Category: Just War Theory

The discussion of the ethics of war goes back to the Greeks and Romans, although neither civilisation behaved particularly well in war. In the Christian tradition war ethics were developed by St Augustine, and later by St Thomas Aquinas and others. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a Dutch philosopher and author of De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (The Rights of War and Peace), wrote down the conditions for a just war that are accepted today.

Cicero argued that there was no acceptable reason for war outside of just vengeance or self defence – in which he included the defence of honour. He also argued that a war could not be just unless it was publicly declared and unless compensation for the enemy’s offence had first been demanded. Cicero based his argument on the assumption that nature and human reason biased a society against war, and that there was a fundamental code of behaviour for nations. St Augustine was a 4th century Christian who lived in Algeria and Italy. He believed that the only just reason to go to war was the desire for peace.

We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace. Augustine tried to reconcile Christian pacifism with the world as it actually was; to bring together the pacifist teachings of Jesus Christ with the obligations of Roman citizens – including Christians – to fight for their country when required to. Augustine accepted that there would always be wars. He thought that war was always a sin, and if there had to be a war, it should be waged with sadness. But Augustine said that war was always the result of sin, and that war was also the remedy for sin. And if war was the remedy for sin, then war could sometimes be justifiable – but only if it was a remedy for sin. Augustine made it clear that individuals and states (or the rulers of states) have different obligations when it came to war or violence.

He stated that Christians did not have the right to defend themselves from violence, however they could use violence if it was necessary to defend the innocent against evil.

The rulers of states, he said, had an obligation to maintain peace, and this obligation gave them the right to wage war in order to maintain peace. It also gave them the right to wage war in order to ensure justice and even impose punishment – something that would not be accepted nowadays.

A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly. This was because injustice was a greater evil than war, and it was proper to carry out a lesser evil if it would prevent a greater evil.

But a war is only just if those waging it do so with the intention of doing good. Punishing the enemy is not a sufficient motive on its own.True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandisement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good. Augustine was much less concerned with how people should be treated during a war, because to him, physical death was not a particularly important thing.

The ethics and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is often questioned, with a nation’s real intentions often being unknown, and this has led to beliefs that it may be used as a façade to disguise neocolonialism occurring. The idea of humanitarian intervention was publicised and reworked by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) name, as now used by the UN. Within the released report The Responsibility to protect, humanitarian intervention was discussed, looking at “the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state.” (ICISS, 2001). The R2P doctrine now exists as an endorsed obligation by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly following the 2005 World Summit (UN, 2005). Humanitarian intervention and humanitarian aid are linked by some to colonialism due to the economic influence of some nations upon states in need of humanitarian support following the period of instability. Historically, the colonial project was seen to act in two ways: direct military control or imperialism, and indirect political control with ideological hegemony being pressed upon nations. This definition has now changed greatly to involve the passive use of globalisation, cultural hegemony and capitalism to engage and influence a developing country. It is in this context, as well as looking at remnants of historical colonialism, that this essay shall identify if the colonial project is still ongoing through humanitarian intervention as its medium. This will aim to break down the moral justification of humanitarian intervention through the R2P doctrine to see if this is still truthful and legitimately being employed. To this aim, within the essay examination of any unjust deployments of humanitarian intervention and their justifications will occur as well as looking at if the implementation of the R2P doctrine within the neo-liberal global climate has improved or exacerbated any national or regional crises as an unintended consequence and how this may result in human rights impacts. Secondly, the essay will look at the main actors involved in humanitarian aid and how it is often implemented by these actors, looking at the Just War Theory (IEP) as a guideline. This can then be used to compare historical colonialism and neocolonialism as some scholars argue is now taking place. This can be analysed to see if these key actors are putting the domestic affairs of the country and its citizens first in returning the conflicted nation to a state of peace. The conclusion will suggest that due to globalisation, colonialism cannot be defined as it historically has been in the past with the existence of imperial nations. As a result, those who believe that the spread of cultural hegemony is a form of neocolonialism may argue that the colonial project is ongoing. The project as imagined however with many international colonies forming part of an imperial nation cannot be seen to be realistic anymore and so this may suggest that the question should not be regarding a colonial project and the historical discourse related to this, but looking at the new forms of colonialism and national hegemony which international superpowers may wish to achieve.

Humanitarian intervention has been justified for decades as a responsibility to protect and as a result it has become an international norm for large international actors with the ability to reduce suffering to act. This can be traced to the increasing importance in human rights and appropriate governance as advocated by the UN. Conflict has arisen over the R2P and humanitarian intervention due to the principle of non-intervention which has legally been described as ‘essential for the maintenance of international peace and security’ and how this can be ignored by the subjective opinions of culturally different nations. Non-intervention has historically been a key principle for liberal political philosophers. Liberal thinkers such as Kant and Mill believed that without the security of their national borders and absolute sovereignty, the people of a nation would not be able to govern themselves as truly free individuals as was historically denied to people in colonised countries. This however has also been the definitive justification used by states when considering humanitarian intervention due to the inability of some states to safely and responsibly provide security to its citizens. This acceptance of a non-intervention policy however can lead to atrocities occurring, such as in Rwanda in 1994. Refusal to engage in any humanitarian intervention in Rwanda resulted in the murder of approximately 800,000 Tutsi citizens by the Hutu-led government. Further contention also occurs over the R2P doctrine and the use of humanitarian intervention over legal legitimacy. A key example of such is the humanitarian intervention which occurred in Kosovo by NATO forces. The campaign was described as illegal due to its lack of approval from the UN security council, yet held legitimacy due to the exhaustion of diplomatic means of resolution, as well as being the only way to stop the crimes taking place. This legitimate intervention caused no moral issues regarding its justification and was never seen to be an extension of neocolonialism occurring due to the collective deployment of NATO forces without any political agenda following the troop deployment.

Humanitarian Intervention has also been used to enable other objectives whilst allowing a nation’s true intentions to remain hidden. A key example of such an intervention as seen by many globally is the invasion of Iraq, with the war not being primarily about stopping atrocities, with a failure to try to implement non-military options before invasions. The main rationale for the invasion of Iraq in 2001, as announced by President Bush, was to disarm the nuclear threat to the world and America which existed through Saddam Hussein’s possession of chemical and biological weapons. This clearly does not fulfil the criteria for the use of humanitarian intervention, as whilst their may have been an underlying threat to individuals within Iraq, the main justification was the global threat due to the possession of such weapons. The Chilcot Inquiry found that the UK and the USA had undermined the authority of the UN Security Council with a lack of legal basis for the intervention, resulting in the war being unnecessary with unsatisfactory evidence of the existence of the chemical and biological weapons. The report represents an effort to provide accountability following the intervention, with criticisms of the government of the time being made, and as a result it may make future intervention a much more appropriate use of the R2P doctrine otherwise governments are aware that even they may be held personally accountable for their actions. Furthermore this is significant due to the R2P doctrine being unentrenched at the time of the Iraq invasion and so was inherently illegal, as declared by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Whilst the USA may not have been a historical colonial superpower, as some European nations may be classified as, it still held colonies in the Americas such as Haiti and Puerto Rico and as such there is a degree of colonial history. The invasion of Iraq may have been a continuation of this imperialism through ideological methods, with Bush wishing to impose the US ideologies of ‘democratic, liberal free trading, and human rights’. This hegemonic belief in their own values was demonstrated in the National Security Strategy of 2002 with the statement ‘American values are universal values’.

The war in Afghanistan may not be seen as humanitarian intervention outright however it may provide justifications due to the military intervention having humanitarian objectives. Such an intervention questions the definition of humanitarian intervention as can a military intervention be classified as humanitarian if it holds strong humanitarian objectives within its character? Colonial projects have never involved humanitarian objectives historically from an onlooking perspective and this may make the separation between modern intervention and historical colonialism and imperialism. Looking at the Afghanistan conflict as purely humanitarian however does cause contention. Issues arise due to how the international community only looked to Afghanistan as an area of military deployment following the 9/11 attacks yet no humanitarian aid or intervention had been considered to help the Afghani people prior to this. Afghanistan may represent a new dimension to the colonial project which may continue to grow throughout the 21st century through the dependence on the United States by Karzai and his government.

Imagine you are a Syrian refugee, going from camp to camp with little to no hope of finding a better life. Having fled your home with the fears of being killed, tortured, or kidnapped. You are forced to leave your home for staying would be worse than leaving. Sadly, this is the reality for over 4.5 million Syrian refugees. The war has caused a global refugee crisis that has yet to be resolved. The just war theory can be applied to the ongoing Syrian war, which is the ethics and reasons of war. Following the events of the war, and after analyzing the motives behind the decisions made it is apparent

The Syria civil war began in 2011, with the killing of a thirteen-year old boy, charged with graffitiing the walls of a church. “The killing of 13-year-old Hamza al-Khatib in custody, and the return of his mutilated body to his family, led to widespread rioting throughout the province”. He was wrongfully imprisoned and killed, after he was killed riots broke out across the country, people were enraged. This was not the sole event that caused the war, there were many reasons that led up to the war. One major reason was the Assad regime which has dictated over the country for many decades. The Regime is the current form of Syrian government and is led by Bassar-al-Hassad, who has been the Syrian dictator for many decades. The people felt that Assad regime was unfair, wanted Assad to step down and for the government to be reformed. The people did not like the way that the government worked, they wanted new laws to be put in place that were fair and gave more rights to the people. To demonstrate this, the people protested, at first the riots were peaceful and relatively small but as the protesting got more popular and more people became involved, the more violent they became. The more people that got involved the more afraid they became, what was at first peaceful protesting became a country wide movement for reformation.

The Regime responded to these protests and demands made by the people by giving a series of speeches that promised peace and reform. These speeches were given over a series of months, with talked a plan to reform the current governmental system. These “changes include the right to protest and civil dissent in Syria. Assad also spoke of the need for economic reforms and greater accountability”. However, theses speeches had no effect on the people, and they kept protesting. Assad’s plan was never really put into effect meaning they were just empty words. The protests got more intense and violent to which the Regime responded with the same intensity and violence. Syrian military was deployed to every city within the country with the intent to beat the rebellion down. “The summer of 2011 saw a sharp increase in the daily number of casualties as the regime sought to crush the rebellion. This period also saw increased defections from the army, and the first appearance of organized, armed opposition to the Assad regime”. Within the same year both the regime and the rebels responded to violence with more focused and organized violence. The rebellion got bigger, so the regime responded by deploying militia to every city in Syria, to which the rebellion responded by organizing themselves into a sort of army. They became a force to be reckoned with, no longer peaceful protestors.

The just war theory explains the ethics and justice system involved with war. Looking through the lens of the rebels looking at the war, the Regime has treated them unfairly, they protested, and the Regime responded with violence. To the rebels the Regime has done nothing butt kill and tear down the people, not bothering to listen to their needs. But when the lens is flipped the Regime tried to preach reformation, but the people did not heed their words. So, they had to respond by getting rid of any opposition before it spirals out of control. Looking at the war from the lens of the just war ethical theory which states “War may be waged when circumstances justify it. But even this theory requires that there be no reasonable alternative to war, and that the proposed military action will accomplish more good than bad”. So really the war was not justified, the people were protesting, and the Regime did not do their part to meet the people’s needs. There are many alternatives to war; negotiation, compliance, nonviolence, peace, or cooperation to name a few. War was not Syria’s last resort, the rebels and the Regime could have negotiated and come to an agreement, the Regime could have listened to the rebels and complied to their needs.

Looking at the beginning of the war it was not born out of necessity but “born out of the collapse of civil societies, perpetuated by fear, greed, and paranoia”. The countries structure was crumbling and eventually collapsed. The people for a long time had been “brutally repressed” by the Regime, and so the people snapped. They required fairness, but the Regime responded to opposition by almost immediately deploying militia to every city of Syria, which did nothing but further the conflict. They made no real attempts to cooperate or negotiate, instead going straight to war. All that has come out of military interference was bloodshed. So, by definition of just war theory the Syrian war was unnecessary and unjust.

The fighting went back and forth all the way through 2012, up until that point the Regime was conquering and gaining ground, the rebels were pushing into lands owned by the Regime. The rebels wanted to push through and meet Assad head on, but at the end of 2012 neither side could fight anymore. Which means that there was a stalemate, neither side could fight so for the time being there was no fighting, the war was at a standstill. This stalemate is “derived from the fact that while the regime was unable to reconquer and hold all the areas that it had ceded to the insurgency, the rebels themselves lacked the strength to move forward into regime-controlled areas and defeat Assad head on.” The rebels had taken land that belonged to the Regime, and the Regime was trying to regain that land. However, the rebels lacked the strength to push on and the Regime lacked the strength and manpower to take back the land the rebels had taken. Thus, there was a stalemate, which is when the war essentially comes to a standstill. The war did come to a standstill but that did not mean it came to an end. In fact, the war is still going on today, it was never resolved during the stalemate.

Consider the theories of personhood and rights, these explain what a person really is and the rights they deserve. Human rights theory is essentially the basis of all ethical theories, with personhood to help supplement and explain.

There is still fighting today, in fact in just the “last 4 years about 0.4 million people have been killed in Aleppo (a city in Syria) and its surroundings. Most of its population has either been killed as a result of aerial bombardment, blown off with cannons or has moved to Europe through Turkey”. There have been more than half a million deaths since the beginning of the war in 2011. The Regime has specifically targeted the city of Aleppo since it is priority to gain control of. The war today has also spread beyond the borders of Syria going into most if not all neighboring countries. Which has caused a global refugee crisis, the war has instilled fear into thousands of families causing them to flee the country.

There is no immediate end in sight to these issues, the war is still ongoing with no attempt at resolution. There will continue to be more bloodshed and further crisis the longer the war goes on. The war was never and will never be ethical as long as it goes on. By the laws and rules of the just war theory, there is no part of the Syrian war that is just or ethical.

Yemen is facing with problems they have been struggling to resolve for a long period. Their incapability to fix these obstacles is putting them at risk with even greater ones. Due to the years of conflict, they have dealt with they are on the brink of a catastrophe. Yemen is one of the world’s poorest countries and almost every third person needs humanitarian assistance. Ten million of its people is in hunger, and the number has more than doubled since four years ago. First, I will discuss the events that have happened to this country then I will go over the statistics that this conflict has caused. Lastly, I will go over how the concepts/theories that can be related to this crisis.

The people of Yemen are struggling so severely due to the conflict that’s been happening there in the recent years. The root of the cause of the civil war that’s been terrorizing the country has been a result of politics. In 2011, the authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to give his position and role in the government to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. President Hadi’s failure to bring stability from this political transition from many problems caused most of the conflict. There were numerous problems that the government was facing and he didn’t seem to make much of an impact. The challenges they were facing that they had to fix were: food shortages, corruption in the government (Saleh’s men still continued loyalty to him), and extremist attacks. Many people believed he was doing a bad job as president and some group were against him such as the Houthis. The Houthis, a group who were rebelling against Saleh during his presidency has wreaked terror to the government. Many people of Yemen supported the Houthis. Attacking the northern province of Saada and neighboring areas. In March of 2015, this group then tried taking over the entire country which forced President Hadi to flee the country. The Houthis rise of power was believed to be helped militarily by mostly Shia, Iran. Nine mostly Sunni Arab states then tried to restore President Hadi’s power in the government by beginning an air campaign. They were also getting support from a few of the allied nations: the US, UK, and France. At the beginning of the war, it was only believed to last a few weeks, said Saudi officials. It’s still continuing four years later. The two are fighting and constantly trying to get rid of the other. The Houthis alliance with ex-president Saleh fell off in November of 2017, which resulted in leaving dozens of people dead at Sanaa’s biggest mosque. Then in December of 2017, the Houthis killed Saleh. While both sides are still fighting, the people of Yemen suffered tremendously since it’s already such a poor country. The humanitarian problems the people are suffering went up tremendously. The statistics are terrifying. BBC said that “at least 8.4 million people at risk of starvation and 22.2 million people – 75% of the population – in need of humanitarian assistance, according to the UN. Severe acute malnutrition is threatening the lives of almost 400,000 children under the age of five.” The civil war has made a lot of people homeless too, more than 3 million people had to flee from their homes. With the country being so poor, it caused the “world’s largest cholera outbreak” which has killed thousands. Because people have to drink dirty water and have been malnourished. Describing the situation in Yemen, it may be the world’s worst man made humanitarian disaster. What may the casualties look like of this crisis? The UN believes more than 6,800 civilians have been killed and at least 10,700 injured in the fighting since March 2015. A group tracking the civil war believes the amount of casualties is far higher than that of the UN. “The US-based

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project estimates that more than 60,000 civilians and combatants have been killed since 2016, based on news reports of each incident of violence.”

This violent crisis is would be described as a man vs man conflict. The Houthis who are against the government, whilst getting help from Saleh’s people. This created tension between the new president, they used his weakness in their favor and tried to overthrow the government. Since President Hadi’s transition into power there has been a constant battle. Their famine of resources was created alone. In total, the battle itself was all created alone and the

suffering of all its people was all due to how the people were against their own government. This caused havoc among the life of the civilians and destroyed many places people called home. It also caused the food insecurity they handle. The source I believe is the transition of power for the presidency. There was a structural violence of the Houthis and Saleh against Hadi. It became a cultural violence though when it became a Sunni vs Shia battle, this occurred when Iran and Saudi Arabia

joined the fight. This current conflict hinders the possibilities of a stable peace with its people against their own government and then it also being a religious battle. I doubt it will ever come to a resolution that will grant peace to the country of Yemen. There are too many problems going on there and with the country being so poor, I have a hard time thinking they’ll ever be able to rebuild from what’s happened. If they can get back from what’s occurred, the country needs all the money they can get from neighboring countries and allies.

Unfortunate events have been happening to Yemen constantly, people dying constantly due to the civil war and the food insecurity. With this civil war happening, would it be considered just? Just war theory has conditions that need to be met before it can be considered just. Some of these conditions are: is it morally justified, what must one do to morally conduct a war, and lastly, how can both sides end it and promote lasting peace after. Putting all of this into consideration, the civil war that’s Putting all this into consideration, the civil war that’s been going on with Yemen would be considered not just. I feel like it’s been going on too long to be considered. All the people in Yemen are also being punished for what’s been happening around them. The next would be the Violence triangle from Galtung. It helps describe the three types of violence: direct, structural, and cultural. While all three is connected to each other some ways. The line through the middle of the triangle suggests how visible it is to us. Direct violence being at the top of the triangle and most noticeable to us. The civil wars in Yemen would be considered a direct violence which has portions of it being about cultural and structural violence. I would say it’s mainly direct though because of the large amount of casualties and it being so visible due to most people who’ve lost homes because of it. Lastly, I’ll compare the ABC triangle which Galtung also created. It helps go in deeper into the three important aspects of conflict: attitude, behavior,

and context. When using the triangle, each aspect stands for something else. Attitude means the parties’ perception, behavior meaning the behavior between the two parties in conflict, and lastly, the different goals between the parties. The houthis are against the government that creates this attitude and context that they’re against them. Their actions talking about the things they do to dispose of the other for behavior. While the government is trying to fight the Houthis but also fix the problems going on in the country too. Their goal is to help the people while the Houthis goal is to get rid of them.

The conflict going on in Yemen is a tragedy that has plagued many with injuries, death, and hunger. The civil war is causing much uproar and the government is struggling to fight them, and the other problems which have risen since the war has begun. Lastly, I spoke about the events that lead to the problem, the statistics behind it, and war concepts/theories that can be used to identify the problem.

According to the US Department of Defence, “irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and non- state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” (“Irregular Warfare” 5). Irregular warfare is waged by irregular fighters such as terrorists or guerrillas and what constitutes irregular warfare is determined by the tactics of war deemed unjust by just war theory and thus excluded from International Humanitarian Law. However, the just reasons for going to war and the tactics deemed just by international law are extreme state centric and oriented around Western Christian moral values. What is not taken into account is the various restrictions placed on war in different cultural environments and societies where irregular fighters are prevalent and necessary (Mégret 265-317). This essay argues that irregular fighters do not inherently wage an ‘unfair’ kind of war due to the fact that various cultures place different limitations on war and thus no single type of war fought by a specific group of individuals is innately just or unjust. Rather, armed conflict is justifiable by any group of fighters, utilizing any means when said conflict is waged defensively, as a last resort, and when the means utilized are of a lesser evil than those of the aggressor.

Just war theory is a doctrine that emerged from Catholic moral theology in the Middle Ages (“Michael Walzer on Just War Theory”). It is the most widely accepted concept of just war, as its two parts make up the laws of war as expressed in the Geneva Conventions. It is made up of two sets of criteria, one of which, Jus ad bellum (justice to war), is to be consulted prior to engaging in war and the other, Jus in bello (justice in war), is to be consulted during the war. Jus ad bellum determines whether or not starting a war is justifiable and Jus in bello determines whether a force’s tactics in war are justifiable. Overall, Jus ad bellum states that war needs to be proclaimed by a legitimate authority, be in self-defence, be a last resort, and have a decent likelihood of success. Just in bello states that war shall be fought with proportional methods and thus the damage done should not exceed the good to be acquired, it must be fought with the motivating reason of love for the opposing side, fought with minimal force, and non-combatants are not to be attacked (Amjad-Ali 243). These two criteria of judgement are independent of each other and thus “it is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules (Walzer 21). This is a paradox, as it is the right to resist aggression, but such resistance is susceptible to moral and legal constraint (Walzer 21). As summed up perfectly by Michael Walzer in his text Just and Unjust Wars, “the dualism of jus ad bellum and jus in bello is at the heart of all that is most problematic in the moral reality of war” (Walzer 21). According to just war theory, if a state is illegally involved in a war, its forces can still wound and kill enemy fighters as long as the way they do it follows the guidelines set by International Humanitarian Law, which disallows certain non-selective modes of killing. Hypocritically, the guidelines of International Humanitarian Law are mostly considered separate from the justness of the war itself. Why should declaring war for an unjust cause be excused by using approved methods of warfare and how can there be any major differentiation when it comes to killing? Surely if a war is unjust then any killings during it are unjust, regardless of whether or not they are deemed legitimate by international law. Furthermore, how is it decided that certain methods of killing in war are considered better than others since some are acceptable and others are forbidden (Kutz 157-8)? These methods of warfare and reasons for declaring war that are accepted in International Humanitarian Law and laid out in the Geneva Conventions are based in the criteria of jus as bellum and jus in bello, which were adjusted over time to comply with Western Christian values and norms of war. They focus on state forces, completely dismissing the legitimacy of any other type of force or fighter, thus giving privilege to the uniformed fighter recognized officially by a sovereign state. This allows for an ‘other’ to have formed that is excluded from international humanitarian law (Mégret 266). The laws of war based in just war theory are a projection of Western imperialism and expansion which includes its own violence even though it attempts to control violence. They project a fantasy of war and destruction that is not universally shared and therefore promote the idea that non-western people have to wage war that adheres to the terms of the West (Mégret 308).

People decide what is and what is not war and they have done so in various cultural environments and concluded that war is limited, as they have constructed specific ideas about what tactics can be used, who can fight, when battle must end, and what privileges come with winning. No matter the type, war is hell because of the victims of the fighting. Innocent civilian bystanders do not volunteer to be part of the war and are thus the real victims of war. Whether directly targeted by forces or whether indirectly killed as collateral damage, large numbers of civilians die as a result of war and this is not just (Walzer 24-30). Irregular fighters may not adhere to western principles of just war, but they have their own morals used for justifying war based on their culture and religion. While their principles may not be recognized as legitimate by the United Nations and International Law as those of the West are, they are arguably no less valuable and are still used to justify armed conflict and violence conducted by fighters deemed irregular by Western society such as guerrillas or terrorists. As such fighters adhere to their own moral code, they do not inherently wage an ‘unfair’ war kind of war. When different societies place varying limitations on war, there can be no single type of war fought by a specific group of individuals that is innately just or unjust (Walzer 180-181). When examining guerrillas, the main criticism they face is that they sometimes disguise themselves as civilians and hide amongst them. This goes against the rule of war that each individual must be determined as either a civilian or a soldier and that by disguising themselves among enemies they are inviting their enemies to attack civilians even if they do not themselves attack civilians. However, guerrillas argue that they do not need to distinguish themselves because they are no longer being protected by an army and are therefore protecting themselves. Guerrilla war is a war of the people that comes from below, rather than a traditional state-sponsored war waged from above. Guerrilla fighters see themselves not as a lone fighter disguising himself among civilians, but rather a group of people called to war and himself as a loyal constituent among many (Walzer 179-80). “If you want to fight against us, the guerrillas say, you are going to have to fight civilians, for you are not at war with an army but with a nation. Therefore, you should not fight at all, and if you do, you are barbarians, killing women and children” (Walzer 180). While guerrillas do take part in terrorist campaigns, which are occasionally even against their fellow countrymen and they burn villages and take hostages, they usually do these things less than the anti-guerrilla groups (Walzer 180). However, oftentimes such tactics used by guerrillas are unavoidable and necessary due to the terrain, lack of resources, limited number of forces, and the high capability of their enemies. Unlike the regular forces of a state, irregular fighters do not receive funding or resources from a wealthy state (Gross). Irregular fighters usually all adhere to their own moral code, whether based on religion or ethics alone. One such example is the Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army issued by Mao Tse-Tung in 1947, leader of the then peasant guerrilla force. They included rules such as forbidding the taking of things from the people, turning in everything seized, paying a fair price for everything bought, returning what has been borrowed, compensating for anything damaged, no swearing at or hitting people, no harming crops, no taking advantage of women, and no mistreating captives (“China, Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung”).

Another group of irregular fighters under much contention when it comes to waging and participating in just war is terrorists. As defined by Louise Richardson, “terrorism, simply put, means deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purposes” (Richardson 20). Terrorists carry out attacks generally because of anger, humiliation, the desire for revenge or glory, or commitment to a cause. Furthermore, they are generally people who feel alienated from society and have a grievance or see themselves as a victim of injustice (Hudson 37). They want to belong to a group and they believe themselves to be acting morally and they justify their actions on moral grounds (Richardson 34). The main problem with terrorism as a type of armed conflict in the eyes of just war theory is that terrorism is aimed at the vulnerable who cannot protect themselves. It is thus by nature a crim against humanity. It is viewed as fundamentally evil because it is deliberate violence against innocent people and in western tradition, religion is not considered a just cause for war because there is no way to decide which religion is more just in terms of its moral and political action (Turner Johnson 60-61). However, terrorist groups, specifically radical Islamic groups have their own moral and legal framework to justify their actions. This is held in the Qur’an with its four various understandings of lesser jihad as read, studied, and implemented by Muslims. Lesser jihad is about defending Islam from outside threat and sometimes called Holy War. Its four understandings are non-confrontation, argumentation, “confrontation within defined limitations,” and “unconditional command to fight all unbelievers,” which is the understanding adopted by radical Islamic groups (Amjad-Ali 244). Terrorism became popular as guerrilla warfare moved into the city from the countryside. Oftentimes terrorism was an unavoidable tactic due to the limited number of forces insurgents had access to and the terrain. It is a crucial aspect of urban and other types of guerrilla warfare and oftentimes deemed necessary by circumstances such as local environment and the capabilities (oftentimes higher when fighting a state) of the enemy. Although many try to claim that horrible acts of terror can be differentiated from righteous acts of guerrilla warfare since terrorism targets innocent people while guerrilla warfare involves fighting an armed opponent. However, many times they are inseparable. Many people have a problem with the tactics that guerrilla movements employ but they see their cause as just. Especially when the people are trying to escape suffering and injustice. On the other hand, transnational movements are not about freedom, but rather domination or control. They seek maximum disruption and to destroy Western interests and thus people do not see their cause as just. But why are organizations with national aims morally better than those transnational or pan-religious groups? If Islamic groups are pursuing an Islamic religious nation, there is no reason why their cause is less just than those who pursue independence based on religion such as in Palestine or Chechnya. Terrorism as method of armed violence that like any other weapon has its purpose in armed conflict under certain conditions (Gross). Therefore, it must be held to the same regulations as other forms of violence. Terrorists are condemned for purposefully targeting civilian non-fighters but what about when civilians die as collateral damage in traditional warfare? “If killing civilians under a guise of collateral damage is nothing but a moral smokescreen, then some forms of terrorism may not be as far from conventional wartime killing as one might think” (Gross). Terrorism, just like any other method of warfare used by any type of fighter, thus be used when it is the lesser evil pinned against a much greater evil that causes existential threat when there is no other way to expel such a threat (Gross). One war that called just war theory into question and that has been the source of much debate is the Iraq War that lasted eight years and began with the US led invasion of Iraq. The debate is over whether or not this act of war by the US was a just response to the terrorist attacks committed by al-Qaeda of September 11th 2001. The United States government concluded that the September 11 attacks did indeed situate the United States into a state of defensive armed conflict, in which the laws of war apply (Yoo and Ho 1). On this day, a total of 2,977 civilians were killed as a result of the attacks (“September 11 Terror Attacks Fast Facts”). According to Bin Laden’s Letter to America written in 2002, the attacks of 9/11 were done as revenge for America’s actions in Palestine and Lebanon (bin Laden). Just war theory argues that the invasion of Iraq was not just because it was not aimed directly at the perpetrators of the ware-waging event. It was not directly targeting al -Qaeda but rather the 2003 Hussein regime itself. Furthermore, non-combatants were put in danger in order to protect American combatants (Bellamy 192). Roughly five hundred thousand people in Iraq died as a result of the Iraq war (“Iraq Study Estimates”) According to the revised principle that states that war is just regardless of fighters involved or means utilized as long as waged defensively, as a last resort, and with means that are of a lesser evil than those of the aggressor (Gross). In the case of the invasion and subsequent Iraq War, the United States was not just in their reasons for going to war. The war was offensive, as it was not directed not at al-Qaeda but rather at the Hussein regime. Furthermore, it caused more harm than the September 11 attacks, with a civilian death toll of more than one hundred times that of 9/11 and over a period of many years of suffering. While 9/11 has caused many mental suffering for years beyond the day itself, the civilian death toll was limited to that day and those immediately after.

Given the above facts, irregular fighters, including terrorists, cannot simply be dismissed by humanitarian law’s Western bias. The frequency of irregular fighters participating in armed conflict and the fact that various cultures place different limitations on war means that no single type of war fought by a specific group of individuals is innately just or unjust (Walzer 180-181). Thus, a compromise must be made that defines just war in a way that includes various groups of fighters and means based on differing cultural limitations. I suggest that armed conflict is justifiable by any group of fighters, utilizing any means when said conflict is waged defensively, as a last resort, and when the means utilized are of a lesser evil than those of the aggressor. Subsequently, each war shall be determined just or unjust on an individual basis.

How important is a nation’s national security? What would happen if one of their critical infrastructures failed? These are some of the topics that are discussed by nations around the globe. The one thing both of the above-mentioned examples have in common is more than likely they have some sort of computer working on them, some cyber device. If I attempted to assassinate another countries Prime Minister, that would be considered an act of war. But if I hacked into that same countries nuclear power plant and caused a nuclear meltdown, would that be considered an act of war? Well, according to the Cornell School of Law, Legal Information Institute (LII), an act of war is “any act occurring in the course of— (A)declared war; (B)armed conflict, whether or not war has been declared, between two or more nations; or (C)armed conflict between military forces of any origin” (LII, 2019).

Man has battled one another for centuries; wars have been fought over a plethora of differing things, people, resources, and ideas. Some say the just war “tradition” is equally as old as war in and of itself. The definition for the Just war theory as explained by James Johnson, as “notion that the resort to armed force (jus ad bellum) is justified under certain conditions; also, the notion that the use of such force (jus in bello) should be limited in certain ways” (2019). I took this as the theory attempting to bring war under the control so, if practiced, it could potentially eliminate war altogether. This theory is scattered throughout the bible; for example in Deuteronomy 20: 10-12, it is explained that when an army marches up to attack a city, they should first ask for their surrender, and should they refuse your request for surrender, then they army should engage in battle (Holy Bible, n.d.). This theory has even been brought to light in the 21st century pertaining to the U.S. (U.S.) involvement in the various wars and operations; World War II and more recently, Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Arguments can be made on both sides that the Just war theory is outdated and has no business in modern military, and that it is practical today just as it was in biblical times. If the goal of the Just war theory is to possibly eliminate war altogether, then why not look to Cyber warfare as the risk of casualties is far less, right?

There are numerous variants to the theory of war, such as Chinese Warfare Theory, Russian Theory, Western Theory, Just War Theory, Islamic (Jihad) Theory, etc. The term “Theory of War” can be taken to mean common guidelines of how a war should be conducted from the view of a given culture, based upon their nation-state’s view of laws and justice (Moseley, 2019). From this we can see the theory of war is not a singular theory, as it is a host of theories dependent on where the war has occurred or who is involved.

Of the aforementioned theories, we will look at Western and Chinese War Theories. Each nation (culture) views war, whether it be asymmetric, unconventional warfare, cyber warfare, from a different angle, philosophy, and have differing theories.

Between the Western, and Chinese War Theories, the western is by far the newest. The Western War Theory is often referenced as the “Western conception of just war” (Izbicki, 2011). As mentioned in the Just War Theory section, the theory has resurfaced in today’s modern era, and according to Emba, a columnist for the Washington Post, “most recent conflicts have not been the sort to which just war theory normally applies — state-centric wars between sovereign nations deploying regular armies” (2015). This prompted the adaption of modern realities and modern warfare in general. I think the Catechism of the Catholic Church said it best when they described one formulation as a “legitimate defense by military force”, further described as for criterium for meeting jus ad bellum (Catholic Church, 2012). As echoed by Professor Nicholas Fotion when he said, “The concept of just war remains rooted in ancient ideals. A just war, then and now, should not be self-serving, to gain land, resources, or power, and should be declared only after all non-violent forms of diplomacy have been exhausted. A just war is always a last resort” (2007). War as a last resort can be seen, even today in the way the U.S. goes about is policy pertaining to attacks, but more specifically Cyber-attacks.

The Chinese theory of war is somewhat similar to the western theory, as the Chinese just war theory also proposes a guideline that must be met and followed for a war to be considered just and fair. Just as the Just war idea is not foreign to the Chinese, it has its roots in their theory of war dating back to ancient times. The term “yi zhan” means “just war” or “righteous war” as described by Lo. Furthermore, the ancient Chinese had their versions of Jus ad Bellum and Jus In Bello. Many of the ways the Chinese learned how to conduct war was trial and error, though the successes and failures of their generals. Sun Tzu, a prominent general and strategist in Chinese history who lived more than 2500 years ago wrote, “War is a matter of vital importance to the State: the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied” (n.d.). Today, the works, The Art of War is still considered in the theory of war and strategy. Additionally, in the Art of War Sun Tzu accepts the idea that war is tragic and should be reluctantly employed only as a last resort (Lo, 2012, 410-411). Sun Tzu further addresses “unjust wars” as the conditions might direct a righteous ruler to wage war (jus ad bellum); however, this may not make this a “just war” … such wars by a “moral rule a virtuous…should not wage wars. However, circumstances sometimes demand flexibility.” (Lo 2012, 415-416). I believe that the Western theory echoes the Chinese Theory since the Chinese theory was adopted in ancient times.

With a Cyber war being a new type of war, one must look at what cyber actions could reasonably generate a physical war. As I mentioned above the attractiveness of cyber war is great due to the lack of casualties, funds and risks; but what if an act was prematurely used before it was justified, and this sparked a physical aggression in return? The theory of an attack in the cyber arena causing no impact in the physical world is incorrect. Case in point, “2007 was when cyberwar went from the theoretical to the actual. When the government of the eastern European state of Estonia announced plans to move a Soviet war memorial, it found itself under a furious digital bombardment that knocked banks and government services offline” (Ranger, 2019). That example is one of many that show actions in the cyber world can have great ramifications in the physical world. More examples are provided in section IV. Furthermore, as Martin Libicki, in conjunction with Head Quarters Air Force explained, cyberspace needs to be thought of by itself; we can longer make policy and blanket it across cyberspace as we did the other four domains (15, 2009). Lastly, individuals, military and civilian alike, need to realize a war in cyberspace is not something fiction books are wrote about anymore; it is happening all around us and we do not even know.

Functioning in cyberspace and being in/working for the military conducting operations presents a rather unique set of concerns such as criminal law, civil rights, etc. The U.S. Department of Defense defined cyberspace as: “A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers” (CJCS, 57, 2019). As I previously wrote about in an unpublished works, the Department of Defense did define the domains of Land, Air, Sea, and Space, but not a Cyber Domain per se (Johnson, 2019). Furthermore, I went on and spoke about the similarities and boundaries they share and how the only pseudo boundary for cyber was a firewall. This led me to believe that the military policy makers have a perceived comfort level speaking about the four domains. Moreover, my assessment was echoed by Brown and Metcalf when they said, “Military legal analysts are comfortable discussing the concepts of warfare in the contexts of other domains, such as “land-warfare” or “air warfare,” but the common use of those terms and the distinct characteristics those terms convey do not seem to have carried over to discussion of “cyber warfare” (118, 2014).

Additionally, from one U.S. Governmental entity to another the term cyberspace held multiple definitions. As previously mentioned, the Department of Defense definition compared to the U.S. Air Force definition outlined in the Air Force Cyber Command Strategic Vision, “domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures” (Lord, 2, 2019) differs. Granted, the Air Force definition closes mirrors the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations. Nevertheless, if you look at the 2018 Congress Research Service concerning Cybersecurity, their definition is again different; “Cyberspace can be considered to be the services that use the infrastructure of the Internet to deliver information to users through their devices” (1, 2018). With the differing definitions of Cyberspace I can see why there are many differing views on Cyberware, attacks, operations, etc. The differing definitions were pointed out in Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under International Law: The “ multiple definitions of ‘cyberspace’ illustrate the difficulty in defining the term, which may be one of the difficulties in creating any type of common agreement among states as to how international law should be applied to warfare conducted in cyberspace” (Schaap, 126, 2009). Conversely, Lt Col, David Fahrenkrug said, “depending on how you define or interpret cyberspace determines what you think warfighting in the domain will look like” (2017).

If we cannot agree on a definition of Cyberspace, how can there be a singular definition for Cyber Warfare? This may be correct; however, the Department of Defense does define Cyberspace Operations as “The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace” (CJCS, 58, 2019). The U.S. Air Force’s definition of Cyberspace Operation mirrors that of the Department of Defense.

Ultimately the U.S. Constitution established that the President of the U.S. is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and gave Congress the authority to fund and regulate the Armed Forces. As such, this allows commanders to conduct Cyber operations when directed by their chain of command; President, Secretary of Defense, Combatant Commanders, etc. to conduct operations (Dept. of the Army, 1-12, 2017).

The military as a whole, including cyber, normally conducts operations under the authority of 10 U.S. Code, Title 10 – Armed Forces, under Subtitles A-E that cover General Military Law, Army, Navy/Marine Corps, Air Force, and reserve Components; however, they can also operate under the authority of U.S. Code, Title 50 – War and National Defense. A further breakdown of Titles and Authorities can be seen in Appendix A, Table 1. The type of operation and who is conducting it will dictate which title will be applied. As outlined in Annex 3-12, “Authorities to act against adversaries are included in the execute order or operation order for a specific operation. If aggressive defensive responses or counter-offensive operations are authorized, authorities should be clearly defined and understood” (Dept. of the Army, 37, 2011).

Furthermore, within Air Force Policy Directive, it states that the Air Force will execute Cyberspace Operations to support requirements, increase effectiveness, resiliency, and survivability…through innovative solutions” (Dept. of the Air Force, 2, 2016). Also, it is worth noting, prior to any operation being conducted, cyber or otherwise, a commander and/or operator shall consult with legal staff and discuss the relevant framework, laws, and policies that may impact the purposed operation. Lastly, some of the legal considerations pertaining to Cyber Warfare cross over into the Law of Armed Conflict.

The Law of Armed Conflict or “law of war” as defined by the Department of Defense is “That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities” (CJCS, 133, 2019). The above mentioned definition also suggested “rules of engagement.” Furthermore, “rules of engagement” are defined as “Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered” (CJCS, 192, 2019). Again, this definition suggested “law of war.” From these clear and distinct definitions that reference one another, they are closely related and go hand-in-hand. The Law of Armed Conflict does not only apply to operations and wars in the four other dimensions, it is included in Cyber Warfare as well. Many scholars have examined the Laws of Armed Conflict and focused on the use of force and armed attack aspects. Those, coupled with the grossly unattributable aspects of cyber-attacks make this a topic of discussion.

The use of force in cyberspace question has been a topic of conversation since the onset of (unclassified) operations within cyberspace. During the advance questioning of Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, Nominee for Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, he outlined that “There is no international consensus on a precise definition of a use of force, in or out of cyberspace. Consequently, individual nations may assert different definitions and may apply different thresholds for what constitutes a use of force” (Alexander, 2010). Alexander went on to say that there always will be a potential for a disagreement between nations on what constitutes a use of force; ultimately, the decision falls to the President of U.S. on what is a threat or a use of force.

Subtle nods to the Just war theory can be found in the last two National Cyber Strategies for the U.S. authored by former President Barrack Obama, and President Donald Trump. President Obama went on to say “When warranted, we will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. All states possess an inherent right to self-defense and we reserve the right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to defend our Nation, our Allies, our partners, and our interests” (Obama, 2, 2011). Echoed by President Trump in 2016, he said, “The U.S. will develop swift and transparent consequences, which we will impose consistent with our obligations and commitments to deter future bad behavior” (Trump, 21, 2018)

Everyone learned at a young age that actions have reactions, sometime consequential reactions, but reactions nonetheless. These reactions are similar to those reactions of weapon usage…sometimes denoted by physical or psychological injury, death, and destruction of property. These are considered a use of force and as such prohibited by both Article 2(4) and International Law and more specifically customary international law (LII, 2019).

Furthermore, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 is an international alliance consisting of 29 nation states from North America and Europe. Put plainly by Carey, from the readings of NATO’s Options for Defensive Cyber Against Non-State Actors said, that an attack on one NATO member shall be considered an attack against all the members of NATO, and this allows them the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. (Carey, 13, 2009). But does this “attack” include cyber-based attacks? In 2007, in the eyes of the NATO officials it did not meet the definition of attack. NATO officials said, “At present NATO does not define cyber-attacks as a clear military action. This means that the provisions of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, or, in other words, collective self-defense will not be automatically extended to the attacked county” (Carey, 9, 2009). To note, Article V as previously mentioned loosely mimics Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Just as terms and definitions related to “cyber” grow daily, so does international law.

Following the statement in 2007, NATO had continued to look into its Cyber Defense Concept and strengthen its development concepts. Between the years of 2010 and 2016, NATO accomplished several milestones gaining “Partnerships at national and international level with industry and academia” (Dinu, 72, 29, 2017). In the midst of these developments, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) was born in 2008 with the mission of supporting “our member nations and NATO with unique interdisciplinary expertise in cyber defense” (CCDCOE, 2019). The CCDCOE had been recognized for their research accomplishments as well as the Tallinn Manual development. Authored by nineteen international law experts, the “Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations” (CCDCOE, 2019).

Moreover, as outlined in the Tallinn Manual 2.0, Jensen explained that experts agreed that the customary law of responsibilities also applies to cyber activities. This is a far cry from the 2007 NATO response of note meeting the definition of “attack.” Furthermore, Rule 14, outlines that “[a] State bears international responsibility for a cyber related act that is attributable to the State and that constitutes a breach of an international legal obligation” (Jensen,750, 2017). Lastly, Jensen went on to say that a cyber act need not have physical damage, injury, etc. to be considered a wrongful act (2017).

The 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia were a series of attacks which began in late April 2007 and ended in early May of the same year. These attacks have been well-documented in various news and media outlets, as well as topics in journals. The focus of these attacks was targeted against Estonia’s critical Internet infrastructure (Hughes, 4, n.d.) to include banks, ministries, newspapers and other news outlets. These attacks originated from outside Estonia and seemed to have anti-government phrases in Russian, such as “ANSIP_PIDOR=FASCIST” (Ottis, 2, n.d.). These attacks stemmed from the Estonians decision to relocate the Bronze Solider of Tallinn, a grave marker, to the Tallinn Military Cemetery. The majority of the attacks can be described as a as Denial of Service (DoS) style attack. Following the attack, Estonia requested NATO assistance but was denied (Carey, 9-10, 2009). However, as referenced above, the CDCE opened only a year later.

Throughout 2019 Iran has increased their cyber-attacks against various U.S. infrastructures. Some of these attacks are not a normal DoS attack or brute force-style attack. These attacks as described by FireEye, a cybersecurity company, cover the attack styles of social engineering, spear phishing, record manipulation, etc. (Bromiley, et al, 2019). Moreover, Iran has reinvigorated a phishing campaign geared toward LinkedIn users. This campaign targets users with invitations to professional groups or networks akin to their careers (Doffman, 2019). These invitations come via an email with attachments; the attachments have various malicious code hidden in them. The codes, commonly known as “TONEDEAF”, “VALUEVAULT”, and “LONGWATCH” are designed to steal certificates, create backdoors and log key strokes (Seals, 2019). Lastly, these cyber-related attacks come shortly after the U.S. Cyber Command hit Iran’s Command and Control structures.

In late June 2019 the U.S. Cyber Command executed a cyber-attack that disabled Iranian missile control systems and spy networks (Sharafedin, 2019). This was in response to Iran downing a U.S. drone in international airspace. In lieu of a kinetic style response, President Trump opted to go with a cyber style response after he learned that if he went with a kinetic style attack, approximately 150 people would lose their lives. He went on to say that the attack would not have been proportionate since the U.S. did not have a loss of life (Trump, 2019).

No matter where you are in the world, what country you belong to, or who you side with, war is experienced by everyone. Cyber warfare is the newest facet of warfare, and in this paper we looked at its viability as a warfare option by evaluating theory, policy, law, and actual occurrences. Throughout this paper we saw a number of similarities between the different policies, theories and even attack styles. We have seen U.S. law and International Policy adjust to allow the usage of cyber-weaponry. The policies that dictate both U.S. and international relations have been drafted and approved by different people, potentially a world apart… but a particular, unifying theme…cyber warfare is legal viable option, just as traditional war.

In the ever evolving, increasingly complex and convoluted world, one thing holds true, “Whether a five-hundred-pound bomb or a computer is used to effect death and destruction, a weapon remains a weapon” (Solis, 2016). This was evident when President Trump opted away from a kinetic attack, and opted instead for a cyber-attack. This shows the world that the U.S. not only can leverage the weight of a five-hundred-pound bomb upon them, but can also act as a thief in the night and infiltrate through a half-pound ethernet cable to deliver a devastating blow.

From Cicero’s early ideas to Saint Augustine’s substantial contributions, the just war theory has been used as a means to morally justify the choice to go to war and maintain that the war is fought justly. Although the idea and ‘rules’ of just war have evolved over time, the idea of just war has become redundant. There are several reasons as to why just war has become obsolete including ambiguity and personal interpretation of criteria and flaws in the foundation of the idea. However, the overarching reason is due to the vastly different nature of contemporary warfare to those of Ancient times.

The context for the creation of JW

Topic Sentence Around 50 BCE, Roman philosopher Cicero began some of the early ideas that later became the foundation for the just war theory. Cicero believed that peace should be at the centre of international relationships and that discussion is a much more becoming solution for contesting a decision than doing so by force (Harrer, 1918, p.27). Saint Augustine, thought of as the founder of Western just war theory, posited his ideas around 300 AD that the aim of a war should be securing peace and that a war should be declared by the proper authority and have a just cause (Lee, 2012, p.309). These ideas were created during a time when Rome was conquering lands to expand the empire and spread their way of life around the Mediterranean. They fought barbarians and they fought to gain and protect their land – maybe. Something about them being Christians then lead into the next sentence as the concept is a Christian ages concept. Collins (2008) argues that using the concept of “just cause” as a justification for war is erroneous as doing so could make almost any war seem acceptable if it was based on religious or moral grounds. Linking sentence about how it has changed over time

The context for modern times JW

The idea of just war has become redundant as (the nature of war has changed completely) the reasons for war and the types of wars have changed and something about something. The just war theory was created during a time where the type of warfare was vastly different to that occurring today. The changing nature of modern military warfare has made the concept of just war redundant. Miller (1964) argues that the doctrine of just war was created with a different type of warfare in mind i.e. weapons of mass destruction. T

The social climate in contemporary times has changed significantly overtime with a current shift towards humanitarianism not wanting to see a senseless loss of life due to greed and a focus on being aware of contemporary issues and getting involved/protesting/voicing opinions. Liberal societies such as those found in many western countries are becoming ambiguous about war with them ferociously supporting a war in one instance but then feeling unsure about it in others (Rengger, 2002, p.356). example Vietnam? Happy when they went unhappy after they heard about atrocities.. or middle east – happy for retaliation after 911 but not what has happened since. Contemporary societies are now asking for justification when waging war and if it has to happen that it occurs in humane ways (Rengger, 2002, p.356). To help combat this, governments and military can portray the enemy as criminals or the ‘other’ to change the group consciousness to believe there is a valid reason for going to war (Goldhagen, 2009, p.36). It is important not to confuse the idea of just war with international and humanitarian law. Although many ideas do correlate, just war is not law in most countries and is merely a moral standpoint for the justification of war. However, the just war theory does have sections and criteria needing to be met in order for the war to be considered just.

Justice of War (jus ad Bellum)

The first section of the just war theory is jus as bellum, which relates to the justice of war and the morality of waging war. This part includes six criteria that need to be achieved in order to declare a war as just. They are just cause, proportionate cause, right intention, right authority, reasonable prospect of success and last resort (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007, p.12). The former three criteria are quite ambiguous and provide a chance for interpretation and judgement by the people who are looking to wage and want to morally justify a war (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007, p.15). If they are able to find a suitable reason for each of the criteria the war may seem just however, it is possible and even likely that there were other motives that were not mentioned that may be to the contrary. precisely the will to do justice for oneself- as justice is seen through the eyes of the one party-that forms the basis for the existence of a doctrine of just war and at the same time ensures that wars will be fought and their causes justified. – The contemporary significance p.278. An example of a less ambiguous criteria is that of the United States of America, their just war idea is only of one that is fought in self-defence (including collective defence) against an armed attack (Miller, 1964, p.265). This assists greatly in determining a war as morally just as all other wars cannot be considered. However, even this can be misleading as the information one receives may be incorrect as was the case with the USA believing Saddam Hussein had a large stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (Jacoby, 2004, p.1).

Justice in War (jus in Bello)

The second part of the just war theory is jus in bello, that relates to the justice in war and has two criteria. The first criterion is discrimination, which ascertains that innocents or non-combatants should not be attacked during warfare (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007, p.14). The second criterion is proportionality, which refers to the consideration of the loss of lives and wellbeing of innocents, own military personnel and occasionally the adversary due to incidental harm versus the likely military benefit of using certain force (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007, p.14). Due to the changed nature of warfare since the creation of the idea of just law and proportionality, Miller (1964) posits that this way of justifying force is obsolete. In relation to both of the criteria, Miller (1964) shows that when one is convinced their enemy’s cause is unjust, they will struggle to show charity towards them which due to the nature of contemporary warfare, may make it difficult to achieve the criteria. Furthermore, due to the current circumstances of war, non-combatants even part of a morally just war are in more danger than in any other war before. This is due to the large number of military targets and the vast increase in firearms and weapons of both quantity and power further increasing the difficulty of achieving the criteria (Miller, 1964, p.281). Additionally, as the proportionality criterion only suggests that the lives and wellbeing of innocents and others be considered and weighed, military personnel could falsely state that they did when in fact they did not. The points discussed and the increase of insurgents makes achieving the criteria extremely difficult in many different wars. –

War examples

The nature of warfare in contemporary times makes it hard to distinguish non-combatants making the discrimination criterion almost impossible to achieve.

When the just war ideas were created, soldiers wore uniforms and were clearly identifiable. In both the Vietnam War …. And the war in the middle east…. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare make it very difficult to ensure that non-combatants aren’t attacked (Creveld, 2008, p.140) . Use stuff from last essay. Use a primary text.

The idea of just war may have always been redundant as the foundation of this theory is relatively flawed and many wars since its creation haven’t met the criteria. It could be suggested that this idea was created to establish a sense of morality about waging and fighting in war and make the entering of wars less more considered. Furthermore, one of it’s important features is that justice should be obtained however, the constituent of justice is not something that could be agreed upon by all and if it had been agreed to by the other party beforehand, there would be no dispute (Miller, 1964, p.278). When determining if a war is jus ad bellum, the people who are looking for justice can only see it from their own side and since it is the will to do justice for oneself, the causes will be justified (miller, 1964, p.278). Additionally, despite there being a well known idea a just war for thousands of years, there are still a large number war crimes and unjust incidences occurring during warfare. Campaigns are being waged with the intention of genocide and atrocious murder and/or humiliating acts against the enemy and non-combatants (Moseley, n.d.). Despite these atrocities being part of the just war criteria, they keep occurring furthering the obsoleteness of the idea of just war.

War needs more than a just cause; as with any deadly game a strict code of conduct and rules are required. – its just another war ( Collins, 2008)

Conclusion

From its inception thousands of years ago, the idea of just war has been used to morally justify the waging and fighting of wars. The effectiveness of this theory prior to modern times is debated however; it is evident that the idea of just war has become redundant in modern times.

“Feminism is the belief that women are of equal social and human value with men, and that the differences between men and women, whether biologically based or culturally derived, do not and should not constitute grounds for discrimination against women” (Reardon 1985, 20). This definition best summarizes the core concept of feminism. From this simple belief, feminism has developed into a social movement and further, a political theory with the question of how society and gender affect each other. As one of the critical theories of international politics, feminism contributes to the field by criticizing other theories, pointing out how they are blind to gender issues, and therefore worsening gender inequality. Moreover, feminism’s main interests are ‘the marginalized’. So, feminism aims to bring everybody, regardless of their social, political, or economic power, to the table and give them voices, while aiming for ‘emancipation’ (Whitworth, 2008).

There are various perspectives of just war theory; the traditional and the revisionist view. Feminists argue that these theories are gender-biased and blind to the impacts war has on women and other marginalized men. Especially, feminists provide critiques on the abstractions traditional just war theory holds that make war more likely. This is what the ‘feminist reformulations of just war theory are, and they provide a superior basis upon which to make judgments about the war when compared to the traditional just war theory. This paper will introduce the critiques feminism makes on the traditional just war theory, and specifically focus on jus ad Bellum and jus in Bello to argue why feminism provides a superior basis. II. Feminist Reformulations of Just War Theory The terms ‘men’ and ‘women’ in feminist discourse refer to masculinity and femininity, which are the culturally constructed concepts of ‘gender’, not exactly coinciding with the biological sex. Putting gender as the main interest, feminists indicate some flaws of traditional just war theory and suggest ‘empathetic cooperation’ as an alternative. The first feminist reformulation of just war theory, according to Sjoberg (2006a), claims to consider war as a continuum. Second, the concept of an independent, autonomous state is in itself gender-biased. Third, feminist reformulation puts emphasis on ‘people’, rather than states. Fourth and most significantly, it criticizes the ‘immunity principle’, which is both theoretically gendered and impractical. Feminists argue that these abstractions make war more likely, which is the exact opposite of the aim of just war theory. III. Superiority on jus ad Bellum In terms of jus ad Bellum, feminism provides the universal frame of war-making, in contrast to the traditional just war theory which argues that states wage war with their own will based on the calculation that varies from case to case. In other words, feminists argue that waging war is not a rational decision of states, but rather, the continuum of already-prevalent violence, which is a more reasonable interpretation of jus ad Bellum. According to traditional just war theory, the only actor with the authority to wage war is the states (Walzer, 2006). The independent, autonomous states decide whether to wage war based on the calculations of the categories of just ad Bellum; the just cause, proportionality, last resort, and the chance of success. These calculations differ from case to case because of historical and social contexts, and this leads to the higher possibility of political leaders distorting or interpreting them in a wrong way to make the war ‘just’.

In contrast, feminism considers war as a continuum, not a discrete event with a starting gunshot and ceasefire. Conflicts have always existed, and war is the product of constant tension. “The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life” (Cuomo, 1996, 30). This expansion of violence has resulted from the masculine nature of international politics (Reardon, 1985). However, traditional just war theory isolates war from daily violence, which blurs the impact of war on people. So, feminists focus on the human security issues that continue before, during, and after “war” (Sjoberg, 2006a). Considering war as a continuum of violence can be applied to every case of warfare, which makes more sense when understanding the background of war-making.

In addition, feminists point out the masculine feature of states and underlying gendered narratives of war-making. They believe that regarding states as the only authoritative actor to wage war is gender-biased. This is because women are excluded from the formation of states historically, and most of the political leaders are male (Sjoberg, 2006a). This results in the foundational characteristic of states being ‘masculine’. Furthermore, it contributes to the underlying gendered assumptions of jus ad Bellum that states claim when deciding to go on war. Masculinity represents features such as powerfulness, chivalry, and not-compromising. Contrarily, femininity refers to weakness, pacifism, and passivity. Also, “masculinism is the ideology that justifies and naturalizes gender hierarchy by not questioning the elevation of ways of being and knowing associated with men and masculinity over those associated with women and femininity” (Hooper, cited by Sjoberg 2006a, 33). These characteristics are based upon socially constructed gender roles, and they lead men to feel the need to protect women, who are weaker and therefore, need protection. In this case, men are the ’just warriors’ and women are the ’beautiful souls. Just warriors fight wars for women, without their consent and even when it is not their primary goal (Sjoberg and Peet, 2011). Just warriors represent masculinity, and just war works as a heroic tale and a proof of masculinity by protecting women. Therefore, gendered narratives of jus ad Bellum of traditional just war theory make it easier to legitimize war under the justification of protecting ‘women’. This critique explains the universal context of war-making considering the fact that the most common cause of war is ‘defense’, especially, that of the innocent, such as women and children.

The concept of ‘Just warriors’ and ‘Beautiful souls’ is even more reinforced when combined with nationalism. Women are not only the symbolic beautiful souls that need protection, but their socially constructed roles also contribute to the gendered narratives of just war theory. Women’s biggest role in a nation has historically been ‘mothers’, who reproduce the next generation of just warriors (Sjoberg, 2006b). This capacity of reproducing the nation biologically and culturally has established the concept of femininity and intensified the gendered notion that just warriors or masculinity is superior and therefore should protect the beautiful souls for the sake of their nation. This acts as the rationale to easily wage and legitimize war, which is not a desirable consequence. These critiques on the gendered assumptions of traditional just war theory provide a more universal frame and foundational understanding of jus ad Bellum, since they always exist despite the contexts of individual wars, and judging them without gender-neutral perception does not add to the validity of the theory. IV. Superiority on jus in Bello Feminist reformulations also constitutes a superior basis of judging war in terms of jus in Bello. This is because feminism puts an emphasis on human security, considering the fact that the real actor of warfare is people, rather than intangible states. One of the most significant elements of traditional just war theory is the ‘non-combatant immunity. Distinguishing combatants and non-combatants, and ensuring the security of civilians are important for just war theorists. However, they regard the damages caused by the ‘double effect’ as collateral. In other words, as long as the ends are good, some degree of evil means is acceptable (Walzer, 2006). Also, some collateral damage on civilians are considered inevitable for the sake of victory.

Feminism argues that the immunity principle is practically ineffective and theoretically gendered at the same time. Traditional just war theory ignores the impact people get by underestimating the hardship of distinguishing combatants and non-combatants and characterizing some harms ‘collateral’. So, feminists focus on the story of individuals and their experience of the ‘marginalized’ harm. Despite the term ‘immunity’, it is impossible for anyone to be completely immune during the war because its impacts are so far-reaching (Sjoberg, 2006b). Putting aside the chance of getting killed or injured, especially women are the target of collateral damage, such as the destruction of infrastructure and sexual violence. As women are socially assigned the role of care, the destruction of infrastructure during a war is lethal to them because they should take on additional household responsibilities as the resources become more scarce (Sjoberg, 2006a). Moreover, sexual violence such as rape happens in a huge scale and is more severe in wartime, but it has not been considered as serious as other civilian damages, since they are regarded as a tactical option. This is because women, as beautiful souls, are the main motivation for war, and eliminating their virginity of them can prove one’s masculinity over the enemies’ femininity (Sjoberg and Peet, 2011). What is more serious is the long-term effects of these marginalized harms. Forced pregnancy and destroyed infrastructure cannot be compensated shortly. The ineffectiveness of the immunity principle and traditional just war theory’s ignorance of these marginalized harms put women in more danger, and claims on jus in Bello with the omission of these impacts cannot be counted reasonable.

Additionally, the chivalric interpretation of the immunity principle shows that it is theoretically gendered. The non-combatants or civilians just war theory aims to protect are usually women and children. This gendered conception continuously reproduces the notion that women are helpless, which starts the vicious cycle that begins with the need to protect the ‘beautiful souls’ (Carpenter, 2003). This assumption that equals civilians to women comes from the gendered expectations that men and women will play certain social roles. So, the immunity principle “constitutes and is constituted by the cultural images of males and females that are predominant in the contemporary world” (Sjoberg, 2006a, 96). In conclusion, the civilian immunity principle “reifies expected gender roles in conflict situations while failing to protect civilians adequately” (Sjoberg, 2006a, 94). Feminism pointing out these gendered flaws of the immunity principle that actually endangers women sheds light on emancipation which should be considered when judging war.

In response to this, feminism suggests ‘empathetic cooperation’ as an alternative. “Empathy is the willingness to enter into the feeling or spirit of something and appreciate it fully – to hear others’ stories and be transformed by our appreciation of the experiences” (Sjoberg, 2006b, 904). It can be the starting point of solidarity, in which individuals can be heard and understood. By standing in others’ shoes, one can think about the truth of war and the impacts it will bring to the everyday life of people. Keeping in mind that it will be no one else but individuals themselves that fight and live in war, it is significant to put an emphasis on human security as feminism does when judging war. V. Conclusion The ultimate aim of just war theory is to minimize the occurrence of war, not promote it. However, the gender-biased narratives of traditional just war theory result in an easier decision of waging war, and the absence of attention on people. So, feminist reformulations of just war theory enlighten us to pay more attention to the hidden assumptions and unheard voices, and also provide a chance to rethink about the true meanings of just war theory, therefore constituting a superior basis upon which to make judgments about war. However, this does not necessarily mean that just war theory or the concept of war itself should be abandoned since that could result in ‘the weak’ having no opportunities at all for a better life. Rather, feminist reformulations of just war theory call for a more people-friendly way of thinking when making decisions and judging war. This is for the just war theory to be interpreted and applied in a rightful way, leading to the true realization of its essentials.

Just War Theory

Jus in Bello

The Jus in Bello aspect of the Just War Theory addresses how nations and states that initiate military intervention should act while in war. The Jus in Bello piece of the theory regulates and provides an ethical framework for judging whether actions whilst in war are ethical or unethical. One of the fundamental aspects of the Jus in Bello theory is that the actions taken by the state initiating the war must be “proportional” and “non-combatants are immune from attack” (Calhoun 2001, 45).

The Kenyan intervention in Somalia is a relatively new conflict, and little is known in regard to its war practices. As the intervention progresses, whether it has complied with jus in bello will become much clearer and measurable.

Jus Post Bellum

The jus post bellum portion of the just war theory is the last stage of the morality metric. During the jus post bellum stage, the intervening state is required to provide a “restoration of a just order” (Amstutz 2008, 115). During the jus post bellum stage, Kenya will be required to help Somalia ensure that that a solid, effective government is installed, the breakdown in society has been overcome, and overall order is imparted. Given the failures of previous interventions held in Somalia, the success or failure of Kenya’s ability to complete jus post bellum will be one of the most telling ways to ultimately determine if the intervention was fully moral.

As discussed in previous sections, Somalia has been invaded on numerous occasions, with none of the incursions resulting in jus post bellum successfully. What seems to be a common theme is: intervening forces enter, there is a stalemate, and the intervening forces decide to leave. This is likely why for the last two decades; Somalia has been at a standstill politically, economically and developmentally. Only time will tell if the Kenyans are successful in fully completing the jus post bellum stage of moral and just war.

For the sake of Somalis, the East African region and the international community at large, it is in the best interest of everyone if the just post bellum stage is fulfilled in its entirety to prevent further regression of the Somali state and repeated failed interventions.

Opposing Views to Just War Theory

From the analysis of the components of just war theory, it is clear that Kenya did have reason or cause to intervene in Somalia and that it did so within the confines of the just war theory metric. Even so, the intervention did not go without criticism and disapproval from key members of the international community and leaders of religious groups. This section will identify and outline some of opposing arguments of just war theory, the incongruities between just war theory and religious teachings, pinpoint the likely challenges that the Kenyan’s may encounter in the future, and explain some of the failures thus far in the Kenyan intervention.

Pacifism

Pacifism is one of the most major arguments against the just-war theory tradition. Under the Pacifism framework, violence as a means of war is essentially never justified or acceptable as moral, even in cases of severe humanitarian crisis. The pacifist approach prohibits the threat and use of force because, in accordance with a rule-base ethic, it assumes that violence can never be a morally legitimate means to provide national security or to secure moral goods such as human rights, international justice and peace.” (Amstutz 2008, 110)

Under the Pacifist outline, pure pacifists would deem the armed Kenyan intervention in Somalia as unethical and immoral. This is a sharp contrast from just war theory which holds that war can be ethical under certain circumstances if specific criteria are met (jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum). However, the pacifist argument supposes that this is not moral and even if there is just because it is absolutely immoral to engage in any violence or use force. Under pacifism the value of nonviolence and peace is higher than any other, so nations should never use force under any circumstances.

In lieu of force, under the pacifist model states are encouraged to use non-violent measures to address conflict and crises. With violence and force out of the question, it becomes essential that diplomacy and non-violent measures are undertaken and enforced. In the case of Kenya and Somalia, pacifists would likely argue that it was immoral for Kenya to enter Somalia with the use of force, as it is not ethical to use force under the pacifism approach. As we know, the Kenyan-Somali conflict is multi-layered and complicated in nature.

Even with the violent nature of piracy and the destruction that it poses to Kenyan national security and safety, under pacifism engaging in force to address this issue would be immoral. Rather, pacifists would argue that Kenyan authorities should engage in non-violent measures to address the issue.

The main issue that this poses is, pacifists assume that “highest priorities are life and peace” and does not address how sometimes using force in extreme situations, such as Somalia, can actually preserve the very ideals that pacifists claim to defend. Pacifism is also somewhat problematic because the pacifism structure works best when engaging two sovereign states with central and effective governments. In the case of Somalia, it has an ineffective government, and many of the issues lie with non-state actors such as terrorists, clans, pirates or rogue states that are not legitimate and are destructive to global security and or its people. Traditional means of nonviolence such as sanctions, diplomatic engagements, etc. would be inappropriate for such actors. Also, when such actors are using violence as their means, it becomes increasingly difficult to preserve the notion of non-violence, as states need to defend themselves against such actors.

While Pacifists may argue that the Kenyan intervention was immoral, it would be unrealistic and ineffective for Kenya to not use force as a means to intervene in Somalia due to the nature of the threats at hand and the nature of the actors involved.

Amoral Realism

Amoral realism is a somewhat more liberal perspective on the use of force, with pacifism being more conservative and just war being in the middle between pacifism and the amoral realism perspective. While pacifism suggests that war and the use of force is never an option, amoral realism not only suggests that it is moral and acceptable, but also proposes that there are no limitations to war whatsoever, and that “morality does not constrain war” (Amstutz 2008, 111). This is a somewhat extreme perception of war in comparison with the pacifist and just-war theory perspective, in the sense that it suggests that, “…morality is silent in wartime, denying that moral limits exist on the conduct of war” (Amstutz 2008, 111). The Jus in Bello aspect of just war theory has a direct conflict with this premise, as Jus in Bello proposes that there are constraints and regulations regarding wartime behavior and morality regarding such behavior. Under the amoral realism argument, is the cynical view (Amstutz 2008, 111). Under the cynical view, war is allowed and there are no moral limitations because they are seen as “subjective” and are irrelevant because, in the realists’ view, they believe overall goal and objective of war is to conquer and win regardless of the means (Amstutz 2008, 111).

Relating amoral realism to the Kenyan intervention, amoral realists would likely be divided over whether or not the intervention was moral and legitimate in the eyes of ethicists. Cynical amoral realists would likely view the intervention as moral because they do not believe in any moral limits on war and the use of force. If the Kenyans believed that war was in their interest, under the cynical perspective of amoral realism, they would be able to enter into Somalia with force without any obligations to morals or ethics. Following the belief of cynical amoral realism, the ultimate goal of the Kenyans would be to win and be successful in the intervention despite what its original intent or reasons for pursuing the intervention may have been. If the Kenyan intentions were purely altruistic and unselfish in nature, in that they were acting on behalf of the interest of Somalia and Somalia only, it may be admirable, but it would be irrelevant in determining its morality, as there are no constraints under the cynical perspective of amoral realism. If the Kenyan intentions were mixed, being somewhat altruistic and somewhat self-interested, that too would be irrelevant, as morals have no place in the decision.

Holy War

The holy war perspective is distinguished by its affiliation with religion and “divine will” (Amstutz 2008, 111). This perspective too, does not have moral limitations in regards to the use of force because of its association with the “divine will” and ultimate prevailing of religious values and the religion overall. If the Kenyan intervention is measured against the holy war position, it could be seen as immoral depending on the religious sect or group. For example, in Somalia, it is has been widely known and understood that one of the goals of the Islamic extremist groups, such as the Al-Shabbab is to instill Sharia law (Islamic law) and to push Islamic values and extremism into the mainstream, general society. The Al-Shabbab is known to have coordinated many terrorist attacks in Somalia and Kenya and has connections to Al-Qaeda and is even connected and coordinating with terrorists Yemen. In the view of the holy war perspective, morals in regards to the use of force and limitations on wartime behavior are irrelevant as the ultimate goal is to fight on behalf of the religion, even if undesirable deaths or destruction could occur. In this case, it is possible that the Al-Shabbab could view the Kenyan intervention as a direct threat to Islam or their goal of instilling Sharia law in Somalia.

The Legalist Perspective and Point of View

Another method of determining ethics and morality in regard to war is the legalist paradigm (Walzer 1977, 118). The legalist perspective or paradigm is somewhat similar to the pacifist point of view in that intervention or invading another sovereign state is immoral and unacceptable, but not because it prioritizes peace and non-violence as an ethical priority. Rather, it prioritizes the notion of the state and states’ legal right to sovereignty, and values international order.

Under the legalist perspective, Michael Walzer argues, there is a fundamental observation that is particularly salient to interventions; specifically, interventions based on humanitarian reasons. Walzer notes the following about the legalist paradigm, “Though states are founded for the sake of life and liberty, they cannot be challenged in the name of life and liberty by any other states” (Walzer 1977, 61). This directly contradicts interventions based solely human rights or other humanitarian bases.

The legalist paradigm also proposes that generally the use of force is only to be used in defense against other parties when they have exercised the use of force, or there is reason to believe that it is a possible threat and if it is used in any other circumstance it is viewed as “criminal” (Walzer 1977, 61). This is expressed when Walter explains, “Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act” (Walzer 1977, 62). Though it is clear that the legalist perspective values these beliefs, it does somewhat lend itself to compromise and interpretation in a way that the pacifism perspective does not. Under the legalist paradigm, states do have the right to intervene in certain instances (as in just war theory) if certain criteria are met: there is a viable threat or if aggression or force has been used against that particular state. This is demonstrated when Walzer explains the following in regards to the legalist point of view, “Nothing but aggression can justify war” (Walzer 1977, 62).

In applying the legalist perspective to the humanitarian intervention in Kenya, it is unclear and somewhat uncertain if legalists likely would approve the intervention as being morally acceptable. While it is clear that acts of aggression have been taken against Kenya on several occasions through terrorist attacks, piracy incidents among others, it is not clear whether such attacks should be attributed to the Somali state itself or to actors (terrorists or pirates) who are not necessarily state-sponsored but are able to conduct such activities due to the lack of state or governance. This is a complicated notion and one that seems to be a recurring theme as we discuss morality and state actors. Moving forward, it will be critical that we re-think diplomacy and even morality in a new age and time where the emphasis on the state is becoming devalued and the emphases is more on individual actors or groups are more emphasized.

Ultimately, the legalist paradigm emphasizes the concept and notion of the state. In the case of Kenya, legalists could argue that because of the aggression of pirates or terrorists by individuals who were housed in Somalia or somewhat facilitated by the collapse of Somalia, it is therefore the Somali who is ultimately responsible and therefore deserving of intervention or the use of force. On the other hand, as aforementioned, legalists could argue that the state and main government, which in this case would be the Somali TFG, cannot be held accountable for individual actors and is therefore under serving of armed interference.

Religion and the Just War Theory Perspective

One of the major issues between just-war theory and Islam is the sense that just war theory is foreign and seen as a “western concept” (Mirbagheri 2012, 128). This would essentially discredit the metric of just-war theory as well as the credibility of the overall theory itself. In the book, War and Peace in Islam, S.M. Farid Mirbagheri details some of the perceptions of just war in the Muslim community. These beliefs and perceptions may essentially discredit the ultimate argument that the Kenyan intervention in Somalia was indeed moral, per the requirements and composition of just war theory.

According to Mirbagheri, not only is just-war theory closely associated with the West, it is also closely associated with Christianity and the Crusades (Mirbagheri 2012, 129). The Crusades, a series of wars fought between Muslims and Christians during the Middle Ages, is still a sensitive issue between Muslims and Christians today. Mirbagheri notes, “The concept of just war may also hint at the notion of holy war in Christendom, reminiscent of the Crusades” (Mirbagheri 2012, 129). It is quite likely that the mere association of just war with Christianity and the Crusades may completely undermine and delegitimize the credibility of just war theory and its ability to serve as a metric for just war within some in the Muslim community.