For Richard Nixon, ending the war in Vietnam was one of his promises made during his election campaign in 1968. He saw that there was monumental opposition to the war by the American Public and by some members of Congress which ultimately led him to declare that he was “going to stop that war. Fast.” (Lawrence p138). This promise might have appealed to the American public, however, it has proven to be a much harder promise to fulfill due to the administration running up “against old problems” (Lawrence p137) as a result of previous administrations having different agendas on how to deal with the war. Aside from different agendas by different presidents, other factors that contributed to Nixon having difficulty putting the war to an end, while also wanting to achieve peace on the US’ terms included: uproars in protests carried out by the American Public, disagreements with governments and the resilience of the North Vietnamese government and their allies. All of these factors contributed to the obstacles that Nixon had when finding ways to put the Vietnam War to an end without making the US look weak as they were still in the midst of the Cold War against the Soviet Union, which was an ally of North Vietnam.
It is no question that Nixon had one of the most difficult tasks at hand; finding a way for the US to withdraw from Vietnam, while also finding a peaceful resolution that does not make the US look weak. Even before Nixon took office in 1969, South Vietnam was already politically and militarily weak, which made them very vulnerable to the communists of North Vietnam and their allies: China and the USSR. Additionally, as election time came around every four years, new leadership was brought to the US which meant that during the course of the war, there were Presidents with different agendas that led to the US not being able to fully execute a long-term plan of withdrawal from Vietnam. Determined to fulfill his promise of withdrawing from Vietnam quickly, Nixon drew up multiple strategies to get the US out of Vietnam, whilst also ensuring that South Vietnam was not vulnerable to a communist takeover and one of those strategies was finding ways of isolating North Vietnam from their communist Allies by convincing the Soviet Union to opt for peace as opposed to increased military tensions. To do this, Nixon had to have hoped that the Soviet Union had a “desire to open negotiations with Washington” (Lawrence p139). By doing that, Nixon could have hoped that eventually, North Vietnam would have steadily become economically and militarily weaker due to the fact that the Soviet Union was their main provider of resources. Another strategy Nixon used was intimidation. He devised a plan where the US would secretly bomb Cambodia as he believed that it would “provoke little opposition so long as casualties were low, and no ground troops were involved” (Schulzinger p278). This strategy was aimed at making the North Vietnamese not underestimate the power of the USA and Nixon as the new leader of the US. Therefore, through strategical planning, Nixon had hoped that this would have allowed the US to have the upper hand in withdrawing from Vietnam without losing the country to communism.
Though these strategies all seemed like sensible ideas for withdrawing from Vietnam while still coming out on top, there were drawbacks that Nixon did not see coming. When Nixon proposed to the Soviet Union to approach the situation by peaceful means, he found that the Soviet Union was more concerned about losing China as an ally if they had chosen the peaceful route, therefore, this left the US unable to put pressure on North Vietnam. Another obstacle Nixon faced was the determination of the North Vietnamese soldiers. The US had underestimated the North Vietnamese forces most likely due to the US thinking that their technology was able to wipe out an entire army, however, that was not the case. The North Vietnamese government believed that it was more beneficial to continue fighting rather than to surrender as they wanted to “offset losses” (Lawrence p141). Therefore, even though Nixon had thought of sensible strategies to get the US out of Vietnam, it is clear that there were obstacles he had to face as a result of the resilience the North Vietnamese put up as a way of showing the US that they were not going to back down without a fight and due to negotiation failures, such as with the Soviet Union in attempting to opt for peaceful resolutions as opposed to increased military tension.
Alongside strategical tactics to get the US out of Vietnam, Nixon had other obstacles to overcome in withdrawing from Vietnam. The South Vietnamese government was always weak and vulnerable, so finding ways to ensure that they would be able to continue to survive without foreign aid from the US was a priority for Nixon. Prior to Nixon taking office, South Vietnam was politically unstable under the Diem government, which made the nation more vulnerable to a takeover by North Vietnam. The army was in disarray, the government was in shambles and the South Vietnamese population began to question whether or not the Diem government was one to live under and some began defecting to North Vietnam as a result. However, since Nixon took office, he and Kissinger saw that the new government under Thieu “remained stable” (Lawrence p139) as a result of the fact that the “military and political situation was better than it had been in years” (Lawrence p139). Additionally, under a joint effort between the US and South Vietnam, the ARVN was able to “extend Saigon’s control over the countryside” (Lawrence p139). Furthermore, under this joint effort, Nixon was still determined to have the US withdraw its troops no matter what and with efforts by him and Kissinger, they continued what Johnson started in an attempt to “build up the South Vietnamese military” (Lawrence p140) and this included increased military training, an increased supply of weapons and technology. This scheme was known as “Vietnamization”. It was a scheme aimed at both withdrawing from South Vietnam, while still providing resources for the ARVN in their continued self-defense. After the Tet Offensive, “morale had sunk among US Troops” (Schulzinger p277) and funding for troops overseas for the “535,000 troops” (Schulzinger p277) had also gone. Therefore, to combat this, Vietnamization had seen an increase of ARVN troops from “850,000 to 1,000,000 men” (Schulzinger p277), whilst also turning over “huge quantities of weaponry” (Schulzinger p277) to the South Vietnamese. This showed how perhaps Nixon’s approach and the new Thieu government were among the factors where this stronger South Vietnamese government was not an obstacle to withdrawing from South Vietnam.
Even though Nixon had the pieces together in ensuring that perhaps South Vietnam could survive on its own without aid from the US, there was indeed an obstacle that he faced that made withdrawal a lot more difficult; the stubbornness of the North Vietnamese. The NLF knew that “to achieve victory they need only wait for the Americans to go home” (Lawrence p140). This was among one the factors that contributed to Nixon’s stalling on having the US troops return to America, even during and after public opposition began to rise on the streets of the US. It can be inferred that Nixon knew that if the US completely withdrew before “Vietnamization” began, it would have been a matter of time before South Vietnam was engulfed by North Vietnam and the entire nation was ruled under a Soviet-inspired communist regime. During the Paris Peace Talks, negotiations and peace settlements began to come around, however, no agreements were made. Both sides were attempting to think strategically about how to approach the situation by looking for weaknesses in each other. The North Vietnamese figured that they had more to “gain by continuing to fight than by making peace” (Lawrence p141). They believed that they needed more time to recover after suffering heavy losses in their army, and they also wanted to be in a position to be able to “negotiate from a position of strength” (Lawrence p141). Furthermore, the North Vietnamese knew about public opposition from the US regarding the war and as a result, they believed that it would have forced Nixon to negotiate on communist terms. Therefore, with North Vietnam wanting to also portray itself as a strong, resilient nation, Nixon had to find ways to overcome the obstacle of North Vietnam not wanting to be submissive to the US’ demands during the Paris Agreement. The North Vietnamese were very clear, and they wanted a “US withdrawal from South Vietnam and the creation of a coalition government excluding Thieu” (Lawrence p142), which effectively meant that South Vietnam would have been lost to communism, should the US have agreed at the time. This was among one of the most difficult obstacles Nixon had to deal with when finding ways to ensure a US victory, whilst also fulfilling his promise of withdrawal from Vietnam completely.
Domestic obstacles were also a contributing factor to the difficulties Nixon faced during the war. An uprise in anti-war protests became a problem for the US in late 1969. Many of these protesters were university students and as a result, protests “erupted on hundreds of college campuses across the country” (Schulzinger p287). Not only just university students, but government officials also felt that the war was a major driving force in weakening the economy as the war “would seriously damage the American economy and undermine the country’s ability to sustain its military commitment elsewhere in the world (Lawrence p127). This meant that even those who did not oppose the war on moral causes had other reasons to support the anti-war movement, as they and the US would have been negatively impacted by an expansion of the war effort. Additionally, another factor that contributed to the anti-war movement was ideas rising about what the American government was doing with tax money as some believed that the money was solely used to “wage war on Vietnam” using “billions of dollars” (Ayers p119). Perhaps by knowing that the tax money was not used domestically to benefit members of the public by improving infrastructure or improving education for example and instead, using the money to fund the military for a war that the US was losing in, this was one of the reasons why protests began to erupt as the American Public and even some members of the government began to withdraw their support to the war. Therefore, the anti-war protests were not solely due to university students expressing their displeasure with the war, but they were a contributing factor to the movement. Despite Nixon promising to withdraw from Vietnam as quickly as possible, it is evident that these anti-war protesters perhaps felt that he was not trying hard enough as US troop presence in Vietnam continued well into his time as President. Therefore, it is no question that these movements made a significant contribution to one of the obstacles Nixon faced when dealing with the war.
Despite these movements, there arguably was a valid reason as to why Nixon carried on allowing operations to continue in Vietnam. As the war was occurring during a tense period of the Cold War, the US was determined to contain communism to the best of its ability following the Truman & Eisenhower Doctrine. With the way the war was going, the odds were against the US’ favor, yet they were still determined not to give up because had the US lost at that time, many other countries seeking help from the US would begin to question whether or not they would be able to do so, which would lead to countries believing that the US is not able to ‘function effectively’ (Lawrence p139). Therefore, it can be inferred that Nixon struggled to put both the US and world interests in mind at the same time, however, it is no question that the ongoing crisis of the Cold War posed an obstacle for Nixon to get out of Vietnam to better serve the interests of the American public and to put an end to the anti-war movements.
The final agreement in Paris in January 1973 stated that there was a cease-fire agreement throughout Vietnam “beginning at midnight on January 27” (Schulzinger p303). This ended US participation in assisting to the fighting in Vietnam and even though this may have come off as a sign of relief for the American Public, most of whom resented the war, for the Vietnamese, this sign did not come off as a relief for them. By withdrawing, it led to ‘shortages of fuel and equipment (Lawrence p165) for the South Vietnamese Army and for the general public, with the government already very weak, the American withdrawal meant that many people were left with ‘unemployment, inflation, and a stunted manufacturing sector’ (Lawrence p165). Therefore, as far as detente goes, it is clear that even though that detente may have had a positive impact and image on the leaders of the US and USSR in easing tensions, it is also very clear that for the Vietnamese, that due to the fact that the US withdrew, it left Vietnam vulnerable and in a state of instability, due to the US unable to “do nothing more to help the government of President Thieu” (Schulzinger p332). Even after the US left for good, the war still continued and an “additional three hundred thousand Vietnamese had lost their lives” (Schulzinger p304), which showed how the war ended not on Nixon’s terms that he would have liked, but due to immense public opposition from the US, it almost seemed inevitable that he had to withdraw from Vietnam for good to ensure that peace could have been maintained in the US, and he also had to fulfill his promise on withdrawing quickly from Vietnam. Therefore, the Paris Agreement of 1973 was not necessarily an obstacle in the war for Nixon to overcome, but it was most definitely not an easy decision to follow through on seeing as the US was committed to combatting communism during the course of not just the Vietnam War, but also the Cold War too.
Overall, for Richard Nixon, finding ways to withdraw from Vietnam was a top priority, however, it came with many obstacles to overcome. With South Vietnam relying heavily on the US to provide support economically and militarily, Nixon wanted to make sure that they had all of the support they needed to combat their communist enemies. Despite the Thieu government being stronger and more sustainable than the previous Diem government, it still was not enough to protect themselves from invasions by the North. The next obstacle that came with doing that was public opposition, who wanted Nixon to withdraw from Vietnam completely, regardless of whether or not it helped South Vietnam. Domestic opposition grew intensively during the Nixon Administration, which was why Nixon wanted to withdraw quickly as soon as he assumed the presidency in 1969. The Paris Agreement was the final step to ensuring that the US involvement in Vietnam would be finished, even though not all parties involved were completely satisfied. The US public may have been pleased, however, it is fair to state that it was likely that the South Vietnamese were not fond of their ally leaving them vulnerable to North Vietnam for a communist takeover. All in all, the war during the Nixon Administration proved to be a very difficult case for Nixon himself in attempting to find solutions that both benefitted Vietnam and the US without having to face obstacles that put the US in a dangerous spot in the Cold War.
Bibliography
- Ayers, Bill. “Fugitive Days: a memoir”.
- Lawrence, Mark A. “The Vietnam War”. 1st edition (2008)
- Schulzinger, Robert D. “A Time for War”. 1st edition (1997)