introduction

It is widely recognized that one of the tasks of our century is the challenge to terrorism. The term, continually used by policymakers and journalists, has become part of our vocabulary and daily lives. Anyone is aware of a danger so called, but few wonder if this has any justifiable reasons. Increasingly, individuals, organizations and politicians compete to defining a certain act as “terrorist” and then having the legitimacy to fight it; but trying to be judge in this ‘competition’, I feeling obliged to penalise all participants since everyone uses their own evaluation and measurement rules. For all these reasons, below, I will try first to give a definition that can as much as possible be accepted in accordance with some parameters, and then I will try to answer the question: Is terrorism ever morally justified?

The historical background

The term terrorism was first used in English in 1528, while in the contemporary history we find the term in France to describe the political violence of the Jacobian Party during the French Revolution. Especially after the World War II it was custom to use the expression “Terrorist” in reference to the state terrorism of colonial powers which were opposed to the self-determination movements and vice versa (it depends on the perspective). Indeed, the ethno-nationalist insurrections during and aftter the war had a great influence on subsequent terrorist campaigns.

In the Middle East, South East Asia and Africa, indigenous peoples opposed at the prospect of returning to their pre war colonial status quo, encouraged by promises of independence and self- determination made by the allies during the war and expecially after the signature of the Atlantic Charter which attempted to “impress enemy opinion with the justice of the western cause”. The points of the Charter, principles subsequently included in the Declaration of the United Nation, provided that United States and Britain would not have want «territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned» while the third point of the Charter supported «the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live»1

In Middle East, more precisely in Palestine, between 1936 and 1939 the country was site of clashes in which emerged the Irgun, known for the terrorist attacks on the Arabs and British soldiers, following the government’s promulgation of a White Paper. Begin’s strategy, one of the leaders of the armed group, it was that of operate within the city, indistinguishable from ordinary citizens, and than emerging to strike suddenly, then disappear back into the community. The Irgun’s aim, was not to defeat Britain militarily, but rather to use the terror to undermine the symbols of the British control. The Irgun’s revolt provided a template for subsequent anticolonial uprisings.

Indeed, «the most effective irredentist struggles of the immediate postwar era were those that emulated Begin’s strategy and deliberately sought to appeal to—and thereby attract the attention and sympathy of—an international audience»2 . the tactical “successes” and political victories obtained by groups like the Irgun, EOKA, and the FLN, they were a model and demonstrated that terrorism could work.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 the term was used without any real rigor as to what terrorism is and what its parameters are, leading the so-called civilized nations to focus on a narrow concept of globalized terrorism, and creating the fiction that civilized nations can never be part of terrorist actions. Currently the term terrorism is used to define a wide variety of acts against the law: according to article 421-1 of the Criminal Code lists, money laundering is considered terrorism under the French law3, while U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell said with reference to Assange’s case “I think the man is a high-tech terrorist”4.

The difficulty of defining Terrorism

“Attempted murder, assault, kidnapping, hostage-taking on airplanes, ships, all means of transport, theft, extortion, destructions, and crimes committed during group combat, the production or ownership of weapons of destruction and explosives including the production, sale, import and export of explosives, the acquisition, ownership, transport of illegal explosive substances, the production, ownership, storage, or acquisition of biological or chemical weapons, and money laundering”.

The definition of Terrorism It has always been debated by scholars and journalists, because very often attributed subjectively according to where one’s interests lie. Within academia, the phenomenon is seen as something «in its “pre-theory stage” or to put it more candidly as something that is widely recognized as theoretically impoverished»5. By virtue of this UN High Level Panel in 2004 stated that «the United Nations must achieve the same degree of normative strength concerning non -State use of force» because «a lack of agreement on a clear and well known definition undermines the moral and normative stance against terrorism and has stained the United Nations image»6. Some scholars have suggested that the failure to define what terrorism is, it could itself be a cause of terrorism and as Golder and Williams have argued that «one danger is that if terrorism is not so defined, the powers of the State may extend very far indeed».

The lack of agreement that emerged from the divergent political positions of some states on what constitutes terrorism reveals the political interpretation given to the term, summarized in the paradox coined by Ronald Reagan: “one man’s terrorism is another man’s freedom fighter’. A definition of terrorism should not be articulated by what the adversary is doing in that moment. Indeed, Schmid points out how acts of violence carried out by a so designed terrorist group, might not be all terroristic actions8. Very often the term is used to define reality in order to put one’s own group on a high moral plane; today terrorist is become «the mantra of our time, carrying a similar negative charge as communist once did»9. For some terrorism is an offense, and for others it is a distinctive act of maintaining power pride; again, for some it is an activity assigned by God, and for others it is a justified action against oppression; it is a warfare strategy; an attack on the peace and security; a quest for identity. From this short list it is possible to understand how, according to the personal view and the interpretation given to a determined event / act defined as terrorist, it is possible to stand against or in favour as appropriate.

Reading this statement made by Robespierre in 1794, we would have no problem in standing his side: «Terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our country’s most urgent needs»10.

Terrorism has been described by Western countries as a threat to democracy and civilization, as if western democracy is the only permissible moral practice and other societies should adapt to it. But is democracy the only universal value while the other government practices are not morally justified? Is terrorism therefore violence that we simply do not like or whose motivation we disagree with? In case the term “terrorism” was simply a derogatory way used by western countries to indicate their enemies (that defend themselves) in order to justify an attack, then one might indeed argue that terrorism is morally justified. In this case terrorism could be viewed as part of the game within the process of power appropriation among winners and losers, in order to consolidate or change the status quo. Having said that we may conclude that there is nothing qualitatively distinctive about terrorism compared with other forms of political violence. It is not equally sufficient for the purpose of our analysis the definition given by the League of Nations which defined acts of terrorism as «criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public»11. This definition only refers to acts against state actors and not towards individuals, thereby reducing the phenomenon to a mere problems of safeguarding of national security.

Terrorism and its forms

Terrorism’s physical manifestation may occur through the use of range of different weapons, suicide bomb attacks, cyber attacks and so on, but these acts of violence are not themselves specifically terrorist act. These physical violence manifestations are not very different from acts committed by common criminals, by psychologically disturbed individuals or acts performed within a conflict among states. Therefore, on the basis of the physical manifestation, we cannot answer the question above because it would mean just answer the question, is violence ever morally justified?

Analyzing instead the political implications of terrorism and identifying the actors as individuals, groups belonging to a given organization until we reach to the ruling class of a given state, even in this case we would give a vitiated response. Under these circumstances we would inevitably be brought, even trying to empty ourselves from any belief, to side with the requests pursued by the individual, group or state concerned that seem more similar to our view of things, with requests we consider morally right or wrong. By virtue of this, we cannot agree with Arafat’s statement before the General Assembly on 13 November 1974 when he affirmed that: «the difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist …lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called a terrorist»12.

This misinterpretation of terrorism brought an accusation for terrorism on last February 5 towards a former Spanish parliamentarian from the Sixth Section of the Audiencial National. Angeles Maestro, former deputy of Izquierda Unida was in fact accused of Terrorism for raising money for Palestinian people after the Israeli military attacks of 2014 and 2015. Here again, we face a partisan accusation following the usual criterion, not ethically correct, which undermines and trivializes the terrorist act by making the word “terrorism” interchangeable with the word “enemy”.

The essence of Terrorism

The definition of terrorism that we want to propose here, it is a definition which consider the intent or purpose behind the act of violence rather than the act itself, independently by the political reasons, the actors who practice the act and the victims who suffer it. This conception of terrorism places at the center the psychological effects, as Schmid claimed: : «there is, in our view, a solid conceptual core to terrorism, differentiating from ordinary violence. It consists in the calculated production of a state of extreme fear of injury and death and, secondarily, the exploitation of this emotional reaction to manipulate behaviour»13. Terrorism is the organized attempt to create fear rather than a tangible and material act; it is the intent behind the violence that determines what is and what is not an act of terrorism.

To achieve this goal, the central instruments of terrorism are not so much weapons as propaganda and communication, in order to reach “a wider target audience”. Indeed, once a group has the attention of a large audience can better manipulate their minds, causing them to behave just as they wish. In this case, sometimes our media can play a fundamental role, inadvertently, helping these to become the powerful forces that they claim to be. « that no partisan struggle had been so publicized throughout the world as was ours. . . . The reports on our operations, under screaming headlines, covered the front pages of newspapers everywhere, particularly in the United States. . . . The interest of the newspapers is the measure of the interest of the public. And the public—not only Jews but non-Jews too— were manifestly interested in the blows we were striking in Eretz Israel»14.

What moral?

According to Bentham, morality can be understood as an exact science. This way of thinking morality as “something scientific”, is placed within the utilitarian conception which put the achievement of pleasure as reasons for the action. The morality act should therefore concretely aim at the pursuit of happiness, or more precisely, in a social dimension, the purpose of morality act should become the maximization of the well-being of the greatest number of people. In this perspective an action is considered good when it is useful, that is when it contributes to common happiness, procuring pleasure or avoiding pain. Therefore, according to this theory is possible, thanks to a sort of ‘calculation of pleasures and pains’, determine which action is morally rightand which politically desirable measure, applying the principle of utility. The right ethical choice is that which produces the maximum amount of utility, the maximum utility not for the person who does it but for all the people affected.

Roughly in the same years Immanuel Kant argued the moral cannot therefore be based neither on a divine command, nor on the own desire for well-being; but only on the ability of the reason to determine the behavior of the human beings. Kant accepted principles that derive from reason, because only reason can dictate rules of behaviour freely. The will to act morally cannot be sacrificed in view of the consequences of actions with respect to other values (such as personal interest, self-preservation, sympathy, happiness). According to Kant the pursuit of happiness, suggested by the senses, is just an individual affair; while I act morally only if I obey reason. In this context, morality must be universal and necessary, otherwise it would not be binding for everyone, but everyone would choose the values that make them more comfortable or close to their culture.

Taking into account Bentham’s utilitarian morality and Kant’s “ethics of the value”, we can assert that neither of these schools of thought would answer “Yes” at the question: “is terrorism ever morally justified?”. Indeed, if on the utilitarian morality seeks at the pursuit of happiness and thanks to a sort of ‘calculation of pleasures and pains’, determine which action is morally right and which politically desirable measure, the “organized and systematic attempt to create fear”, key element of the terrorism, cannot be considered in this case justifiable. Considering a terrorist act as any act carried out by a person, group or state entity against defenceless citizens, the well- being obtained by that particular act (assuming that the terrorist act leads to an achievement of well-being and happiness on the part of those who perform it) is lower (numerically) than those who suffer the damage. This happens because the psychological effects caused by the terrorist act, does not affect only those who suffer the act at that moment, but the spread of fear also affects those who have not been affected and all those who identify with the affected target. «Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider “target audience” that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general».

Moreover, the utilitarianism known in the version of the ‘utilitarianism of the act’, recognizes validity only in the principle of utility which has an absolute value: it does not allow exceptions, and solves all conflicts and all other moral rules. For what concerns the Kantian perspective, since the moral cannot therefore be based neither on a divine command (religious terrorism), nor on the own desire for well-being (political perspective), but rather must be universal and necessary; an “organized and systematic attempt to create fear”, it means placing action to achieve self-interests before something universal and necessary.

Conclusion

Chronic anxiety about being victimized without warning can be caused by natural as well as human action, but if the uncertainty caused by nature can be rationalised and contextualized because inevitable, man-made terror has a totally different emotional impact. Those who live in a earthquake zone, they are afraid of a sudden earthquake; but since the earthquake an inevitable event and at the same time “necessary” because only regulated by nature, man have learned to live in fear. Conversely, the fear caused by human action through the instrument of terror cause a chronic and permanent anxiety as in a hostage situation, leading those who suffer it to seek a way to escape because avoidable. In this case, however, the imminent and non-identified violence it does not allow a real escape from the threat, as the threat itself has no clearly identifiable borders, flags and weapons. The terrorist act deletes one of the fundamental human chance, the real or supposed ability to defend one’s person, since the terrorist’s victims are unarmed, non-combatant or simpler, as mentioned above, because do not exist a real battlefield and your enemy is unknown.

Ultimately, we cannot therefore define morally justified, in any case, a strategy of war or propaganda such as terrorism, since this does not allow one’s to equip himself with any preventive measure and instrument of defence. Being the terrorism an organized attempt to create fear rather than a tangible and material act, it is impossible for those who suffer it, and in the same way, even for those who do not suffer it but who recognize themselves in the target, trying to defend yourself. This is not a matter of power disparities neither a question of target (civilian rather than military). My answer is based on the fact that, it can never be morally justifiable who decides to affect someone else, regardless of their reasons more or less shared, through a non- rational and non-material instrument: fear.

Bibliography

1. Acharya Upendra D., War on Terror or Terror War, The Problem in Defining Terrorism, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2009.
2. Finlay Christopher J., How to do things with the word Terrorist, Review of International Studies, British International Studies Association, Vol. 35 n. 4, 2009.
3. Golder, Ben; Williams, George, What is ‘Terrorism’? Problems of Legal Definition, UNSW Law Journal, 2004.
4. Herbst Philip, Talking Terrorism: A Dictionary of the Loaded Language of Political Violence, Greenwood Press, 2003.
5. Hoffman Bruce, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006.
6. League of Nation, Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 1937.
7. Richards A., Conceptualizin Terrorism, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of East London, Routledge, 2014.
8. Schmid A. P., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, Routledge, London, 2011, 64.
9. Tiefenbrun S., “A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism,” ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2003. Sitography
10. CNN, 5 December 2010, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/12/05/wikileaks/index.html
11. Report UN, 2 December 2004, available at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/the-secretary-generals-high-level-panel-report-on-threats-challenges-and-change-a-more-secure-world-our-shared-responsibility/
12. http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/12/05/wikileaks/index.html

Today the World is divided into two groups: those who eat meat and those who do not eat animal meat. There are many reasons why people become vegetarians but the main ones why people quit using animal meat as a food are some ethical, budget, environmental and health reasons. However, from the ancient times since people had no idea about vegetables, they had to hunt to animals and eat animal meat in order to survive. Therefore, people are genetically used to eat meat in a daily life. Nowadays, human beings are asked if it is moral to eat animal meat. The answer is that eating meat always considered moral. Then why using animal meat is moral? There are many reasons why people eat animal meat but the important ones are that we get many nutrients and vitamins from animal meat, the second one that if people would stop eating meat there would be a global chaos in the World, and the finally people should not compare themselves to animals.

From the ancient times meat is our necessary product of daily life, our ancestors ate meat in order to survive, get energy and full fill the hunger. Therefore, the advent of civilization allowed the domestication of animals such as chickens, sheep, rabbits, pigs and cattle. This eventually led to their use in meat production on an industrial scale with the aid of slaughterhouses. According to E. Boyle (1994) meat is a source of rich nutrients, especially protein, B vitamins, iron and zinc. “Meat is a major dietary source of thiamin, riboflavin, niacin, vitamin B6 and vitamin B12. A 3 ounce cooked portion of pork provides more thiamin than most other foods commonly consumed” says Doctor Elizabeth Boyle (The Nutritive Value of Meat, 1994).

P. Singer (2011) says “People living in industrialized societies can easily obtain an adequate diet without the use of animal flesh. Meat is not necessary for good health or longevity” (p.54). Also the author mentions about situations when some people or countries have no access to vegetables and need to eat meat in order to survive countries in western side of Earth. However, if to consider that countries, where vegetables are all year around does that mean that those countries should not use animal meat? Most likely no, Why? In case of that countries where the winters are not that much cold, where vegetables and fruits are growing in their own countries, will it be enough to eat them and get energy from it? Singer says that industrialized cities can live without meat and live quite healthy eating vegetables, fruits and other non-animal products. But does he consider the vegetables and fruits that countries have? Most of them have poor agricultural products, the variety of non-animal product is poor , and many of nutritional fruits and vegetables come from other countries for import. In fact, that imported products are very expensive, and unfortunately, middle class society can not afford buy them daily. For the developing countries it would lead to decreasing their economy, there would be health issues because of lack of nutrients. That is why eating meat in those countries would be much cheaper than buying imported nutritional vegetables and fruits.

Author emphasized that “Castration, the separation of mother and young, the breaking up of herds, branding, transporting, slaughterhouse handling and finally the moment of slaughter itself – all of these are likely to involve suffering and do not take the animals’ interests into account” (P. Singer, 2011, p.55). All of these activities against animals are immoral indeed, however not all animals are grew up like this, animals do not have to be tortured, we should take into consideration that many countries have humanely raised livestock, animals are raised happily in mountains or the meadows eating green and tasty grass. Where people place themselves – above or equal to animals? For me, eating meat is morally right as long as I believe that human beings should not place themselves into a level of species of animals which were grew up and domesticated for people from a long time ago. People are above of animals, people have high intellect, consciousness ability to analyze and think, whereas animals are living by their instincts. Many people argue that new born human baby is also lives by instincts till some period, but the main thing is that new born baby is a potential person, whereas animal is not, and will stay in that level and condition till death. That is why people are not equal to animals and should not consider themselves as they are killers, because it is a system of nature – the one who is weaker dies.

Global Livestock Counts emphasized “The world’s average stock of chickens is almost 19 billion, Cattle are the next most populous breed of farm animal at 1.4 billion, with sheep and pigs not far behind at around 1 billion” (Where the world’s livestock lives, 2011). what would happened to the world if people would stop eating animal meat? Definitely there would be a chaos; disruption of ecosystem, there would be more ecological problems than now when people still eat meat, ruining of centuries old traditions of many nations and cultures. Probably all domesticated animals would die for no reason; processed or not procced meat would become waste, for those who died would need a place to be buried, or people would anyway burn them. People would burn over 21 billions of animals? In this case there would be real air pollution, lot of energy would be wasted to get rid of that domesticated animals, it would not be moral anyway. We would harm ecosystem. Even if people would not kill the, imagine that these animals would be free and out of farms and would walk on streets, do a crap everywhere, anti-sanitaria would be everywhere, mousses and insects would appear in the cities. Maybe there would be black markets where animal meat would still sell as something illegal, because people can not quit eating animal meat that fast. Also the countries would need to increase their food production based on plants, lot’s of land would be needed for agricultural reason which would lead to deforestation and decreasing of natural habitats. Plants would need to be growing all the year round, for this purpose people would need put chemicals to plants in order to grow faster and more, countries would be fighting with each other for more lands and recourses such as water, place where is sunny and rich nutritional soil. Many cultures, countries, nations would loose their centuries old traditions, such as Aid Kurban, meaning sacrifice to God, when cow or sheep is given to God as a sacrifice. “Henceforth, nature too has had millions of years to build a cycle of energy transfer- the food chain and any disruption would not treated kindly. The results would wreak disaster on the humans, institutions built by humans (economy, government etc.) and earth itself. It would be one way of triggering what could become the mother of all dominoes effects” says M. Strivastava (2017).

Eating meat can be from both sides healthy and unhealthy but the only thing that people always forget about is a balance. We should learn keep balance in the World in order to not harm nature. Without livestock, life for people living in certain natural conditions will be impossible, but eating everyday meat will lead us to health issues. Eating meat is moral and natural as much as death. All of life creatures die one day, but the death is different. People should not feel guilty themselves for eating meat, cause our domesticated animals, livestock, were meant for us from a long time ago, thousand years ago. that is why people should not compare themselves with those animals. In pursuit of profit we forget about other problems such as harming ecology, and only thing we need is a balance. Balance in everything.

Bibliography

1. P. Singer (2011) “Practical Ethics” Retrieved from https://ecourse.auca.kg/pluginfile.php/149961/mod_resource/content/1/0.%20Peter%20Singer%2C%20Practical%20Ethics%2C%203rd%20edition.pdf
2. E. Boyle (1994, August) “The Nutritive Value of Meat” Retrieved from https://www.asi.k-state.edu/doc/meat-science/the-nutritive-value-of-meat.pdf
3. Global Livestock Counts (2011, July 22) “Where the world’s livestock lives” Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2011/07/27/counting-chickens
4. M. Srivastava (2017, January 10) “What would happen if everyone, including animals, stopped eating meat?” Retrieved from https://www.quora.com/What-would-happen-if-everyone-including-animals-stopped-eating-meat

Morality has and continues to play an enormous role in shaping societies. What a civilization agrees upon as right or wrong plays a clear influence in how people interact with world, be it because of their moral attitudes, social judgements or even laws. But how exactly are moral violations or just acts experienced? There is a great deal of debate in the perceptual philosophy literature on the existence of moral perception. Can moral properties be experienced at the level of perception or are the exclusively understood or felt as belief states? Some argue that they are only experienced through emotions, or that they are only cognitive, but others such as Robert Audi suggest that morality can be experienced at the level of perception (Audi, 2013; Faraci, 2014). I intend to argue in favor of the existence of moral perception through theoretical and empirical avenues. I will begin by describing some of Audi’s views on perception in a general and how he ties this into his view on moral perception. I will then address some critiques of Audi’s view of moral perception and offer some of my own. I will next discuss arguments involving contrasts between normal and pathological moral and perceptual states. Finally, I will make a tentative empirical argument via psychological studies of moral foundations.

In my view, moral perception, though not exactly as Audi explains it, offers the best account of the phenomenal experience of witnessing a moral violation Robert Audi offers one of the most relevant and well-known accounts of moral perception. His account is somewhat controversial as is the entire concept of moral perception. In his book Moral Perception (2013), Audi begins by first offering a general account of perception. His account is not extremely in depth and therefore is still potentially compatible with other more specific accounts of perception and various modes of perception. His general account of perception begins by arguing that perception is vertical. He suggests that there are three kinds of perception, the first being simple perception which he defines as “seeing an object.” For example, seeing a book is simple perception (Audi, 2013, p 10). Next, he defines attributive perception as seeing something to be some trait; for example one might see a book to be blue. Finally, he argues for “propositional perception” which would be seeing that a book is blue, as he puts it, seeing the “truth” in the belief state that blue is the color of the book in question (Audi, 2013, p 10). So, he suggests that these all have verifiable correctness conditions.

This sets up the argument he makes later about different level of processing moral experiences. His views on belief formation should also be clarified as they will be relevant to moral perception. Audi makes a point to address the idiom “seeing is believing”. He says that perceptual experiences are separate from belief, and that individuals may form a belief about any perceptual experience they have, but it does not always happen and is not necessary (Audi, 2013, p 17). Say I am drinking from a cup and can see that it is striped. I can have the perceptual experience of the striped cup but may not form the belief that the cup is striped without first paying attention to said cup and forming the thought ‘this cup has stripes’ (Audi, 2013, p. 17). This argument seems naturally fitting to my own phenomenal experience and seems to have the benefit of seeming intuitively accurate. When the distinction between belief and perception comes up in terms of morality it may be somewhat less intuitive. He goes on to give a general account of how things are phenomenologically experienced. He suggests that people get a phenomenological sense of three dimensional things in the world from the physical properties which are experienced; so, the phenomenal experience of anything is grounded by the experience of constitutive properties, color, shape, etc. (Audi, 2013, p. 27). He emphasizes again that this is all perceptual and there is no need to form separate propositions so to phenomenally experience whole objects. He argues that the experience of phenomenal properties that make up object in the real world are causal factors for the experience of these properties (Audi, 2013, p. 26).

This leads him into the question of how this sensing of perceptual properties can lead into a perceptual experience of morality. Audi expands upon his ideas of perception to discuss groundings role in moral perception. He begins by clarifying that moral perception is of course different from the perception of the physical world as there are not the same spaciotemporal properties as experienced in the real world (Audi, 2013, p. 31). He makes another distinction between perceptual and perceptible properties, going on the explain the perceptual properties are the constitutive parts of experience like shape or color and perceptible properties need only be observable and therefore extend to include things like moral experiences (Audi, 2013, p. 32). He explains the existence of moral perception through causal connections between basic perceptual experiences and moral ones. He suggests that moral perceptions “map” on to non-moral properties, like perceptual properties mentioned earlier, and create a sense of moral rightness or wrongness; this integration of moral and normal properties according to Audi produces kind of “disposition” toward right or wrong regarding a moral experience (Audi, 2013, p. 39). He argues that this experience is wholly perceptual and not inferential and does not have to be formed as a position to be identified as wrong. He even likens perceiving a moral wrong doing to perceiving emotion, namely anger, suggesting that if one can perceive behaviors and expressions related to anger, maybe one can also see properties associated with morality (Audi 2013, p. 42). He later makes a comparison to facial recognition saying that one can recognize another’s face without having to make cognitive inferences about details of the face, so too can one recognize injustice without such cognitive insights (Audi, 2013, p. 53). This is another of Audi’s use of intuition about perceptual experience to his benefit.

One of the points he makes which I feel is weakest is his argument towards the end of the chapter that a child who did not yet have a concept of right and wrong would still have moral sense/perception of the wrongness of a certain act. (Audi, 2013, p. 46). I will discuss my issue with this in the next paragraph, as it is related to common critique. He also clarifies it is not the case that all moral knowledge can be perceptually experienced. There are moral intuitions which are not necessarily perceptual. (Audi, 2013, p.46). Later, Audi also discusses the role of emotions in the formation of moral intuition and discusses how moral disagreements come about. While interesting topics, I while focus on his arguments which are essential to moral perception. Overall, Audi’s account of moral perception is interesting and I agree that moral perception is possible. However, I feel Audi’s argument can be improved upon with different lines of thinking and that his description of moral perception can be expanded upon. There have been a variety of critiques on Audi’s view of moral perception.

Some suggests that Audi’s account relies on morality being a natural characteristic (Faraci, 201). Some offering this critique take issue with the seeming assumption that moral perception would serve as an innate function even in those who have not necessarily yet learned a set particular moral values. Audi argues in both his book and an earlier paper on the topic of moral perception that morality need not be naturalized saying, “I am not seeking to naturalize moral properties, nor does explaining the data require (they be naturalized)” (Audi, 2010, p. 92). Despite claiming here to not be naturalizing moral properties he quickly goes on to say “…I am (non-reductively) naturalizing moral perception. For I not only take moral perception to be a causal relation, but grant that the base properties for moral properties are natural….The non-causal element in moral perception and in knowledge acquired through moral perception belongs to conceptual capacities that go with an adequate understanding,” (Audi, 2010, p. 92). Here he claims that he does want to naturalize the perceptual element of moral perception if not the moral properties themselves. He thinks that the perceptual properties in which moral perceptions are grounded are what is natural.

So, the suggestion is that what is right vs wrong is not necessarily naturalistic but that the experience of a sense of wrongness or rightness is naturalistic. This relates back to one of my critiques of Audi book, the example he gives of child witness a moral violation and not have a concept of right vs. wrong but still perceiving an act as wrong. This example suggests a naturalistic view. While Audi claims this is just a naturalizing view of perception, I think this example presents a number of issues. Firstly, I think it is not right to assume that there is no concept of right vs. attached to this sense of wrongness experience. While I agree that the experience of wrongness need not be cognitive, I do not think a child can experience rightness or wrongness without some kind of basic conceptual framework for morality. While it may not be a complex concept, I think for a child to experience this sense of morality, there must first be some background information as is argued by David Faraci (2014). He argues for the mediation of background knowledge in moral perception, though he also suggests this would make moral perception not entirely perceptual, with which I do not agree. Another critique offered of Audi’s perspective is that his idea of “sensing” moral violation is too vague and is an unconvincing account of phenomenal experience. I somewhat sympathize with this criticism as it seems there may be arguments which Audi could have used to more clearly and effectively explain moral perception. One argument I found particularly interesting and convincing come from Preston Werner. Werner brings up several effective point about moral perception which I think are perhaps more effective than Audi’s.

One of Werner’s best arguments in favor of moral perception involves Susanna Sigel’s idea of natural kind properties. (Werner, 2014). He cites Siegel as an example of an argument in favor of the presence of higher level thoughts in phenomenal experience. He specifically mentions her method of phenomenal contrast. Say a person has the novel experience of seeing a cat. They see the things that make the cat a cat but do not know what it is or that it fits into the category of cat. It seems that this person will have a different phenomenological experience of seeing the cat than say a veterinarian who is highly knowledgeable about cats and therefore may see the cat as a specific breed, etc. Even the person who initially did not know what the cat was would seemingly have a different phenomenological experience if the entered the exact same situation later, with the only difference being their knowledge of “cat,” (Werner, 2014). So, in this case the natural kind property would be that of being a cat and we can see a clear contrast of experience between those with and without the experiential knowledge. Might morality be a sort of natural kind property? The issue of naturalizing morality arises again here. I do not want to focus on any argument for which naturalizing moral value is a necessity as the idea a universal morality is unconvincing based on obvious cultural differences.

There are perhaps some moral violations held to particularly wrong by all but one’s thoughts on the degree of wrongness can be affected by a variety of factors for ages to political affiliation (Graham, Haidt, & Nose, 2009). In terms of perception some might have a stronger sense of injustice than other when experiencing a certain moral violation. Though knowledge about morality is not as straight forward as knowledge about what kind of animal you are seeing, there still seems to be evidence of individual variation. In the case of morality an individual doesn’t necessarily just gain more knowledge but is likely shaped more by their culture and what is typically believe as wrong and right. Unfortunately, as Werner (2014) brings up, this slow cultural development of a set of beliefs does not lend itself to a simple before and after comparison like knowledge of natural kinds does. Fortunately, he offers a solution which I hope to add to with some empirical data. Werner’s proposed proxy for a “before and after” knowledge of moral properties phenomenal experiences is to compare neurotypical individuals to “emotionally empathic dysfunctional individuals.” He defines them by saying “EEIDs are individuals who have a fully functioning “theory of mind”— that is, they are capable of inferring the mental states of others based on behavioral, vocal, and contextual evidence—but who nonetheless lack affective empathy” (Werner 2014). The disorder most commonly associated with the traits mentioned would be anti-social personality disorder, though this does not apply to all individuals with ASPD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).

These individuals serve as a proxy for a change in the phenomenal experience because they can have the cognitive experience of knowing something is wrong by learning or being told that it is without the emotional or perceptual reaction one would expect form a typically functioning individual. Werner cites some physiological evidence that emotionally empathic dysfunctional individuals have different phenomenal experiences. In a study involving a psychopathic (similar to ASPD, though not technically a diagnosis) tendencies, individuals with more psychopathic traits tended to have less strong skin conductance responses to negative emotion faces than typical participants which suggests a muted physiological response (Blair et al, 1997). The lack of physiological response suggests at least some degree of difference in phenemonal experience of emotion, though clearly it can’t be definitive proven. Thereby, one could argue that these individuals who because of neurological differences do not experience empathy in the same ways as neurotypical people, would have a different experience of morality, akin to the differences in knowledge of natural kinds. This is an example of an effective contrast argument in favor of moral perception.

The contrast argument allows for a more liberal view of the inclusion of higher-level properties in phenomenal experience. This allows for background knowledge of moral standards in one’s own society to be included in moral perceptual experience which in my view helps to correct some of the issues associated with Audi’s view, which just suggests a kind of moral sensing. I hope to add a bit of empirical research to further verify the contrast argument. Research on moral cognition has been growing in popularity for social psychology in the last couple of years. There is a great deal of research on what kind of factors shape a person’s moral attitudes and research the different aspects of morality. Things like risk aversion and parental status have been shown to affect individual moral attitudes. These difference in moral attitudes between groups may serve to help offer contrasting experiences of moral experience based on background. Rather than a demonstrating a lack of affective moral experience like in emotionally empathic dysfunctional individuals, we can examine individual differences and how that might shape their moral perception. One way in which cognitive moral attitudes are measure in social psychology is through moral foundations. Individuals are presented with various moral scenarios in brief sentences and asked to rate the wrongness of each moral violation.

The violations fall into one of five categories. First is harm which asks about moral violations involving hurting another individual in some way. Next is loyalty, this includes moral violations which relate to betrayal of some group which an individual belongs to. Then there is authority, this include moral violations relating to disobeying authority figure or laws representative of authority figures. Next is fairness, these include moral violations relating to cheating or having unfair advantages (Moral foundation.org). Finally there is purity. These violations relate to contamination and include sexual misdeeds. Individuals from different backgrounds vary vastly in thier moral beliefs, which showcases the cultural effects on morality (Graham, Haidt, & Nose, 2009). Certain groups tend to emphasize some moral foundations moral than others. For example, conservatives to more harshly judge moral violations of purity, authority and loyalty when compared to liberals (Graham, Haidt, & Nose, 2009).

Though details mentioned so far only include cognitive assessments of moral violations, if political background is also related to phenomenological differences in moral perception, this would be further evidence for contrastive differences. It seems most plausible that differences in higher level concepts about morality based on past experiences and knowledge, should have some impact on the way individuals experience moral violations much like having an understanding of a natural kind category would. One study suggests a link between religiosity and experiencing more disgust in relation to homosexuality, which according to these individuals would be a moral violation (Olatunji, 2008). So this provides tentative evidence of a phenomenological difference based on different moral background, though in this case mediated by an emotion. Some research also suggests that parents judge moral violations moral harshly than non-parents, this likely is related to being in a protective frame of mind because of having children (Eibach, Libby, & Ehrlinger, 2009). If there in a phenomenal difference here, perhaps this group is the opposite of the EEDI’s, are instead have a hyperactive sense of moral perception. Overall, there is some existing psychological evidence to support further contrastive differences in moral phenomenology, but research is not wholly conclusive and further research in the area would be valuable. The variability of moral values, however, does seem to suggest that there is unlikely a natural set moral properties common to all individuals. In my view, Audi presents some interesting ideals about moral perception, but his description is not without issue.

The naturalization of certain moral properties that his explanation of moral perception suggests is questionable because of a variety of evidence against morality as a natural property. Arguments from Werner using contrast conditions based on Susanna Siegel’s work are more convincing in my view. This argument better lends itself to include both a priori and empirical evidence. The use of individuals with empathy dysfunction as a comparison group is an effect argument for the existence of a phenomenal difference without moral perception and experience. I also want to suggest that research on factors causing variation in moral vigilance and variations in specific moral foundations supports the existence of a

The Giver by Lois Lowry depicts a society in which everything is regulated, including marriage and careers. The society has no freedom and choice resulting in a dystopian world where epidemics like hunger and poverty are eliminated, and freedom of expression is restrained. The people of this society mostly believe in this dystopian ideology and accept their livelihood. However, from a political science standpoint, this society has moral and political failings. The novel’s community does not care for anyone else other than their “unit” (one family). This lack of care is considered a moral failing in society which in turn affects the moral standards of the community. Since there is no compassion, the difference between right and wrong is altered resulting in a society with no moral compass failing to understand each other.

Politically, the government controls every aspect of the people, so there is no space for diversity and representation. The suppression leads to lack of individuality and expression of the people, but more importantly there is no real justice. No individuality and expression forces people of society to succumb to the power of the government with no one having the right to speak out. Since the government dictates every action, justice is no longer a part of society making this a political failing as the government forces people to follow a certain path.

Unfortunately, the society in The Giver has moral and political failings that lead to a dystopian society which paves way to injustice, oppression, control and a twisted society. However, these failings can be addressed through restricting government infringement and introducing compassion in people’s lives so that they can learn to care for whole society as one big family.

Moral Failings

The main moral failing of the society described in the novel is the nonexistence of compassion. In the novel, families are separated into “units” consisting of two parents and two children. Each family is only responsible for their own. Nevertheless, they are unattached with other units and no calamity outside their respective unit can affect them in anyway. This system essentially rids of compassion. For example, in the novel, newborn babies who are considered “imperfect” because of some abnormalities or ailments are killed as they do not have any place in the “picture perfect” society. The government and rest of society accepts this as normal task and never considers this as a violent and hideous act. In a modern American society, such an act is unthinkable and barbaric. Yet in the Giver, there is no uproar because society lacks the compassion to feel and empathize with others. According to Johnathan Haidt in The Righteous Mind, “You have tear ducts in the first place and those ducts can sometimes be activated by suffering that is not your own” (Haidt, pg. 7, week 8). In explaining the foundation of care, Haidt explains how in a regular society we feel and care for each other, regardless of our relations. However, in the Giver, this care for one another is nonexistent and contributes to the moral failing in society.

Another moral failing stems from the idea of the “collective good” over an individual. Similar to the concept of utilitarianism, the Giver portrays a society in which decisions are made based on the majority of the people and not an individual voice is taken into consideration. As aforementioned, babies are killed for imperfections. As a society, the majority (mostly all) believe this is a good act because of the lack of empathy and madness of perfect society. The lack of compassion towards other lives and killing babies results in a bad act being considered good. The main weakness of utilitarianism is that it does not consider the moral responsibilities we have as humans towards other lives. In the Giver, since the people are not obliged to care about another’s life, the death of the babies is considered a right action for the benefit of the whole society. This portrays how the majority rule sometimes results in a moral failing of the society.

Hence, lack of compassion and the utilitarianist ideas erased the fine line between caring and perfection in the society. In addition, the lack of these emotions results in a disconnect within society that no longer has a pain-free world, rather a world of ignorance and darkness where right and wrong is blurred, care and harm is blended, and the majority is always correct leaving no place for individual voices and choices.

Political Failings

The main political failing of society is the lack of justice. Since the government controls everything in the novel, there is no justice system in place. The lack of justice results in a government that is constantly in command and influence. While there may be no crimes in society, there is no justice either. According to John Rawles from Theory of Justice, “Justice does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many” (Rawles, pg. 3, week 9). Rawles explains how justice is not only about the majority, but for everyone in a society. Individual rights and freedom is allowed and permitted by justice and no governing force has the right to take it away from any person in a society. However, in the Giver, the justice is nonexistent which is a major political failing of this society. This oppression of justice results in no individuality or freedom of expression.

The branch of the main political failing is no individuality. In the novel, citizens are not allowed to choose their own life paths. At a young age, the government chooses careers for each person. The person must follow that career path and has no right to object. This political failing results in no individuality for the people of the society. Forced into one path with no personal choice is a political failing because society has come to a point where the government is the only functioning entity that has the entire rights on its’ people and people on the other hand are like living breathing robots who just follows the commands with no thinking or decision making power what so ever. The no individuality results in a society with no diversity and no differences all contributing to the main political failing of no justice.

Another political failing is the nonexistence of the freedom of expression. Citizens in society are not allowed to openly express their beliefs if it contradicts the government. For instance, in the novel, a character that went against the government rules was sentenced to death. These government rules suppress the people and the people are manipulated in such a way to believe these rules as the social norms. This government rules turned into social norms are a political failing as the government does not take action to remedy it. Furthermore, the lack of freedom and expression along with no social justice erased the balance between right and wrong.

The moral failings discussed in the previous section are an aftermath of these political failings. The lack of individuality and freedom of expression result in a society with no compassion and empathy. The government dictates the life of people and they follow it diligently. As there is nothing called justice, the moral standards are blurred together resulting a society where the majority believes wrong is right and a government that enforces and ensures such wrong. The combination of the political and moral failings showcase the real dystopia of the Giver and a remedy to fix the injustices of this dystopia require government and citizens effort.

Remedy the Injustices

From a moral and just standpoint, changing the moral ideas and standards of people can be used to remedy the injustices of the dystopian society in the Giver. Politically, restricting the government’s unhealthy power over society can allow for a more just society that addresses the political failings.

The government in any society is formed to foresee the wellbeing of the people. The laws are made to ensure the smooth running of the society so that people can lead happy and secure lives. The government should never dictate the lives of people. According to Adam Smith from The Theory of Moral Sentiments, “Our moral ideas and actions are a product of our very nature as social creatures” (Smith, week 2). Smith explains how humans conceive their moral standards from the society around them, not just rules. Applied to the society in the Giver, the first remedy is to change the moral standards of society which allows them to distinguish between the right and wrong, more importantly letting the people individually and freely choose the difference between right and wrong. This remedy reintroduces freedom of expression and justice and a political system with laws to protect the moral rights of the people.

In terms of the government, their role will change as a governing body of enforcers, not decision makers. This difference allows the government to still have healthy control of society and the people, but strips away the power to set social norms and moral standards. The government still has the ability to make rules, but a more democratic system is involved. Individual choices are the driving force behind decisions, so systems like voting will be put into place for society to make decisions, not just the government. This restructuring of the whole government and moral thinking makes the society powerful, compassionate, caring and above all more human.

The reintroduction of moral standards and the restructure of government allows for a society that has compassion and the ability to make their own decisions that is backed by a healthy government. These remedies together reflect a more just society and addresses the injustices of a dystopia such as the one in the Giver.

Some may argue that the society in the Giver has no war, crimes, or pain and is a life full of pleasure which outweighs the political and moral failings in society. However, as mentioned earlier, emotions such as compassion and empathy are essential to human life. Humans devoid of emotions are like robots who can never be part of society. In addition, the absence of moral standards are actually more detrimental to society because wrong acts can be considered right. While there are no wars or crimes it is notable that there is no place for individual voices and opinions. The line between suppression and justice is eliminated in Giver’s society. Suppression is depicted as justice. Furthermore, diversity in a society allows for progress and change which is highly restricted in the novel’s society. The idea of being “same” eliminates freedom, individuality, justice, and morality. In all, life’s experiences are about the good and bad, the right and wrong, pain and pleasure which the society in Giver does not accept resulting in a society with political and moral failings that are detrimental to the people.

Modern Social Impact

While the Giver is a fictional society, the political and moral failings of the novel can be related to injustices in modern society. Many nations have citizens that are suppressed by the government with no voice. For instance, some countries do not give women any rights and allow men/husbands to be in control of their wife. The political failing of the government is allowing such a rule to exist and be legal. In addition, the moral failing is the idea that outsiders to do not care as much as they should. While there are movements to get rid of objectification of women in countries, the country themselves are not doing that much. These moral and political failings are reflective of those found in the novel. The government rules everything and the people follow it with the victims succumbed to the power. While the Giver may not be real, the political and moral failings evident in their society can be traced to injustices found in a modern, real society in the world.

Conclusion

The novel, The Giver, portrays a dystopian society with moral and political failings. Human emotions are nonexistent and no individuality and freedom of expression result in an unjust society. The lack of empathy results in manipulating the thinking of people which makes hideous acts like killing babies seem right. On top of that, the lives of people is dictated by government from choosing a career to starting a family. The lack of individuality makes the people to accept the lifestyle given to them and restricts them from broadening their perspectives. The absence of expression forces people to the constriction of government rules and norms with no strength to speak out. These moral and political failings actually ruin society. While there may be no hunger and pain, there is also no morality, decision making, thoughts, and basic freedom and justice. These sacrifices do not overweigh the needs of a painless life. Society is meant to have moral standards and norms that people choose to follow. The good and bad of society is decided by each individual who is part of that society and not by an unfair system. The political and moral failings of The Giver portray the injustices of the dystopia and how a society of individuality, justice, and freedom, with pain and pleasure combined, is a proper and more happy society.

Works Cited

1. Haidt, Johnathan. “The Moral Foundations of Politics.” Ares – Automating Reserves, 2012, reserves.ucsd.edu/ares/ares.dll?Action=10&Type=10&Value=49488.
2. Rawles, John. “A Theory of Justice.” Ares – Automating Reserves, 1999, reserves.ucsd.edu/ares/ares.dll?Action=10&Type=10&Value=48076.
3. Roozeboom, Alison Nicole. “Lois Lowry’s The Giver and Political Consciousness in Youth.” Digital Commons, 2017, digitalcommons.denison.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1113&context=articulate.
4. Smith, Adam. “The Theory of Moral Sentiments.” Adam Smith Institute, 2019, www.adamsmith.org/the-theory-of-moral-sentiments.

Throughout philosophy, there is an ongoing debate concerning how our moral judgements effect our moral motivation. In this essay I will examine two different explanations of how our moral judgements are linked to motivation; internalism and externalism, whilst arguing and concluding the latter. I will begin by outlining the Ed Gein case and using it as the framework to identify the two theories. Throughout this essay, I will argue in favour of externalists, including criticisms mainly from Michael Smith- a weak internalist. However, I will that his objections are not persuasive enough.

Ed Gein was a murderer who killed innocent people, making masks out of their skin and soup bowls from their scalps. Gein claimed that he knew what he was doing was wrong but argued that he didn’t know why it concerned him (Fisher p.128). The foundation of an internalist theory argues that it is ‘conceptually impossible’ for our motivation to not have a necessary link to our moral judgement. Thus claiming, if Ed Gein genuinely thought it was morally wrong, then he would have a conceptual necessity not to do it. Initially, the internalist view seems plausible that there is a necessary link between moral judgement and motivation. This is due to countless everyday examples; judging it right to be a vegetarian therefore motivating you to become a vegetarian, or judging it right to follow your religion therefore motivating you to follow your religion. However, through cases like Ed Gein, it is clear that this is not always the case. Moreover, metaethicists, i.e. Michael Smith (1994) follow the form of weak internalism, which holds a slightly different, less punitive theory. They claim that there is still a necessary connection between moral judgement and motivation, but only if they are ‘C’ (Fisher, L3). Various philosophers have derived what is meant by ‘C’: psychologically normal (i.e. Blackburn), practically rational (i.e. Smith) and morally perceptive (i.e. McDowell). If you are ‘C’ and make a moral judgement, then you are necessarily motivated. Therefore, it could be argued that Ed Gein was not making a genuine moral judgement when he said: ‘it is wrong to skin people’. Rather he believed that ‘in society it is wrong to skin people’. Therefore, he is not making a genuine moral judgement by explaining the lack of motivation to stop. So, weak internalist argue that whenever moral judgements don’t lead to motivation, it is because it is not a genuine moral judgement. Whilst weak internalists’ give a valid argument for the Ed Gein case, there are still problems classifying how to judge someone as ‘C’. This creates an unstable foundation, as there is no strict guide how to judge someone as ‘C’. I will now justify why I believe that the externalists argument gives a far more universal and clear cut theory.

Externalists claim that moral judgements are contingent and external to our motivation. However, if a moral judgement does motivate then it is in virtue of the agent’s desire (Fisher p.129). Externalists explain that Ed Gein is not motivated to stop because he doesn’t have the desire or motivation to stop, even though he argues to have the wrong judgment. Thus, the main difference between internalist and externalists is that internalists’ believe the link between moral motivation and judgement is necessary, whilst externalists believe it is contingent and only connected through the desire of an agent. Undoubtedly, this shows a solution to the problem internalists’ face i.e. not covering cases when there is no link between moral judgement and motivation. It adds the element of an agent’s desire (Fisher, L3). Thus, externalists explain that people can make a moral judgement without being motivated to follow through, purely because an agent’s desire can change. To use a simpler example, when discussing vegetarianism with a friend and they agree that eating meat is wrong, yet fail to be motivated to follow through. This is explained through a lack of appropriate desire. They do make a genuine moral judgement that eating meat is wrong, but lack the desire, hence fail to become motivated. Intuitively, externalism is more appealing because it is inevitable that during the process of making a judgement and being motivated, external factors will likely come into play i.e. a student being tempted to eat meat because it is cheaper than being a vegetarian. This doesn’t mean there is no genuine moral judgement, merely external factors come into play.

Michael Smith, a leading contemporary metaethicist, further developed the argument between internalism and externalism in his book ‘The Moral Problem’ (Miller, 2003). Smith advocates in order to fix the problem between the two theories, he needs to identity a common ground that would be of mutual agreement between the two. (Fisher p.131). Furthermore, Smith argues that both internalist and externalists generally would agree that ‘a change in motivation follows reliably in the wake of a change in moral judgement’ (Smith, 1994: 71). This is known as the ‘Striking fact’. An example of this is if I judged it right to vote ‘leave’ for Brexit, then I would be motivated to do so. If I changed my mind and thought it was right to ‘remain’, then I would be motivated to vote remain instead. Smith strongly argues in favour of internalism, so at first glance it looks like this favours internalism due to the necessary connection between moral judgement and motivation. It suggests that externalists don’t accept it. However, the striking fact does not mention a route from moral judgement to motivation. Thus, allowing externalism to accept and explain how it also fits their theory.

Furthermore, externalists believe that as long as you have a certain desire to do what is right, then your moral judgement will (with the addition of the desire to do what is right) create a motivation. Likewise, if you do not care about morality, there will be no motivation. The link between moral judgement and motivation is through the agent’s desires. So, if I judge It right to vote ‘leave’ and I have the desire to do what is right, then I will have the motivation to vote ‘leave’. Thus, in regard to externalists explaining the striking fact, if I change my judgement and chose it right to vote ‘remain’, with desire too, then my motivation would inevitably change. The general non-specific desire is called ‘de dicto’ (Fisher L3). Consequently, given that externalists follow de dicto, it accounts plausible for them to follow the striking fact, allowing another argument in favour of externalism.

However, Smith is still not satisfied with the externalist response to this argument and forms yet another criticism. Smith believes that externalists incorrectly describe the psychology of a moral agent. This is through the use of de dicto; using a general non-specific desire to ‘do what is right’ in specific situations. (Fisher, p.132) For example, deriving a desire to do what is right and vote ‘leave’, whilst also deriving a desire to do what is right and vote ‘remain’. They are both based on the same general desire to do what is right. However, usually we think that a moral agent is motivated through specific features rather than a general concept. For example, if a good person would desire to raise money for charity because they have a personal connection to that charity, the externalist would claim that the good person does not have a desire to help that charity. This is due to the personal connection over the desire to do what is right.

Additionally, Smith claims that this creates an ‘abnormality’ of the good agent’s moral psychology. Merely, having a general desire causes the good agent to have a wrong moral psychology (Fisher p.133). In ‘The Moral Problem’ Smith claims that ‘common-sense tells us that being motivated is a fetish or moral vice, not the one and only moral virtue’ (Smith, 1994: 75). Thus, Smith claims that externalists turn a good moral agent into a ‘moral fetishist’ i.e. someone driven by a general desire, rather than a specific one (Fisher, p.133). As previously shown, both theories accept the striking fact, but Smith argues internalism gives a more persuasive argument for it, allowing no burden and creating no further issues. Unlike how he claims that externalists explain the striking fact, at the cost of a moral agent becoming a moral fetishist.

Even though internalists’, namely Michael Smith, creates a counter argument claiming that externalists turn a good moral agent into a moral fetishist, due to desire. This is not always true and thus thought not to be very effective, as having a general desire can lead to doing what is right in a specific occasion. If Smith’s argument worked, it would need to be a result of the moral agent consciously knowing the desire they are making, in which this is invalid. However, a further objection to this is mentioned by Brook J. Sadler. Smith claimed that ‘being a morally good person, you have a direct concern for what you think is right… de re and not de dicto’ (Sadler, 69). Yet, it has been shown that being a morally good person can indeed come from a de dicto. There are countless background desires to prove that we are not consciously aware of them. For example, I may have the general desire to live a nutritious life, but not be conscious of it. I also may have a desire to break, without being conscious of it. This shows how in some instances, having a general desire does lead to what is right, therefore, making Smiths argument unjust. Allowing the externalist argument to once again become valid, resulting in Sadler and Smith not succeeding in showing that de dicto is implausible.

In conclusion, throughout this essay I have continuously and productively shown how the externalist view is a plausible account about moral motivation. Whilst showing various criticisms, namely through Michael Smith, the externalist theory had reason and explanations to cover it all. Not only is the externalist argument easy to follow, it also allows for the justification of how a moral judgement affectively creates a moral motivation; through a de dicto account of desire mixed with an appropriate judgement. However, the internalist and externalist argument is still an ongoing debate throughout the philosophy of moral motivation, yet as shown in this paper, it is clear to me that the externalists have the superior argument.

Bibliography

1. Fisher, Andrew. Metaethics: An Introduction, Routledge, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central
2. Fisher, Andrew. Lecture 3, Introduction to Metaethics
3. Miller, Alexander. An introduction to Contemporary Metaethics / Alexander Miller. Cambridge 2003, Print
4. Sadler, B. (2003). The possibility of A moralism: a defence against internalism, Philosophy, 78(303). 67-78

In a world that is full of confusion and contradiction, it becomes a must for each individual to define the underpinnings of his/her own adopted worldview. One significant dimension of such adoption is the nature of morality and ethics, that is to say, what one is ought to do and what is not. This question of right and wrong has occupied great minds and intellects through history. Thus, an entire literature has been produced, and still being produced today, regarding this matter. However, what is considered as one of the hottest debate in this area is whether an objective and absolute moral body exists, transcending all worldly matters, or it is just a relative set of morals that guides human actions dependently. In this paper, it will be shown why an absolute system of values is a necessity for individuals in order for them to acquire real and deep-rooted morality, and how relativism doesn’t work even though many claim it does. Then there will be a brief introduction to the Islamic moral mainstream as an example of an objective set of morals.

The recognition or the denial of the existing of absolute moral standards determines all what comes after it. And this attitude, in its turn, is determined by one’s position towards the existing of a superior and omnipotence entity that is responsible for establishing such absolute values, for there is no possibility for an absolute system to exist without the existing of an ultimate supreme being. Therefore, all attempts that try to universalize certain values without taking into consideration the notion of God would never succeed because the ontological root of such values is missing. In his novel “The Brothers Karamazov”, Dostoyevsky demonstrates this idea in a brilliant short dialogue:

“It’s God that’s worrying me. That’s the only thing that’s worrying me. What if He doesn’t exist? Therefore, for an atheist to be consistent with his mindset, he cannot claim any moral absolutes that are universally valid for all rational beings. In an interview with Justin Brierley (2013), Dawkins was very honest to admit this idea. He was asked if he believes that what makes rape wrong is just as arbitrary as the fact that we’ve evolved five fingers rather than six, he frankly answered: “yeah, you could say that.”. Since, for him, ethics must be variable and evolving as everything else in the universe. According to Dawkins again, in his book “River Out of Eden” he states: “The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference.”

However, the question here is not “can you be a good person without being a believer?” rather, it is “can you be a good person without the existence of God?”. As God is the ultimate source of morality; regardless if a person is an adherent to a certain religion or not, God has granted all his creations with an inherent capability of differentiating between the basic moral and immoral acts, and without God and this given instinct; any moral discussion would be futile. As stated by Sartre (1980), “The existentialist .. finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it”.

Overall, the basic principles of right and wrong are not merely relative to a particular culture or society or to subjective individual opinion, rather, there must be a certain set of moral laws that consists of such things- an absolute virtues and absolute vices; in order for individuals to function and for societies to persist.

Consequently, after constructing the ontological foundations of the question of morality, and reaching the conclusion that absolute morals are a necessity; one can start examining the sources from which right and wrong can be derived, that is to say, investigating the epistemological level of morality. Taking Islam as an instance, it has no such thing as debate about the inherent morality of particular actions. Instead, there is the divine command and its interpretations by different schools and scholars. In Islamic thought, the issue was discussed under the title “al-husn wal-qubh”.The disagreement lies in the question of whether humans are capable of differentiating between good and bad by their mere reason or do they need a certain scripture or a divine revelation in order for them to be guided.

The early Muslim scholars seem to be divided into three main groups regarding this matter. First, the Muʿtazilites, who believed that good and evil are objective qualities of things. Thereby, the divine law doesn’t establish morality, rather, it indicates it. According to them, humans are capable of distinguishing between good and evil without the need for external guidance, and each individual is responsible for his choices regardless if revelation reaches him or not. However, there is a slightly easy objection from today’s reality which rebuts their argument. Inherently, almost everyone agrees that intoxication is bad, but no one by mere reason can conclude that a small quantity of alcohol is also bad. Nevertheless, according to Shari’a; “whatever intoxicates in large quantities, a small quantity of it is forbidden.”, thus, reason has limits and it cannot reveal everything God commands, therefore, it can be said that it is sort of injustice if God judges people on the bases of reason although revelation is absent from the picture.

Whereas according to the Ash’arite scholars, knowledge is derived by reason, but the obligation is established by revelation. That is to say, “knowing that something is good is separate from knowing that it is right or obligatory.” Many other Ash’aritists argue that what makes an action good or evil is divine commands, not its intrinsic nature.

Nietzsche claims that “The sight of man now makes us weary”, and “We are weary of man.” He points out that in modern modes of life and social convention, moral values are “hostile to humans and their lives.” In this paper, I am going to argue that I agree with Nietzsche’s argument and his conclusion about modern modes of individual and social life, moral values, and norms. It is a justified argument, and the reason why he gets this conclusion is that: people have the ability to express the will to power, and social life is oppressing people’s will to power. Will to power means the ability to give meaning or form to things. It is the internalization of humans, so once it is impeded by other things then human lives will become ‘nihilistic’, and people themselves will also become resentful.

Firstly, I am going to argue about why the modern modes of individual and social life keep people far from the will to power. Nietzsche figures out that once a person lives in society, he will give promises, for example, he is a son so he gives a promise to his parents that he will be filial, and his parents are expecting of him, so, when he faces difficulties like ‘he has to do what he is not good at, because of the expectation of his parents, it tends to influence him and make him choose to repay this expectation rather than he follows his heart. There is the expectation of others and he has the power of keeping promises, so these promises turn into his responsibilities, he thinks that he should follow what he promised before. So, when he faces such a situation, there will be two kinds of conscience inside him, the self—conscience and other-regarding conscience. Although Nietzsche says that the conscience ought to be related to people themselves first. ‘It should not be repressive for a person, but freeing.’ However, if a person does something that makes him feel that he breaks his promises, he will be more regretful; to avoid this kind of feeling, most people are more likely to be ‘other-regarding’, and their ‘other-regarding ‘ conscience will be stronger than their ‘self-conscience’ when they are joining social life, so that will make them disregard themselves. ‘Disregarding’ makes people always find their faults inside themselves and they will repress their ‘will to power. If one keeps living in a society with a lack of will to power, he then will be resentful. Social life leads to resentment and resentment leads to the ‘weariness of man’. This is how social life keeps the person far away from will to power.

Moral values deprive people of the will to power. Moral values exist to guide us on whether an action is right or wrong. Christianity and law are two kinds of moral values. In Christianity’s view, according to the bible, all humans have original sin from the beginning of their lives. In their whole lives, whatever they do, they are obligated to answer to god, so, people who believe in God, believe in Christianity, they do not ‘need’ will to power. Because in their lives, the only thing they need to do is atone for their sin, they have no freedom to express their will to power, because it is meaningless to their lives. And the law, like the other kind of moral values, gives all people ‘moral constraints’ when they are joining society. In the past, if there is a debtor who did not return the money to the creditor, the creditor has the right to punish the debtor physically. It is just a relationship but not a moral issue. However, in nowadays society, the law gives all human behavior and relationships moral meanings. People who live in society have to follow those moral meanings because these are their choices, they only have the freedom to obey or not to do. Once a person chooses the ‘wrong’ choice, he or she does not obey the law, then it means that this person is committed a crime. Honestly, the law influence much more people in society than religion, because there may be still someone who does not believe in god and live in society, and everyone who lives in society must obey the law. Although the law makes society more ‘ordered’, it deprives peoples’ will to power and makes them all follow the same rules and lets them agree that following morality is following the law, the law is the basic moral value of society. With such a kind of moral value like Christianity or law, people only can do what others ask them ought to do. In Nietzsche’s argument, he points out that because of the oppression from societal law or religion, people are oppressed and become ‘weak’, they do not have the freedom to express their will to power so which leads to ‘slave morality and makes people realize that they are being repressed and they have no way to express who they are and what they need; so they have to find a way outside and ignore what inside to change themselves into ‘other person’ or other things to get a ‘better’ life. So, it is different from what I mentioned before, it is not a repressive power that comes from inside, it oppresses the will to power outside. Because this is not a promise that makes by people themselves, it is a constraint of morality that imposes people to obey, if people want to live a better life in society, then they have to follow those moral values and ignore who they are, what they need to do is to do what moral values ask them to do and become the person that moral values want them to be. So moral values deprive human’s will to power.

In Nietzsche’s opinion, the social norm has caused people to pursue a ‘higher culture.’ Nietzsche points out that higher culture is a vapid exercise, but it is a thing that encourages people to care about what is socially revered. So, it can make people change easily themselves to pursue the higher culture and removes people from their ‘primal instincts.’ For example, most of the persons think that go to university is good, everyone should go to university for higher education and then they can live a good life. The fact that we use social media and care about it so much shows that we value what social media offer us. People care about things that are attractive, which are fancy, and which are popular. All of them seem to worship those things’ surface. Because those things are always changing, so people will also change themselves frequently to pursue them. In the end, people who keep pursuing the ‘higher culture’ ignore their will to power. When they are pursuing what they ‘care’ about, it seems like they are following their mind, they are expressing themselves; however, it is influenced by the desire to pursue higher culture. That is why social norms are also oppressing peoples’ will to power, it makes people forget that they have the desire and ability to express their will to power.

However, the social norms of pursuing higher culture are not always negative for humans. Although most of the social norms are attracting people and making them forget what they need, and what they want. There are still some social norms that can help people improve themselves. For example, pursuing of bachelor’s degree, pursuing a university education. It is different from the other two factors, social modes are related to other people so an individual cannot change others; meanwhile, moral values are general, and it is obvious that they cannot be changed just by an oppressed individual. So, people have no choice, they can only obey, and that oppresses people and make them more and more resentful. But, if one person can always remember his desire for the will to power, then a good university education will help this person to have a better ability to express his will to power, and he will also live a better life because of this advantage. When facing those different social norms, people can be more freely choose whether they follow those or not, it is much freer than the other two factors. So, if one can improve their ability to will to power through the higher culture, then it is not an oppressive thing for this person, he can use this to help himself. But in conclusion, it still needs people to remember their desire of expressing their will to power. It is too hard to keep the will to power in their mind under such a huge influence of social modes, moral values, and social norms, most people will ignore their will to power from the beginning of their lives until they die.

People live in society, they have to live in a certain social mode, and they are oppressive, so people cannot always express their will to power because they give promises and they do not want to make those people who have expectations of them disappointed. They do not want to be regretful. So, sometimes they have to repress their desire for the will to power. Then, as the basis of a functioning society, moral values become guidelines of what people ought to do, and what they ought not to do. Law and religion are the two main moral values of our society and they are all oppressed. If people want to live a good life in society, they have to repress their desire of expressing their will to power and they have to follow those moral values. Once they choose to obey moral values, then they have to always repress themselves and that makes people more and more resentful, they will find out that they are too weak, so they have to switch themselves into another form, become persons that moral values want them to be. So, after partial repression of social modes, moral values deprive peoples’ desire of the will to power. Besides, social norms also let people forget that they are disregarding themselves, People even do not realize that they are repressing their will to power while they are pursuing the higher culture. Higher culture always encourages people to pursue those things that are socially revered to live better lives. Those three things consist of the whole functioning society. The whole system is oppressing peoples’ desire for the will to power, making people far away from who they are and what they want, social life makes them even cannot find a chance to give meaning to things, it impeded their will to power. In conclusion, Peoples’ lives are actually not living for themselves; because of these three factors, their lives are all ‘nihilistic.’ These are reasons why Nietzsche says that we are weary of man because these social modes, moral values, and social norms are hostile to people and their own lives, making them far away from their will to power, so, his argument is justified.

Bibliography

1. Nietzsche, Friedrich. ‘On the genealogy of morals.’ Marino, Gordon. “Basic writings of existentialism”. New York: “The Random House Publishing Group” Excerpt From Gordon Marino. “Basic Writings of Existentialism”. Apple Books. , 2004.

Does wickedness or amoralism (or both) pose an insurmountable challenge to internalism?

In the study of moral philosophy, or rather, the metaethical study thereof, exist conflicting ideas regarding the motivation and drive towards morality. This debate can be split into the camps of internalism and externalism. The former, internalism, is more commonly accepted than its counterpart, being a foundational a priori assumption for several modes of ethical thought, but externalism is not without its own compelling counterarguments. One such possible counter that can shake the steady footing of the internalist position is the question pertaining to the amoral and the wicked among us. Wickedness is a somewhat charged concept, even on a linguistic basis, but amoralism, and the amoralist, make for fascinating subjects in this debate. Evil is generally a common feature in many discussions of ethics, which provide their own explanations for such phenomena, but sheer moral apathy and disinterest seem to confound the internalist position.

In order to fully discuss this topic, it would be beneficial to first define the necessary concepts. Let us begin with the defending party: Internalism. Internalism stems from the belief that moral judgements, necessarily by their nature, act as motivators. It is, according to the internalist, impossible on even a conceptual level to make a moral judgement, and yet fail to be motivated. (Fisher, 2011) This is also why wickedness may fail as a defeating factor, as an action is motivated by the judgement, it is simply that the action takes the negative side of the judgement, rather than the potential amoralist, who ignores the judgement altogether. Nonetheless, internalism holds that if one, for instance, sees a person in distress on the street, they shall be compelled to help. This ideal has varying degrees of intensity within the ideology of internalism, with what could be referred to as a “strong internalist” stating that it is literally impossible, on any level, for one not to act upon a moral impulse, utterly disqualifying the possibility of an amoralist (Rosati, 2016). Conversely, in the case of supposed “weak internalism”, an agent may not act upon a moral impulse, perhaps due to a conflict of interests, or a lacking ability to call upon the faculties of reason (exemplified, for instance, by some mental condition, which hinders these very faculties, or otherwise clouds them.). This means that only those possessing of an adequate degree of will, reason, and moral drive already will act upon such impulses, which opens the doors to the possibility of an agent who makes a moral judgement, but receives no stimulus nor motivation from it. As such, this is the position suited to combating the problem posed by the hypothetical amoralist. Though of course, a shift towards the alternative extreme of externalism would also resolve this problem.

The next step of this process of definition then takes us to the term “amoralist”. What, precisely, is this hypothetical individual who disrupts the theory of internalism to such a degree? In summary, an amoralist is a person who, like any other, forms, receives and acknowledges moral judgements, but more uniquely, is entirely unmotivated by these stimuli. They are not incapable, through some deficiency or condition, of moral judgement, but instead, they are entirely unmoved by them. In the case of the aforementioned “strong” internalism, such a lapse need only occur on a singular occasion to be classified as amoralism. But such a concept of internalism, theoretically, utterly excludes the possibility of the existence of the amoralist, so as such, the suggestion of this may leave the theory in a spot of trouble. To exemplify amoralism, let us take our earlier example. Ordinarily, by the reckoning of the internalist, a person passing someone in distress, let us say in a state of medical emergency, upon the street would be compelled to help them. But an amoralist, meanwhile, would acknowledge the situation, and the action they morally ought to take, but rather than acting upon this impulse, or actively going against it, they simply would not pay any mind to it. This subconscious lack of an impulse to act is precisely what characterizes an amoral act, and in the case of strong internalism, an amoralist.

Then how can internalism respond to this quandary, which lacks in a moral drive? What can make the amoralist act morally? Perhaps the amoralist is acting in a manner which is purely self-serving, rather than abiding by morality, and so see no reason to follow such impulses. Perhaps then, it could be argued that in fact, what the amoralist experiences is not, in fact, truly a sense of morality? After all, if by definition, one who experiences a moral judgement cannot help but act upon it, how can someone who does not act upon it be truly said to be experiencing moral judgements in any normal, conventional sense? (Brink, 1997) It is not the case that the amoralist is indifferent to all moral standards, as it may be perceived by others, bur rather, by some quirk of character or psychology, this supposed amoralist is instead operating based upon a unique and personal view of morality, which does not necessitate action in all the same situations. Then, taking a sentimentalist stance, if we assume that the amoralist’s view of morality refers only to matters of approval and disapproval, the system of moral judgement becomes entirely different to the one which internalism builds itself upon, and so, the amoralist’s perceived moral failures are only their own, and cannot be attributed to internalism. It is not, as far as an internalist is concerned, a real moral judgement.

An alternate internalist response may take more of a realist, virtue ethics-grounded approach to the conundrum in question, and instead hypothesise that an amoralist takes a purely psychological view of moral situations, seeing them through a purely cognitive lens, but being unable to truly parse nor act on them, as the amoralist is simply not a virtuous person, be they inherently possessing of such a disposition, or merely lacking in sufficient moral education towards that end. (Svavarsdottir, 1999)