Hurricane Katrina: Hazards Management

Introduction

The events of Hurricane Katrina that hit the Gulf Coast in August of 2005 are best described as the most devastating. Lives were lost, homes were destroyed and property worth millions ruined in this natural catastrophe which is described as the worst ever in America’s history. The few who were lucky to survive lost all they owned and this started a tough recovery journey that saw some move on while others lacked the strength to try (CNN 1).

Hurricane Katrina, according to investigations, resulted from global warming, a phenomenon linked to extreme events such as this. Temperatures at sea surface have continued to rise thus leading to the occurrence of typhoons and hurricanes. People are paying little attention to hurricane prone zones and end up settling there. This exposes them to natural calamities since tropical cyclones have a tendency of striking both land and sea (Young 1-3). This paper explores the events of Hurricane Katrina in regard to the arguments for and against rebuilding along the shorelines.

Arguments for rebuilding along the shorelines

Despite the destruction that came with Hurricane Katrina, the survivors were eager to embark on a reconstruction process to reclaim their livelihoods. Those who lived close to the beach lost their homes while those that lived far off suffered flooded and roofless houses. Their possessions were swept away and they now formed a ridge that divided the shoreline into two leaving a huge pile of debris (Pilkey and Young 2).

Natural disasters cannot be controlled since they strike when least expected in known and unknown zones. The answer thus lies in reconstructing the damaged buildings and ensuring that the latest technology is used to produce strong structures that can stand the hurricanes. The argument is that life has to continue anyway since no one is immune to natural disasters. The gulf has been home to many with facilities that include schools, hospitals, recreational facilities, as well as infrastructure. This is the reason why it must be rebuilt to give the survivors their life back.

Arguments against rebuilding along the shorelines

Attempting to reconstruct the damaged shorelines is unacceptable bearing in mind that natural calamities always recur without notice. Rebuilding will therefore remain a vicious cycle where more lives will be lost and more infrastructures damaged. The migration of the survivors will become habitual and this is more reason why people should be relocated to other disaster-free areas to curb this. Letting these vulnerable people live in disaster prone areas like the New Orleans City is comparable to sacrificing them in the name of making the shorelines more habitable. The Hurricane Katrina’s impact has intensified over the years and these occurrences cannot be wished away. Dealing with massive deaths and destruction is not only depressing but also expensive bearing in mind that such disasters may happen again (Oliver 2-4).

Conclusion

The devastation left behind by Hurricane Katrina is described as the worst ever to strike the gulf. Many lives were lost and property worth millions destroyed with thousands of people being left homeless. There have been various arguments for and against rebuilding the shorelines as depicted in this paper and each one of them stands strongly. Those for reconstruction argue that it is only sane to give the survivors their life back since this is the only home they have known for the longest time. Those against this cite that reconstructing the gulf is synonymous with gambling since natural calamities such as Hurricane Katrina cannot be controlled and are bound to strike again.

Hurricane Marine Essay

Hurricane Maria is regarded as the worst natural disaster on record in Dominica and Puerto Rico. The tenth-most intense Atlantic hurricane on record and the most intense tropical cyclone worldwide of 2017, Maria was the th named storm eighth consecutive hurricane, fourth major hurricane, second Category 5 hurricane, and the deadliest storm of the hyperactive 2017 Atlantic hurricane season. At its peak, the hurricane caused catastrophic damage and numerous fatalities across the northeastern Caribbean, compounding recovery efforts in the areas of the Leeward Islands already struck by Hurricane Irma. Maria was the third consecutive major hurricane to threaten the Leeward Islands in two weeks. after Irma made landfall in several of the islands two weeks prior and Hurricane Jose passed dangerously close, bringing tropical storm force winds to Barbuda. Maria is also the third-costliest tropical cyclone on record with a total of roughly $100 billion in damages; only hurricanes Katrina and Harvey from earlier in the season inflicted more damage, respectively.

Originating from a tropical wave, Maria became a tropical storm on September 16, eTast of the Lesser Antilles. Highly favorable environmental conditions allowed the storm to undergo explosive intensification as it approached the island arc. The hurricane reached Category 5 strength on September 18 just before making landfall on Dominica, becoming the first Category 5 hurricane on record to strike the island. After weakening slightly due to crossing Dominica, Maria achieved its peak intensity over the eastern Caribbean with maximum sustained winds of 175 mph and a pre 908 mbar, making it the tenth-most intense Atlantic hurricane on record. On September 20, an eyewall replacement cycle took place, weaken Maria o a high-end Category 4 hurricane by the time it struck Puerto Rico, Interaction with land further weakened the hurricane, though it regained some strength as it moved northeast of The Bahamas. Moving slowly to the north, Maria gradually degraded and weakened to a tropical strom on September 28 Embedded in the westerlies. Maria accelerated toward the east and later east-northweast over the open Atlantic, becoming extratropical on September 30 and dissipating by October 3. As of November 20, at least 517 people were killed by the hurricane: 499 in Puerto Rico.31 in Dominica,5 in the Dominican Republic 4 in the contiguous United States, 3 in Haiti, 2 in Guadeloupe. and 3 in the United States Virgin Islands. Dozens of others, mostly in Dominica and Puerto Rico, are still missing. The death toll in Puerto Rico is believed to be far higher than the official toll of 58, with estimates of the actual loss of life ranging from 500 to more than 1,000. Maria wrought catastrophic damage to the entirety of Dominica, which suffered an island-wide communication blackout. Much of the housing stock and infrastructure were left beyond repair, while the islands lush vegetation had been practically eradicated. The island of Guadeloupe and Martinique endured widespread flooding, damaged roofs and uprooted trees. Puerto Rico suffered catastrophic damage, including destruction of its previously damaged electrical grid. For weeks in Maria’s wake, most of the island’s population suffered from noodling and lack of resources, compounded by the slow relief process.Total losses from the hurricane vary wildly but are estimated at upwards of $99.45 billion, mostly in Puerto Rico.

The National Hurricane Centre began monitoring two tropical waves on September 13. The easternmost wave quickly spun up into what would become Hurricane Lee, while the western one continued moving generally westward. With generally favourable conditions in the disturbance’s path, development into a tropical cyclone seemed likely. During those two days the disturbance became better organised, and by September 16. convective banding became established around poorly-organised circulation. As the system was an imminent threat to land despite the centre not being well. defined, the NHC initiated advisories on it as “Potential Tropical cyclone Fifteen” 15: 00 UTC, in accordance with a policy change enacted at the tart of the season. A midlevel ridge anchored north of the disturbance steered west northwest into a region highly favourable for further development sea surface temperatures of, low wind shear and ample moisture were anticipated to foster hurriecane-status before the system reached the Lesser Antilles. At that time, Maria was situated 620 mi east southeast of the Lesser Antilles.

A central dense overcast and favourable outflow developed atop the centre of circulation, which enabled Maria to become further organised throughout the early morning hours of September 17. After a brief intrusion of dry air exposed the circulation, a convective burst occurred over the centre and intensification resumed, Hurricane Hunters investigating the system observed surface wind of and a formative eye feature. Accordingly the NHC upgraded Maria to hurricane status at 21 00 UTC. Expansion of the central dense overcast and an increasingly complete eyewall singled steady intensification throughout the night of September 17-18 Considerable lightning activity was identified within the hurricane’s core early on September 18 and statistical models indicated a high probability of rapid intensification. Explosive strengthening took place shortly thereafter, with aircraft reconnaissance finding surface winds of and a central pressure of 59 mbar, making Maria a Category 3 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale, and hence a major hurricane. Additionally, radar data revealed a well-defined wide eye. The eye contracted slightly to as intensification continued, and the system reached Category 4 strength by 21: 00 UTC.

Hurricane Katrina: Improvised Communication Plan

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina swept through the city of New Orleans (Lachlan & Spence, 2007). The hurricane caused extensive losses in the Gulf Coast region. In the aftermath of the damage, thousands of residents were left homeless. As the victims escaped from the region to safer grounds, millions of Americans watched agonizing images of fellow citizens languishing in conditions, which were analogous to our expectations of catastrophes witnessed in the developing nations. A recent study indicated that 90% of Americans were following the tragedy’s news broadcasts through and after the hurricane. As the rescue process was being undertaken, millions of people questioned how the tragedy came to be and what they could do to aid the victims. The public health society inquired about how they could help in protecting the victims’ health and how they could enhance their recuperation (Brunkard & Namulanda, 2008). Similarly, the disaster management fraternity inquired about the lessons the public could gain from the tragedy to improve the preparations for the future. This article seeks to highlight improvised communication plans that were adopted by the victims in the shelter at the Houston Astrodome. It will also focus on the means of how they communicated, the advantages and disadvantages of these means, and lessons learned.

Whenever a hurricane is witnessed, colossal breakdowns of communication facilities and technology are realized, which have resulted in delayed preparedness and rescue missions. Concerning this, several scholars have confirmed that communication plays a major responsibility in effective disaster management. In the aftermath of the hurricane that happened in the year 2005, the victims in the shelter at the Houston Astrodome realized that the communication infrastructures had been severely damaged (Taylor & Viswanath, 2010). With hardly any dependable communication structures in place, the community had to rely on improvised communication plans. Most of the victims who had no phones relied on bulletin board postings. Others communicated through word of mouth for news about their relief programs, missing loved ones, and health care. People with mobile phones could not communicate through voice calls but rather through messages. There were incidences of some people never using the message services in the past. However, after the tragedy, they had no other option but to adopt the services to communicate with their loved ones. The victims who had sought shelter at Houston Astrodome had to acquire authorization from the government to establish a low-power radio station. The radio station was established to inform the victims in the Astrodome about how they could put their lives back together. As the radio station had been established, portable radios were acquired for the victims.

The improvised communication systems illustrated above were very useful for the victims and the rescuers. Through them, the victims could learn about the evacuation processes, interventions put in place by the federal government to enhance their health care, news about their missing loved ones, and crucial information about how they could return to their normal livelihoods. As such, the improvised communication systems emphasized how archaic systems can be useful in times of disasters.

Despite their usefulness, these communication systems had their shortcomings. Unlike other conventional communication systems, the old ones were not dependable. More often, the outgoing calls could be initiated while the incoming calls could not. Equally, the improvised communication systems had to be shared with several individuals. Those who had satellite phones had to share them with several other people. This implies that communication processes were not only cumbersome but also unreliable. Another disadvantage associated with the improvised communication plan was that it did not provide all the information needed by the victims. After the tragedy, the victims wanted to know about several proceedings in their neighborhood. For instance, others wanted to know about the extent of the damage, while others wanted to know if the neighborhood was safe enough for them to return. The improvised communication systems could not provide all this information at once to the thousands of victims at the Astrodome.

In the aftermath of the tragedy, the victims, the citizens, the government, and the disaster management team learned numerous lessons. In a study conducted in the year 2007, it was found that half of the victims had incorporated modern communication systems into their daily lives (Gallagher & Fontenot, 2007). Before the 2006 hurricane, most of the residents in the region depended on landline phones because the mobile phone networks had repeatedly failed them. The disadvantage with landline phones is that they are prone to damage when natural disasters occur and they do not provide massage services. On the other hand, handsets cannot be damaged because they are portable and enable their users to access message services. Other than the victims, the government and the disaster management team learned vital lessons from the crisis. They learned that the relevant authorities should assess the existing laws and strategies related to communications. Thereafter, they should come up with a national emergency communication approach, which will enhance communication levels during disasters.

Similarities Between Tornadoes and Hurricanes

Though both a tornado and a hurricane are fraught with terrible consequences, both in terms of material damage and the possible injuries, when choosing between the two, I would rather face a hurricane than a tornado. There are several reasons for the choice that I have made, yet a comparative predictability of a hurricane is the feature that was defining in the comparison between the two (Lutgens and Tarbuck “The Atmosphere in Motion” 447).

Indeed, a closer look at a hurricane will show that its destructive power is lesser, much like its longevity. Unlike a tornado, which traditionally forms from a cumulonimbus cloud, a hurricane, also known as a tropical cyclone, occurs as a result of water evaporation from the surface of the ocean and then forms clouds immediately (Lutgens and Tarbuck “The Atmosphere in Motion” 451).

One must admit that hurricanes, while causing impressively lesser damage, may conceal even greater threat, since they often trigger tornadoes. Therefore, there is a possibility of having to face both instead of merely a hurricane. However, the threat of a hurricane progressing to become a tornado is quite low; in addition, the tornadoes spawned by hurricanes are less powerful than the ones that develop directly from a cumulonimbus cloud (Lutgens and Tarbuck “Weather Patterns and Severe Weather” 476).

Therefore, I would rather face a hurricane than a tornado, mostly because of the difference in their duration and effect. Though each of the phenomena is potentially dangerous and is likely to do a lot of damage, a hurricane has a less powerful effect than a tornado and, which is most important, is much more predictable than a tornado (Lutgens and Tarbuck “Weather Patterns and Severe Weather” 484). As a result, it would be much easier to avoid injuries and predict the worst case scenario.

The course has definitely given me a lot of food for thoughts; it has made me reconsider the impact that people have had on Earth, as well as the changes that the planet is undergoing at present. Moreover, the information acquired throughout the course has allowed for not only envisioning the possible future of the planet and the civilization, but also the ways to escape the drastic consequences that may follow unless the environmental policy is reconsidered.

However, it would be wrong to claim that the course has made me view the Earth through merely an environmentalist viewpoint. While admittedly important, this manner of viewing the planet did not bring many surprises. What literally made me gasp in awe in front of the majesty of nature was the text about volcanoes. True, the information about tornadoes and hurricanes also stirred my imagination and impressed be, yet the fire that pours out of the depth of the Earth looks much more impressive to me. Before taking this course, I never thought about the forces that were raging under the Earth crust, and that the center of the Earth could literally be described as liquid fire.

Apart from the weird charm of the idea that the Earth can breathe fire, the very fact that once dormant, a volcano can become active again and bring immense destructions seems mesmerizingly terrifying and at the same time interesting and worth researching to me. As a matter of fact, it was reading about volcanoes that made me feel like doing a bit of a research on the topic. Learning about volcanoes was clearly one of the most exciting elements of the course.

Structural Violence and Hurricane Matthew in Haiti

Paul Farmer’s chapter “Suffering and Structural Violence explains the concept of structural violence and applies it to Haiti. According to Farmer, structural violence occurs when the political, economic, or social structure of the country facilitates the suffering of certain categories of people. Vulnerable communities are characterized by various axes of oppression, which can be any characteristics that distinguish them from privileged communities.

For instance, gender is a significant factor, since women are under the increased risk of rape and various health issues associated with sexual activity, pregnancy, and childbirth. Race and low income are other examples of the axes of oppression. In Haiti, poverty and female sex are the two factors that impact life quality the most. With the majority of the population earning less than $1 a day, Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the Western hemisphere. The society is structured, with middle- and high-class families living primarily in the cities, and the poor living in villages with no decent infrastructure and little access to healthcare or protection of the police.

The situation worsened after several natural catastrophes, starting from the 2010 earthquake, which left two hundred thousand people dead and even more families homeless. This year, Hurricane Matthew has landed another major hit on the country. This paper aims to explore the issues of structural violence in the aftermath of the hurricane using two quotations from Farmer’s text, as well as the recent newspaper reports to build an understanding of the issue.

By what mechanisms, precisely, do social forces ranging from poverty to racism become embodied as individual experience? This has been the focus of most of my research in Haiti, where political and economic forces have structured risk for AIDS, tuberculosis, and, indeed, most other infectious and parasitic diseases. (Farmer 369)

In this quote, Farmer argues that one of the structures supporting human suffering in Haiti is the government itself. Indeed, health infrastructure in Haiti does not have enough resources and staff to provide for the majority of the population. Lack of contraception leads to unwanted pregnancies, dangerous abortions, the spread of AIDS and STDs. This is not the same for every layer of society: middle-class families living in the capital have better access to healthcare than poor farmer households.

However, the government’s influence on human suffering extends beyond health issues. For instance, Haiti’s social policy could hardly be deemed efficient: law enforcement is outnumbered, and the justice system is still in development – anti-rape laws were not enacted officially until 2005. The level of crime rises exponentially in the poorest regions with few opportunities to control the criminals.

In light of recent events, the impact of government’s actions (or lack thereof) is even more apparent, as The Economist argues in the article “The Misery of Hurricane Matthew is Deepened by Human Failure”. The article explains that the reason for such a high death toll compared to other regions is the lack of government support before the disaster.

For instance, there is a set procedure in Cuba, which ensures the safety of the citizens in case of an approaching hurricane: “State-controlled media warn residents for days of approaching hurricanes; schools are closed and turned into shelters. State-owned buses are dispatched to evacuate residents. Local party snoops, known as the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution, with representatives on every block, make sure the elderly or infirm are not left behind” (The Economist par. 3).

Haiti’s government, on the other hand, cannot operate effectively in case of a crisis: “Haiti’s government barely functions. The infrastructure is poor, with few solid buildings. Haiti’s media are chaotic. High crime rates mean residents refuse to leave their homes unattended” (The Economist par. 4). The consequences of the government’s inaction primarily hit the underprivileged rural communities with worse living conditions and higher crime levels, which makes this situation a good example in support of Farmer’s statement and shows how the government supports and facilitates structural violence.

Today, the world’s poor are the chief victims of structural violence — a violence that has thus far defied the analysis of many who seek to understand the nature and distribution of extreme suffering. Why might this be so? One answer is that the poor are not only more likely to suffer; they are also less likely to have their suffering noticed… (Farmer 383)

In this quote, Farmer addresses the fact that most of the structural violence is directed against the poor communities, mainly because the poor are silenced, and the general public is oblivious to their suffering, and thus nothing is done to end it. In Haiti, poor people do not have any influence on the social or political situation in the country, and they are too preoccupied with daily survival issues to fight for the right to be heard.

Even the health, crime, and death statistics used in various studies are unreliable, as they only contain officially reported cases. Most deaths in Haiti go unreported, and so do most crimes. Poor access to healthcare leads to a lot of issues being unaccounted for, including serious infectious diseases, such as cholera and AIDs. In general, the lack of comprehensive data means that the suffering of people in the poorest regions could be worse than we expect.

This issue has become especially prominent after Hurricane Matthew. Firstly, the total amount of deaths resulting from the catastrophe cannot be measured correctly, since there is no access to poorer regions: “towns that were reportedly hard hit but which have been hard to reach, such as Jeremie, on the north side of the southern peninsula, had yet to be counted” (Partlow and Murphy par. 5). Access to health care following the disaster remains fragmented, which led to the rise in infectious diseases, such as cholera.

Clean water and sanitation are essential in treating cholera, however not all the regions of Haiti can provide those: “At least three cases of cholera were reported […] two people with cholera had shown up Thursday, but the hospital staff didn’t have the intravenous fluids or antibiotics to treat the disease” (Partlow and Murphy par. 14). Overall, it is, indeed, the poor people that suffer the most in the current situation, and the actual extent of their struggles is not visible to the general public.

In conclusion, I would say that there is no doubt that the principles of structural violence, explained by Farmer, apply to the present situation in Haiti. Moreover, the concept of structural violence allows for a better understanding of the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew. For instance, it underlines the role of government as an agent of suffering and shows why the poorest people are more affected by natural disasters. A deeper understanding of the structural violence in the present context could be very helpful in determining a plan of action to help the victims and to minimize the risk of similar issues in the future.

Hurricane Katrina’s Mental Health Impact on Populations

The occurrence of Hurricane Katrina and Tsunami disasters called for the development of specialized techniques that would respond to a crisis. The disasters challenged the governments of the two nations to be more awake on issues to do with disaster preparedness and response. During the rescue missions mounted by various crisis workers and other support organizations, the personnel experienced various resistances owing to cultural factors that are upheld in high esteem by the locals. First, crisis workers have faced language problems ranging from difficulties in communication to poor communication of essential information. For instance, crisis workers could not pass urgent information to the affected families instead they had to employ the services of translators, which was time-consuming and expensive. In case crisis workers had to educate the public or create a certain form of awareness, they had to liaise with other organizations to deliver services. Such connections caused delays that later led to the loss of more lives and property. Furthermore, cultural believes affected the efforts of crisis workers because crisis workers had to spend much time convincing the public not to use available water. People could not believe that available water was contaminated given that poisonous generators had broken, releasing dirty gases to the mainstream water supply lines.

Some cultural considerations faced crisis workers during the two deadliest disasters. First, health care organizations were required to provide quality services by first understanding the effective means of communication. This had to incorporate the services of interpreters. This was a big challenge since such services were costly and had to be met by individual organizations, without demanding anything from clients. Furthermore, organizations and other caregiving personalities had to educate locals about their rights and what to be done in case of a crisis. The same information had to be provided in understandable languages, which was a challenge. For there to be culturally competent care, organizations were required to train their staff members to sharpen their skills and strategies, as far as caregiving is concerned. This was not easy since the place had no classes and other learning facilities (Mahoney, Chandra, Gambheera, De Silva, & Suveendran, 2006).

The responses to the Katrina and Tsunami disaster were culturally competent because caregiving organizations such as WHO conducted thorough research and availed critical information to communities before the outbreak of communicable diseases. In other words, the caregivers had the interest of the affected at heart. For instance, in the Tsunami case, the WHO deployed health experts to some parts of Sri Lanka and Indonesia to assess the possibility of the outbreak of communicable diseases in December 2004. The group of experts was charged with the responsibility of implementing a disease examination and offering adequate information before the occurrence of another disaster in form of a disease outbreak. The rescue exercise abided by the crisis intervention strategies and skills because the team deployed by the WHO participated in offering support and assistance to communities. In the Aceh region, crisis workers participated in supplying laboratory goods, advising the locals on what to do, and helping the disabled to move out of trouble areas (Mills, Edmondson, & Park, 2007). In most societies, survivors of a crisis and their health conditions are usually used in evaluating the damages and responses to the crises. In the two disasters, the crisis workers did their best because they managed to salvage many victims. This shows that they must have used proper techniques and skills.

Florida Civilians Refuse to Follow Hurricane Dorian Evacuation Protocol

Hurricane Dorian is a category five hurricane that formed over the Central Atlantic as merely a tropical wave on August 24th, 2019. The storm became a hurricane on August 28th as it reached north of the Greater Antilles. Dorian reached its peak of one hundred and eighty-five miles per hour and was declared a category five hurricane on the 1st of September. It made its way through Elbow Cay to the Grand Bahamas and remained there for the next few days causing catastrophic damages due to the intensity of the storm and resulting in possibly 1,000 casualties and 1,300 missing civilians. Hurricane Dorian had debilitated over time but unfortunately began heading northwest towards the United States. Many of the Florida and North Carolina counties issued mandatory evacuation protocols for civilians living near the coast.

The hurricane headed northeast and North Carolina experienced a category one hurricane on September 6th. On September 10th Hurricane Dorian had finally ceased in Greenland only after striking Nova Scotia. The article, “Some Floridians refuse to evacuate but worry about Hurricane Dorian’s unclear trajectory” (2019) was posted by NBC News on August 31st to update viewers on the course of Hurricane Dorian. However, this article focused on an old retired couple that live together in Magnolia Beach. Don and Carol Killingsworths, both seventy years old, were refusing to follow the evacuation protocol that was issued on several counties in Florida. Nine counties were issued with mandatory evacuation and another seven counties were issued with voluntary evacuation due to the fact that the trajectory of Dorian could not be predicted. The couple talks about how they had once before experienced an evacuation protocol and it was the reason the couple had moved to Florida back in 2007. It was because of this experience that the Killingsworths had decided that they would only evacuate if it was proven that Hurricane Dorian was heading towards their beachside home, despite being begged by their daughter who lives in Orlando to evacuate.

About an hour after their statement Brevard County, where the Killingsworths live, was issued with mandatory evacuation. The elderly couple were still persistent on remaining in their home. Wife, Carol Killingsworths had essentially told the interviewer that if Hurricane Dorian were to take away their home that they would go alongside it. In critical thinking, it is best to avoid using any bias such as personal opinions or experiences to come to a conclusion. The conclusion should be based off of accurate evidence to support it. In the context of the interview with Don and Carol Killingsworths, they are choosing to ignore current evidence that Hurricane Dorian is a dangerous fast-moving tropical cyclone that has destroyed the homes of thousands of families, resulted in about 1,300 civilians to go missing, and acquired about 7.5 billion dollars-worth of damages. The trajectory of Hurricane Dorian was not able to be accurately determined due to its different peaks of intensity and the Killingsworths used this to justify their decision to stay behind. There is clear evidence in all the harm it can do, therefore, it would have been a more logical decision to follow the evacuation protocol. At the time Brevard County was not issued a mandatory evacuation, but the couple should have prepared for it to be a possibility very soon. However, there is the possibility that the elderly couple is not in fact ignoring the magnitude of the current situation but is not as scared as other civilians because this is a tragedy that they have experienced before.

The Killingsworths know what it’s like to lose everything and being forced to start over and find a new home. Due to their old age and previous experience, the Killingsworths have probably mentally prepared themselves to be one of the thousands of homes that will be destroyed by Hurricane Dorian. The couple has lived a long life together and possibly don’t want to endure starting over once more. When the article had surfaced many people via social media platforms such as Twitter, were very upset with the Killingsworths decision to enjoy cocktails on their porch rather than evacuate with the others. The couple was offered shelter by many of their friends who lived in Nashville, Tennessee and still refused to evacuate. Twitter users were upset that the couple seemed to have no disregard for the hundreds of law enforcement officers who risk their lives to rescue civilians and provide transportation to shelters.

Others were upset with the fact that the couple was offered assistance during this devastating time and refused to take it, considering many other families struggle to find others willing to help. In the article, “Why do some people refuse to evacuate during a hurricane? For the same reasons people don’t listen to warnings they should save money” (2019) published by Michelle Singletary of the Washington Post, she intends to show others why blaming the victims of hurricane destruction is never the answer. Singletary shines a light on the perspective of the victims and discusses the many reasons civilians refuse to follow evacuation protocol. Singletary explains that in times of devastation many families do not have the financial stability to help themselves and references the many residents that were criticized for refusing to evacuate during Hurricane Katrina. Unfortunately, these families didn’t have the resources to find shelter and had no means of transportation to even get out. Many of these civilians accepted the fact that they would not be able to find the means in time to evacuate, so they have no choice but to stay behind and hope that they can handle the situation themselves.

In a poll done on those who refused to evacuate during Hurricane Katrina, some civilians reported that they believed they could handle the situation. Fifty-seven percent of this group of civilians admitted that they had misjudged the severity of the storm. Singletary compares the state of hurricane victims to those who live their lives paycheck to paycheck, those who cannot afford their children’s college tuition, and even those who cannot afford to start investing in a retirement fund. In Singletary’s eyes, a civilian’s inability or “refusal” to evacuate during a hurricane is due to the fact that they do not have the means to, just as many of us lack the means to plan for our futures and pay a young student’s tuition. With the fact that Hurricane Dorian is the worst natural disaster to strike the Bahamas and how hundreds of thousands of people have lost their homes and loved ones, it is evident that Michelle Singletary’s perspective seems very illogical. It does not seem right or logical to compare a natural disaster; something that no one has any control over, to common misfortunes that every day people experience and play a huge roll in themselves.

Unfortunately, there are limited resources to those who survive natural disasters, however, there are hundreds of resources offered to help those who are in financial trouble.

Essay on Hurricane Irma

On August 30th, 2017 just off the West African Coast, Hurricane Irma started off as a weak wave that was followed by showers and thunderstorms. At this time there were favorable conditions for a tropical cyclone to form, in the Atlantic. As it moved through the Atlantic, it became a tropical storm on August 30th, near the Cape Verde Islands. The hurricane continued to intensify, while it moved over warm water and moist air. On September 6th, Irma finally made its first landfall as a Category 5 Hurricane right on the Northern coast of Barbuda. It had wind speeds of 185 miles per hour, which made Hurricane Irma one of the strongest hurricanes ever recorded in the Atlantic. Although Category 5 hurricanes don’t usually happen for long periods of time, they lasted for about 3 days. On September 8th, Irma finally weakened down to a Category 4 hurricane, where it moved through the Bahamas with winds of 155 MPH. But it became a Category 5 Hurricane once again when it moved through the Northern coast of Cuba. The hurricane made landfall in Southwest Florida as a Category 3 storm on September 10th. The Florida keys received winds of up to 115 MPH, and averaged about 10 to 15 inches of rain, along with a 10-foot storm surge.

Hurricane Irma was one of the most powerful hurricanes, and its effects of it were severe. The worst places that got hit were the Northerneastern part of the Caribbean and Florida. Irma had a death toll of about 129 people and it caused over $50 billion worth of damage. A majority of those deaths occurred in Florida. There were about eleven deaths directly related to the hurricane, 3 deaths possibly related, while the remaining 115 were indirectly related. The indirect deaths were caused by existing medical conditions, heat-related, or due to lack of power. In Florida, many power lines were down due to wind damage, and storm surges caused flooding. Fort Pierce, Florida received 15.9 inches of rain, which was the most in the state. In the Florida Keys, it was “estimated that about 25% of homes were destroyed and 65% of others suffered extensive damage.” Much of the building codes had high wind standards because they improved after Hurricane Andrew. But many of the buildings stood no chance against the speed of the winds. They also revamped building codes for homes after Hurricane Charley, which helped 80% of the homes in Irma’s path be more resilient. The storm left about 60% of homes without power and threatened $1.2 billion worth of crops. Florida is America’s second-largest grower of many different types of vegetables, so prices for orange juice and sugar increased prior to the storm. The Caribbean Island of Barbuda was hit just as badly as Florida, “Irma damaged 90% of the buildings on Barbuda. It destroyed almost all communication and left 60% of the population homeless. The government evacuated 1,800 citizens to Antigua.” Many people who were forced to evacuate, left their homes and sought shelters to ride out the storm, or they went to visit family that was out of the path of the hurricane. “Barley habitable” was how the Prime Minister of Barbuda described it during the event of the storm.

Many different agencies were brought into Florida for the federal response to Hurricane Irma. The following information is from a FEMA report when the Hurricane was occurring, “…in Florida, FEMA US&R saved 1,006 lives. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has rescued 326 people and saved 53 pets. The U.S. Coast Guard has also answered more than 1,750 emergency phone calls at their headquarters facility.” With FEMA and the USCG working together, even though they are two different agencies they are able to work toward the same goal. 10,000 federal workers are helping with the different mission areas including the response. Out of those workers, about 3,200 of them are FEMA staff, and about 13,000 of them are from the National Guard and are airmen. These workers originated from 22 different states, and are helping with operations like evacuation, rescue, support, and security. FEMA is also in charge of transferring food, water, and generators during this crisis. The Department of Energy also helped with communications, providing situational awareness, and restoring power. About 60,000 personnel, for this department, was activated from 250 different companies. They were able to restore about 70 percent of the area that was affected. I only highlighted a few federal agencies, but there are still a lot more that helped during Hurricane Irma.

For the Florida Keys’ state response, Monroe County Emergency Management led planning and preparation. Their responders helped with clearing debris off airport runways and repairing roads. They also inspected and maintained bridges, and cleared off roads in order to “make the Keys’ only main road safe for search and rescue crews, other emergency responders, and utility workers.” This aided many of the search and rescue efforts, they were able to search through 15,000 homes in only 6 days. Not only did Monroe county do this, but Fire Rescue and others also helped with this effort. Monroe County Fire Rescue also assisted with search and rescue, responded to calls, put the fires out, and cleared debris during the first few days. Monroe County Sheriff also got assistance from law enforcement from all around the country, which made them able to respond to calls and prevent looting. They were also able to coordinate aid from non-governmental agencies like the Red Cross, in order to set up food, water, and medical tents throughout the county. In order for the state agencies to coordinate this it took a lot of money. “State agencies spent $680.2 million after Hurricane Irma, with county government costs exceeding $1 billion, according to a draft of a report by the House Select Committee on Hurricane Response and Preparedness.” This shows how much devastating the Hurricane was not only physically, but financially as well. There are more agencies that were involved in the State response, but I wanted to focus on the ones that I felt were the most important

Nongovernmental agencies and volunteer organizations also helped in response to Florida during Hurricane Irma. One of these volunteer organizations included Habitat for Humanity. “In storm-battered Florida communities, the Red Cross and other nonprofit organizations are joining with the 26 Long Term Recovery Groups that have formed across the state to help Irma survivors connect with those resources” The Red Cross had a group of about 7,000 workers that were able to provide financial assistance to households that were damaged, which was about $37 million total. They were also able to provide 1.6 million meals and provide shelter for a total of 555,300 overnight stays. For long-term recovery, they were given around $15 million in grants, in order to help the most impacted parts of the community.

Hurricane Irma caused more than $50 billion dollars worth of total damage. The people who are responsible for paying for all this are the government, the state, the private sector, and insurance companies. “Nearly $3 billion in FEMA disaster assistance, low-interest U.S. Small Business Administration disaster loans, and National Flood Insurance Program payments have flowed to Florida for recovery and rebuilding” Flooding usually isn’t covered under standard home insurance unless the homeowners use the National Flood Insurance Program. Over $1.02 billion in grants were funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Public Assistance program. These grants were given to state and local governments and were also given to some non-profit organizations that were involved. These grants were used to help remove debris, repair roads and bridges, respond, and manage costs. For long-term recovery, Monroe County is doing the majority of the work. “The Monroe County Long Term Recovery Group has invited World Renew Disaster Response Services, also known as “The Green Shirts,” into the Keys to meet with people who still are recovering from Hurricane Irma and need financial, emotional, and/or household help.” The World Renew Green Shirts are volunteers, whose tasks are to go to individuals affected by the disaster, where they gather information and prioritize them. Monroe County is getting this money from federal, state, local, and non-profit, in order to repair and make Florida more resilient. 5,854 of a projected 7,959 total projects – nearly 74 percent – have been funded

In the research I conducted, I learned a lot of lessons that were created from Hurricane Irma. FEMA published an after-action report called, “2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report.” Three main lessons learned would help the agency and the emergency management community. The first lesson was that they must build a national culture of preparedness. Doing this it would make sure that everyone at the individual, community, federal, state, and local levels is prepared for the worst types of disasters. They also want citizens to mitigate these possible disasters, and buy insurance to ensure that whatever happens there will still be hope. FEMA’s second lesson learned was that they must get the Nation ready for catastrophic disasters. “The response to the hurricanes demonstrated the need for emergency managers at all levels to improve collaboration with the critical infrastructure sectors.” Even though there are developed plans with good information, emergency managers must be ready to adapt. For revising this coordination across the different sectors, FEMA wants to revise the National Response Framework and the Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan. For the third lesson, FEMA’s agency needs to become more efficient, and not as complicated. FEMA wants to simplify its strategies and make them more simple with new technology and approaches. By being able to communicate better, they want to be able to serve the survivors better before, during, and after the event. FEMA states that there is “no easy or one-size-fits-all solution to housing tens of thousands of displaced survivors. FEMA needs to simplify the process of applying for assistance to make our programs easier.” If they work together, they will be able to execute better methods for housing displaced survivors. Most of these methods are able to be executed by the federal state, and local levels working together.

There are many resources that I found useful for research, but I will be focusing on the three main ones. The first one comes from the National Weather Service website, which it has a detailed summary of Hurricane Irma. I used this mainly in the first paragraph, where it talked about the path of the Hurricane, and when the hurricane was either a Category 3, 4, or 5 hurricane. It also talked about the speed of the winds in each area, along with the dates on which the events took place. For the second resource that I found most valuable, I used “Hurricane Irma: The Immediate Response” from the Monroe County, FL, Emergency management website. This helped me gain more knowledge on the state and local response, and how they were running most of the operations. It also gave me a good insight into how they were working with non-governmental agencies like the Red Cross. For the third resource, I used FEMA’s “2017 Hurricane Season After-Action Report,” which was made on July 12th, 2018. This source was able to provide me with a great in-depth overview of the entire disaster itself. I mainly used this source in the paragraphs where I talked about the response aspect. It also provided a lot of the logistics, like how much the damage and costs were, and who was going to pay for them. This source also touched on the different lessons that were learned from the event, where they also provided recommendations that could fix the problems that they faced.

Report on Hurricane

On August 25, 2017, Hurricane Harvey made landfall as a Category 4 tropical storm near Rockport, Texas. Harvey’s outrageous breezes and tempest flood caused annihilation along the Texas coast. As Harvey moved gradually inland, meteorologists anticipated that Harvey would drop between 900 – 1000 mm (35-40 in) of rain during the following week in coastal Texas (Risser). In certain regions, these expectations were surpassed, especially in the greater Houston region. As a result, unprecedented flooding occurred over an area the size of the Netherlands. Houston, the fourth biggest city in the U.S., was particularly hard hit, inciting a huge crisis reaction running from nearby grass-attaches endeavors to formal disaster management. Initial reports place the harm from Hurricane Harvey among the top five historical weather events in the United States (Van).

More than 20,000 individuals had to look for emergency temporary shelter during the disaster and an estimated 120,000 structures have been impacted by flooding. Extreme flood events like Harvey are tragic but also very rare to occur frequently. The families who were exposed to the floods had to be rescued (by emergency workers/responders), escape (by themselves or with help from other citizens), or wait until the water levels had decreased. In multiple areas, the water level declined so quickly that people did not have to escape or be rescued (Van). Nonetheless, there were some places where evacuation was necessary.

Following the disaster declaration for the state of Texas by President Trump, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) began to go about as the government planning body for crisis reaction. My role as part of the FEMA is to initiate a few different systems at both the national level (National Response Coordination Center in Washington D.C.) and in the impacted locale (Regional Response Coordination Center in Denton). These planning components upheld individual states in actualizing a range of crisis readiness measures. The measures included data to the populace through weather alerts, data on evacuation temporary shelters, and safety tips in numerous dialects (“Historic Disaster Response”). FEMA not only helped at the government level but also at the citizen level.

FEMA allotted 28 Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) groups from the country over to send to Texas to help state and neighborhood organizations with the lifesaving strategy. The groups saved 6,453 individuals and 237 animals, utilizing boats and high-water trucks. Search and rescue endeavors included the USAR, National Parks Service, U.S. Fish, and Natural life Service, Customs and Border Patrol, and the Department of Defense. FEMA provided “3 million meals, 3 million liters of water, 9,900 covers, 8,840 bunks, 10,300 hygiene packs to the state to distribute to survivors. FEMA rapidly gave $186 million in Public Assistance subsidizing to repay neighborhood and state organizations for the expense of emergency protective measures and debris removal.” FEMA conveyed groups of authorities to neighborhoods and calamity recuperation focus to help Texans with enrollment and inquiries concerning calamity help. FEMA composed National Business Emergency Operations Center calls among 150 private segment accomplices chipping away at catastrophe reaction, worked with social media companies to share catastrophe data, and helped cell administration organizations in giving charging stations to catastrophe survivors (“Historic Disaster Response”).

Aside from communicating with people in general, FEMA moreover prepositioned groups and assets, including Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT) the crisis activities focuses. Through the reaction to Hurricane Harvey, more than 15 other government (federal or state) organizations have been included. In addition to these formal, governmental organizations, the American Red Cross and another 300 voluntary associations were assembled (Flowers). The sum and size of these associations, each with their commands, mastery, assets, methods, and structures added to the multifaceted nature of the reaction and difficulties in coordination. All the different organizations involved with different roles resulted in keeping the citizens safe

The American Red Cross (ARC) gave $45 million to more than 100,000 disaster survivors to support them with prompt needs. The Red Cross deployed more than “3,000 staff and volunteers, 171 emergency reaction vehicles, served 965,000 meals and 1 million snacks and worked shelters” throughout the affected districts (Flowers). These organizations mutually sorted out the emergency response for the influenced territories. This reaction included operational exercises, for example, search and rescue, evacuation, and medicinal consideration. Besides, the response likewise secured the provisioning of help things to the influenced populace, for example, nourishment and water, emergency shelter equipment, and monetary remuneration.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) role in an emergency crisis is to upgrade the well-being and prosperity of all citizens, by accommodating successful well-being and human administrations and by encouraging sound, supporting advances in science’s fundamental medication, general well-being, and social administrations. The HHC in Hurricane Harvey sent in more than a “1,110 workforce with medicinal gear and supplies. The workforce gave medical consideration to 5,359 patients and conducted 60 shelter assessments evaluations.” The department established a medical shelter and helped move Port Arthur residents who had been living in flood-water-polluted houses and apartments to temporary housing at the Bob Bowers Civic Center (Hines). The HHS also gave a helping hand even after the water level had decreased to make sure all the citizens impacted had good well-being.

It very well may be noticed that more than 300 volunteer associations supported crisis tasks. These non-administrative associations contributed a huge bit of the assets, both labor and things, in the outcome of Hurricane Harvey. Not just their assets added to the crisis reaction; their local presence, commonality with the area, and access likewise guaranteed a progressively viable activity for the administration-commanded associations. The coordination jointly effectively delivers aid and emergency response key factors in guaranteeing these associations mutually adequately convey help. The non-governmental organizations helped a lot in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, due to the high amount of damage.

Joined together, various factors made Hurricane Harvey a huge tempest. In the first place, the storm framed rapidly and heightened to a Category 4 in every brief time frame, giving individuals deficient time to get ready for it by emptying. Second, since Harvey was moderately moving, the flooding and tornadoes proceeded for quite a long time after Harvey made landfall. At last, Harvey’s area added to its demolition; it affected the fourth most-populated metropolitan region in the nation. Without the physical and financial help of the non-governmental organization, Hurricane Harvey would’ve taken longer to recover.

Report on How Hurricanes Work

In this report I will be writing about hurricanes. I will be writing about how hurricanes work, how big some are, how much damage they caused, and high were the wind speeds.

First I will be talking about how hurricanes form. These storms form over the ocean, often beginning as a tropical wave, a low pressure area that moves through the moisture rich tropics, possibly enhancing shower and thunderstorm activity, warm ocean air rises into the storm, forming an area of low pressure underneath. This causes more air to rush in. The air then rises and cools, forming clouds and thunderstorms.

There are two names for hurricanes. When you hear a hurricane it means that the hurricane is in the Atlantic ocean. If it is called a typhoon that’s when it is in the pacific ocean and they usually hit the phillipians, Japan, and the countries around there. They are basically the exact same thing though.

The biggest typhoon or hurricane ever was typhoon Tip. It was formed on October 4, 1978. It was almost half as big as the mainland United States. It stretched 1,380 miles long. The wind speeds were 190 miles per hour and it caused 99 fatalaties. It was a category 5.

The next hurricane is one of the most deadly hurricanes to hit the United States. That is hurricane Katrina. The hurricane and its aftermath claimed more than 1,800 lives, and it ranked as the costliest natural disaster in U.S. history. It touched down on August 23, 2005. It had wind speeds over 175 miles per hour. It was a category 4. The reason it was so deadly is because the city of New Orleans is built under sea level. So it was basically like a bowl of cereal.

The next hurricane I will be writing about is hurricane Sandy. Hurricane Sandy was the deadliest hurricane of 2012 and one of the most destructive hurricanes in history to hit the United States. It caused $70.2 billion worth of damage, left 8.5 million people without power, 650,000 homes, and was responsible for the deaths of at least 72 Americans.

The next hurricane is hurricane harvey. When Hurricane Harvey made landfall in Texas Aug. 25, 2017, as a Category 4 hurricane, it became the country’s first major — Category 3 or higher — hurricane since Wilma hit Florida in October 2005 and the first major hurricane to strike southern Texas since Celia in 1970. Causing about $125 billion in damage, Harvey ranks as the second-most costly hurricane to hit the U.S. mainland since 1900. Harvey killed 68 people.

My next hurricane i will be writing about is hurrican Irma. Hurricane Irma was a category 5 hurricane and it had wind speeds of 185 miles per hour for 37 hours. 6.5 million people were ordered to evacute. It caused 50 billion dollars worth of damage. It made landfall on september 6, 2017.

Hurricane Sandy is the last hurricane i’ll write about. Hurricane Sandy affected 24 states and all of the eastern seaboard. Causing an estimated $70.2 billion in damages, it was the fourth-costliest US storm behind Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and hurricanes Harvey and Maria in 2017. It had wind speeds of 115 miles per hour.