The Book of Genesis, as by literal translation of its Hebrew name, is the beginning. It is the first book of the Bible and the first installment in the five-part Torah. The author remains unknown until today, but Moses is credited as the human author of Genesis. The Book of Genesis sets the stage for the later books, explains the main concepts, laws, God’s promises to the people, and introduces the characters who played an essential role in God’s plans and God himself. It also unofficially consists of two main parts: the first part describes God’s relation to the world, the second part is about the pre-history of Israel’s nation itself and how it became chosen. There are various topics raised in the Book of Genesis: God, creation, covenants, faith, disobedience, death, Etc. There is no doubt that predestination and free will stand out among all of them. It is still debatable which one motivates God’s children’s choices, considering God created all living creatures. Some were disobedient and rebellious, but there is no proof it was not originally a part of the plan either.
Predestination in the Book of Genesis
The Book of Genesis starts with God eliminating the void and creating the world according to his plan. He destines the light to be good and the darkness sinister, the Moon and the Sun become the rulers of their parts of the day, Etc. Day 6 is remarkable because God creates human beings “in our image, as our likeness so that they can hold sway over the fish and the sea…” (Goldingay 2). Some theologists state that the Book of Genesis narrates the story of God trying to make a project of great importance and creating things and beings that will contribute to it (Goldingay XII). Disobedience is possible but not acceptable – it changes the being’s position in the world’s system. When Eve consumes the forbidden fruit, God puts Adam and Eve down on Earth. However, to some extent, they still supervise the world along with their creator – they are also still in charge of creating other human beings who are destined to continue the parents’ work.
Abraham is another example of how living beings are predestined to fulfill some particular purpose during their time in the world. God chose Abraham and blessed him so that he could do the same for the worthy ones. After numerous occasions, Abraham proves his loyalty, and God praises him by protecting him and his family until Abraham’s deathbed. God also gives Abraham numerous descendants; the first one – Ishmael – was born when Abraham was already 86 years old. By that time, Abraham seemed to be a friend to God because God came to him to ask for advice about Sodom, gave him numerous children and lands. Nevertheless, viewing them as equals is the wrong way – Abraham was always meant to be a tool with the destiny to fulfill. He had a right to make a mistake, but that mistake would have cost him all the blessings he received, and God, as he was portrayed in Genesis, made sure he made it clear.
Free will in the Book of Genesis
God creates people to be like him, so one could conclude, people should have free will. The story of the first people – Adam and Eve- and the first sin is probably one of the most famous ones in the Bible in general. It may be the story that proves the concept of initial free will in Christianity. Eve chooses to follow the serpent and does what is prohibited initially by her creator, who got to decide whatever was about to happen before. Their freedom gets limited after she gets the knowledge and opens her and Adam’s eyes to good and evil. Some theologists say that that was the moment (up to Jesus’ times) when human beings lost their connection to God and came back to the role of the tools of the masters’ project. Their punishments find them faster and are crueler than before. However, one can observe that people do not lose their freedom altogether.
Sodom and Gomorrah prove that people still got to decide things in their lives. People of these cities followed their heart’s desires, and later on, they got punished for that. God did not prevent them from taking the wrong path; he observed, and when things got ultimately out of hand, he destroyed both cities. God had mercy on Lot, who got to escape the city with his daughters, being warned by the envoys (Goldingay, 16). Still, that act of kindness was also connected with Abraham, asking God not to overlook Lot’s achievements and nature. People of Sodom and Gomorrah had some freedom over their decisions, but God decided their destiny based on these decisions.
Conclusion
Predestination and free will are two highly controversial and yet connected topics raised in the Book of Genesis. Until today, theologists debate whether or not everything in the God-created world is destined, or humans and other living creatures possess any freedom over their lives and decisions. On the one hand, being created to be a God-like creature would mean having God-like freedom over everything in life. On the other hand, God created people to be a part of his world and plans. This ultimately excludes the possibility of having any choice over one’s destiny in the bigger perspective, even if people are allowed to make everyday life decisions.
Works Cited
Goldingay, John. The First Testament: A New Translation. InterVarsity Press, 2018.
Philosophy is a very wide field dealing with human thinking and reasoning capabilities thereby providing the ultimate platform for making decisions and solving problems. It is a study involving general as well as fundamental problems like the ones closely associated with knowledge, mind as well as a language among many other aspects.
In this context, however, the focus narrows down to following argumentative terms in philosophy, which include fate, determinism, ontology and free will. From the normal definition, it is evident that determinism is simply the philosophical position assigned for every event such that there are conditions or factors that could not cause any other event. In real life situation, determinism is commonly referred to as cause and effect (Hospers, 1997).
On the other hand, fate is simply the predetermined course of the events or the predetermined future. In many circumstances, people ask more about free will than fate. However, free will is the central ability to make a choice between separate courses of action. There may be constraints, but limits do not form any barrier.
The four conditions put any person in a big dilemma especially with regard to determining the course of action or self-identity. Situations may sometimes be too tight, and this may call for an action that may be termed as philosophically sound or not sound.
Thesis
People need to have the freedom to decide their course of life. They should be able to choose who they want to be, what they want to do and become the person of their own choice in life.
Discussion
Determinism favors the causal principle. The principle leans towards the aspect of every occurrence being aligned with a particular cause. The question that one needs to ask himself or herself is whether everything that happens has a cause? In some situations, the answer is yes. Religious people are of the belief that anything good must be influenced by particular external forces.
Theological determinism will state the fact that everything happens through the will of God. In this case, God is the source of every outcome (Hospers, 1997). On the other hand, scientists may have the same dimensional thinking stating that everything that happens is as a result of prior causes existing in the natural world. Furthermore, mechanistic determinism will state that every event taking place must have been influenced by other conditions (Hocking, 2010).
It is true that since ancient times, people believed in causes. In the contemporary society, a person stealing will be termed as a thief because the action itself is against the relevant law. Determinism receives immense support from laws. Laws in physics put in place some situations that will determine a particular phenomenon. A leaf falling off from a tree must have been driven by the law of gravity.
An earthquake happening in some regions of the world must have been brought by the centripetal and centrifugal forces. The science world and the world of religion seem to have created their own platforms that they both base on in determining the cause of everything. The argument about death is such an example that brings forth the involvement of the scientists and religion. Scientists would state the cause of death as diseases and other biological factors while Christians will say it is the will of God.
In most cases, however, determinism fails at large to mention the kind of causes that must have led to a particular occurrence. Determinism fails to be specific and will state anything as being the cause. The case where the bulb goes on and off may be such an example where different parties could not give the reason for the unpredictability. Another example is where the glass is dropped for the first time, and it does not break.
However, when it is dropped for the second time, it breaks. In such circumstances, the problem will have no cause. In some situations, children fail to achieve their dreams because of the parental influence. A child must have a different identity from that of its parents (Campbell, 2004). If the parent is a lawyer, it does not mean that the child should not be a footballer. In such a situation, the child is not influenced in any way by the parent’s career.
Free will is closely associated with the freedom to choose. Every human being must have the free will to make judgments, choices in life and what one wants to do. People have talents and passions (Hospers, 1997). Doing what one desires is much healthier than doing what one is forced to do. In philosophical statements, freed men are productive compared to the enslaved ones.
The aspect of conscience describes the cognitive influence of human actions and emotional frustrations. In some cases, people commit suicide because they are left with no chance to make their own choices. Dictatorship, for example, may be one of the factors that limit one’s ability to take action. Someone held at gunpoint may have limited alternatives.
This limits the influence of the free will. It is evident that systems have been fighting for the democratic free will that favors an individual’s decision rather than allowing authorities to determine what people should enjoy or what they should not enjoy (Nagy, 2015). People will always feel good if they are not constrained by any conditions.
However, it must be noted that the aspect of free will should not go beyond some limits. There are some factors that naturally limit free will. For example; human beings do not fly though people have the freedom to fly. This means that some individuals will want to fly, but their natural capabilities cannot allow them to do so. Apparently, natural capability forms a barrier to making the flight.
Under the common law, claims made by an individual of being hindered to fly are absolutely not genuine and may lead to punishment. Under different circumstances, the age factor is also an unavoidable factor. A child of four years will not be allowed to make decisions of his own.
This is because the cognitive development of this age may not allow the child to make sound decisions, and if allowed, the decisions may lead to harm. In situations where the child is allowed to make awkward decisions, parents ate always held accountable, and the law may term them to be irresponsible.
Fate largely complies with determinism and may have similar arguments (Gillies, 2000). Fate reflects on the predetermined future. This means that there are conditions that define the probable future. It also implies that there is a cause that will later on bring an impact, and people are certain about the impact. For example, an individual suffering from cancer may probably die in the end because there is no reliable cure for the disease. People may even set dates for the death, and some of them will start preparing the burial.
However, the judgments made by people may not be valid in case the person survives. In other circumstances, people tend to accept their fate based on the prevailing conditions. A student who has been failing exams will end up accepting the fact that he is a failure. in most cases, he or she may end up doing nothing about the same. Teachers may be certain about the student’s performance and may have their own predictions about the final performance of the student.
However, it may come as a surprise if the same student tops the class. In such a situation, the student is said to have changed what seemed to be the fate. Combining this with determinism, it can be said that the outcome does not absolutely depend on the cause as some conditions may change the prediction.
Ontology is a philosophical aspect that largely intermarries with free will or freedom. It clearly states the situation or the state of being. It therefore, establishes the reality of the situation. Ontology can exclusively be described from the linguistic perspective. People from different environments may have different pronunciations and usage of words.
One can call a chair a cup and vice versa. This may sometimes be problematic. However, people around the world speak different languages meaning that they have their own way of understanding things in their environment (Achinstein, 2005). People are never forced to learn new languages. Their interest and level of understanding allows them to do so.
However, circumstances may force one to learn new languages. An example is where students meet in an institution. In such a situation, a common language must be established to bring in the aspect of understanding each other between different parties. However, in such a situation, the environment forms the compelling force and not the involvement of strict rules, measures and regulations.
Conclusion
Philosophy brings in the idea of weighing situations with human beings forming the central roles in such kind of circumstances. In this context, the central focus narrows down to the argument of allowing people to make up their own mind without being restricted by law, measures and regulations among other external factors.
The discussion brings in the ultimate debate of four significant concepts in philosophy. The concepts include determinism, ontology, free will and fate. Based on the discussion, fate and determinism borrow so much from each other and as a result bringing about the concept of cause and effect. This means that in whatever that any given person may have done, the outcome should have been influenced by something else.
The big failure of determinism revolves around the fact that specific causes are sometimes not stated. On the other hand, free will and ontology have features that are almost similar. They both suggest that the condition or something decided upon by one defines his or her real state. It is pragmatic that people should not believe in the cause and effect. Rather, they should accept a person’s real state and the decision that an individual makes.
References
Achinstein, P. (2005). Scientific evidence: Philosophical theories & applications. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Campbell, J. (2004). Freedom and determinism. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Gillies, D. (2000). Philosophical theories of probability. London: Routledge.
Hocking, A. (2010). Fate. Charleston, S.C: CreateSpace.
Hospers, J. (1997). An introduction to philosophical analysis. London: Routledge.
Nagy, E. (2015). Freedom of choice. London, UK : Bloomsbury Academic
Since nascence times, the questions of free will and determinism interested philosophers. Following Descartes, our actions are our voluntary control and we can control events in our life. Thus, Popkin and Stroll, Rohmann and Russel reject this opinion and prove that our beliefs are not under voluntary control. Our choices produce physical events in the brain and in the rest of the body, and these events would seem to be governed by physical laws. This position must make it credible that our choices could be free in the sense it advocates given the evidence we have about these physical laws, and according to the objection, this cannot be done.
Main body
In contrast to Descartes and his assumption of free will, Popkin and Stroll suppose that: “No one is free to act capriciously or by chance; all actions are deter- mined by past experience, by physical and mental constitution” (1993, p. 30). Popkin and Stroll agree that a decision’s being causally determined by factors beyond the agent’s control would preclude moral responsibility. If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, then it is no remedy simply to provide slack in the causal net by making the causal history of actions indeterministic (Bergson, 2001).
Such a move would yield one incompatibilist requirement for moral responsibility–leeway for decision and action–but it would not supply another–sufficiently enhanced control. In particular, it would not provide the capacity to be the origin of one’s decisions and actions that according to incompatibilists is unavailable to compatibilists (Bergson, 2001). This formulation of the objection departs from Hume’s original version, since he denies that determinism undermines moral responsibility.
Instead, it develops this general sort of challenge from the point of view of an incompatibilist who favors origination as a requirement for moral responsibility. Popkin and Stroll add that: “true opinion can be held in different ways: it can be held openly by a mind that is always willing to change its point of view depending upon the evidence, or it can be held as sheer prejudice” (1993, p. 80).
‘Determinism’ means that a sufficiently complete knowledge of the state of things at one instant permits a precise prediction to be made for the state at some other time; while our discussion of the introspective meaning of ‘free-will’ has shown that an individual believing in it believes that there exist not only a set of alternate actions physically possible for him in a given situation within restrictions of his immediate environment, but also the possibility of his psychologically being able to choose any one of them, and the impossibility of any outside observer, no matter how knowledgeable, unvaryingly predicting his particular subsequent course of action in advance (Bergson, 2001).
The question arises of course most commonly in connection with the relationship between man and his actions, and an omniscient God. Freedom of the sort required for moral responsibility is accounted for by the existence of agents who possess a causal power to make choices without being determined to do so. In this view, it is crucial that the kind of causation involved in an agent’s making a free choice is not reducible to causation among states of the agent or events involving the agent, but is rather irreducibly an instance of a substance causing a choice not by way of states or events. The agent, fundamentally as a substance, possesses the causal power to make choices without being determined to do so. Chisholm, Taylor, Clarke, and O’Connor advance views in this category. Russel develops views of this sort.
He states that: ‘hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs, beginning with those we hold most strongly, and presenting each as much isolated and as free from irrelevant additions as possible” (Russel 1997, p. 25). First, he argues that decisions can be indeterministic and yet possess a number of characteristics we associate with agent control and with responsibility. If decisions are undetermined, then agents could still make them voluntarily, intentionally, knowingly, on purpose, and as a result of their efforts.
They may yet have reasons for making these decisions, they might choose for these reasons, rather than by mistake, accident, or chance, and they may want to choose for these reasons more than any others. Agents might nevertheless not be coerced or compelled in choosing, and they may not be controlled by other agents or circumstances (Bergson, 2001). Indeterminism is therefore consistent with an impressive sort of control in action, and, Rohman believes, enough control for moral responsibility (Castañeda and Hector-Neri. 1975).
Russel is right to the extent that he shows that indeterminism allows for significant control in action. But compatibilists, familiarly, also appeal to the same sorts of claims as Russel does to defend against the objection that determinism does not allow for control sufficient for responsibility. Since incompatibilists wish to deny that compatibilists can secure this sort of control, one might question whether Russel’s defense can, in the final analysis, accommodate what incompatibilists are most fundamentally after.
In the book “A World of Ideas” Rohmann argues that: “we may aspire to live in harmony with nature and to understand the device will” (2005, p. 382). Rohmann argues that if the phenomenology of indeterministic action were such that the initiation of an action were experienced as an uncaused, involuntary event, not resulting from one’s effort of will, then this would provide good reason to believe that no genuine choice is involved, and that the agent is not morally responsible.
But if the initiation of the action were indeterministic and experienced as voluntary and as resulting from one’s own effort of will, then the agent’s moral responsibility is not challenged. Russel describes a case of a businesswoman who is on the way to an important meeting when he observes an assault in an alley. An inner struggle ensues between her moral conscience, which urges her to stop and call for help, and career ambitions, which tell him he cannot miss the meeting. He resolves the struggle by making the decision to help the victim. Rohmann imagines in this case that the effort of will is indeterminate, and as a result the decision is undetermined (Castañeda and Hector-Neri. 1975).
Our beliefs are not under our voluntary control, so to get this result, one might specify that the individual does not in any sense intend his decision to occur at any instant in particular, but rather he only times it to occur during some very short temporal interval. He is not even aware that there is an instant, as opposed to some very short temporal interval, at which he might time his decision, or at which his decision eventually occurs (Bergson, 2001).
To add to the plausibility of this specification, note that there must be a limit to the human capacity to time decisions–there must be a limit to the control a human being has over exactly when a decision of hers will take place. Consequently, there will be some interval of time–perhaps some very fraction of a second, call it n–such that no human being can control at which point in that interval he makes a decision.
It may be that despite this limitation, an agent could still be responsible for making a decision at an instant if he intends to make it at that instant (supposing that this is psychologically possible). In the absence of such an intention, it seems reasonable to conclude that the agent is not responsible for making a decision at a particular instant as opposed to being responsible for making it during some interval with a minimum length (Castañeda and Hector-Neri. 1975).
Russel supposes that indeterministically free action cannot be reconciled with certain provisions in action theory that libertarians themselves would want to endorse. Specifically, they have argued that a theory of action cannot allow for agents to be morally responsible for freely willed action, for freely willed action to meet plausible general requirements on explanation, and for freely willed action to be rational. These kinds of criticisms are sometimes categorized as coherence objections to libertarianism. According to another sort of complaint against libertarianism, the free will it espouses does not harmonize with the empirical evidence.
Prospects for moral responsibility for the effort of will are not improved if the agent’s character is partly a result of his free choices. For consider the first free choice an agent ever makes (Bergson, 2001). By the above argument, he cannot be responsible for it. Then he cannot be responsible for the second choice either, whether or not the first choice was character-forming. If the first choice was not character-forming, then the character that explains the effort of will for the second choice is not produced by his free choice, and then by the above argument, he cannot be morally responsible for it. Suppose, alternatively, that the first choice was character-forming.
Because the agent cannot be responsible for the first choice, he also cannot be responsible for the resulting character formation. But then, by the above argument, he cannot be responsible for the second choice either. Since this type of reasoning can be repeated for all subsequent choices, Rohmann agent can never be morally responsible for effort of will. Given that such an agent can never be morally responsible for his efforts of will, neither can he be responsible for his choices.
For in Rohmann ‘s picture, there is nothing that supplements the contribution of the effort of will to produce the choice. Indeed, all free choices will ultimately be partially random events, for in the final analysis there will be factors beyond the agent’s control, such as his initial character, that partly produce the choice (Castañeda and Hector-Neri. 1975).
On the other hand, free will can be viewed as simply positing, as a primitive, agents who have the ultimate control that cannot be secured by event-causal libertarianism–agents who can be the sources of action in a way that from the incompatibilist point of view, confers moral responsibility. More exactly, this theory posits, as a primitive feature of agents, the causal power to choose without being determined by events beyond the agent’s control, and without the choice being a truly random event. This free will power cannot in turn be analyzed into event causal relations of any sort. In the best version of this position, free choices are identical to activations of this power (Bergson, 2001).
Following Russel and Popkin and Stroll free will can secure the kind of control required for moral responsibility depends crucially on whether the sort of causation proposed by the theory could exist. Critics have expressed their doubts about the coherence of this notion of causation. For example, it is sometimes claimed that the main problem for theory is that an agent, fundamentally as a substance, simply cannot be the first term of a causal relation. It is not problematic, on this conception, to regard agents as causes, so long as it turns out that any causation by agents is reducible to causation among events.
It is well understood that the causal relation holds between events, and that all of our well-established cases of causal relations are between events, it is not virtually an analytic truth that the causal relation holds only between events (Bergson, 2001). Second, there are no cases that make it intuitive that a sister relation holds between a sister and an event, and indeed the claim that this relation can hold between a sister and an event is thoroughly unintuitive. By contrast, it is not similarly unintuitive that choices can be caused by agents, fundamentally, not by events. In fact, from the introspective point of view it may be difficult to find an event, or a set of events, that could have been the cause of my choice for chocolate over strawberry ice cream (Castañeda and Hector-Neri. 1975).
Rejecting the response of dismay is justified for several reasons. Determinism does not challenge the causal efficacy of the deliberations and decisions by which we aim to mold our futures. Nor does it endanger the prospect of overcoming challenges that result from the kinds of external and internal impediments Honderich mentions. For example, determinism does not imperil the view that if others wish to make one’s life miserable, one might achieve a happy life for oneself despite their efforts, nor the claim that if one has a proclivity to laziness that threatens to frustrate one’s career aims, one might be able, through one’s efforts, to surmount this tendency.
The aspect he emphasizes is the dependence of our life-hopes on the notion of a self with an indeterministic causal power. He maintains that if the notion of such an indeterministic self is rejected, we are left with the position according to which our actions are caused solely by our environment and dispositions. In his view, “a hope for a future in which we are not creatures of our environments and our dispositional natures” (Bergson 2001, p. 87) must be rejected if determinism is true.
Russel argues that an aspect of our ordinary self-conception is that we are selves distinct from our mental states and dispositions to act, and that these selves have causal powers. Indeed, on one conception, we are selves of this sort and they have indeterministic causal powers. But such selves might also be components of a deterministic system. The Stoics and Descartes maintain that we are selves that are distinct from our dispositions, and at the same time that determinism is true (Castañeda and Hector-Neri. 1975).
The determinist must reject the notion of a self that has the power to overcome its dispositions and the effects of its environment indeterministically, but he need not deny that we are determined selves with the power to overcome these factors. This is an important concession to the intransigent response. One can be a determinist and deny that we are creatures of our dispositions and environment in the way that Rohmann envisions.
The pre-philosophical position does include the assumption that factors beyond our control do not generate our futures, because we have selves whose choices are not produced by factors beyond their control. Perhaps this assumption is tied to the belief that there is an intrinsic value to shaping aspects of our lives that were not determined prior to our decisions, and that there are such aspects of our lives (Bergson, 2001).
Philosophers (Russel, Popkin and Stroll, Rohmann) agree that one might maintain that the agent-causal view has no advantage over event-causal libertarianism in providing for moral responsibility because for the most basic sort of action, the notion of causation itself is irrelevant to moral responsibility. For example, Popkin and Stroll (1993) position is that an agent’s causing simple mental acts would have no such advantage over his simply performing such acts, where “performing” can be analyzed non-causally–just in terms of the agent’s being the subject of the act.
The answer that the advocate of agent causation should provide is that event-causal libertarianism does not provide agents with any more control than Descartes does, and hence a way must be found to enhance an agent’s control to the appropriate degree. The relevant sort of control involves two factors. The first is the absence of external determination, which both event-causal libertarianism and agent causation provide (Bergson, 2001). The second is the capacity of the agent to be the source of his decisions and actions, and this is the factor that event-causal libertarianism is missing.
To be the source of one’s decisions and actions is plausibly to be their cause. It is a credible hypothesis that being the agent-cause of one’s decisions and actions is required for the control that moral libertarian choices, agent-caused choices do not fall on the continuum we have devised. Agent-caused choices are not alien-deterministic events because the agent is not causally determined to cause them.
They are not truly random events, since they are caused not by nothing, but at least partly by the agent. If these agent-caused choices were partially random events, their causal history would be exhausted by the causal contribution of factors beyond the agent’s control. In the theory, the agent plays a fundamental causal role in the causation of the choice, and factors beyond his control do not causally determine him to make it. “We can make decisions of their own free will, we are being made more and more aware that this sort of assumption is very often erroneous” (Popkin and Stroll 1993, p. 115). ‘Prescription’ is a carry over of ‘moral’ cause from the child or the savage (Bergson, 2001).
Indeterminism is a necessary condition for free-will. To see that it is not a sufficient condition we can take some simple examples: the space-time motion of an electron through a set of slits is undetermined, the path of an atlas rocket leaving Cape Canaveral on its peaceful intercontinental ballistic missile path is determined, according to our present-day physical theories (Castañeda and Hector-Neri. 1975). However, in the first case we would not speak of the electron’s free-will, nor in the second would anyone be concerned about the rocket’s lack of free-will. The reasons are quite simply that one just doesn’t use such a category of description with reference to such entities (Bergson, 2001).
A second necessary condition for free-will then is that the entity under investigation be one about which free-will might or might not be legitimately attributed according to our prevailing world picture. In this, electrons and rockets would be excluded. As better and more ‘introspective’ mechanical ‘brains’ are developed it may become difficult to decide exactly where to draw the line, but for the moment we can certainly restrict our free-will consideration to living entities. In most semiotics it is further limited to animals, and often to human beings alone (Bergson, 2001).
Conclusion
In sum, Descartes is wrong stating that we cam determine our actions and control them. Philosophies of Popkin and Stroll, Rohman and Russel prove that our actions out of our voluntary control. The common-sense man has always had a belief in his personal free-will and, as soon as he acquired some knowledge of philosophy and theology with its concept of a superhuman God, has also usually become concerned with the validity of his belief.
Now certainly freedom from absolute external constraint is a necessary condition for feeling ‘free’, as the word is understood by common-sense man, but it is not nearly a sufficient condition. Past environmental compulsions acting upon the individual have modified his psychological constitution and are extended in fact into the present through this modification. If the laws are deterministic then we expect certain types of experience to follow others unvaryingly, but in no sense do the ‘laws’ compel the particular succession observed.
References
Bergson, H. (2001). Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Dover Publications.
Castañeda, Hector-Neri. (1975). Thinking and Doing (Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Double, Richard. (1998). Metaphilosophy and Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press.
Rohmann, Ch. (2005). A World of Ideas. Bedford/St. Martin’s; 7th edition.
Popkin, R.H., Stroll, A. (1993). Philosophy Made Simple. Made Simple; 2 Rev Sub edition.
Russel, B. (1997). The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University Press, USA; 2 Sub edition.
Since the beginning of time or rather rational thinking, people have contemplated their purpose, reasons for existing and the self. There are those who believe that people have a soul, which expresses itself in a way of emotions and is what guides our lives. But another view is competing—the physical, material frames that are placed upon us, stripping of any freedom and choice. Philosophy is a science that has been researching these questions for the longest time. The concepts of determinism, compatibilism and libertarianism have emerged as a possible explanation to human attitudes and behaviors.
The most basic theory of human attitude and behavior is determinism. It denies the existence of free choice, confining people’s lives into a predetermined set of actions. Determinism is a very physical and material view that bases itself on the circumstances and cause and effect (Butts 10). Its main points state that people are defined by the genes that they have received from the previous generations and by the environmental factors. There is no way to change the genetic material, so it is agreeable that this part of the equation is determined, even though in the current age there is genetic experimentation with the information stored in the DNA. And the second point—environmental surroundings, also completely negates the free choices in life. But planet Earth is a large enough place for a person to be able to change the setting they reside in. There is no denying that people are limited by the ability to move around due to their physical state, connection to others and their age, since as a child it is hard to choose a place to grow up in. Still a person’s will and determination will not stop anyone who has physical troubles, as they can find a way to accomplish their wants. Today’s world of technology made communication over great distances very easy, so anyone can escape into any part of the world and keep contact with the loved ones. But a limit is set when a child is growing up; they have no choice to live wherever they want. This factor eventually disappears, once a person grows up. So for the physical determination the only limitation are the material boundaries of the planet, without considering the possibility of building a space craft to travel to other worlds. It would be safe to assume that a person’s environment is limited by the geography of the planet and the amount of possible places to visit, which is enormous but is nonetheless limited. What is not framed is the person’s individual choice of what area to pick. Depending on their inner want, they could go to the north or the tropics. Considering all of this it is presumed that the emotional desire is also determined by the previous genetic information and the up-bringing—nurture. So the question is what exactly determines this inner want to choose the environment? A simple cluster of information absorbed from the media, parents, peers and other social mediums, plus the beneficial and not so much DNA coding, could not possibly create an individuality, as genes are a simple and emotionless gathering of facts and ideas. The way a person interprets and uses these ideas and information is exactly what makes each one unique. Compared to other theories determinism seems to be on the right track, having some useful explanations and ideas but it lacks the grand picture of emotion and originality.
Another theory is compatibilism, which is much closer to the truth. It is defined by both deterministic qualities and free will. The thinkers of this direction acknowledge that some things in the world are determined (Mele 103). As mentioned previously they are the boundaries of the planet, human physical abilities and the physical laws of nature. But in reality there is no real proof that after meditating for 50 years or more or less, a person could not learn how to fly. To make an argument easy, it is assumed that it is impossible and thus this limitation does exist. What makes this theory stronger is that it accepts the possibility of free will existence. Free will is defined as the ability of a person to make a choice not influenced and forced by anyone from the outside world (Pereboom 7). Ability to choose encompasses human soul and emotions. It is an unquantifiable entity that is very hard to pinpoint. The limitation of language and concepts creates a problem for compatibilism in the precise definition of free will. From one perspective nothing in this world is made by choice. People are born without really wanting it, someone else decides for them. Once they are born, they have a structure of society and family to follow. As a child’s mind is developing and cannot properly judge what is happening around, from lack of experience and knowledge, parents or guardians are the ones who have to take the young person through life’s steps. For children of young age free will can be seen when they play—the great use of imagination based on very little sensual information from the world. For example, at age 5 a child would not be able to rationalize why the world is the way it is, the little human being’s free will and choice are limited by their age. They cannot go out late and drink alcohol, but it would be wrong to consider this as the absence of freedom. It is clear that a person receives this “free will”, once they start to consciously analyze the world around them and themselves. Considering the facts mentioned above it would be safe to say that the “democratic” nature of compatibilism is moving in the right direction.
A theory which is based purely on freedom of choice is called libertarianism. It is obvious that it takes the said freedom to the extreme (Brennan1). Just as determinism is basing everything on physics and complete absence of choice, libertarianism advocates that people are completely free agents and have the choice to do anything they want (Duncan and Tibor 3). This could theoretically be true if a person lived on a privately owned island, being the king and making own rules and laws. But even then they would be unable, for example, to build weapons and send rockets to bomb other countries. So in reality, a person living in this world has no absolute freedom, as people are social beings, living in communities interdependent in the functions of society. The fact that there are moral rules, such as not hurting another human being without a justifiable reason, already creates a determined boundary. From where specifically this innate “good” comes from, no one can say, it is called a part of “human nature”. What’s definite is that humans did not create the universe, physical laws and the ethical principles that a properly and responsibly behaving human being abides by. As this proves, human nature cannot be chosen because we are born into it. This already negates the theory of libertarianism. But the whole question of freedom is very much displaced from the argument at hand. If the air we breathe and the kinds of animals we hunt are considered a limitation of free choice and will, then people are simply marionettes, which is false. Even the fact that there is a limit in the number of possibilities allowed by the physical and moral laws, does not take away the true freedom since everyone has a unique way of searching for those possibilities. A very obvious and simple example of free will can be seen when analyzing music, arts and imagination in general. There is an unlimited amount of combinations that one can create. In music there is an everlasting ordering of notes and rhythms, this is proved by the enormous number of musicians in the world today. Painting, dancing, singing and building are all unlimited in the distribution of their elements. Compatibilism is definitely the theory that comes closest to the absolute truth. Yes, humans are limited in certain things, concrete and immovable, but the specific way in which every individual chooses to do or think is unique and free. In reality free will does not exist, because the definition of freedom is wrong from the very beginning. The closest anything comes to “free will” is a person’s emotional predisposition towards something. If a person was born with genes that favored kindness and then during the upbringing kindness was reinforced by the environment, the person becomes determined or defined by this kindness. The fact that they will not be able to hurt anyone innocent purposefully for their whole life, does not take away their free choice. Anyone is free to want anything. It depends on the person, how far they want to go with this want. In basic terms everything can be framed into the predetermined cause and effect world, even such things as kindness, respect and love. But the fact that human beings are given the ability to think about their existence, consciously speculate about the good and evil, moral or not so much, self evolvement and justice, proves that we are masters of our destiny and are free to choose any path of desire but there is no guarantee that these choices will be left without consequences, affecting and determining the future of people around or of that person in particular.
Philosophy is considered to be one of the oldest sciences in the world. When humans did not have the tools and mechanisms to study nature, they had the greatest mechanism of all—their brain. People have long been trying to find answers to the questions of life, reasons for existing, free will, soul and the right choice. It is true that society defines our behavior and land limits our dwelling places but there is no limit to the imagination and exploration of unreachable galaxies and so, this would be enough to say that human beings are free, in their mind, even if they are bound by shackles and walls.
References
Brennan, Jason. Libertarianis: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York, United States: Oxford University Press, 2012. Print.
Butts, Robert. A primer on Determinism. Massachusets, United States: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986. Print.
Duncan, Craig, and M. Tibor. Libertarianism: For and against. Maryland, United States: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005. Print.
Mele, Alfred. Free Will and Luck. New York, United States: Oxford University Press, 2006. Print.
The argument on whether humans have free will has remained controversial for decades. Determining whether our actions are purely based on our own volition or controlled by a chain of preceding events has remained very complex. Attempts by scientists and philosophers to find a universally accepted explanation for the phenomenon have been futile. According to Ross (2012), both freedom and determinism play significant roles in influencing human choices and behavior. However, in my opinion, humans do not have free will. Their decisions are influenced by various external factors.
Philosophers such as Rene Descartes claimed that humans have free will and that external factors play a minimal role in influencing their decisions. In fact, Descartes was so convinced of human free will that he described it as “so free in its nature that it cannot be constrained” (Frankfurt 74). Those who hold the position that human decisions are controlled by free will argue that even though our surroundings bully us, the final decision is ours. We consciously decide how to respond to situations and what to do despite external influence. The fact that we make our own choices makes us responsible for them and the consequences that they may attract. The proponents of this argument also claim that the fact that humans are held responsible for their actions and decisions can only mean that they are free to choose what to do for how can people be held responsible for something they have no power to choose how to respond to? Since we are always held accountable for our choices, then it means that we are free when making those choices.
Our genes, biology, and environment play a significant role in shaping our characters. Our characters in tern shape our choices. The above factors are completely out of our control thereby affirming the fact that we do not act out of free will. Our decisions are always influenced by external factors. For instance, if a person decides to change residence, it could be because of changes in his or her socio-economic situation but not just a random decision to move. Additionally, a customer who decides to buy an ice cream may be seen to have made a random decision but in reality, the customer may have been influenced by hunger, thirst, and the availability of money to buy the ice cream. Without the money, thirst, and hunger, the customer may not have considered buying the ice cream. From the above examples, it becomes clear that what many people consider free choices may just be illusions. In fact, if situations were changed, 100% of the choices we make may not be the same. If choices were indeed random, then situational changes should not affect them in any way. Neuroscience studies have also shown that human brains make decisions even before we become aware of them, which shows that our actions and decisions are not out of our own free will.
Essentially, we may seem to have free will but our actions and decisions are actually part of a causal chain. The causal chain “operates on a sub-molecular level” making events at that level to be random. However, at the decision level, every event is caused or influenced by an array of factors. These factors make our decisions incapable of being free. Therefore, we cannot claim that humans have free will.
Works Cited
Frankfurt, Harry G. Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 1999. Print.
The concept of free will has been used to understand human behavior and what drives people to do certain actions. Various philosophers have advanced different arguments that talk about the concept of free will and how it influences human behavior and actions. Human beings make different choices which affect what they do and how they react to different situations in various environments.
Free will is described as the power by an individual to choose to do certain actions without being influenced or coerced by external factors. This paper will analyze the concept of free will critically by analyzing arguments by various philosophers to determine its validity.
Thomas Nagel argues that human beings use their mental capabilities to think more critically about different issues that affect them. Nagel argues humans have a subjective view of the world and this gives them a strong physical and mental ability to comprehend what surrounds them. He advances the notion that humans will improve their understanding in future to distinguish what constitutes physical and mental aspects of life.
However, he takes the view that some humans are not guided only by laws to act and they are not able to exercise their own free will. Richard Taylor argues that human actions are not easily controllable and they occur due to the will of the agent that makes them happen. He takes the view that the agent is a human who starts and controls how the action proceeds and its impacts. He argues that there are no conditions that make an agent act the way he does and this argument advances the theory of free will (MacKinnon, 2011, p. 93).
A.J. Ayer argues that human action is determined by causal laws which drive humans to do certain acts. Ayer takes the view that humans can act freely and their behavior is influenced by certain rules which they internalize after living in certain areas. He insists that causal laws help humans exercise their own reasoning in various situations and this hinders them from exercising their own free will. This makes it difficult for human beings to exercise their own free will when they do certain acts.
Human beings apply their own wisdom to overcome certain challenges and this wisdom is influenced by various moral principles that guide them (MacKinnon, 2011, p. 97). Stephen Cahn argues that human behavior makes them apply logic in whatever they do. This makes them categorize different ideas as true, false or uncertain. He argues that the concept of free will cannot be verified because human beings are unable to detect what they will do in future without any evidence.
Nagel makes it clear that humans have conscious personalities that shape their perspectives of both mental and physical aspects of various situations. Therefore, he maintains that human imagination is limitless and enables different individuals to improve the way they think. Saul Kripke has taken a divergent opinion regarding Nagel’s argument that human imagination is limitless. He argues that Nagel’s views do not add a lot of weight to the concept of free will.
Richard Taylor takes the view that causal systems that are developed by humans control the way people act and behave. He takes the view that these factors make a person choose what he wants to do without being influenced by any external other factor (MacKinnon, 2011, p 105). However, critics have pointed out that Taylor’s arguments lack merit because they do not show how humans are agents that influence the way different actions occur.
Ayer argues that humans rely on causal laws to shape their own moral actions and this makes them distinguish between right and wrong. He reveals that humans have the ability to decide what they want to do but moral principles which they are accustomed to place limitations on how they behave and act.
Therefore, they are not able to exercise free will because causal laws restrict them from doing certain actions that are considered immoral. J.L Austin criticized Ayer’s arguments by asserting that some humans are able to act freely in areas where causal laws do not exist.
He argued that Ayer’s philosophical position was flawed and because some men do not care about moral principles when they choose to do certain actions. Cahn (2009) argues that the concept of time makes it difficult for men to exercise their own free will (p. 57). His arguments are similar to other philosophers’ arguments that human behavior is not always controlled by a set of predetermined factors.
It is clear that human beings do not have the ability to exercise their own free will. There are other factors which influence human attitudes and how people behave in different environments. Nagel’s arguments about limitless human imagination are not true because some people learn through observation and exposure.
Therefore, their actions will be influenced by what they see and learn in different environments and this makes them choose to do certain actions. This makes it difficult for human beings to exercise their own free will. Taylor’s assertions that human beings are at liberty to choose their own actions is not factual because it fails to show the impact of the environment on human behavior.
Taylor’s arguments are not valid because he fails to appreciate the impact of culture and other factors that motivate people to do certain actions (Cahn, 2007, p. 61). His argument also fails to take note that some human beings learn from past events and these experiences have profound effects on their behavior.
Many people ensure their actions conform to acceptable norms and standards of behavior in areas they live. This makes them more considerate and responsible in the way they act. They do not have any free will because they understand consequences that are likely to result from their actions. Moral and causal laws guide humans to think about benefits and disadvantages they are likely to experience from certain engagements.
However, in some situations, humans act without taking time to think about consequences they are likely to experience from their actions. Some of them choose to disregard causal laws and engage in actions that are considered immoral in societies where they live. They are able to choose for themselves what they want to do even when the actions they choose to engage in are harmful to them and other people (Pojman and Fieser, 2007, p. 42).
Ayer’s arguments regarding the concept of free will are valid. However they do not adequately address how humans make their own choices whenever they face different situations. Humans are affected by dominant moral ideals which make them reflect on what they are about to do and results they are likely to get. These moral ideals make humans understand that they are responsible for their own actions and this influences the way they behave and act.
Therefore, external factors motivate people to engage in certain actions. However, in some cases, people disregard moral principles that are supposed to shape their behavior. This makes them engage in habits that do not conform to moral principles observed in their specific societies. They decide to do these actions to achieve their own ends (Pojman and Fieser, 2007, p. 49). Human beings have different perspectives of what is right and wrong and this makes them approach various issues they face differently.
Human beings interpret various issues differently depending on what they learn and observe in different environments. They choose different places to do various actions that satisfy their individual interests and needs. Cultural, religious and educational influences expose human beings to a wide variety of concepts and they impact the way people make different choices that affect their lives.
Therefore, humans are not able to exercise their own free will whenever they choose to do certain actions. From the arguments advanced by Cahn, individuals cannot always predict how they will react to different situations they come across. This shows that they use knowledge they acquired in the past to handle different issues they face in future. The results they get from different actions they choose to pursue differ a lot (Pojman and Fieser, 2007, p. 67).
In conclusion, the concept of free will is not valid because there are various factors that influence how human beings act and behave in different settings. These factors make humans choose specific actions they intend to do.
The recent years have brought a resurgence of interest in philosophical questions about free will and determinism. In the current paper, one more attempt is made to understand these notions, their importance in human life and the complexity of their close interconnection and interaction.
Free will is people’s ability to choose according to their desires. Having free will means making unforced decisions. Jonathan Edwards, in his fundamental work The Freedom of the Will (1754), argues that the will always choose according to its greatest desire at the moment of choice. Few simple examples illustrate this fact: if a person can choose whether to stay at home and have a tedious time alone or to go to see his or her friends and enjoy meeting them, the person will surely choose the first alternative. But if, for example, the person is to decide whether to read up for an exam or to go to a disco that night, he or she faces a more difficult dilemma. In this case, the person realizes that he or she will get more benefits from studying than from the short term enjoyment that dances will bring. So, when the person chooses to study, he or she still chooses according to personal preferences, all things considered.
A question might appear: what determines a person’s preference? Determinism theory states that every event, including human cognition and behaviour, decision and action, is caused by a chain of prior occurrences.
There exist different points for free will compatibility with determinism. Some philosophers, known as Hard Determinists, argue that this world is deterministic and deny that there exists free will. Others deny that the world is entirely deterministic and argue for contra-causal freedom. Also, there are such philosophers who do not agree that free will is incompatible with determinism, they are known as Soft Determinists or Compatibilists.
Roger Sperry, in his work Changing Conceptions of Consciousness and Free Will, tries to prove that free will exists. This neuropsychologist argues that while consciousness is determined by the biochemical activity of the brain, it also helps to integrate and organize this activity. This gives people some degree of freedom from purely physiological mechanisms. But even though Sperry argues that contra-casual freedom would not be freedom at all, it still does not allow one to call him a compatibilist. The neuropsychologist believes that free will depends on “degrees of freedom” from causal control rather than complete freedom (Sperry, p. 10).
If, according to Sperry (1976), a subject’s conscious intentions or volitions do not simply emerge from brain activity but help to organize and control it; they serve as the causal determinants of behaviour. Sperry claims that there is
a causal sequence of brain events leading to and determining a given voluntary act or decision” even if the occurrences concerned are “no longer conceived to be restricted to a series of neurophysicochemical activities (Sperry, p. 14).
The author distinguishes between having “degrees of freedom” and having complete or absolute freedom from physical determinism. The idea of having a degree of freedom implies that voluntary, conscious decisions modify ongoing brain activity.
Patricia Smith Churchland’s work Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy is also concerned with neuroscience and philosophy. The focus of our interest here is Churchland’s, Free Will. Considering the problem of free will, the author suggests the thesis that
there are systematic neurobiological differences between being in control and being out of control, and that these differences can be characterized in terms of fuzzy-bordered sub-volumes of the multidimensional parameter space (Churchland, p. 232).
The author explains her point by examining a large scope of sources on psycho-neurological deficits, presenting empirical proofs to the old Aristotelian idea that humans are responsible for their deeds to the extent to which there are no mitigating circumstances. Churchland states that from this, it comes out that responsibility matches with being in control. The author considers this assumption to be pragmatically justified: society is interested in adopting this assumption. The recently popular assumption that freedom of the will may be an effect of quantum indeterminacy is, on the contrary, considered by the author as empirically vacuus and the one that raises more questions than answers (Churchland, p. 2002).
One more research is interested in terms of the problem of free will. Benjamin Libet studied the existence of free will experimentally. The experimental approach that Libet has taken to this question is reflected and thoroughly considered in his work Do We Have Free Will? Here, Libet states:
Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in the brain (the ‘readiness potential’, RP) that begins 550 ms before the act. Human subjects became aware of the intention to act 350–400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms. Before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is therefore not excluded. These findings put constraints on views of how free will may operate; it would not initiate a voluntary act, but it could control the performance of the act. The findings also affect views of guilt and responsibility (Libet, p.47).
Seeking an answer to the question of whether “our consciously willed acts are fully determined by natural laws that govern the activities of nerve cells in the brain, or whether acts and the conscious decisions to perform them can proceed to some degree independently of natural determinism (Libet, p. 55) Libet stresses on the fact that “free choices or acts are not predictable, even if they should be completely determined.” (Libet, p. 47)
Werner Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty that states that it is impossible to simultaneously determine the position and momentum of a particle prevents people from having complete knowledge of the underlying molecular activities. Quantum mechanics deals more with probabilities than with certainties of events. According to chaos theory, a random event shifts the behaviour of a whole system in some unpredictable way. However, Libet states,
even if events are not predictable in practice, they might nevertheless be in accord with natural laws and therefore determined (Libet, p. 55).
Libet considers both deterministic and non-deterministic views on free will and claims that neither of the two theories proposes even a potential experimental design to test the hypothesis about the existence of a free will. Still, the author suggests adopting the view
that we do have free will (until some real contradictory evidence may appear if it ever does). Such a view would at least allow us to proceed in a way that accepts and accommodates our own deep feeling that we do have free will. We would not need to view ourselves as machines that act in a manner completely controlled by the known physical laws (Libet, p. 57).
This permissive option is similar to the one advocated by R. Sperry we talked about above. Libet closes his study with a relevant quotation from the novelist Isaac Bashevis Singer where he stated his strong belief in people’s having free will. In one of his interviews, Singer stated that
The greatest gift which humanity has received is free choice. It is true that we are limited in our use of free choice. But the little free choice we have is such a great gift and is potentially worth so much that for this itself, life is worthwhile living (Libet, p. 57).
One more work that is worth considering in terms of the problem studied is Daniel Dennett’s Freedom Evolves, where he seeks freedom and free will in a deterministic world. The philosopher states that there is freedom and free will in this world. He uses a lot of provocative formulations to show how people alone among the animals have evolved minds that give them free will and morality. One part of the Freedom Evolves presents especial interest for our investigation; this is, Are You Out of the Loop?
In this work, Dennett suggests that the traditional psychophysiology of free will is reminiscent of the myth of Cupid. If someone had taken this myth literally, they would have a false theory of romantic love. The laws of life are such that people do fall in love but do it in another way. By analogy, Dennett suggests that someone who believes in the theory of free will as due to the soul’s interventions in the brain activity has a false vision of free will. The same as with love, people do have free will, but in a different way.
Dennett’s view of free will is based on Daniel Wegner’s assumption that free will is an illusion that depends on consciousness. Dennet claims that although in the strictly physical sense, human actions are pre-determined, the abilities that people evolved enable them to be free in all the ways that matter. Free will, as Dennett sees it is the freedom to make decisions without the press of causality. Dennet introduces the term evitability as opposed to the inevitability defining it as humans’ ability to anticipate possible consequences of their actions and act in a way to avoid undesirable ones. It is obvious that evitability is entirely compatible and even requires people’s actions to be deterministic.
Thus, we can see that there exist different views on the compatibility of free will and determinism. The more scientists and philosophers try and investigate this problem, the more solutions appear. Still, we are inclined to believe that this is human life and experience that are to give an adequate answer to the question about what people’s behaviour is ruled by.
Works Cited
Churchland, P.S.’Free Will,’ in Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2002), pp.201-237.
Dennett, D.C. ‘Are You Out of the Loop?’ in Freedom Evolves (New York: Viking, 2003), pp. 221-257.
Libet, B. ‘Do We Have Free Will?’ Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 6, No. 8-9 (1999), pp.47-57.
Sperry, R. ‘Changing Conceptions of Consciousness and Free WIll,’ Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Vol. 20(1976), pp. 9-19.
Van Inwagen argues that free will and determinism are incompatible, and asserts there is a weak relationship between propositions and allied notions, which include entailment, conjunction, and denial. The conjunctions also conform to the contraposition laws. Furthermore, any contrapositive is automatically regarded as true if the original proposition is true. Determinism also includes the idea of the general physical world.
The notion of a state should be treated in such a way that the physical condition of the world remains independent of logic. Indeterminism, the state should not be given first priority or allowed to affect the world’s momentary situation. Otherwise, the states cannot be as theoretical as they should be. The laws of physics have a great influence on the states and hence the description of determinism.
Free will determines the ability of an individual to act differently. Every person has free will, otherwise, there would be no difference between what people do and what they are capable of doing. As a result, it is easier to hold people responsible for acting the way they do since they have the chance to act in a different way. Some of the laws explaining the existence of free will have been rejected following their failure to sail through the approval experiments.
Inwagen uses the example of Aristotle and Plato to deliver his argument regarding propositions. Aristotle had enough reasons to disregard the last proposition of Plato. If people only cared about the ascriptions related to one’s ability, then Plato’s last proposition would have failed to hold. Since no one has the chance of unveiling the last true statement of Plato, it is difficult to make a decision based on Aristotle’s assertion.
One of the common tactics used by philosophers to show a certain argument does not hold is unveiling the illogical parts of that viewpoint. This tactic was also used by Aristotle to disapprove of Plato’s last statement. There are several ways through which philosophers can determine whether someone has done his best or not. Most of the philosophical arguments are generally complex and for that reason, it is difficult to extract the truth from them.
It is a fact that most of the actions people do are not for free. This follows the fact that they are foreseen by God. For instance, if someone was to insist that predestinarianism and the free will have to be compatible, then his argument would definitely be wrong. Only theses are compatible with one another. However, the compatibility may not be so obvious at times. In any case, there is always a conceptual connection between any two comparable theses.
Personal Argument and Views
It is obvious that people have free will; because if they did not have it, then alternatives to people’s acts would not exist. If someone refuses that human beings have free will, then he or she would be suggesting that there is a difference between what they do and what they can actually do. As a matter of fact, the concept of ‘can’ is what is normally used to hold a particular individual liable for an act.
It is difficult to explain the concept of ‘what people can do’. The term ‘can’ defines an individual’s ability or inability to carry out a particular action. It defines what someone ought to have done instead of what he or she has actually done. A good example is where an individual says another ought to have reached somewhere before a particular time of the day. In this case, the accused person may offer a proposition justifying his failure to have reached that place by the scheduled time.
Another example is about a person who has deliberately refused to carry out a task assigned to him or her. If determinism exists and it is compatible with free will, then such a person cannot be said to have refrained from accomplishing the duty. This shows that the ability or inability to perform a task depends on an individual. Therefore, it is true that people have free will, which compels them to do or fail to do a particular act.
Objection
The law of nature does very little to explain free will and determinism. There is no evidence that determinism and propositions are actually components of the law of nature. For instance, people do not have to formulate a technical framework to help them remember the events that will take place in the future. As a matter of fact, no single individual can claim to remember such events.
Response
Some philosophers argue that laws of physics are closely associated with determinism, and these rules are just a small part of the laws of nature. This argument holds to some extent; for instance, the proposition that determinism can only be verified if the physical laws are given a priority is true. It is also true that force is a product of mass and acceleration. However, not all physical laws can be regarded as natural.
If one was to ask a random person whether they have free will, the answer would likely be affirmative, for a variety of reasons. It is both challenging and incomprehensible for most human beings to accept that their life may be guided by something other than the free will of decision-making. However, the concept of determinism, although not directly meant to challenge free will, ultimately suggests incompatibility. Determinism is a theory which states that the course of the future is determined by a combination of past events and the laws of nature, creating a unique outcome. It argues that the events that are secured in the past, combined with laws of nature that drive the real world, results in a possible reality where the very same events and natural laws would apply, and therefore, shape the future. Causal determinism is the primary argument against free will presented in this paper using the following premises:
P1. The universe is deterministic with past events and laws of nature bring subsequent change and a unique future;
P2. Humans have no influence or choice about the laws of nature or events in the past;
P3. Events of past or nature are determined by physical forces since human actions are events, in reality, then they are determined by physical forces;
P4. If humans do not cause or originate actions, then these events are not controlled by us, thus lacking the ability of self-determination;
P5. The no-choice principle – a lack of influence on the inputs, resulting in a lack of control over the output or predetermined future;
Determinism is incompatible with freedom of will.
P1 is the basic premise of determinism. P2 examines the human ability to influence said premise. P3 creates the sequence which affects human decisions. P4 explores how the concept of free will plays into determinism. P5 presents a theory and closing argument. The conclusion is the final logical assumption based on the premises.
There are several schools of thought regarding determinism and free will. There are the compatibilism perspectives that suggest that both free will and determinism are real and can co-exist or are mutually compatible in reality. While compatibilists believe at least partially in some effect of a metaphysical combination of past events and natural laws, the freedom of choice ultimately depends on the situation, sometimes humans are forced by circumstance while in other times, humans are free agents. Compatibilists argue that determinism does not suggest a lack of free will because it does not entail that humans ever act on their desires unencumbered
The incompatibilism perspective views free will and determinism as conflicting, with two schools emerging of libertarianism which suggests free will exists in the indeterministic world, and hard determinism that presents a world with no free will. Hard determinism will be explored here, through a concept known as the consequence argument or “no choice principle.” It follows the basic premise of how one can have a choice about something that is an outcome of something that one has no influence on. Therefore, since no human being has a choice about past events or laws of nature, the logical conclusion is that there is no choice about current decisions, supporting determinism.
According to determinism, the state of the universe results in the decision. With laws of nature stating that if a specific state of the universe would lead to certain outcomes. No one has a choice about that sequence of events or the state of the universe or laws of nature, and it is consequential that no one has any choice about the decision. Such conditional proof eliminates any aspect of free will. For example, John is placed in a situation where he has to either lie or tell the truth. This decision is based on a pulse from the brain which converts to behavioral action. For the pulse in the brain to go one way or another, one has to consider the laws of nature as well as the state of John’s brain and related aspects. For John to decide on which way the pulse must go, he had to have done something beforehand to influence it. Since he did not do this, the direction is undetermined and there is no freedom. If John was really free, he must have had an influence on the event leading up to this position, but instead, it was determined by a sequence of prior events and the laws of nature. Every action and thought coming from John are consistent with the prior event both occurring and not occurring. If there is no genuine choice, and the decision is random, it is not an exemplification of free will – fully supporting hard determinism.
The primary philosophical interest and concern in the free will v. determinism argument are actually motivated by the external factor of moral responsibility. If the no-consequence argument is accepted and determinism stands true as the force precludes free will, the same applies to moral responsibility since it is generally accepted that freedom is a necessary condition for one to take responsibility for the course of action. However, the concepts are mutually exclusive as moral responsibility is a scope of ethics rather than compatibilism and incompatibilism. It is also a matter of perception on moral responsibility, whereas proponents of free will argue that only self-determination and full control of one’s actions can present an appropriate platform for the evaluation of morality.
At the same time, supporters of hard determinism demonstrate an argument on their own. The compatibility of moral responsibility with determinism had to be proven via that the ability to do otherwise (alternative action) was also compatible. Eventually, the principle of alternate possibilities was introduced, which suggested that whether one was a supporter of compatibilism or incompatibilism, the ability to choose is not necessary for moral responsibility. It was demonstrated through a two-step thought experiment. In the context of free will, there is a person named John who is faced with a morally challenging decision, and he chooses an immoral alternative, therefore burdening the responsibility. There is an omnipotent being, a threat, or penalty which would punish John if he did not act accordingly. Any sort of coercion mechanism can be implied here, but it would only intervene if John makes an alternate choice. By coincidence, John acts exactly as the coercive mechanism wants, making the decision.
The question arises, whether John is morally responsible for the action even though he was coerced. It is implied that the threat is so significant that John has no other choice, thus the lack of “alternate possibilities.” However, since John acted according to the will of a higher being, there was no intervention and nobody ultimately forced him to make that choice. This is a metaphor for determinism, which suggests that it does not matter whether an individual has free will, because choices are not genuine, always guided by some sort of coercion, and one is unable to choose otherwise. Therefore, moral responsibility is largely irrelevant to the outcome, but rather applies during the actual sequence of events.
As criticism of determinism, it can be argued that if one has knowledge about past events and laws of nature, possessing some intelligence, one can predict the future, thus acting in free will to change it. The no-choice principle becomes challenged as, in this scenario, it would no longer meet the premise. Even if determinism stands true, it is entirely possible for the future to be unpredictable since there is an inherently weak link between a determined future and a predictable future. Humans generally lack the necessary intellectual capacity or the full understanding of past and natural events to make accurate assumptions about the future and cannot be used as an argument that determinism does not exist.
In conclusion, determinism presents a strong argument against the existence of a free will. In comparison to more abstract philosophies such as Laplace’s demon, causal determinism is more grounded in logic. The primary issue with determinism is that it is currently empirically impossible to prove that the universe is deterministic, thus challenging the premises. Furthermore, there are a number of perspectives on whether determinism and free will are compatible and able to co-exist.
The author of this paper does not align with a particular school of thought but most closely relates to compatibilism in the context of Ayer’s Paradox. Ultimately, it does not matter whether determinism is true, or events are probabilistic, as neither demonstrates free will and in both realities, moral responsibility is denied. If events could not have been avoided based on the deterministic argument, then there is no free will or moral responsibility, and the same outcome emerges even if events are random, the combination of factors and natural forces still lead to certain decisions which a human cannot interpret. Free will does not exist in the context that most people assume, as choices are bound to either causal laws or statistical law, which one is unable to escape, and this does not meet the requirements for freedom of action.
Calvinism and Wesleyanism developed a conceptually new vision and understanding of free will and predestination in religion. Calvin responded to the turbulence of his age, to the “terror of the abyss,” by seeking assurance in the order of nature. This Calvin sought order, harmony, and balance as a way of overcoming the chaos he saw all around in the collapse of the old medieval world[1]. He called upon reason and fixed principles as a way of putting up boundaries, of providing intelligibility and certainty, in the face of what appeared to be the limitless disorders and uncertainties of his time.
Main text
Calvin, the philosopher and rationalist, was a conservative seeking a way to control himself and his world. There was another side to Calvin, a radical side, that recognized the powerlessness of human beings to control life, to construct boundaries, and to build perfect systems, that saw mystery in the universe, and that came face to face at some deep inner level with the ambiguities and paradoxes of the human condition. What filled this side of Calvin with anxiety was not the chaos of his time but the feeling of being trapped, of being constrained and boxed in by the rigid systems and enclosing boundaries of the old order[2]. This was Calvin the humanist, more concerned with persuasion and its art–rhetoric–than with the neat systems and orderly arrangements of philosophy. For Calvin the heart and the affections played as important a role as the mind and reason. This dethronement of reason, and with it a hierarchical understanding of the human personality, would help make manual labor for Calvin as noble a calling as scholarly endeavors and would raise troubling questions about all social hierarchies.
The main tenets of Calvin’s ideology are total inability, unconditional election, limited atonement, efficacious grace, the perseverance of the saints[3]. The famous doctrine of predestination and election that has been so closely identified with the Reformed tradition is an attempt to express both the absolute miracle of salvation, that it comes as a free, undeserved gift, and the character of God as the Sovereign One. The belief in such a sovereign God has been a fountainhead of contrasting elements of fundamental importance in the Reformed tradition and in Reformed communities the world over. Theological affirmations, in other words, no less than contextually induced anxieties, helped to shape the antithetical impulses of the tradition[4]. On the one hand, the emphasis on the sovereignty of God has been the source of Reformed piety, the inspiration of the courage, self-sacrifice, and broad humanitarianism that has often marked the Children of Geneva. It has been this piety, and the passionate belief that God is working God’s purposes out in human history, that has inspired in Reformed communities resistance to tyranny, that has sent their members out to do battle with evil, that has made them social reformers and in some places and circumstances revolutionaries[5].
Freed from such preoccupation with personal moods and feelings, they have often given themselves to building a holy community and indeed a world that will reflect the will of God[6]. On the other hand, the passionate belief in God’s sovereignty has all too often encouraged a self-righteous, cold, and narrow sectarianism in Reformed communities–especially when they have forgotten their belief that election is a sign of grace and not of their own righteousness. The sovereignty of God has been used to justify not revolution but a vigorous defense of the status quo, emphasizing that every person has a God-given place in society with corresponding duties and privileges. With such a defense, there has often come an inward turn, a movement away from a concern for action–although action was rarely abandoned[7]. Calvin supposes:
when the will of a natural man is said to be subject to the power of the devil, so as to be directed by it, the meaning is, not that it resists and is compelled to a reluctant submission, as masters compel slaves to an unwilling performance of their commands; but that, being fascinated by the fallacies of Satan
[8]Such contrasting elements and opposing impulses have not been neatly divided or clustered within Reformed communities–a point that must be emphasized–but have lived side by side in a greater or lesser tension. Sometimes one impulse dominates while its antithesis recedes; sometimes the opposite is the case. Always the social context and the place of the Reformed community in that context have been critical factors in shaping which elements of the tradition come to the fore and which elements remain in the background. For the Reformed communities, the heart of sin is worshiping anything other than the sovereign God[9]. Sin is making a god of that which is not God. Any attempt to control God, any endeavor to equate human understanding of God with God, must be rejected as idolatry. These communities have all too often done precisely that, especially when chaos threatens and there is a need for order and boundaries. Then they have substituted their theological statements, their convictions about God or God’s causes, for God. The Reformed tradition as a movement has insisted that the Transcendent One is both hidden and completely free and cannot be manipulated by even the most pious[10].
For the Reformed communities, the transcendent, sovereign God, the hidden One, is revealed in Jesus Christ. And what is revealed in Christ is not only God’s majesty and sovereignty but a majesty and sovereignty that expresses itself in mercy and forgiveness, gracious humility and compassion. Only the sovereign, elective grace of God, they believe, can free the human soul from its bondage and bring it to rest and peace in its Creator. Grace for those in the Reformed tradition is understood as a pure gift: it comes from above as a surprise, like rain to a dry and weary land, and is not the result of any human activity[11]. The heart could and should be prepared through prayer, Bible study, worship, and a holy life for the coming of the Spirit, but the Spirit blows where it wills, and its coming is always a gracious gift from a sovereign God. Such grace is powerful and irresistible, pursuing and overwhelming the soul, cleansing it of its secret faults, and turning the heart to God[12].
For Calvin and his early followers, the emphasis on the sovereignty and providence of God was a source of comfort and strength. But for later generations, it became increasingly a source of anxiety, encouraging the Scholastic side of the tradition. How could you know if you were among the elector if you had experienced God’s grace? It was a question of “assurance,” and beginning in the seventeenth century, it became a deeply troubling question to many Reformed communities[13]. While those included among the elect are always hidden in the mystery of God’s grace, two signs, it began to be said, are present when a person experiences God’s grace. First, a person can testify to an inward experience of being touched by the Spirit of God. Persons who have experienced God’s grace know in their hearts that they have been seized by the Spirit and overwhelmed by the infinite[14]. Second, they demonstrate by a morally upright life that God has granted them grace and touched their lives. If your heart has been changed, if you have had an experience of regeneration, then you will walk in the way of the Lord[15].
In 1790 enlightenment was still most conspicuously the property of the old English Presbyterians, and led them into a conflict which was both the last of the old denominational order, and the prelude to those of the new. John Wesley insisted on keeping the system open. Moreover the teachers ran the Ridgeway Gates School according to their own rules, with little respect to the jurisdiction of Conference. The famous free-for-alls which arose from this self-conscious return to the past have disguised the degree to which the evangelicals shared in the assumptions of the enlightenment, and constituted the second channel of its influence. The one thing absolutely incredible to eighteenth-century evangelicals was the metaphysical approach to theology so characteristic of reformed theologians in the seventeenth century[16]. With astonishing speed they came round to the view that the contest between the Arminians and the Calvinists was not merely unfortunate in its effects, but utterly mistaken in principle[17].
It was system, metaphysics, which seemed to account for the unhappy embarrassments of the past, especially in regard to reprobation, and, high and low, ‘system’ became the theological swearword of the hour. Long before Newman discovered that the Bible was not a textbook of school theology[18], Simeon was pronouncing that ‘God has not revealed his truth in a system: the Bible has no system as such. Early in the nineteenth century, the dissenting ministers of Manchester ‘unanimously agreed that the best method for the spread of the Gospel was to preach in a way that the people could not discern whether they preached free will or free grace’. For when empiricism was the order of the day, there seemed little to choose between the two sides[19]. Early in the nineteenth century, the dissenting ministers of Manchester ‘unanimously agreed that the best method for the spread of the Gospel was to preach in a way that the people could not discern whether they preached free will or free grace’. For when empiricism was the order of the day, there seemed little to choose between the two sides. of the preachers, and the relations of the whole body with the Church[20]. Wesley believed in “correlated view of predestination and irresistible grace,” and he depicted the meritorious cause as one that “allowed for prevenience, free will, and universal redemption”[21]
Wesley’s desire to remain within the fold of the Church was perfectly well known, but in the last dozen years of his life he often celebrated the Lord’s Supper in large provincial chapels, and he gave preachers authority to celebrate in America and Scotland, i.e. outside the jurisdiction of the Church of England. As long as it was simply a question of the Methodists enjoying the fellowship of the ordinance together, the line might be held by modestly irregular devices of this kind. But mutual hostility between the Church and the Methodists would make it difficult to resist the demand of certain preachers for full ministerial status[22]. John Wesley supposes that it is the certain way to obtain more grace. To use all the faith you have will bring an increase of faith.”[23]
The case of Methodism suggests a different view and reveals not only an important example of the English response to the Irish situation, but a means by which Protestant opinions were disseminated from the center outwards. No English evangelical body was more closely involved with the Irish than the Methodists. Irish Methodism was vigorous and expanding, and if it was now even harder to get. After the war, as English Methodism was torn apart by social conflict, the Irish came to blows on the sacrament question. As in England in the 1790s, the majority determined to receive the sacrament from their own preachers, while in 1818 the minority separated and set up as Primitive Methodists, ‘primitive’ in this case implying that they continued to receive the sacraments within the Establishment[24].
Summary
In sum, Calvin and Wesley brought new ideas and visions to traditional interpretations of the Church and predestination. Reformed communities became moralistic and famous for their legalism and self-righteousness. Their ethic was not a gloomy, otherworldly ethic as it has sometimes been portrayed. Reformed communities have been convinced that the world God created is good, if fallen, and that history is moving, in spite of all the sins, trials, and tribulations of humanity, toward God’s coming Kingdom.
Bibliography
Basinger, D., Basinger. R. Predestination and Free Will. InterVarsity Press, 1985.
Berkouwer, G.C. Divine Election. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1960.
Boettner, L. The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination. P & R Publishing, 1990.
Calvin, J. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company; 1536, 1995.
Collins, K. J. The Theology of John Wesley: Holy Love and the Shape of Grace. Abingdon Press, 2007.
Hunter, A.M. The Teaching of Calvin Modern Interpretation. Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson, and Company, 1920.
Foonotes
Hunter, A.M. The Teaching of Calvin Modern Interpretation. (Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson, and Company, 1920): 72.
Boettner, L. The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination. (P & R Publishing, 1990): 33.
Boettner, L. The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination. (P & R Publishing, 1990), 59-60.