Category: Michel Foucault

In modern society, the dominant social account of ‘madness’, the attached characteristics, meanings, and treatment is monopolized by psychiatry and medicine, reducing the basis for its existence simply to biological differences. Historically, individuals were provided with socially produced images and descriptions of specific characteristics of madness and insanity, particularly in Western society, beginning with the Biblical imagery of madness as generated by possession by the Devil or promoted by a divine dissatisfaction. The notion of the latter image is continued throughout history, evident in the Renaissance age where the Church promoted the desire to be punished by God, in order to please Him and thus accomplish salvation. Religious reasoning to justify different types of illnesses and diseases was far more common than seeking a Medical cure during this period – if it was divinely ordained by the Lord, it was the Lord and only the Lord who could remedy it. As such, having an illness or condition, whether it be leprosy or insanity, was deemed a blessing from God, each individual being especially ‘chosen’. Even the social exclusion they faced as a repercussion for their presiding identity as ‘other’ in society was met with fulfillment, offering them another chance of communion, patience, and repentance. Over time, however, the medical model of madness, insanity, and sanity become the dominant discourse in Western society, perceived as having the only justified interpretation of mentality and possible cures.

Published in 1961, Madness and Civilisation was Foucault’s first major book, based on his academic thesis and undoubtedly shaped by his own personal experience of psychological difficulties both as a patient and as an informed observer. The book was subjected to both strong criticism and praise, arguably more criticism at the time of publishing and more praise in the twenty-first century. Foucault’s work has been resoundingly deemed as speculative and rather profound, in the sense that the arguments he presents are regarded as contemporary, eliciting numerous criticisms and disputes. The very fact that he, and rather his work, is invested in different disciplines including but not limited to poststructuralism, sociology, and queer theory, serves to confirm his convictions are intrinsically a product of essentialism. For the most part, his work surrounds the connection between knowledge and power and how social institutions such as prisons and schools are used in order to aid social control. As such, in his analyses, he focuses on the social constructs that are prevalent in the relative social and how they operate as a tool for social control, as opposed to solely focusing on social realities.

In Madness and Civilisation, Foucault introduces and extends the principal notion that for individuals, a sense of normality is gained through the suppression and exile of the abnormal, which essentially serves as a microcosm of what exists on a wider scale in modern society. When an individual label another as ‘mad’, they other them by placing themselves as ‘normal’, reinstating their own included position in society. Foucault presents every form of social inclusion as being a form of exclusion, in order for a group of individuals to feel included, others must simultaneously be excluded. The book traces and inspects the fluid meaning of madness throughout history and the stigmas and characteristics attached to the image of the mad, how this influences the treatment of the mad, and social institutions of confinement.

The first chapter explores how the mad were treated during the Renaissance age, initially introducing the structure of the leper houses as empty prisons for the mad, previously having been inhabited by lepers. The “regression of leprosy” throughout Europe led the lazar houses to be reserved for “Incurables and madmen”. Not only did the mad adopt the houses of the lepers, but they also represented the social image of lepers, taking on the identity of the “insistent and fearful figure” that was detached from the lepers as they decreased in volume and thus decreased in the power to elicit fear and terror in others. The social removal of the previous image of the leper meant that this physical human embodiment of sinisterness had to be replaced with another character that was customary in society, Foucault notes that these structures “remain” and the “formulas of exclusion would be repeated”. He observes that although as time changed, along with meaning and culture, the social structures remained intact, particularly that of a “rigorous division which is social exclusion but spiritual reintegration”.

In the chapter Stultifera Navis, Foucault explains the emergence of the Ship of Fools, within the landscape of the Renaissance, not only proving the reality of the Ship of Fools through factual and statistical evidence but also through the frequent representation of ships alike in Renaissance art.

In his conclusion, Foucault notes there is no inherent madness in art, art is the last place madness is allowed to speak and be heard by rational people. He argues that it is the last refuge for a dialogue between madness and reason as we respect the mad artist and works that we cannot explain, but not the mad man. Contrastingly, in some societies, mad people became priests, leaders, and high ordained people, which Foucault argues slowly diminished and ceases to exist in Western societies throughout history. This is particularly evident in today’s society, where madness has become completely institutionalized, serving as a complete opposite of what it was a mere few hundred years ago. Foucault notes that there was a brief reemergence of this previously disappearing role, in the renaissance era, there was a dialogue, according to Foucault between rationality and madness – creating an understanding between delusion and reasoning. He notes that rationality becomes a driving force in classical society, but once the dichotomy of rationality and irrationality is evidenced madness yet again becomes ‘other’ and excluded.

In the Birth of the Asylum, Foucault shows the initial liberation of the socially classified ‘mad’ who was then shortly after subjected to ‘freedom’ in the likes of the asylum, mental hospital, or into the care of a psychiatric ward. He notes the movement from the mad being feared by society to the mad becoming afraid themselves that they are not ‘normal’ or deemed acceptable by society. They are forced to believe that they are the minority in society as ‘others’, rather than the normal majority, influencing the creation of their own individual mental confinement. It is the unbearable weight of the social pressure to be included and fit in with others and the human desire to feel as if you belong and are like other individuals, created by society, which unfortunately leads to this new form of confinement, long after the asylums were shut down.

In today’s Western society, asylums have been shut down and replaced with ‘care in the community, but it must be mentioned that a vast majority of individuals in prison or homeless suffer from rather severe mental health problems – more so than the general statistics that represent society as a whole. Foucault notes that although the new modern forms of institutions such as ‘hospitals’ for the mad are no longer physical prisons, or have cells and bars or high walls, the simple fact that the mad are forced to obey orders and fit into the behavioral patterns deemed acceptable by society causes the mad to internalize this oppression. Whilst the mad are physically liberated from their shackles and physical confinement, Foucault argues that it is better to be in a prison rather than these new asylums as they void any possibility of mental freedom as they are constantly being observed and reviewed. The mad are tranquilized with drugs like animals in order to keep them complacent and quite literally force them to fit into society. As humans begin to remove themselves from the animal world, the mad increasingly fit into the image of wildness that was previously reserved for animals/beasts.

Foucault argues that a certain form of the human body became normalized in capitalist society due to the industrial need for a labor force, which ultimately led to the creation of prejudices against ‘other’ bodies such as disabled individuals who failed to fit into the demands of the society. In this society, the madman could go by undetected, confirming himself to social expectations and standards of work out of fear and in order to keep his identity hidden to lessen the chances of being outed and shamed. The emergence of ‘care in the community meant that individuals are now expected to accept their mental illness but strive to live life like a ‘normal person, hiding your illness from others and confirming to society in order to meet the social standard of reason. However, Foucault notes that there is a madness in pretending not to be mad, evidenced by the “tea-parties” with “no intimacy, no dialogue”. This pressure to satisfy normal customs and behaviors instills a sense of fear of being ‘found out and consequently being shamed by society. Although this fear can be seen in a positive aspect, in its ability to envoys genuine emotion from the mad like a sane person, it can thus cause the individual to go deeper into delirium and insanity. Foucault notes that throughout history, the two crucial factors that were constant in relation to the confinement and treatment of the mad, firstly the never-ending and complicated distinction of social inclusion and exclusion and secondly, the existence of liminal spaces reserved for the mad – the physically moving Ship of Fools and the modern crisis of homelessness for those suffering from mental illnesses.

The increase in accessibility of Foucault’s writing becomes apparent in his later works, such as ‘Discipline and Punish’ or ‘The History of Sexuality, with a distinguishable shift in the stylistic methods deployed – it becomes much less dense and more feasible for ordinary people to comprehend. Clearly, his literary techniques and overall style change dramatically as his beliefs and notions change with the assumed increase of knowledge. Foucault himself presents his discourse as accessible and wholly intended for the “user” as opposed to the “reader”, his work simply being a ‘tool’ that this user deploys and puts into practice in the real world in order to assist them in their understanding of their respective societies. Whilst this is true, the most prevalent use of Foucault’s work is found within the realms of academia and is read almost exclusively by intellectuals – differing to perhaps what he intended it to be – Madness and Civilisation probably isn’t the ordinary person’s literary leisure. Foucault did not want subjects who would master his work, rather, using it in a practical sense was his aim in order to better societies. However, in studying and analyzing him, we are in fact evidently attempting to master his discourse.

Foucault argues that he himself cannot give a voice or speak for the mad through his reasoning that psychology and the social oppression of the mad completely restricts and denies them ownership of a voice in society, deeming whatever they say as irrational and thus unable to exist as authentic or justified. However, in doing so, he undermines his portrayal of the mad and negates reason as he undoubtedly presents yet another monologue of madness, employing philosophical and historical arguments, he ends up doing what he argues is impossible – giving a voice to the mad. The undermining of his own argument is mirrored not only in the text but also in Foucault’s position on himself as a philosopher as well as other philosophers. In his works, he seeks to deconstruct dominant discourses as a means to understand them wholly but simultaneously invalidates them, creating a space in society for a new discourse to be created. Although he fervently criticizes these discourses, Foucault never seems to offer real or practical solutions to replace these social structures that reinstate inequalities, he simply undermines the existing structures without having the means to demonstrate his personal ideal substitution or a recommended realistic course of action individuals can take, which is the ultimate criticism of him.

Based on the theory of the Panopticon by Michel Foucault, this essay considers the view that the existence of power is intrinsically linked to the existence of resistance to it, with his idea being true for power within the media as well. I argue that power is part of the function of the media as it is for any institution and therefore there will always be some form of resistance such as unplugging movements or Edward Snowden’s actions against the monitoring of our media and digital consumption. For Foucault power was structured like a Panopticon and prevented people from wrong-doing through visibility, thus making them unable and unwilling. For him, the power was in the anonymous gaze of the Eye of Power. This high concentration of power in one place at the expense of the right to privacy, within itself brings forth conflict; as Foucault puts it, ‘the problem of the cost of power.’ (Foucault, Gordon, and translated by Colin Gordon. The number of overseers is an issue and thus this resulting economic cost. Additionally, there is also a political cost as well, the demonstration of this power has to exist between parameters in order not to provoke revolt against it.

Michel Foucault took the idea of the Panopticon conceptualized by Bentham and applied it to the modern age. For Foucault, ‘Bentham didn’t merely imagine an architectural design calculated to solve a specific problem,’ (Foucault, Gordon, and translated by Colin Gordon. He’d ‘invented a technology of power designed to solve the problems of surveillance’ which in itself whilst trying to maintain order is intrinsically an ‘exercise of power’. This gives the idea that the structure is fundamentally an instrument and demonstration of power just by being the structure that it is. On its own, it answers any questions it presents. The ring-like building contained rooms with purposefully placed windows ‘one opening on to the inside, facing the windows of the central tower, the other, outer one allowing daylight to pass’, (Foucault, Gordon, and translated by Colin Gordon and with an overseer in a tower in the center of the ringed structure with a view of all these rooms. This allowance of light into the rooms and the possibility of being seen by whoever is in the tower strips the prisoner of his or her privacy; this fact means that the overseer possesses some sort of power over those he is viewing, for his gaze can ‘capture the inmate more effectively than the darkness which after all is a sort of protection,’ (Foucault, Gordon, and translated by Colin Gordon. This idea of privacy having some sort of power is central to the Panopticon’s function as an instrument of power, for having the ability to negate privacy indicates the presence of power over that which privacy is inhibited. Essentially the Panopticon was a tool to ‘prevent even the possibility of wrong-doing by immersing people in a field of total visibility where the opinion, observation, and discourse of others would restrain them from harmful acts,’ (Foucault, Gordon, and translated by Colin Gordon further perpetuating the idea of visibility equating power. However, where there is an exertion of power there will always be opposition to it. In recent times this opposition or rather a resistance was shown through publications by WikiLeaks and the continuing existence of the group Anonymous. These groups function solely to combat the use of government and organizational power over the masses. Without the existence and use – whether just or excessive – of power, these resistance groups would not exist. Ironically they use the idea of visibility to counteract the structures of power that make our lives visible and so controllable. Intrinsically this shows the power of ‘and inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorizing to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself.’ (Foucault, Gordon, and translated by Colin Gordon.

Resistance to media power can also be individual, and not only orchestrated through collectives. Movements to ‘unplug’ from media outlets have gained traction throughout the increasingly global and connected media age, such as the articles detailing how one can go about it on the Huffington Post website for example ‘How To Turn Off Your Phone, Shut Down Your Computer And Totally Unplug Every Single Week,’ (How to unplug, 2011) Although not observed on a mass scale, it has the potential too and would hinder the power of media surveillance in possibly a more effective way than any WikiLeaks revelation or Anonymous post, as there would be no consumer to exert the power of media visibility to. This idea of avoiding media content or technologies for a period of time is thus resistance to the hold media has over our daily lives. The presence of any kind of resistance is a sign of a fundamental flaw of the use of power within media or other mediums and supports the notion that power creates resistance to it, just by being so.

Edward Snowden’s actions are a clear form of resistance to the idea of our media consumption being made visible and monitored. ‘It is Foucault’s thesis that our own societies are maintained not by army, police and a centralized, visible state apparatus, but precisely by those techniques of dressage, discipline, and diffused power,’ (Sheridan, 1990) therefore it can be deduced that power is held within the ability to monitor and so the monitoring of public media is an exertion of power. Snowden thought that ‘the balance of power is changing as a post-terror generation turns away from reaction and fear in favor of resilience and reason.’ (Ratcliffe, 2015) This idea of power and its balance being skewed further supports the view of power resembling a Panopticon; therefore, Snowden’s actions ‘driven by “the power of an informed public” added to the end of the mass surveillance of private telephone calls under the US Patriot Act and was a “landmark victory for the rights of each citizen (Ratcliffe, 2015). This intrinsic resistance to the media demonstrates that there is a level of power held within it. This power is broad and fluid; it’s the power of suggestion over what is ordinary and acceptable and right and so resistance such as that produced by Snowden, is inevitable.

Resistance is part of the human condition and according to ‘people are completely dominated by and subject to power,’ (Danaher, Schirato, and Webb, 2000), therefore, where there is power, there will always be some form of resistance to it, this includes power within the media. The idea that ‘people are not really free to think and act, because they – and their ideas and activities – are produced by the structures in which they live,’ further perpetuates the existence of a Panopticonic structure around all aspects of life. The power of the media is shown through the reproduction of the status quo which caries ideology held by those possessing power and influence. Resistance to power within media can be small or large scale, as just an act of unplugging from ‘the blob’ is a form of resistance that within such a connected age could have the same substantial impact as Snowden’s file release or Anonymous hacking.

In conclusion, power is part of the function of media and so intrinsically gives rise to opposition or resistance to it. In any structure where power is involved, there will always be resistance, and in the case of the media where it is controlled by a small collective of organizations, resistance is not just justified but to some extent expected.

Foucault (1976) describes biopower as the mechanisms and techniques that manage and control the lives of a population. The powerful statement “to make life, or to let die” (Foucault, 1976), highlights two different ways of looking at biopower and the state. On one hand, the main objective of the state is to make people live and protect them from harm, however, the state also has the power to ignore the pain and suffering of certain groups.

I think that the Flint water crisis is an example of how the state has the power to ‘let people die’ and shows how actions of the state can harm certain people, rather than make them live. The water source in Flint was switched from the Detroit water system to the Flint river in 2014, in an attempt to save money. Residents noticed that something was not right with the smell, taste, and color of the water straight away, yet their concerns and complaints were repeatedly ignored and dismissed by those in authority. Despite tests clearly stating that the water contained dangerous chemicals and was not safe to drink, and residents reporting health issues, the state ignored these concerns and frequently reassured the people of Flint. It wasn’t until a year later in 2015, that the water was reconnected to the previous source, however, this did not solve any problems, as the damage was already done.

I believe that this event can be linked to Foucault’s idea of the need for racism within biopower – as he questions how a state that is designed to protect and improve the population, can also kill. When Foucault (1976) speaks of racism, it is not necessarily limited to ethnicity, it is essentially any group that is deemed inferior or the ‘other’. Therefore, it is important to note that almost 60% of Flint residents are black, and 40% are under the poverty line (US census, 2018). The fact that it took so long for the state to listen and make changes, highlights how certain lives are arguably seen as less politically important, and that the state prioritizes saving money, over the health and wellbeing of certain sections of society. There were even allegations that the state had attempted to cover up statistics that highlighted increased levels of lead in the blood of children – this shows how the state actively ignored how thousands of children were being poisoned due to their actions.

However, I would say that Foucault’s (1976) ideas around racism and biopower do not completely fit this example, as he arguably overemphasizes the state’s desire to turn a certain group into a ‘threat’, or a group that needs to be killed in order to maintain the health of the population. As in this case, I would argue that it was not a deliberate attempt by a racist state to kill certain groups to make society ‘healthier’ or ‘purer’.

Before Foucault, ethics was focused on the finding of oneself within a predetermined moral order or the creation of oneself in terms of a great transcendental ought. Thinkers like Bentham believe in an ethical theory rooted in an empiricist account of human nature. Bentham’s ethics reflects what he calls “the greatest happiness principle,” where he implies that ethics reflects the moral obligation to seek out what produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. This thinking is a part of utilitarianism (Baujard, 2013). Furthermore, thinkers like Kant, believe in an ethical theory in which one has a duty to obey a set of rules, in order to exhibit moral personhood. Kantian ethics reflects that we are obligated to act in accordance with moral law to achieve the greatest good. This thinking is a part of deontology. Foucault’s work veered away from the previous focus of ethics and found a position in which ethics would not refer to a body of rules or principles, such as moral codes, but would rather refer to a “self-forming activity” or subjectivity, where one has the freedom to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own accord. In general, Foucauldian ethics puts emphasis on the type of relationship one ought to have with himself (Moore, 1987). According to Foucault, there are four different aspects that create the ethical self and define the relationship man has with himself.

Firstly, he says that one must ask “which is the aspect or the part of myself or my behavior which is concerned with moral conduct? (Moore, 1987).” This is that of ethical substance or the ontological element. Foucault deviates from the Kantian point of view, in which it is believed that the field of morality is intentions as indicated by the Christian point of view and says that it is our own feelings that are the main field of morality within society.

Secondly, he asks, “what is the way in which people are invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations (Moore, 1987).” This is called the mode of subjection. Foucault actually refers to this as the deontological component of ethics, in which one must decide whether they act because of divine law, natural law, the cosmological order, or a rational rule.

Thirdly, he asks, “what are the means by which we can change ourselves in order to become ethical subjects (Moore, 1987).” This is known as ethical work or ascetics. This aspect consists of self-forming activities which are intended to ensure one’s own subjection to moral authority and transform oneself into an ethical agent.

Lastly, Foucault asks, “which is the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way (Moore, 1987).” Though Foucault later answers his own question, in saying that the modern person is characterized by a will to truth and thus aspires to recognize the discourses of its time. Here is where Foucault’s theory on power, truth, and subjectivity begins.

Foucault again deviates from the modern idea of philosophy and inverts modern questioning. Foucault aims to offer that scientific truths about human nature are in fact the outcome of contingent historical forces and not the previous scientifically grounded truths as modern thinkers have thought. Throughout his research, Foucault often found himself on the opposite of Kantian thought.

Deontology is the study of duty or obligation. It says that doing your duty is moral. In this, there are two duties with two associated extinctions. The perfect and imperfect duty to one’s self and duty to others. In class, we discussed four examples. The first being suicide. Suicide is categorized as a duty to one’s self. A deontological thinker would say that for the love of self, they have a duty to shorten their life in order to avoid future evil. However, this does not fit with deontology as suicide cannot be a law of nature because the act of suicide in itself eliminates the law of nature. Next, false promising, which is a duty to others. In which, deontological thinkers say you have a duty to falsely promise so long as the other is happy. However, this then leads to a lack of meaning in promising, and eventually promising will disappear. Thirdly, we have to neglect our talents, which is an imperfect duty to one’s self. Though we as beings have a natural will to nurture our talents and therefore this cannot be universalized. Lastly, the failure to help others, which is an imperfect duty to others. This institutes a universal moral law in which we mustn’t interfere but not help others. Society could not function this way either.

Alternatively, utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism in which it is an ethical theory that determines right from wrong by focusing on outcomes. The two most influential thinkers who contributed to this theory are Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Bethan proposes the greatest happiness principle, in which he states that a right or moral action is one that maximizes or ensures the greatest happiness for the greatest amount of people. This pleasure principle makes utilitarianism intuitively appealing for most. The pleasure principle follows two obligations. Firstly, that all people are equal. In saying this, Bentham means that everyone’s pleasure is equal in worth. Secondly, it follows that the only things that matters are pleasure and pain. Though there’s a problem. In reality, how does one measure pleasure/happiness? It is impossible to objectively rank and therefore cannot in reality be put to use as a moral theory. This leads to Mill. Mill introduces evil desires. Mill asks does desiring something makes something a desire. Well in my opinion, yes, but not all desires can create happiness. This leads to the three major subjections to utilitarianism.

Firstly, in principle, it is just to condemn one if it maximizes happiness, regardless of innocence. For example, we talked about in class, putting an innocent man in jail in hopes of stopping the actual killer. Well, Utilitarianism says that this is just and can morally be done because the end creates the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, in which people find peace in knowing someone has been caught, although they do not know it is the wrong person. Secondly, utilitarianism can justify various forms of oppression. In other words, what’s good for the majority, might make the minority suffer. Again, in class, we discussed teaching Catholicism to a Muslim during school hours simply because the majority of the parent board would like Catholicism to be taught at the public school. Lastly, deathbed promises. Utilitarianism says that you do not have to fulfill these promises so if it inconveniences yourself because you cannot bring happiness to a dead person, though you can bring yourself pain or suffering.

Thus, Foucault creates his own ethical theory surrounding subjectivity, freedom, truth, power, and discourse. Foucault says that there are three ways in which a subject is created. But first, you must understand that individuals just are. Anyway, the three ways are the sciences, divided practices, and technologies of the self. The science or those who find themselves through scientific means, such as biology, like gender. Divided practices involve the exclusion of certain groups. Technologies of the self are the identification through means such as sexuality. From this, Foucault creates an implicit relation between the pattern of discourse and the relations of power. Foucault’s biggest clarity at this point is as follows;

The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn’t the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. There is a battle ‘for truth’, or at least ‘around truth’ — it being understood once again that by truth I do not mean ‘the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted’, but rather ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’, it is understood also that it’s not a matter of a battle ‘on behalf of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays. It is necessary to think of the political problems of intellectuals not in terms of ‘science’ and ‘ideology’, but in terms of ‘truth’ and ‘power’. ‘Truth’ is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements. ‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces, and which extend it. A ‘regime’ of truth. The problem is not changing people’s consciousnesses — or what’s in their heads — but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth. It’s not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time. The political question, to sum up, is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness, or ideology; it is truth itself. (Foucault & Gordon, 1980)

This was an excerpt from a 1977 interview of Foucault himself, in which he explains the relationship between power and truth. I feel as though this is a perfect way to summarize Foucauldian ethics as it explains his foundation of power and subjectivity in truth. In short, Foucault says the use of the truth determines which belief is told and how that belief is used, and to Foucault, the acceptance of a specific truth, and its resulting actions of submission creates power. Foucault’s version of the truth is his notion that what we choose to believe influences what we believe we have to do, and in deciding what we have to do, we inherently abide by specific structures that create and reinforce the truths we allow ourselves to accept. It is a cycle of creation of an object, determination of subjective truth, and submission to the entities responsible for the creation of the initial situation, in the first place. Therefore power is created, and Foucauldian ethics exists.

In my opinion, Foucault’s ethics are more accurate and historically represented than utilitarianism and deontology. Both theories are good theoretical theories, but if they were actively participated in and enacted, they simply would not be realistic enough to hold up in our society, whereas I genuinely believe Foucauldian theory could have a chance at survival as it was founded through historical research and pattern observation and as we all know history is cyclic and is always bound to repeat itself over and over again, the same as Foucault’s theory on power and subjectivity being a never-ending cycle.

The word ‘discourse’ becomes a significant part of theoretical and academic discourse with Michel Foucault. Foucault explains how discourse is guided by the people in power: ruling elite or state and that through discourse the power is exercised by them. It is a discourse that constructs the reality, that we see or believe to be real, maintains the slave-owner relationship between state and people, and constructs and enslaves our consciousness.

Generally, it so happens in a society that various thought or theories are not accepted in the society at a particular point of time for their being, let’s say, anti-dominant discourse; for instance, the theory that the Sun is the center of our solar system couldn’t be accepted in medieval times for it being against Christianity which held power and constructed discourse during those time. It is in this sense that Foucault is interested in history to explore how discourse changes throughout history which he calls discursive change.

Though Foucault always rejected the labels which have been associated with him, he is often considered structuralist, poststructuralist, postmodernist, new historicist, etc. Associating him to any one of the above schools of thought would be a mistake as his works revolve around almost all existing, not school of thought, but discipline. Our concern, however, is to see him as a poststructuralist because, as matter of fact, his theories contribute to the field of poststructuralism.

Structuralism tries to break the idea of having universal truth but ends up creating its own universal claims. Poststructuralist theorist, like Foucault, argues against those theories. Truth, in its fundamental sense, is criticized by Foucault to not have any universal authenticity. He argues that every truth is a construction of the discourse, that changes from time to time and, hence, truth must not be understood from the view of essentialism.

It is generally understood that knowledge is free and is beyond anybody’s control. Also, that knowledge is accessible to everyone and that knowledge belongs to individuals’ domain. Foucault critiques it saying that knowledge is also control by the one that reigns over the country, institution, or discipline. Hence, knowledge has its own political dimensions; therefore, Foucault states: “Knowledge is Power,’ meaning that the one that possesses knowledge has power over the ones who don’t have it; for example, reservation of the biblical knowledge for the Church in medieval era helped Christianity to control over its followers.

Michel Foucault’s 1977 work, Discipline and Punish, philosophically analyses the development of the modern penal system. Foucault’s focus on the social contextualization of power relationships associated with punishment led to numerous new ways of thinking including the carceral continuum. He notes that the continuum acts as a means for the sentencing authority to infiltrate “all those other authorities that supervise, transform, correct [and] improve.” This paper will explore Foucault’s background and conception of carceral continuum, in particular, how contemporary law has both grounded and perpetuated this practice and its associated institutions. Following on, the relevance of governmentality in modern society will be gauged against the framework of Foucault’s theory.

Foucault’s Background.

Michel Foucault’s life experience greatly informed and influenced his work. The forensic analysis of power systems consistent through his work was birthed from his own contact with the modern bourgeois state in 20th century France. Being born to a doctor and educated at elite Jesuit Schools, Foucault was subject to many of the structures which he would later critique. He maintained a sense of guarded privacy about his troubled youth however it is informative to any study of his work. In his early 20s, Foucault abused himself, attempted suicide and was treated by France’s most famous psychiatrist Jean Delay against his will. Delay’s treatment allowed Foucault to identify that his unhappiness stemmed from the repression of his own homosexuality and interest in sadomasochism. This realization led him to explore the underground scene and travel Europe to societies which were less censorious. His interest in philosophy remained through this time and he drew inspiration from Friedrich Nietzsche’s writings. Foucault characterized himself as a philosophical historian, who could study the past for insights and solutions of modern problems. His seminal work Madness and Civilisation (1961), compared treatment of the mentally ill in the Renaissance to modern-day, thereby signalling his discipline which would similarly manifest in Discipline and Punish (1975). Foucault’s works include two distinct techniques which he used as a lens when studying history, the ‘archaeological’ method and the ‘genealogical’ method. The former centers on how language and it’s foundations act to frame discourses and perspectives. Whereas the ‘genealogical’ method focuses on social structures and their associated relationships of knowledge and power. These two approaches inform the majority of Foucault’s work and together mark his contribution to the wider historical philosophy discipline. His theme of scrutinizing power dynamics and relationships informs the basis of the carceral continuum conception.

Panopticism and punishment

Before engaging the continuum, it is necessary to understand its basis, that is, Foucault’s theory of Panopticism. Panopticism is an indicator of internal surveillance which Foucault conceived after considering Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. Named after Argus Panoptes, a mythological Greek giant with 100 eyes, the Panopticon, was a hypothetical circular prison tower that discretely observed prisoners from central tower. This had many effects including the prisoner’s not being aware of their potential surveillance and thus felt compelled to act appropriately, even if there was no-one watching. This use of disciplinary power separated prisoners from each other, using spatial division and heightened surveillance to de-emphasize the need for physical punishment. Foucault extended this logic beyond the prison into other institutions to create Panopticism.

“He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.”

Foucault’s realisation of the transferability of the Panoptic power dynamic demonstrates the continuing relevance of this theory. The permeation of surveillance induced self-regulation into the individual is condition of all authority figures, which leads the “convict to good behaviour, the madman to calm, the worker to work, the schoolboy to application, the patient to the observation of the regulation.”

He recognises that the panopticon is not just a building, but a is symbol and mechanism which confers unique power sentiments. It features a pervasive power because the tower can see every cell and all activities within, thus its regulatory reach is extensive. Further, the Panopticon obscures power because the prisoners can be observed from the tower but they cannot see into tower, hence they cannot know when, how, or why they are being observed. Foucault also extrapolates the transition that structural violence is replacing direct violence. Bentham championed the reduced need for prison guard presence and thus the reduction in associated reprimanding abuse. He noted that prisoners would behave themselves without coercion (by violence). However Foucault noted that the tower itself by its implications was coercive, as imposed structural violence upon prisoners who are subjected to it. Moreover, the tower limited the options of all involved to simply compliance with the will of its author, there was no alternative to working towards power’s goal. Bentham theorised that the Panopticon could be made profitable, turning prisoners into an assembly line within their cells in exchange for bread and water. By using the tower for the goal of the ruling authority, those in power may dominate every facet of the prisoner’s life in pursuit of their own goals. Foucault highlighted the extension and scalability of Panopticism as a mechanism of punishment and rule.

The Carceral Continuum

The Carceral Continuum the state where Panopticism has migrated beyond institutions into interpersonal relations generally. A technical genealogical study highlights “the frontiers between confinement, judicial punishment, and institutions of discipline… (that disappeared) to constitute a great carceral continuum that diffused penitentiary techniques into the most innocent disciplines.” Foucault engages the archaeological method to cite the medium for taking this way of thinking into interpersonal relations is linguistic discourse. He highlights Victorian sexuality to demonstrate how trend of discourses establishing norms limit freedom. Victorians, by not discussing sex, created no discourse and therefore no norms. There was no standard of what was acceptable and thus no limitation on what they could or could not do. However, in the modern era, conversations about sex have conditioned people to conform to ‘normal’ notions of what sex is. Foucault posits that the prevalence of norms in modern society is a key vehicle for power to travel through discourses. The stem quote effectively encapsulates the continuum by demonstrating that “Prison continues… an innumerable mechanisms of discipline”, on individuals even today. Foucault this perpetuation is demonstrated through the contemporary legal and punitive systems.

Contemporary law & the function of the penal system

The contemporary law features penal practices and institutions which are grounded in Foucault’s carceral continuum. The continuum extends the power dynamics established by the Panopticon onto individuals through the melding together of institutions and discourse. Foucault’s comparison of society’s punishment in the 18th century against the modern day demonstrated the basis of contemporary law in the continuum. In Discipline and Punish, he explored the execution of Robert-Francois Damiens, who had attempted to assassinate King Louis XV of France. Foucault details the gruesome, tortuous and excessive punishment inflicted on the “Body of the Condemned”, as an emotive example of how power was exerted in past societies. The penal system of old featured public and physical inflicting of pain. The modern law uses policing and surveillance to ensure that punishment is privately applied, is boundless and is more focused on non-physical penalties. The shift from focussing punishment on the mind rather than the body has coincided with the increase of discourse. The universal spread of the continuum is reflected in modern society through the regulation of crime. Foucault’s extrapolation of Panopticism applied to contemporary penal system suggests that its function is to inflict power to turn a profit. Modern punishment methods seek to recycle “waste product’ into something beneficial for the weilder of power. He qualifies the waste product as only the specific offenders who are not useful to the ruling classes. The utility of the punished is dependent on the ruling class however in Capitalist societies, job creators are seen as useful. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis signifies this dynamic where only one banker in America was sent to prison despite 22 trillion USD being lost. Banks paid settlements as penalties and used shareholder money to pay off fines. The regulation of white collar crime is relatively lenient when compared with other offences. Foucault would suggest that this is a perpetuation of large institutional power dynamics which have taken root in modern society. This is further evidenced by the recent failed case of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Westpac Banking Corporation in the Australian Federal Court. The general lack of oversight led to potential mismanagement of the power dynamic by the bank’s lending policy. The case assumed that customers had sufficient financial literacy, self-regulation and responsible tendencies to comply with loan agreements without note to the actual pragmatism of this position. The case ruled in favour of the bank that the necessary requirement was to enquire whether the consumer will be unable to comply with the consumer’s financial obligations under the contract. This downhill assignment of responsibility places extra emphasis on the independent self-moderation expected of the individual. This power dynamic is grounded in contemporary law and is perpetuated by the norms of white collar crime. This alignment and affirmation of individuals with self-governance of modern society may also be observed through examination of governmentality in modern society.

Governmentality.

Contemporary authorities have perpetuated and expanded upon Foucault’s concept of governmentality. They supervise, transform, correct and improve the behaviour of individuals under their power through a new method of social control. Foucault characterises governmentality as “a unique way of governing populations as a whole but not by using law, and not by directly using discipline.” He compares the top-down authority of law and action based discipline against this new method which governs from above by utilising the self-control autonomy of the governed. This triad of forces developed over time into siloed avenues whereby sovereignty orders society at large (general laws), discipline works on individuals (to order individuals) and governmentality governs populations as a whole but not by using law, and not by directly using discipline. Governmentality enables powers to rule society by appealing to people to freely participate in government solutions. This social policy may be enacted not through legislation but through non-legal devices which rely upon free will and independent decision-making. This method of governing, from an arm’s length through gentle steering and suggestion has been directly implemented in modern society.

The concept of ‘nudging’ was first promulgated in 2008 by economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass Sunstein. Nudging is a concept in behavioural science, political theory and behavioural economics which proposes positive reinforcement and indirect suggestions as ways to influence the behaviour and decision-making of groups or individuals. Nudging contrasts with other ways to achieve compliance, such as education, legislation or enforcement. It’s success led to the formation of the British Behavioural Insights Team in 2010, often called the ‘Nudge Unit’ and the Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government, or BETA in 2016. This clear example of behavioural intervention as part of ruling policy demonstrates governmentality’s ubiquity in modern society. Foucault’s continuum works in tandem with governmentality through the imposition of an absentee ruling power in the mind of the citizen. However nudging and governmentality create concerns of liberal paternalism, is it right to decide what is right for people? Foucault may not clearly indicate whether governmentality is right or wrong, but he does explore the freedom and mobility that it affords. He notes that

Governmentality does not objectify people to control them – it constructs subjects (individuals capable of choice and action) and aligns their interest with those of the government. It doesn’t abolish freedom; it presupposes it. It cultivates subjectivity in a way that is functional for government. It creates homo prudens (person capable of being prudent).

In this essay, I will argue that Foucault’s two registers of the modern machine-body – the anatomico-metaphysical and the technical-political, although distinct in construction share a common purpose to achieve their respective goals. The approach they have in common is to dehumanize the body and use the docile body for manipulation. To illustrate this, I will draw on Descartes and in particular Leder and discuss the functions Foucault’s two registers serve in the context of administering punishment and the role of medicine. According to Foucault, the anatomical-metaphysical body focuses on ‘functioning and explanation’ while the technico-political examines the ‘use and submission’ of the body (Foucault, 136). Yet, the body as an entity has always been held under ‘strict powers’ that constrict its motion and weigh it down with ‘constraints and obligations’ (Foucault, 136).

Initially, mentioned in Man-the-Machine, Descartes wrote the ‘first-few pages’ regarding the anatomical-metaphysical register (Foucault, 136). Focusing on the distinction between mind and soul, Descartes developed this further in Meditations, in which he described the mind and soul as interacting entities that ultimately represent different ideas. According to Descartes, ‘the mind or soul of a man is entirely different from the body’ and it is the ‘mind alone, and not mind and body in conjunction, that is requisite to a knowledge of the truth’ (Descartes, 115 & 119). Indeed, the body ‘is merely an extended thing,’ of much less significance to the extent that Descartes ‘is certain that (he) is distinct from my body and can exist without it’ (Meditation 4). By installing the soul within the mind and by separating it from the body, Descartes effectively dehumanizes the body and creates space for the docile body.

Drew Leder in his text, A Tale of Two Bodies, develops this point by noting that framing the body as a machine that needs attention in the form of maintenance and repair rather than healing and care, diminishes an individual’s experiences and removes their human qualities, thereby reducing them and making them less relevant. The idea of the body as a machine stems from Descartes who reconceives the human body as ‘a kind of animated corpse, a functioning mechanism’ (Descartes, 119). Leder suggests that this model of the body as an automaton dominates medicine because the anatomy of the body has driven medical knowledge, which has been derived from the corpse – the dead body, and that ‘the epistemological primacy of the corpse has shaped not only medical technology but diverse aspects of training and practice’ (Leder, 121). The shift from symptoms experienced by living patients to organic pathology identified solely in the corpse has meant that disease ‘exists’ only in the material world. In other words, the truth about disease is best gleaned from dead matter and lived experience is epiphenomenal – further diminishing the importance of what the person (patient) expresses.

While the mind and soul distinction in the anatomico-metaphysical oddly displaces the body, the original distinction was seen as a benefit according to Foucault as it changed the way society viewed punishment. Before the 17th century, the punishment was ‘based on a relation of appropriation of bodies,’ this reductive view was articulated by Foucault in his vivid description of Damiens’ body as a target of sovereign power as it is relentlessly tortured to the point of being deconstructed completely (Foucault, 137). In this account, the soul (that resides in the mind) is the criminal, and yet it is the body that is being tormented. Foucault alludes to this form of punishment, that targets the body, being dehumanizing by arguing that we ‘too readily and too empathically’ construe the withdrawal of public torture as a ‘process of ‘humanization’’ (Foucault, 7). Instead, Foucault argues that punishment has morphed from torture to discipline so as to utilize the body to better serve institutions. Here Foucault insinuates that by valuing the body as a machine, instead of torturing it, the body could be trained to become docile and thus further instructed to become productive.

Understanding the anatomico-metaphysical register as the distinction between the mind and body, the body becomes docile and therefore it can be manipulated. It is here that Foucault’s second register of the technico-political (machine-body) is brought into the frame. In this register, Foucault is interested in how the body is directly engaged by institutions. In other words, how through the ‘political technology of the body’ it becomes a ‘useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body’ (Foucault, 26). However, unlike the anatomy of the body which can be seen and described, the political technology of the body ‘is rarely formulated in continuous, systematic discourse; and instead is often made up of bits and pieces’ (Foucault, 26). Furthermore, the technico-political body is ‘constituted by regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the army, the school and the hospital, for controlling or correcting the operations of the body’ (Foucault, 136). Foucault proposes that the body is governed by a ‘micro-physics of power’ in which ‘power exercised on the body is conceived not as property, but as a strategy’ and that it is ‘exercised rather than possessed’ (Foucault, 26). It is a logic that affords political control of the body, and in turn, of human beings, who are thought of as machines acting as soldiers or workers.

Political technology, via micro-physics, allows bodies to be trained for particular roles and manipulated for social purposes and gain. But such control over the body can only be enacted on the body if it is docile and malleable and has already been adopted by the anatomic-metaphysical register, wherein the mind is distinct. Similar to the anatomico-metaphysical register, the technico-political register also partitions the soul from the body – but here it is regarded ‘as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body’ that exists ‘within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished’ (Foucault, 29). Distinction of the mind as a ‘thinking-thing’ from the body lends itself to Foucault’s concept of the docile body, which connects the ‘intelligible’, ‘analysable’ body that features in the anatomico-metaphysical register and the ‘manipulable’ body that characterises the technico-political register (Descartes, 74 & Foucault, 136). Thus, the body, being highly pliable, serves as an ‘instrument or intermediary’ for the technico-political, and hence the latter is dependent on the anatomico-metaphysical (Foucault, 11).

In the context of punishment, if an institution or individual were to ‘imprison’ the body or to ‘make it work,’ Foucault suggests that the docile body now succumbs and works for those institutions to provide and be productive. This conception of the body as a productive tool completes the foundation for Foucault’s technico-political register and allows Foucault to explain the transformation of punishment – that is no longer bound by physical abuse and extortion. Punishment of a docile body aims to conform the mind by restricting the body. Therefore, the body no longer operates as a machine capable of promoting its autonomy and free-thinking. Instead, according to Foucault, this new form of punishment regards the body merely as a machine that can be constrained so as to limit the mind. This rejection of the body and mind as one, allows the latter to be captured by confining the body. Again this dehumanizes the body and centers the soul, thinking and feeling within the mind. Foucault indulges this idea as he acknowledges that institutions and society aim to correct the body through discipline and that there is a ‘modern’ form of execution – ‘the “non-corporal” penality’ (Foucault, 11 & 16). Disconnecting the body, the ‘justice reticence takes away life, but prevents the patient from feeling it and deprives the prisoner of all rights but does not inflict pain;’ execution is no longer about torturing the body instead it ‘affects life’ as ‘the soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body’ (Foucault, 11 & 30).

The theme of dehumanizing the body in both registers is further discussed by Leder who identifies the roots of this paradigm in medicine where it also leads to reductionist forms of treatment. To counter this Cartesian model of embodiment Leder invokes the term ‘lived body’, which ‘holds that the body of a living being has an essential structure of its own which cannot be captured by the language and concepts used to explain inanimate nature’ (Leder, 123). At the crux of this idea, the lived body is an ‘intending’ entity that interacts with the material world wherein interaction involves ‘intertwining’ (Leder, 123). It challenges medicine’s Cartesian duality that is drawn substantively from studying the corpse, and proposes instead that when the body falls sick, for instance, disease does not only create a broken ‘machine’ but also leads to loss of autonomy, sense of self and inter-relatedness and that these effects are integral to our experience of illness (Leder, 119). In doing so, Leder counters the machine-body model and suggests that it be substituted by the lived body in which illness is a complete experience of both the body and the mind together – meaning that the body is human and not simply material. Intertwining allows for both physiological and existential elements of illness to be regarded equally and of mutual importance both causally and experientially.

Thus, the two registers posited by Foucault, although quite different conceptually, with the anatomico-metaphysical register providing a functioning and explanatory model where the body is a machine and can be analyzed and understood as such and the technico-political register in which the body is a means of confining the mind to maintain its usefulness, both registers ultimately dehumanize the body and regard it as less important than the mind per se. Regarding punishment, the shift in registers still targets the mind albeit through confinement/control as opposed to the infliction of pain, whereas in medicine both registers fail to invest the body with lived experience and as such it is regarded as an object to be studied, treated and controlled.

Norm Kelly, a famous politician and councilor for the City of Toronto. Not only is he popular within the political community but is a well-liked and trendy figure within the world of social media. Norm Kelly belongs to the Liberal Party of Canada and also represented the City of Scarborough as a councilor as well as a representative for Ward 40 York South-Wieston for the years 2000-2018. Ever since this famous political figure entered the world of Twitter, it became prevalent that he had gained a huge fan base who thoroughly enjoyed reading his tweets and communicating with him. Despite his age, he has become a very relatable figure with the kinds of tweets he posts and his daily activity on his Twitter platform. Norm Kelly’s Twitter platform is important to analyze sociologically because he is a public figure who has a strong responsibility to keep his followers well informed about things taking place around the city. As a politician, he also has an image to maintain throughout his social media sites as his tweets are constantly being looked at by thousands of people around the city. The two sociological theorists that are going to be used in analyzing the Twitter platform of Norm Kelly are Michel Foucault and Raweyn Connell. These two theorists are relevant when analyzing the tweets of Norm Kelly because both theorists focus on concepts that have to do with the fact that he is a popular figure with a sense of responsibility to provide for the community.

Description

Over the two weeks of tweets that were observed on the Twitter platform of Norm Kelly, many of them consisted of attempts to become closer with his fan base. He is known to tweet things that bring out a comedic effect to the world of Twitter. His tweets are also very informative and he is constantly updating his followers about things that are taking place around the city and even popular things to do around Toronto. It was also observed that he adds motivational and inspiring quotes to give his followers a good start to their day. Many of his tweets are also very relatable in terms of how some of his tweets are dedicated to specific audiences. For example, one of his tweets was targeted at students who were preparing for school exams, and another tweet was targeted at families who were heading out of the country for the holidays. He also has many tweets that focus on what is taking place around the city like the fixing of potholes, or extreme cold alerts. His Twitter platform is very informative yet relevant at the same time.

Analysis

Michel Foucault and Raweyn Connell are two very influential sociologists that focused on important concepts that help analyze the interactions between a political figure like Norm Kelly and his followers that represent the population of the City of Toronto. Michel Foucault, the author of “Discipline & Punish – The Birth of the prison”, was a famous sociological theorist who had a strong passion for the social sciences. He was always involved in many social movements and focused on topics like surveillance and technologies of surveillance in our world today (Quinlan, 2019). In his book, he discusses the functions of a Panopticon and how every move in the panopticon is watched. He says, “Every day, the intendant visits the quarter in his charge, inquiries whether the syndics have carried out their tasks, whether the inhabitants have anything to complain of; they ‘observe their actions’” (Foucault, 1977). This quote best relates to the position of Norm Kelly because as a councilor and politician, he is essentially in charge of dealing with complaints that are taking place around the city. He even looks at things that could be changed further and improvements that can be made. In this case, Norm Kelly is like the “intendant” of the Panopticon and has a crucial role and responsibility in maintaining a professional political stance. Everything he says is always being observed by his followers and whatever he chooses to tweet about affects the public whether that be in a positive or negative way. The second influential sociological theorist Raweyn Connell focused more on concepts like Masculinity and how the concept of Masculinity is socially organized. In her book “The Social Organization of Masculinity”, Connell talks about the fact that “the overwhelming majority of top office holders are men because there is a gender configuring of recruitment and promotion, a gender configuring of the internal division of labor and systems of control, a gender configuring of policymaking, practical routines, and ways of mobilizing pleasure and consent” (Connell, 2005). As we know, Norm Kelly is indeed a male figure that has been a councilor for many years. It could be argued that the fact that he was able to represent the city for so many years is really because of his gender or just the fact that he has excelled in his job for a long period of time. Connell also discusses the concept of Hemogenetic masculinity. She says “Hemogenetic masculinity can be defined as the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women” (Connell, 2005). Another way to look at this idea of Hemogenetic masculinity is the fact that the domination of masculinity is not only between men and women but also men themselves. Due to this, Norm Kelly has a purpose to stay relevant in the social media world as he is always in competition with other politicians and most of the politicians being men. The more popularity Norm Kelly gains through his twitter profile, the better it is for his career because he will gain more support. These are the ideas that Michel Foucault and Raweyn Connell would use to sociologically analyze the Twitter platform of Norm Kelly.

Sociological Reflection

Both sociological theorists Michel Foucault and Raweyn Connell have a few similarities and differences between their works. Some of the similarities consist of the fact that their work revolves around the study of the male gender. When Foucault discusses the idea of the Panopticon and its functions of it, he uses men to describe the different roles that can be found in these prisons. Likewise, Connell’s main focus on her work is about masculinity and how masculinity is organized. The difference between both these theorists’ work is that Connell’s main focus is only on masculinity while Foucault covers a wide variety of topics when he discusses the prison structure. Each perspective allows us to understand why Norm Kelly remains constantly active on his Twitter platform and how that is beneficial to his career. Some of the limitations the perspective has is the fact that both theorists focus on very specific things that it is sometimes difficult to compare a social media platform and two very different sociological works.