Lying is the concept of being deliberately deceitful, untruthful, or telling of lies, false. Since time immemorial, lying has been a common practice in the world, as people use it, to gain advantages at the expense of others. Kant, a philosopher, pointed arguments why people should not lie.
Theories of ethics
According to Kant, much of man’s conduct should be controlled by such ‘oughts’ whereby if one got a desire then he or she must follow a relevant path, he called this “hypothetical imperatives”. On the other hand, moral obligations do not rely on desires instead one is to perform, these are categorical. The difference between the two theories is that hypothetical “ought” are possible because they have desires while categorical ought are possible because they have reasons. Categorical ought, however, must be accepted by every rational person.
Kant bases his arguments on the categorical imperative principle that one’s actions should be morally correct, and thus when thinking of performing something, know what ‘maxims’ to follow. The maxims, that one chooses, therefore should, be accepted universally as a law, which will determine if the rule is accepted, sound, or forbidden depending on how the community views it.
Arguments of lying
Kant argues that behaviors should be guided by universal laws, which are moral rules that are true in all situations. In his first argument, universal laws should not be based on lies since it would amount to people not believing one another. Suppose one was to lie, and then it should be on those actions that conform to universal rules, people believing each other would make lie not to be appreciated, and, therefore, no lying.
Many people are tempted to make exceptions against lying being good thinking that the consequences of honesty are bad and the consequences of lying are good. That having been considered, nobody knows what the consequences will be, as in; the actions of lying might be extremely bad, therefore avoid it and let the outcomes be, even if the consequences are bad one should not be blamed for it. This points to an assertion that everyone is responsible for their actions, true or not.
Moral reasons, if valid, are binding on all people and at all times, therefore, must always be used and followed that if you accept any factors in one situation, you must also accept them in other cases. In morals, a person cannot regard herself as right or special. From this view, she cannot think that she is consistently permitted to act in a certain way that is forbidden to others, or that her intentions are more important than other people’s interests.
Conclusions
Before one considers lying to save a situation or as the only option then the chosen option must always apply at all times. The consequences derived from lying, according to Kant, have many repercussions than telling the truth as they may lead one in the wrong direction with serious implications (analogy of the murderer and the fleeing man). Responsibility and accountability are the facets of morals, the consequences of your actions should be borne by you alone and no one must suffer or gain favors in the name of a lie. Lies are not justifiable.
There exist multiple moral philosophies, but some of the most well-known ones are Kant’s deontological moral philosophy and Mill’s utilitarianism. In this paper, both theories are explained. After that, it is argued that although Kant’s philosophy is “better” in some respects, Mill’s moral theory is preferable due to being practically applicable.
Kant’s ethical philosophy is a deontological one, meaning that it is based on absolute principles rather than on conditional rules. Kant’s categorical imperative is a principle that, according to his philosophy, applies to any rational being purely because of their being rational (Johnson and Cureton). In fact, any actions that are immoral are also irrational, for they contravene the categorical imperative (Johnson and Cureton).
One of the three (supposedly) equivalent formulations of the categorical imperative is that one must act only according to a maxim that can be simultaneously willed by one to become a universal law (qtd. in Johnson and Cureton). The categorical imperative should be distinguished from hypothetical imperatives, which exist because apart from rationality, other factors may motivate people; in this case, “willing” should be distinguishing from simply “wanting”, because the former means consciously committing to a goal, not only desiring it (Johnson and Cureton).
Another important notion in Kant’s philosophy is that of duty. Roughly speaking, duty is a motivation to act in a certain way out of respect for the code requiring one to act so (Johnson and Cureton). Nevertheless, actual adopted codes or laws may also be morally wrong, as in the case with Nazi German laws; thus, duty should be understood as complying with moral laws (which are dependent upon rationality) rather simply with some legislation (Johnson and Cureton).
In contrast, Mill’s moral philosophy is utilitarian: it primarily assesses actions as moral or immoral based on their consequences. The philosopher states that the main principle of morals is the principle of greatest happiness, according to which actions are moral or right in proportion to the degree of happiness they lead to and are wrong or immoral in proportion to the degree of unhappiness they cause (Mill).
Here, happiness should be comprehended as pleasure and the lack of pain, whereas unhappiness means deprivation of pleasure and the presence of pain (Mill). This understanding of happiness may appear simplistic; nevertheless, it is argued that this is not so, for Mill qualitatively differentiates types of pleasure, stating that there are higher and lower pleasures (Brink). For instance, intellectual pleasures are stated to be higher than bodily ones (Brink). Thus, although it is difficult to define in general which pleasures are higher and which are lower (Mill does so by using a notion of the “preferences of a competent judge”; Brink par. 38), this moral philosophy is more complicated than simple hedonism.
When choosing a moral philosophy, one may be tempted to choose Kant’s system. His moral theory is more general and more sophisticated than Mill’s; it is easy to see how one could simplify Mill’s understanding of pleasure and simply turn his philosophy into pure hedonism, which could be harmful. Simultaneously, Kant’s categorical imperative appears to be more difficult to misinterpret, given that one is sufficiently rational.
Nevertheless, Kant’s theory may often not work in practice, for it often faces at least one major restriction: humans are not omnipotent. Given several bad choices and no good ones, one cannot decide between them based on Kant’s philosophy because one cannot make a good choice. To give an extreme but simple example, one may have to press a button and kill a thousand people today, or not press a button, and a million will absolutely certainly die three days later. In this case, Kant’s moral philosophy does not provide a solution, whereas Mill’s theory does. Thus, Mill’s theory is preferable because it is more applicable in practice.
Thus, Kant’s moral philosophy is rooted in the categorical imperative and on (Kant’s understanding of) rationality itself. In contrast, Mill’s moral theory is based on the principle of greatest happiness. While Kant’s theory is more elegant and sophisticated, Mill’s theory is preferable due to being much more practically applicable.
This essay deals with the Kantian philosophy with particular reference to his 1784 essay “What is Enlightenment?” In this essay, Kant poses the apparently contradictory statement “Do we live in an enlightened age?” and the answer to this is “No! We live in an age of enlightenment”. This essay tries to bring out the fine distinction between these two statements and attempts to put this in context of the present age.
Immanuel Kant1
Immanuel Kant was a German philosopher who lived during the time of what we now call as the “Enlightenment”. He was born in Prussia in 1724 and is regarded as one of the foremost intellectual thinkers of his time. His essays about perpetual peace and Critique of reason were hailed for their extraordinary insight into the human condition and the state of war and peace that existed at that time.
What is Enlightenment?
“What is Enlightenment” is an essay written by Kant in 1784. In this Kant describes the conditions necessary for what is described as “man’s immaturity” and conditions necessary for man to emerge out of this and think for himself.
The definition of enlightenment as described by Kant in the opening paragraph of his essay is reproduced here:
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! [dare to know] “Have courage to use your own understanding!”–that is the motto of enlightenment2.
Distinction between an Enlightened age and an Age of Enlightenment
Let us know turn to the central theme of this essay, namely the distinction posed by the question that Kant puts forward in his essay and answers it as well. In the time of what is called the “Enlightenment” period where there was resurgence and rejuvenation in Europe in matters regarding the purpose of human life and the flowering of the sciences, there was also an emergence of the nation state and corresponding increase in the rights of individuals for their liberty. In this context, Kant wants people to move away from the “self imposed” shackles to his intellectual freedom and using his own understanding to emerge from the cocoon of apparent comfort provided by authority and by conforming to the established norms.
Kant identifies the barriers to an “Enlightened age” as those of the Church, the state and other authoritarian figures that keep man away from thinking for himself. The very subtle contradiction of rights provided by the state and the conditions attached for such liberties is what is the key factor in man reaching to his full in terms of Enlightened thinking. Hence, Kant calls upon the rulers and the guardians of civil society to treat man according to his own dignity and remove him from his yoke. He also makes the point that the guardians may find themselves under the yoke.
The other point about living in an “Age of Enlightenment” is the prevalence of independent thought and thinkers like Fredrick who have shown the way for man and the society to proceed to a fuller appreciation of intellectual freedom and liberation for man. Thus though we are not in an enlightened age because of the conditions imposed by the state and other “externalities” that impeded intellectual freedom, there is nevertheless a situation of an age of enlightenment. This theme is a recurring one from the time of that period and it continues to this day where thinkers and philosophers have mused about individual freedom and the role of the state etc.
Parallels to the present age
The famous assertion of Kant regarding the age of enlightenment and the enlightened age has many parallels in the present age and the first decade of the 21st century. With an increasingly global world and the advent of market economics, the nation state is being subsumed by the larger forces of capital and free trade. As such, the transnational corporations have taken centre stage usurping many of the functions of the nation state and providing many its services.
The advent of global media has given us newer forms of self expression but has also held us hostage to what Flaubert called the “mass manufactured visions of happiness”. 3
Thus we have a situation where the interconnectedness of life has provided us with more opportunities for self expression and at the same time held us in thrall of materialistic excesses. Thus the question posed by Kant remains as relevant today as it was when it was first articulated.
References
Durant, Will. The Story of Philosophy. New York: Classics, 1926.
English. Dept. University of Pennsylvania. 2008. Web.
“Delusion of the Self.”Penguin Classics. 2008. Web.
In chapter 10 “Kant: The Need for Reason to Dominate,” Joel J. Kupperman has illustrated the role of human perception and believes in forming a reason or judgement. It is said that humans do follow the empirical approach to find answers for their queries, but even before finding the truth, their minds structure the truth. When a car is stopped suddenly, the driver can say that it stopped for no reason, but even without checking the engine, the passenger knows that there has to be a reason for its malfunctioning. It is because of the prior experiences or truths that the passenger has already structured about the truth before knowing the truth.
The author uses Kant’s Method of reasoning to explain the human thought process. This method comprises of three critiques. The first is the Critique of Pure Reason. This explains that a human mind gathers all past facts and knowledge to build up a logical reason. The second is the Critique of Practical Reason which connects the effect of something with possible actions for it. The author explains in the chapter that all human desires are connected with actions to achieve, and that forms the basis of defining laws and principles. The third is the Critique of Judgement, and that is another important aspect in forming human perception for truth. It links human experience and intuition, defining that humans’ personal interest, feelings, and imagination can alter the nature of their judgements.
In the later part of the chapter, the author elaborates Kant’s concept of the noumenal and phenomenal world. Humans are aware of the phenomenal world, knowing that they are intelligent beings, and the truth is what can be seen or assessed. However, the unaware reality that truth is not separated from human senses and morality. It is not seen either accessible, but it is present and has a profound influence on all reasoning made in the phenomenal world.
Works Cited
Kupperman, Joel J., editor. “Kant: The Need for Reason to Dominate.” Theories of Human Nature, and, Human Nature: A Reader, Hackett Publishing, 2010, pp. 125–37.
Morality can be defined as the system through which human beings try to differentiate right from wrong. On the other hand, ethics can be defined as the branch of philosophy that deals with morality. Moral theories are those theories that have been put in place to help determine whether some of the actions we do are right or wrong. They help human beings make informed decisions based on their understanding.
Kant’s moral theory
This theory is proposed by Immanuel Kant who was a philosopher and argued that the actions of human beings depended on goodwill. According to Kant, human beings should only do something if it is morally right. Based on Kant’s argument, we can conclude that an individual who follows moral laws in making decisions is a good person. One should also take into account the consequences, actions’ effects, or outcomes of their decisions. Kant defines goodwill as an action that respects moral laws. He believes that some actions are undesirable even if they would bring about happiness.
Mill’s moral theory
This theory is proposed by John Stuart Mill. According to this philosopher, people should consider possible outcomes, consequences, and effects of a decision before making it. Mill believes that humans should make decisions that benefit all people. His views also reflect an idea that people should do actions that make them happy too, which is known as utilitarianism. In addition, he defined a good action as an action that would make the person happy as well other people after the decision is taken. This theory focuses more on pleasure and happiness. However, Mill does not define how people should determine the effects of their actions.
To shed more light on this the following moral issue could be given as an example. A woman is walking alone at night unaccompanied. A criminal happens to spot her and without warning pounces on her. The criminal intends to rape and then kill the woman. While the two are struggling, the woman happens to take out a machete. She is compelled to make a quick decision. She either attacks the criminal with the machete first or risks being raped and killed. If she killed the criminal she would be happy as she would have escaped from being raped, injured, or even murdered. Also, people would be happy knowing that she killed a criminal who could continue causing harm to society. The other option would be not to hit the criminal with the machete. Her fate would then lie in the criminal’s hands. She would risk getting hurt and worse of all being killed or raped.
If the woman employs Mill’s theory to solve this situation, she would kill the rapist. She would then escape death. Self-defense here would have come first as she would escape unhurt while causing injuries to the criminal. The only option the woman would be having is to free herself from the hands of this rapist by using the machete.
On the other hand, if the woman employs Kant’s theory, it would be immoral to kill the rapist by attacking him with the machete. Therefore, in this case, the woman would have no other option. By not using the machete in her hand to free herself she would risk being raped or killed. By acting morally she would not be able to free herself from the ruthless rapist.
In my own opinion, in this case, the woman is faced with tough choices. Attacking a person with a machete is not morally right. But the woman would attack the criminal with the machete to protect herself. Therefore, attacking him would be the best option. This might inflict injuries to the criminal, but by doing so, the woman would be trying to protect herself. If she got killed her family would suffer. I think the moral thing to do in this case would be to attack the criminal with the machete. She would also help stop a criminal who could take advantage of other women if escaped.
Mill’s theory allows individuals to apply common sense when faced with complex situations. It also presupposes that one assesses the outcome before making a decision. On the other hand, Kant’s theory does not allow to use of common sense as it does not consider those complex situations that would compel a person to choose an immoral act to protect themselves. In this case, the woman will have to attack the criminal to become free. It is worth noting that Kant’s theory does not give individuals the freedom to choose.
I believe that Mill’s theory is more flexible compared to Kant’s one. We can, therefore, easily apply Mill’s theory when we are faced with complex situations. Since a person has a lot of options to choose from, he or she is assured of a better result after assessing the outcome of their decision. People should make decisions that make them happy and safe.
Why Kant thinks the possibility of knowledge of an objective realm reduces the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments
Kant’s notion on the possibility of knowledge of an objective realm reducing to the possibility of a priori synthetic judgment is explained by his interest in necessary truth, the theory of a priori, and necessity. Kant’s assertion that “if a proposition is thought along with its necessity, it is an a priori judgment; if it is, moreover, also not derived from any proposition except one that in turn is valid as a necessary proposition, then it is absolutely a priori” (Bird 153-57), depicts that his interest was in the kind of synthetic judgment like a priori, judgment of mathematics and physics, and of metaphysics with the content of knowledge (Pereboom 89-94).
Except for judgments Kant separates, those of metaphysics with knowledge content lack real knowledge, and if knowledge is present, it is likely obtained by a priori. His perception of what knowledge is was more restricted thus deepening his reason for choosing a priori knowledge. This is because genuine knowledge cannot exist till its contingent features are known. Kant’s perception that experience teaches us things which can turn to otherwise depict that judgments, propositions, known a priori (in part) are likely to contain genuine knowledge, hence the reason behind his emphasis on synthetic judgments that are a priori (Pereboom 88-90).
Kant explores the possibility of knowledge of an objective realm reducing to the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments by summarizing questions behind the critique of pure reason. He suggests that analytic-synthetic judgments inform nothing new and are achieved by drawing from the contents of our concepts and adding resultant propositions inferentially into arguments. Hence they do not readily tell anything new and if they do, they lack something to test for truth or falsity. This is depicted by Kant’s use of “though in” and “though confusedly” and his suggestion that the existence of concepts of things is no mark of their existence (Pereboom 88-90).
What Kant means by the claim that space is the a priori form of outer intuition
Kant claims that “the only manner in which our knowledge may relate to objects immediately is by means of an intuition”. Therefore Intuition only occurs when we have an object affecting our mind. Kant suggests that although intuitions come before experience, they act as contributors to knowledge. According to Kant, the possibility of knowledge and experience require understanding hence “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (Barbet 10).
A form is what the contents of an object can be arranged into and it “lies ready a priori for them in the mind” (Bird 157). Kant, in the ‘Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements’, refers to a priori to mean knowledge which is obtained without experience or sensible awareness.
According to Kant, sensibility is the ability to receive external objects’ representations sensibly including mental components or states of cognition. Kant achieves through the use of two kinds of intuition, space, and time, which slightly and sensibly belong to a person’s apparatus of perception (Barbet 3-9). Time translates to inner sensibility and space to outer sensibility (outer intuition) (Bird 155).
Kant perceives a ‘form’ using loose thoughts of a lens-type or in-built sieve, hence it is in the lens/built-in sieve (‘form’) that data from senses must pass. He ultimately perceives sensual intuitions as empirical (Anschauungen) or Empfindungen (sensations) and comprising the ‘matter’ of how things appear (Erscheinungten), hence aspects of time and space act as contributors to these appearances in terms of their ‘form’ (Bird 150-60).
Space refers to a form of all phenomena where outer intuition is only possible and therefore according to Kant, space is a “pure intuition or absolutely a priori representation”. Kant argues that “The representation of space must already be presupposed in order for certain sensations to be referred to something outside me.We can never have a representation of there being no space, even though we are quite able to think of there being no objects encountered in it. Hence space must be regarded as the condition for the possibility of appearances” (Bird 154)
Kant thinks subjective judgments (judgments about how things seem/appear to me) presuppose objective judgments (judgments about how things actually are, independent of how they seem to me). Why does he think this?
Kant claims that subjective judgments presuppose objective judgments especially when it comes to taste judgments which rely on the subjective principle and have a universal force. What we consider pleasant or unpleasant is based on feelings according to subjective principles and not concepts (Bird 153-57). In the Critique of the Power of Judgment exploring the ‘beautiful’, Kant brings out the ‘a priori’ character of taste judged as an item of a necessary satisfaction (Bird 153-57).
This aesthetic judgment (known to be subjective and non-conceptual) being necessary contradicts the idea of necessity being abstract and conceptual. Kant claims that “[T]his necessity is of a special kind: not a theoretical objective necessity, where it can be cognized a priori that everyone will feel this satisfaction in the object called beautiful by me, nor a practical necessity, where by means of concepts of a pure will” (Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:237).
A priori claim possesses universality as well as necessity hence it is necessary to get pleasure from a beautiful thing. There is no epistemic basis for this and Kant urges us to distinguish real pleasure from claimed pleasure from a beautiful item (Critique of the Power of Judgment, 120-25). However, in aesthetic judgment, pleasure from an object said to be beautiful becomes something that should be approved by all (Bird 150-60).
This is depicted in Kant’s claim that “In all judgments by which we declare something to be beautiful, we allow no one to be of a different opinion, without, however, grounding our judgment on concepts, but only on our feeling, which we, therefore, make our ground not as a private feeling, but as common sense” (Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:239). Such a principle of general approval and acceptability can only be via common sense since all people possess similar cognitive capacities. Kant views common sense as an avenue of everyone’s external senses and a power for judgment especially in aesthetics based on our feelings (Bird 150-60).
Universally necessary feelings are based on objective mental states, not subjective desires. Kant relies on the presupposition of common sense based on the objective mental state to bring out aesthetic judgment as necessary judgment (Critique of the Power of Judgment, 111). Before accepting universally communicable knowledge, we should agree that our mental state is universal. Therefore, mental processes in aesthetic judgments are similar in everyone and based on a similar subjective principle (Critique of the Power of Judgment, 113-21).
What does Kant mean by a category? Briefly explain why he thinks that categories are involved in every judgment
In the Kantian point of view, a concept or idea which is pure of understanding is referred to as a category. The Kantian approach to categories depicts them as having characteristics of any other general object in terms of appearance. According to Kant, pure concepts or categories regarding understanding are applicable to general objects of intuition. The Kantian category refers to the aspect of the possibility of things in general and not specific or particular objects.
Kant refers to a “category” to mean an attribute that can be predicated about something and logical employment of categories is depicted the way they are used as object predicates, hence Kant referred to them as “ontological predicates” (textetc.com par.6). Kant’s meaning of category is almost an appreciation of the Aristotelian approach, which asserted that categories or predicates can be asserted of anything in general (textetc.com par.5-8).
According to Kant, one thinks of his experiences as belonging to their own consciousness, and possibility of the experience is enhanced by nonconformity to categories. A person must also suppose existence of a “transcendental object” or an object which Kant calls “X” (real existing objects before a person experiences them and to which their representations are referred to in line with “rules” depicted in Kant’s quote that “it is not itself an object of knowledge, but only the representation of appearances under the concept of an object in general — a concept which is determinable through the manifold of those appearances” (Bird 130).
Kant suggests that humans can have thought and knowledge in their understanding which ascertains spoken and written judgement about particular things. Hence he perceived that people’s ability to judge is equivalent and related to ability of thought. Therefore he inferred that qualities or attributes about objects contribute to thoughts and ultimately judgments (textetc.com par.1-5). Kant’s perception of involvement of categories in judgment is influenced by traditional and Aristotelian categories of logic. His approach is also influenced by using pure reason which depicts removal of all empirical content. Therefore according to Kant, “time and space do not qualify as categories of understanding but as media where impressions are received” (textetc.com par.5-9).
Explanation of the First paragraph of SS16 for the Reprinted Transcendental Deduction
Kant attempts to depict synthesis of ideas and refute associationism by means of a two-pronged mechanism. The process of ordering of mental states largely encompasses processes of synthesis which refers to joining different representations (which Kant calls “a manifold”) and grasping the manifold component in them in a single cognition, and employing concepts as modes under which representations are ordered (Bird 157-63). This is depicted in his quote that “all sensuous intuitions are subject to categories, as conditions under which alone the manifold content of them can be united in one consciousness” (Critique of Power of Judgement 112)
Kant’s important argument (as per the quote above) is the argument of ability of categories to synthesize human representations. The subject is important in mental processing and it is different in terms of its representations. This is because understanding is a consequence of categories which provide synthesis (Bird 159). According to Kant, associations, unlike synthesis, do not have enough resources to explain aspects of consciousness of the self. He establishes different features of principles regarding necessary unity of apperception and extends to a priori synthesis by explanations of grasp of self consciousness (Bird 153-57).
Apperception is mental state apprehension in terms of one’s own representations hence Kant perceives that a person’s apperception enjoys unity since representations have to be grounded in pure apperception thorough self identity in all representations (Bird 150-60). Kant asserts that object perception lacks collections of representations and intuitions are distinct from the self, which gives the perception that intuitions are not components of the subject and the implausible interpretation that the self merely comprises collections of concepts.
In addition, Kant’s attribution of the self’s lack of inner intuition of the subject contradicts the perception of the subject being a collection of representations. Kant maintains that self intuition of representations can be achieved by inner sense hence the notion that purity of apperception is not intuition of the subject. Therefore, a person’s representations are attributed and represented as an object in ‘a priori’ way (Bird 154-68).
Works Cited
Textetc.com-Analysis of Kant’s Philosophy. Textetc Philosophies. 2000. Web.
Certain phenomena can explain if knowledge lies within the circle of reason or does not follow scientific principles. Kant explains that each time they are about to conclude, they retrace their steps and start a new line of approach. On the contrary, there is only a point that they have retraced steps in logic if they are dealing with features that do not involve science. Logic, therefore, is an advantage that is obligated to deal with its limitations from all dimensions of knowledge. Therefore, understanding cannot stand without logic.
He states that if the reason was to be employed as a model of science, there should be a priori characteristic. This means that the knowledge obtained from reason is from everyday experience. Even though knowledge is theoretical, the reason is practical. Kant established that it was easy for mathematics as it was easy for logic and reason would be left to stand alone. Kant states that reason can only contain after a ‘model which it can securely travel is well established.
Kant had set the concept to bring out only what was necessary and to put a construction of knowledge into the figure, as he had told himself. The main outcome of the intellectual revolution by Bacon in ingenious propositions was natural science. It is mainly founded on empirical principles to explain a phenomenon. After different scientific experiments, such as turning metal to oxides and oxides back to metal, scientists understood that reason only gives insights into the questions which come from it. Nature cannot explain the concepts of reason. Therefore, one should not compel nature to answer questions of reason. Reason also involves morality, a concept of right and wrong, which is more or less an individual’s freedom to judgment.
Metaphysics is named the long-lasting and almost permanent element of science. It explains concepts, unlike mathematics. Kant states that metaphysics would remain even when the rest are swallowed or destroyed by the forces of nature. He states that hope for future life is characterized by nature because it is not satisfied by temporal things. Kant believes knowledge can be advanced; for instance, the school was brought to provide higher insight than the existing one. Every phenomenon can be improved and report a higher authority in its dimension. The nature of metaphysics, reason, mathematics and science is temporal because it is a foreseen and advanced future. He intends to succeed in his proposition to provide a metaphysic nature of morals speculatively and practically. However, if he places reason on the right path of science, he might render it the most powerful force in human nature.
Immanuel Kant is considered the most influential philosopher of the Age of Enlightenment and one of the greatest Western thinkers of all times. His contribution to metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics had a substantial influence almost on every philosophical movement that followed him. Also, Kant was one of the most important figures in the development of modern science. His main contribution to the rise of modern science was its liberation from theology.
Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in Königsberg, which was the capital of Prussia at that time. His parents were Pietist, and Kant went to a Pietist school, the Collegium Fridericianum (“Immanuel Kant”). Pietism was related to a strict Lutheran movement that emphasized arduous religious devotion, introspection, and a literal interpretation of the Bible. Although Kant disliked Pietist schooling, he respected and admired his parents, whose hard work, honesty, and independence influenced him a lot.
When Kant studied at the University of Königsberg, he got interested in philosophy. At that time, he was introduced to the works of Christian Wolff, John Locke, G.W. Leibnitz, and Isaac Newton. Kant’s first work Thought on True Estimation on Living Forces, published in 1747, was evidently influenced by the work of Isaac Newton (“Immanuel Kant”). When his father died, Kant was left without income and had to interrupt the studies. He worked as a private tutor for about six years outside Königsberg. In 1754, Kant returned and started teaching philosophy at the Albertina, where he worked for the next forty years until his retirement in 1796.
In 1755, Kant published Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heaven. In the work, he developed a theory that later was called the nebular hypothesis (“Immanuel Kant”). The theory explained the formation and evolution of the Solar System and became the most widely accepted model in the field of cosmogony. A New Elucidation and The Physical Monadology were his first works related mainly to metaphysics, in which Kant continued developing his view on the interaction of finite substances.
Both works demonstrated the influence of Christian August Crusius (“Immanuel Kant”). Since Kant was a non-salaries lecturer, and he was paid by the students who came to his lectures, he had to work a lot to earn his living. At that period, Kant was interested in the works of British sentimentalist philosophers, especially, Davis Hume and Francis Hutcheson, and the Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (“Immanuel Kant”). Kant was popular among the students and established a reputation of intellectual in the local society.
In 1763, Kant published a major work The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God. In the book, he developed “an argument for God’s existence as a condition of the internal possibility of all things,” whereas he criticized other arguments on the matter (“Immanuel Kant”). In his another work, published in the same year, The Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy, Kant observed that the real opposition of conflicting forces could not be reduced to the logical relation of contradiction (“Immanuel Kant”).
Besides, he argued that “the morality of an action is a function of the internal forces that motivate one to act, rather than of the external (physical) actions or their consequences” (“Immanuel Kant”). The next work Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime focused on the connection between finer feelings and humanity. Kant claimed that individuals with different temperaments and dispositions cannot have the same senses for the finer feelings.
In 1766, Kant published Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics, his first publication regarding the possibility of metaphysics. In this work, which was caused by Kant’s interest to the Swedish visionary Emanuel Swedenborg, he satirically paralleled Swedenborg’s visions to the idea of rationalist metaphysicians about the immortality of an incorporeal soul (“Immanuel Kant”).
He concluded that due to the limited experience of the human reason, philosophical knowledge about these questions is impossible. However, Kant noted that “moral faith” supports the belief in an immortal and immaterial soul, although it is impossible to get metaphysical knowledge in this sphere.
When Kant got a promotion, he included new subjects to his lectures such as anthropology, rational theology, pedagogy, and natural right. He wrote a Latin dissertation, known as The Inaugural Dissertation. In this work, Kant differentiated between two basic powers of cognition: sensibility and intelligence. He viewed sensibility separately from intelligence and stated that sensibility provides sensory representations. All the representations through sensibility are structured by two subjective forms of space and time, but moral judgments are caused by reason alone.
According to Kant’s views, sensibility enables the access to the sensible world, whereas intelligence helps human beings to understand a distinct intelligible world (“Immanuel Kant”). Later, he rejected the idea that human reason can have insight into an intelligible world, and concluded that the reason together with sensibility “supplies forms that structure our experience of the sensible world, to which human knowledge is limited, while the intelligible world is strictly unknowable to us” (“Immanuel Kant”). Kant worked on The Critique of Pure Reason from 1770 to 1781. Another major work that followed was The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, which became his first mature work on moral philosophy.
In 1790, Kant published The Critique of the Power of Judgment, the book on aesthetics and teleology (“Immanuel Kant”). In the work the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discussed the possibility of metaphysics. He defined metaphysics as “the cognitions after which reason might strive independently of all experience” (qtd. in “Immanuel Kant”). In the book, he aimed to reach a “decision about the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general, and the determination of its sources, as well as its extent and boundaries, all, however, from principles” (qtd. in “Immanuel Kant”). Therefore, metaphysics for him related to a priori knowledge, which is the knowledge that comes pure from reasoning, independent of experience.
In both works The Critique and The Inaugural Dissertation, Kant tried to reunite science with morality and religion, referring them to sensible and intelligible worlds. He attempted to clarify the probability of a priori knowledge about the world that does not depend on the human mind, however, he reached a deadlock. Nevertheless, The Critique had another important view that people can have a priori knowledge about the general structure of the sensible world as it is not completely dependent on the mind.
The human mind builds the sensible world from a combination of sensory experience that people get passively and a priori forms supplied by the cognitive faculties of a human being (“Immanuel Kant”). The central thesis of the work is that human experience is appearances, not things in themselves. According to the book, “space and time are only subjective forms of human intuition that would not subsist in themselves if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of human intuition” (“Immanuel Kant”). Kant called the thesis transcendental idealism.
Human autonomy is a fundamental idea in Kant’s philosophy. According to his works, human reason does not supply the content of the experience, although it arranges the content received through the senses. Kant argued that it is a condition of self-consciousness that human intelligence builds experience in such a way. Since human a priori knowledge about the structure of nature is based on self-consciousness, it can be called the highest principle of Kant’s philosophy.
Work Cited
“Immanuel Kant.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016. Web.
Kant’s third antinomy pays attention to the link between two major assumptions shaping the modern philosophical thought. The first antimony considers causation as an approach deployable to explain all motions of natural beings. The second assumption holds that people are self-moving and free. The first assumption finds relevance in modern science while the second assumption finds application in the interpretation of modern morality. At superficial value, the two assumptions appear to contradict. However, Kant “attempts to show that this contradiction only arises when reason transgresses its limits and seeks to grasp the infinite” (Gillespie 1). This way, reason takes a dialectic form. It is submerged in the illusion with imagination coupled with rhetoric acquiring noble roles in guiding it.
The reason should not be exposed to subversion. Kant believes that this problem can be resolved only by subjecting the power of reason to criticism in the endeavor to establish its limits. This aspect constitutes the main objective of Kant’s book, Critique of Pure Reason. Kant argues that the critique of reason creates room for the possibility of establishing a distinction between legitimate deployments of reason in philosophy and rhetoric coupled with dialectical use. Hence, the foundation for rationality in science and rooms for religion coupled with morality are also excluded. This paper starts with a description of the Kant’s antinomies in general before introducing the third antinomy, which is “on freedom”, and finally providing the writer’s interpretation of the third antinomy.
General Description of the Kant’s antinomies
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discusses four antinomies or metaphysical propositions, which seems contradictory. The first proposition deals with definiteness of the beginning and the end of the world in comparison to the infiniteness of the world (Moore 480). The second antinomy introduces the claim that everything available in the world constitutes simple indivisible elements, which are indestructible (Radner 413). The antithesis for this claim is that all things available in the universe constitute infinitely divisible and composite elements.
The third metaphysical proposition’s thesis is the claim that people act in a manner determined by their free will while the antithesis is the claim that all things done by people are within the control of nature. The last antinomy encompasses the thesis that there “is a necessary cause vis-à-vis the antithesis that nothing is necessary and everything is contingent” (Kitcher 36). Kant dogmatically assumes on one hand that the thesis for each antinomy is true and he uses it to prove the antithesis. In the second instance, he dogmatically assumes that the antithesis is true and thus he used it to prove the thesis. Through this methodology, Kant depicts that each of the antinomies arises from people’s misunderstanding of issues under discussion. Major misunderstandings arise from the non-verifiability of the antinomies through experience so that people are compelled to conceive that they “deal not with appearance, but with things in them” (Kitcher 43). In this end, appearance becomes deceiving and a major impediment to the deployment of the power of reason in establishing the truth.
First antinomy’s chief challenges emanate from mistreatments of time coupled with space. Moore posits, “Its treatment of times and space as constituting things by themselves as opposed to the sensibility of faculty institutions” (482). Time and space comprise key features of people’s experience. This assertion implies that their isolation from experiences constitutes impossibility since they cannot exist as independent entities in the absence of experience (Moore 483). When subjected to reason, the interrogative on the capacity of time coupled with space to offer a limitation to the world makes logical sense. Such limitation “would require the existence of outside realms of people’s experience” (Moore 483). The second antinomy introduces a major philosophical puzzle when Kant treats the refutation coupled with proof of bodies as being constituted of simple elements.
Schmiege joins and relies on Jonathan Bennett’s argument that no person has ever interpreted the second antinomy so that the “thesis and antithesis arguments come out valid and to constitute genuine antimony” (Schmiege 272). These complaints come up while Kant states that all antinomies constitute valid arguments. Radner quotes Kant claiming that antinomy “proofs are not deceptions, but are well-founded under the supposition that appearance or a sensible world comprehends that they all are things in themselves” (413). In this regard, when people talk of parts, as sub-elements comprising one single homogeneous object, presumption emerges that the sub-elements are already are in existence, but residing within the homogeneous object. In this sense, the object is not a single whole; rather, it constitutes an illusion of parts.
The above argument implies that parts making up an object are appearances whose existence is only possible when they are experienced. Schmiege notes that Kant’s second antinomy makes people “try to extend their knowledge of phenomena they have experienced beyond their experience of them” (286). However, Kant reminds people that experienced objects constitute mere appearances. He claims that the elements of time and space, under which people perceive objects of appearance, make up pure institutions possessed by people. The major argument advanced here is that objects of experience cannot exist in the absence of people’s experience of the objects. Hence, people’s experience on objects creates the perception of the objects in their mind, which means that the perception of objects resides in the mind of people. Thus, the physical existence of objects arises from contention in mind that the object indeed exists in the physical world, whose existence is also a philosophical subject of convincing the mind about its existence.
The third Kant’s antinomy is perhaps the most interesting. The antinomy makes freedom and necessity seem contradictory while they fit into each other. Time coupled with space limits is essential for the probabilities for the action of nature’s rules and laws. This realization means they are only valid as appearances. Get argues, “Freedom is the ability to be outside the confines of causality, and so to exist outside the confines of experience” (85). Hence, freedom only applies to things themselves. People’s faculty of reason fails to incorporate experience, which implies that people are free and rational beings. However, freedom is manifested through overall principles operating independently from time, causal influences, and space. Consequently, in the effort to obey the general maxims, people still find themselves following regular laws guiding the world characterized by appearances, which implies that while people are free, they can also be subjects of nature’s laws.
Superficially, a contradiction in the fourth antinomy is amply resolved if the thesis is interpreted as handling objects in themselves while the antithesis is interpreted as being concerned with appearances. Unfortunately, in the world full of appearances, interpreting the antimony this way introduces errors in reason. All causal relations have probabilities for being contingent. This implies things can occur in contradiction to anticipations. Thus, a probability exists for appearances to link up objects.
The main question arising in the proofs of the fourth antinomy is whether things occur in the fashion they should or they need to occur differently. In the attempt to provide reconciliation for the antinomy, Kant presents two varying types of causations, viz. necessary and contingency causations. The contingency causation “determines how causes work in the world of appearances while necessary causation determines how things in themselves cause the appearances we experience” (Inwagen 103). Kant describes objects as acting themselves as causes and as necessary. However, he argues that necessities coupled with causes are the province of appearances. They comprise pure paradigms for the enhancement of understanding.
Analysis of the third antinomy
In the discipline of philosophy, problems encompass the building blocks for utilization of the power of the mind in reasoning. Through an interrogative process and without committing fallacies, philosophers explore various solutions to a problem. The best and the most reasonable solutions are selected based on coherent and substantive arguments on all developed possible solutions. The third antinomy of Kant is an attempt to offer solutions to philosophical problems of necessity and freedom. In this section, the statement of the thesis and the antithesis for the Kant’s third antinomy is provided. An attempt is also made to examine the proof of the antithesis and the thesis.
Kant’s third antinomy addresses the question of necessity and freedom of human beings. His thesis states, “Causality by laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived, but to explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom” (Priest 5). In his proof for this thesis, points of departure from contention arise on the subject whether the antinomy amounts to conflicting nature’s laws. However, Kant fails in capturing such disagreements. The antithesis corresponding to the thesis in the third antinomy is that freedom does not exist so that all things in the world happen through the action of laws of nature (Priest 5). The antimony places an interrogative on the actual implication of causality through discussion of relationships existing between a series of events.
The thesis takes a rationalist position (described as dogmatism by Kant). This invokes Descartes and Wolff’s position on the reasoning process to unveil the truth. The thesis does not categorically argue that all events in their totality are rested on platforms of freedom; rather, “it is necessary to assume causality through freedom” (Sassen 81). The antinomy draws from two main theoretical arguments to attempt to explain states of the derivation of events existing in the world about nature’s laws. These are the uncaused cause, what Kant refers to as spontaneity, and causality. The Kant’s antithesis for the third antinomy encompasses a counter-argument on empiricism as advanced by philosophers such as Hobbes, Hume, and Bacon. It “denies all causality through freedom and asserts that everything in the world happens according to natural necessity” (Inwagen 105). In the proof of the antithesis, Kant struggles with the interrogative on whether events solely depend on the natural necessity or whether people, through freedom, are responsible for the courses of events.
Proof for the thesis is initiated by the refutation of antithesis. Kant argues that an assumption that the antithesis is true only leads to the conclusion that all things must be in themselves causes and effects. This assertion implies that since the “series continues ad infinitum, there is ultimately no way to distinguish a true cause or a true effect, and thus everything is merely mediation and the whole is nothing other than a self-medicating motion, a pure process with no ground in being” (Pippin 461). In this context, Kant’s antithesis has a major failure for it does not satisfy the principles of adequate reason. The truthfulness of the antithesis implies that there exists no limitation of cause series, hence no sufficiency in reason.
Kant’s main concern is on causality sufficiency as a composite or simply as a mechanism of synthesizing the composite (Ginet 93). Hence, the main challenge is on whether natural causality can explain a whole in itself as opposed to an explanation of the causation of successive events. Therefore, it turns out that no significant difference exists between immediate causes of events with events preceding them. Hence, causality fails to convince the power of reason for it cannot be sufficiently determined. This observation means that no explanation for causation can be derived entirely without the creation of necessity for an additional explanation in case there are chains of infinite causes. The proof “concludes that if there is only natural causality, the sequence of events cannot be a whole” (Inwagen 107). Therefore, only transcendental freedom combined with natural necessity can make conceivability of wholeness for various realizable causal events. The noble question emerging here is whether the “assumption is inconsistent or incompatible with the initial assumption on causality’s universality” (Inwagen 98). More importantly, does it create a greater disaster to affirm the thesis than when it is denied?
Kant attempts to prove the antithesis by refuting his thesis. According to him, in case the thesis is held as true, a condition emerges for no contradictory causal series. It also means that free “actions would redirect the series or the series would interrupt itself” (Inwagen 107). Hence, accepting the thesis implies that the world only constitutes a collection of isolated events whose interlinks cannot be established. Hence, “the assumption of freedom as a determinative cause in addition to natural causality makes the unity and the wholeness of the wholly impossible” (Ginet 93). Additionally, the assumption undermines various natural laws and the essential rules accompanying the laws.
Hence, the restoration of rules and laws’ guidance becomes attainable when freedom of causality is presumed. In turn, the freedom would establish and ensure the maintenance of its invariable rules and would only differentiate its self from natural necessity by its name. Then it implies that if “everything took place by such a will, which while nominally free was bound to its own rules, then this will would not be free in our ordinary sense of the term” (Ginet 94). In this context, real freedom is best described as lawlessness. In the conclusion of the proof, Kant argues that it is necessary to look after causes higher in the series of events. Such causes should ensure not only conditional but also conductive cohesiveness of experiences. Assuming that freedom exists only leads to the destruction of rules, which creates the possibility of the experiences’ cohesion (Ginet 95).
Author’s interpretation of the third antinomy
The challenge of freedom and free will comprises one of the major interesting debates in philosophy. In the context of Kant’s third antimony, the question of free human beings becomes important. Kant’s thesis to the third antinomy supports the view that people are held responsible for their actions simply because they have free will. In the absence of this free will, it is possible that people can excuse themselves and run away from the assumption of accountability for their wrong actions for they do not have choices. This assertion means that the power to act oppositely does not reside within themselves, but it is subject to control by some external agents or forces. Hence, freedom essentially entails having the ability to make choices in the manner in which makes a person act without relying on external forces to predetermine and coerce a free-thinking person to act in a particular way, which is not justified by reason.
Principles of nature and causation of events compromise the freedom of people, which introduces the need for acting in a manner that meets requirements for necessity. In this line of argument, Clarke notes that nature’s laws “dictate that every event is caused by some previous event and that every event, in turn, acts as a cause for some subsequent event” (43). How can then people act freely and independently without compromising the natural laws? Kant responds this interrogative through holding the position that causes, while not negating effects constituting understanding faculties possessed by different people, and which are valid strictly to appearances. In contrast, freedom comprises the faculty of people’s power of reason, hence inapplicable to appearances. The alienation of freedom from appearance implies that it exists outside the confinements of space and time. In this context, “a free act cannot be contingent on the particularities of what is happening at a particular time or in a particular place” (Ginet 86). This assertion means that free acts need to comply with general maxims’ laws. Here, freedom is not subject to spontaneity. It implies compliance with people’s established laws and manifests itself through order, which makes it not to compromise nature’s laws that apply to appearances.
The discussion of freedom put forward by Kant presupposes events’ ontology. This ontology is exemplified by his use of the phrase “that which happens” (Priest 5). This aspect suggests that events occur after the occurrence of some conditions. However, my understanding is that conditions for the occurrence of events do not imply that an event has occurred. In attempting to derive the meaning for freedom from the paradigms of self-reliance in acting, Kant thinks that people “are free if and if only respect exists in which a person’s cause for the occurrence of an event and/or events and respect in which a person is not an effect of an event exist” (Priest 5). However, this element does not comprise adequate conditions for freedom since “being the cause of some event might itself be caused, if the respect in which (putatively) I am uncaused does not preclude this” (Ginet 87). This scenario reduces people’s cause of causes or causes of anyone’s events caused by people.
The third antinomy of Kant introduces ambiguities in an attempt to understand the proofs for its thesis and antithesis. Hence, making their clarifications and removal is paramount. Priest supports the argument that there exist ambiguities in the third antinomy of Kant by claiming that Kant appraises “the claim that there exists a kind of freedom from which the world of appearance may be derived” (5). This take may create two different meanings. First, it may mean uncaused events that initiate every consecutive causal chain that exists. Secondly, it may imply uncaused events that initiate some isolated causal chain that constitutes a single member of a set of various causal chains. The first meaning of freedom principally refers to God or the principal cause for everything that exists. Freedom may also refer to finite attributes of people, but dismissing certain phrases in the first meaning. The justification for this argument is that in the third antinomy, the main concern is the self’s freedom. Kant supports this assertion when he argues in CPR 414, A450 and B478 that the “absolute first beginning of which we are here speaking is not a beginning in time but causality” (Priest 6). In CPR 414, A450, and B478, he further argues that in case an event is the cause of other following events, then it necessarily implies that the event precedes other events in space and time.
The above argument suggests that events are caused by an event, which at any particular time is the first event. This scenario opposes myriads of actions, regarded as free, executed by finite people. Such acts encompass the finite act of standing up executed by Kant. Despite the act being free, Kant’s theory suggests that cause follows events as opposed to being self-caused. In his proof for the thesis, Kant “assumes the contradictions of what is to be proved and attempts to derive a contradiction” (Priest 7). He argues that the causes of events are necessitated by temporarily preceding events, thus making it impossible to have completeness of a series of causations of events. “Put differently, determinism constitutes infinite regress for causes of events” (Priest 7).
In the context of Kant’s reasoning chain for events’ causation establish self-contradictions. He stops at this point without explicitly stating the contradiction. However, it is also possible to reorganize the self-contradictions. This can be achieved by “stating that for complete determinism to remain true, then in causation, there is both presence and absence of an initial event (per impossibile)” (Priest 7). The justification here is that any first event will have to be putatively arising from a proceeding temporally event. Nevertheless, several events would both in practice and theory fail to occur without the existence of some preceding event. However, claiming the conjunction of events precisely requires logical impossibilities (contradictions) that in time there existed and an uncaused initial event was absent.
The proof for the thesis forms the basis for people’s freedom. To my understanding of the third antinomy, the best way to run away from contradiction is through denial of the existence of total determinism. Hence, according to Clark, “We must, then, assume a causality through which something takes place, the cause of which is not itself determined by necessary laws, by another cause antecedent to it, that is to say, absolute spontaneity” (38). Here, my interpretation of spontaneity is an actor’s capacity to cause a causal chain without itself being caused by any other causal chain or even an isolated cause. Hence, absolute spontaneity is only realized when an event q is the only event after event q, where event q is both adequate and necessary condition for the occurrence of q, but not any other event(q-1) preceding q such that q-1 is an unnecessary or adequate condition for event q.
For the explanation of the origin of everything that exists to make logical sense, the postulation of absolute spontaneity is important. This assertion implies that free action and will of people does not account for part of the things existing even if human action as a free will can be described exemplarily as constituting absolute spontaneity. Hence, merits in support of third antimony are not convincing enough. Kant himself admits this challenge at A449, B476 by asserting that the “necessity of a first beginning due to freedom, of a series of appearances we have demonstrated only in so far as it is required to make an origin of the world conceivable” (Priest 11). This admission implies that more arguments are required to achieve freeness in human actions. Such arguments are raised at A448, B476-A52 and B480, where Kant divides the concept of freedom into empirical and the transcendental freedoms and calls the whole idea psychological freedom (A448, B476) (Priest 11).
Transcendental freedom refers to the “kind of uncaused cause without which even in the (ordinary) course of nature, the series of appearances on the side of the causes can never be complete” (Priest 12). This position taken by Priest implies that all things that exist are uncaused. Rather, their occurrences are instigated by freedom possessed by people. This aspect suggests that some kind of freedom exists, which putatively places conditions specifically on appearances as opposed to general events. My interpretation of this argument is that transcendental freedom is necessary to be invoked whenever an attempt is considered for a description of human actions as free.
No substantive arguments on the thesis prove without any reasonable doubt that human beings are free. The philosophical proposition countering the thesis to the third antinomy of Kant is that there “is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely by laws of nature” (Sassen 105). Freedom ensures that people get liberated from compelling pressures. It also ensures that the rules of nature do not inform their deeds. This implies that determining freedom from the paradigms of law leads to a situation where freedom does not exist at all. My interpretation of the antithesis is that it is fallacious to presume that causality has rules of freedom ingrained in it as portrayed in the nature courses so that freedom occupies the place of forces of natural laws.
According to Kant, the specific answer for problems of the third antimony is essentially transcendental idealism. In my understanding, he advises people to adopt the “distinction between things as they are in themselves, and as they appear to the human subject” (Kitcher 86). Here, the question of appearance and deception takes important roles in the creation of a perception of freedom, yet people may not be free per se. Kant argues that in noumena selves, people are free. However, they appear within themselves as determined by the principles and rules of natural laws. If Kant has responded yes to the question of whether he is free in his book, then here he says yes. To him, freedom constitutes a type of causality for free events that are causes that do not affect. Whether determined and/or natural, causality demands the existence of events that have both effects coupled with causes (Clarke 27). If freedom comprises one of such events, then it is subject to some external forces. Hence, there is no freedom and all people’s actions do not emanate from their free will, but control of natural laws.
Conclusion
Considering the proofs of both the thesis and the antithesis to the Kant’s third antimony, it sounds imperative and reasonable to conclude that both determinism and free will do not explain exhaustively and in a convincing manner, beyond any reasonable doubt, that they can offer true accounts on how things occur. Tracking the determinants of the occurrence of events leaves one single event whose occurrence cannot be linked to any other event preceding it. Therefore, its causation cannot be explained using the determinism or free will philosophical theoretical accounts. Perhaps the most prudent way to attribute the occurrence of such an event is to conclude that it naturally exists. This conclusion is not reasonably accurate and it only leads to making the inference that people do not have freedom, but it also implies that everything they do is under control of external forces or laws of nature. This assertion holds as the event responsible for the causation of chain of events and hence everything else in the world has no causation limited both in time and space. Does it imply that people’s conception of freedom is simply appearance, while in effect their actions are subject to control by forces of nature? If this is the case, then the question of whether ‘I am free’ remains a philosophical construct unresolved by Kant in his third antimony.
Works Cited
Clarke, Randolph. “Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action.” Philosophical Topics 24.7 (1996):19-48. Print.
Gillespie, Michael. Philosophy and rhetoric in Kant’s Third Antimony, 2006. Web.
Ginet, Carl. “Freedom, responsibility, and agency.” The Journal of Ethics 1.1(1997): 85-98. Print.
Inwagen, Peter. “When the Will is Not Free.” Philosophical Studies 7.5 (1994): 95-113. Print.
Kitcher, Peterson. Kant’s Transcendental Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Print.
Moore, Walter. “A Note on Kant’s First Antinomy.” The Philosophical Quarterly 42.169 (1992): 480-485. Print.
Pippin, Raymond. “Kant on the spontaneity of mind.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17.3 (1987): 449-476. Print.
Priest, Stephen. Kant’s Concept of Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print.
Radner, Michael. “Unlocking the Second Antinomy: Kant and Wolff.” Journal of History and Philosophy 36.3 (1998): 413-441. Print.
Sassen, Benson. Kant’s Early Critics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Print.
Schmiege, Oscar. “What is Kant’s Second Antinomy about?” Kant Studies, 97.3 (2006): 272-300. Print.
Humanistic ethics should be discussed as a type of ethics that is focused not on moral laws and principles, but on a human, as well as on his or her existence and well-being. In his work, Fromm explains human ethics as “the art of living” and opposes it to authoritarian ethics (18). However, there is a question about the position of Kant’s ethics in the paradigm of authoritarian and humanistic ethics. On the one hand, Kant’s ideas presented in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals can be viewed as related to authoritarian ethics because of the accentuation of moral laws, universalism, and persons’ duties.
On the other hand, Kant’s visions are directly connected with humanistic ethics and the role of a man in the world from the perspective of a giver of moral norms (8). Furthermore, there is also a question about the connection between Kant’s ethics, whether humanistic or not and Fromm’s specific humanistic system of ethics. Although the principles from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals can be considered as associated with authoritarian ethics or reflecting other views on humanistic ethics, Kant’s work presents a system of ethics that is similar to Fromm’s humanistic interpretation because Kant promotes the idea of human dignity and freedom, an individual is discussed as a norm giver, and criteria for virtues and the good are determined by persons.
In order to discuss similarities in Kant’s ideas regarding human dignity and freedom and Fromm’s vision of a man, it is important to define these concepts from the perspective of Fromm’s humanistic ethics. According to the philosopher, the focus should be on the human existence that should be respected, and a person’s freedom is not in being free as opposed to being enslaved, but in being free to become happy and live following ethical norms that reflect the good for this person (Fromm 27).
These ideas are also reflected in Kant’s work as he accentuates that an individual is free to assess his or her actions and evaluate their value while discussing ethical laws as not imposed by other persons, but included in the human nature and developed by this individual (42). In addition, according to Kant, “man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will” (43). As a result, Kant’s man is as free as Fromm’s man, and the necessity of respecting human dignity is emphasized in both works in spite of differences in reasoning and arguments to support these ideas.
One of the key statements that allow for speaking about Kant’s ethics as humanistic is the idea that an individual is a norm giver. In order to understand this concept, it is important to discuss providers of norms and laws in authoritarian and humanistic ethics. According to Fromm, in authoritarian ethics, the good for individuals is determined by authorities, and in humanistic ethics, “man himself is both the norm giver and the subject of the norms, their formal source or regulative agency and their subject matter” (9).
This idea is also reflected by Kant in his categorical imperative: “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (36). Thus, in spite of the fact that the actions of a person should be universally ethical, the morality of these actions is still determined by that individual who performs them. From this point, Kant’s human is also a norm giver, but the ethical character of his or her actions is explained through the lenses of universal moral laws. In this context, a person is not restricted by norms proposed by authorities, but he or she is limited by one’s own visions of morality, which are expected to reflect the universally accepted visions.
As a result, the following fact also allows for comparing Fromm’s and Kant’s ideas: specific criteria for morally accepted actions, virtues, and the good are determined by individuals as norm givers. According to the principles typical of Fromm’s humanistic ethics, “only man himself can determine the criterion for virtue and sin, and not an authority transcending him” (12). This humanistic ethics is “anthropocentric,” and men’s “value judgments … are rooted in the peculiarities of his existence and are meaningful only with reference to it” (Fromm 13). Finally, Fromm’s virtue is the “responsibility toward his own existence” (20).
This idea is directly reflected in Kant’s ethics because his vision of virtues is associated with duties and the concept of the universal good. Criteria of this good are developed by persons and their own views regarding moral laws. Furthermore, while determining personal criteria for ethical actions, individuals make sure that these norms are rational and rather universal: “to whatever laws any rational being may be subject, he being an end in himself must be able to regard himself as also legislating universally in respect of these same laws” (Kant 54). As a result, Kant’s individual independently determines moral laws to follow in his or her life, but these imperatives as so strong that they can be followed by other humans to guarantee their well-being that is the concept of humanistic ethics.
Nevertheless, opponents of the idea that Kant’s ethics is correlated with Fromm’s vision of humanistic ethics can state that Kant’s ethics is rather authoritarian in its nature. The reason is that it is possible to interpret the philosopher’s focus on universal moral laws as imposed on individuals by authorities because these norms are expected to be followed worldwide. On the contrary, it is important to note that Kant’s ethics is humanistic because moral laws are determined by individuals’ inner visions of the good and the bad. These views are associated with human nature, and they are not formulated under the impact of external factors.
One more opponents’ view is related to the idea that even if Kant’s ethics is humanistic, it is not similar to Fromm’s ethics. Thus, Fromm is focused on a human being’s free will when Kant accentuates obedience to laws. Still, it is possible to state that Kant’s vision of an individual’s freedom is also important because he proposes persons to evaluate virtues and the morality of actions through their own beliefs. In spite of the fact that individuals are expected to follow universally appropriate ethical laws, they formulate these rules independently and freely.
Furthermore, they formulate these laws in order to contribute to a person’s happiness, and this aspect is part of an individual’s moral duty. As a result, this idea is correlated with Fromm’s one because of his focus on making people happy in the context of his ethics.
Humanistic ethics differs from authoritarian ethics in terms of being concentrated on the interests of human beings rather than authorities and their laws. Therefore, in a humanistic system of ethics, moral laws are determined and formulated by individuals for their benefits and happiness. People determine what is good and what is bad for them according to the idea of their dignity.
Their existence is viewed as critical to determining ethical norms. In spite of the fact that these ideas seem to be opposing to Kant’s ethics, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals represents ethics from a similar perspective. Although Fromm is focused on the self, he promotes the ideas of human dignity and freedom, the importance of an individual as a norm giver, and the significance of determining criteria for the good and the bad by individuals, not by authorities.
It is important to note that, in his work, Kant is concentrated on the same visions. A human being’s dignity and his or her importance are close to the idea of absolute, and therefore, individuals can independently determine moral laws to make them universal without depending on authorities. Furthermore, the criteria for moral or good actions, as well as virtues, are developed by persons with reference to their internal visions and feelings.
From this point, both philosophers reject the necessity of involving authorities in developing moral rules that should be based only on human visions of ethics and good, which seem to be inherited by all people. As a result, the development of universal laws is possible for the purpose of guaranteeing that all people can reach their happiness and harmony while following these rules.
Works Cited
Fromm, Erich. Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics. 2nd ed., Routledge, 2013.
Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, Classic Books International, 2010.