Can a municipality disregard the results of a civil exam? The answer should be no. New Haven municipality should not disregard the results of a promotion test based on the fact that the exam yielded many qualified applicants from one race, and not enough of the minority since the exam was race-neutral. The municipal was not supposed to ignore the results because the exam was crafted by a professional body that ensured there was no bias towards any race but it focused on their knowledge regarding fire fighting.
History of the case
In November and December 2003 New Haven fire department conducted a racial free promotion test. The test was to fill seven captains and eight lieutenants’ positions. The department had authorized a company in Illinois IO solutions, to design a racial free promotion exam. Io solutions performed their task are required in designing a race-neutral promotion exam. The New Havens three rule stipulated that the three topmost scorers in a test only one of them would fill the vacancy. When the promotion exam results were out the whites scored higher than the blacks and Hispanics. In the captain’s test, the first person from the minority to score highly was in position six followed by another in position eight. The results would have enabled at least two Hispania in the rank of captain while the rest being whites. The lieutenant’s posts would all have been taken up by the whites since the first person from the minority was in position fourteen. Leaders in the New Haven council refused to endorse the names of the qualified candidates thereby making the results of the race-neutral exam invalid (Adversity.net. 2009).
After the 1991 civil rights act new court ruling brought a new dimension in the order of employment and promotion. A precedent set by the Supreme Court put any program incorporating racial or affirmative principle needed to undergo stringent inquiry. The federal law against discrimination was in good faith in helping employers voluntarily help the minority but did not compel them to always incorporate the minority. New Haven council, therefore, was not obliged to incorporate racial principles because the test had been scrutinized by the designing company and was not race-biased (Spicer, R, and Spicer, 1995).
The firefighters were justified to be entitled to the promotions because if there was one race or there were no minority promotion would have proceeded without any delay, thus the white firefighters had been discriminated against. Since the test was occupationally related there would be no reason to bring the issue of race as the disregarding factor. The positions at hand required very highly skilled personnel and declining to promote those who had scored highly would undermine the high standards required in carrying out the designated tasks.
The New Haven municipality was not justified in disregarding the civil service exam because, in the case of Dallas v. Dallas firefighters association of 1998, the final ruling was in favor of those who rightfully qualified for a certain post. In 1988 Dallas city council came up with a personnel policy that gave priority to women and minority people over the whites who had scored higher in the promotional test. At the time women were 15% of the driver-engineer position while the minority was 3% of the lieutenant position. The decision was a result of past prejudice that the council had accented to in1976. By 1992 women comprised 23% and minority personnel comprised 18% of drivers and lieutenants respectively. The council wanted to further extend the proposal for another five years. Dallas firefighters association and individual firefighters filed a suit against the council for discriminating against some of them. The district court ruled in favor of the association and firefighters based on the grounds that the council did not show any convincing reasons and there was no proof of past discrimination. After launching an appeal, the Supreme Court did not contrast the decision of the district court citing that the program was discriminating the white firefighters (Shafritz et al, 2007)
The type of examination administered to the firefighter was an assembled examination. Unlike unassembled exams that assess a candidate’s background, assembled examination accesses the potential of an individual in carrying out a particular job. A lawsuit was filed by Michael Briscoe that contends the writing part is prejudiced against blacks. The suit is from the thought that blacks do not perform well in written exams, of which there is no evidence toward these allegations. Since the firefighters knew the exam as was an assembled exam, the ones from the minority should have put extra effort and read thoroughly to lift up their performance.
The exam sat comprised 60% written and 40% oral. The oral part was meant to increase the chances for the minority groups in passing. This kind of arrangement was part of ensuring fairness in an effort to counter-cultural bias. Such exam setup has been criticized since it does not focus on an individual’s background. Fairness is implied because minorities are outnumbered by the majority. The difference in exam performance or results is directly related to differences between the group’s ability and cognitive skills. The exam can be said to be valid since it met the entire validity criterion. However this issue of including an oral part in the exam was not contested; if they had raised the issued more weight to win the case would have been on their side as the chances of the minority scoring low was well catered for (Spicer, R, and Spicer, 1995).
In Ricci v DeStefano the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. This means that the municipality was not supposed to disregard the test results. The ruling statement stated that the firemen were victims of racial discrimination and that the decision for the municipality to use “raw statistics” violated Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1991. The municipality would have gone ahead and promoted the firemen even though they would face legal suits from the minority. The ruling did not harmonize laws relating to employment; wherein one warns on employers using racial principles while hiring while the other advocates for them to take racism into account. This implies that the municipality should have looked into the matter of racism thoroughly. The court also found out that the municipality’s claim that adopting the results would have brought a disparate impact was not strongly supported (Dorf, 2009).
New Haven council should not have been guided by the racial results in canceling the promotions. It caused some harm to those who qualified for the positions because they had spent a lot of time and resources while preparing. Many had studied for months, bought textbooks, audio and visual material to help them improve their performance. Others incurred expenses through travel to libraries in search of reading materials (Adversity.net. 2009).
The firefighters were justified to be appointed to the vacant positions based on the fact that the municipality had provided equal opportunity to the candidates. They all had sat similar exams that discriminated none of them. All the candidates knew how to read and write, they all had been under formal training regarding firefighting and all were aware of the firefighting guidelines applied in New Haven. This shows that none of the candidates had a competitive advantage over the others (Cohn, 2000).
Finally, the case of Ricci v. DeStefano has not solved the conflicting ideology between protectionism against racism or any other differences, and the one requiring employers not to make employment decisions based on racial principles. It also provides precedence that municipalities and other organizations should not fall for the advocacy of quotas but should instead focus on designing the hiring practices that are justified and do not violate equal and protection principles. Based on the reasons provided above, New Haven municipality was not justified in disregarding the promotion exam that was crafted to be race-neutral on the grounds that the exam yielded many qualified applicants of one race and not enough of the other.
Reference
Adversity.net (2009). Case 50: New Haven Refused to Promote Firefighters Who Scored Highest on Exam. Web.
Cohn S. (2000). Race, Gender, and Discrimination at Work. Boulder: West view Press.
Dorf, M. C. (2009) The Supreme Court Decides the New Haven Firefighter Case. Web.
Shafritz, J. M., Riccucci, N. M. & Naff, K. C. (2007). Personnel management in government: politics and process (6th Ed). London: Taylor and Francis.
Spicer, R. & Spicer, L. (1995). Race Discrimination at Work. London: XPL Publishing.
The North Haven town is located ten miles from Yale University and New Haven and ten miles from Long Island Sound in Connecticut, United States of America. It is about seventy six miles from New York City. This town has an estimated area of about twenty one square miles whereby almost twenty square miles consist of land while the rest is covered by water. According to the census report of 2005 it was estimated that The North Haven town had a population of twenty three thousand nine hundred and eight people.
This town is home to various learning institutions like Quinnipiac University graduate colleges and schools and other New Haven based learning institutions. It derives a lot of fame through its developed infrastructure with a huge manufacturing and retail businesses employing about twelve thousand six hundred and forty people. This report aims at outlining various aspects in the structure and functioning of The North Haven Fire Department which plays a major role in rescue and emergency services.
The history of The North Haven Fire Department dates back to more than forty years ago when it was a constituent of a SAFER donation from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. However, in 2009/2010 there were major changes in this department and it was allowed to develop its fire fighting abilities through investing in career development of its workers.
This plan was successful courtesy of the grants obtained from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the immense support from the community during a budget referendum to put the grant into consideration (The Library Director). This played an important role of ensuring there were enough resources to train their staff as far as fire fighting was concerned. The North Haven Fire Department consists of thirty four employees.
These employees are categorized as administrators who comprise of one Fire Chief, Deputy Fire Chief and four Lieutenants who also act as shift controllers. The other group of workers is referred to as the fire fighters and it consists of twenty eight workers. This department is further aided by other volunteer companies that include Montowese, West Ridge and Northeast companies that are allowed to have a maximum of thirty five workers.
These volunteer companies consists of a Captain, two Lieutenants and two Foremen while the Fire Police Division are supervised by Police Lieutenants assigned to each company and are answerable to the Chief of the Department. This Department has an elaborate system that enables all their plans to be carried out effectively (The Library Director). The management does not solely perform the administrative roles but rather allocates some of these duties to the managers of volunteer companies.
Through this division of labor it becomes very easy to offer quality fire fighting services to the residents of The New Haven town in terms of public awareness on fire fighting equipments and the steps to be taken in the event that there is a fire outbreak. Planning is an essential element in the process of delivering quality services to the people.
The office of the Fire Marshal has an elaborate plan that involves new activities and reviewing the existing practices. These activities include routine inspections of fire fighting equipments in homes, institutions and all other areas that have been considered to be risky in the event of fire breakouts.
All new and renovated buildings are visited to ensure they conform to the standards stipulated by the CT Fire Safety Code. Training of fire fighters is a mandatory practice that all disaster management organizations must adhere to in order to ensure the fire fighters and the victims are safe during rescue operations while ensuring there is no damage to property.
It is a requirement that all career and volunteer members of The North Haven Fire Department attain a minimum of Firefighter 1 level in order to handle medical emergencies and respond effectively to situations that require systematic rescue procedures.
There are daily training sessions by the career fire fighters using a time table prepared by the chief’s office and supervised by officers commanding these sections. In the volunteer companies training is done every week to ensure all fire fighters have the required skills and to inform them on how various equipments are used.
There are indoor sessions that offer basic and technical knowledge to all fire fighters to enable them develop and sharpen their field skills in order to have a wider knowledge on how to approach various disasters in the town. There were certification classes organized by the department to build on the skills of staff members in fire fighter 1 and 2 curriculums.
In addition, four members received higher training on Hazardous Material Technician Level (HMTL) to ensure they have skills that will enable them handle disasters in the Haz-Mat team levels (The Library Director).
It is very important that all fire fighters undergo regular training in order to build on their skills with regard to the inevitable changes that occur as a result of modernization. In addition, it is important for fire fighters to do routine exercises to ensure they remind themselves of the basic rules and guidelines that ensure effective rescue operations are conducted in the event of disasters.
Fire fighting and disaster management is a comprehensive activity that involves the use of physical, biological and mental assets of the victims and rescuers. It should be noted that the fire fighter’s safety is as important as the victim’s safety and without efficient equipments both of them will be subjected to great risks.
However, The North Haven Fire Department boasts of an elaborate network of apparatus that enable its workers perform their duties effectively (The Library Director). These equipments consist of a ladder truck, seven pumping engines, two rescue trucks and two vehicles that carry command functions.
There are other equipments for special cases like a boat for rescuing victims stranded in rivers and ponds and a gator for off road cases. Apart from performing rescue and evacuation services to the public The North Haven Fire Department offers public education on safety in schools, homes, companies and business premises through issuing educational brochures on safety topics.
The fire fighting department carries out periodic surveys on security matters in schools, homes and companies to ensure no one is exposed to any risk. In addition, they also help in supplying smoke detectors to homes that had faulty ones or none at all. This was made possible during one of the department’s campaign dubbed North Haven Cares that saw one thousand three hundred and forty three smoke detectors distributed in various homes that had faulty ones or none at all.
Conclusion
The North Haven Fire Department is one of the largest successful enterprises in the United States due to their ability to handle various forms of disasters that citizens are exposed to. These disasters range from fire outbreaks to drowning on swimming pools. Effective rescue operations are determined by the level of training of rescue workers, equipments used and public knowledge regarding essential safety measures at personal and institutional levels.
Works Cited
The Library Director. The North Haven Fire Department: The North Haven Town, May 2001. Web.
Strategic planning is a management tool that serves various purposes in organizations. It provides a framework for developing appropriate courses of action in organizations after an analysis of current organizational operations and outcomes. Strategic planning also helps organizations adapt to changes in the face of complexities and diversification of factors.
In order to determine the suitability of plans to their purpose, an analysis of the plans is necessary in case the plans need modification or require the organization to abandon them and rethink its position. Goodstein, Nolan, and Pfeiffer (1993) provide a detailed explanation of nine necessary aspects for the creation of an effective strategic plan for an organization.
These aspects include planning to plan, values scan, mission formulation, strategic modeling of business, performance audit, gap analysis, integrating action plans, contingency planning, and implementation (Goodstein, Nolan & Pfeiffer, 1993).
This paper looks at two organizations, viz. the New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) and the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) in relation to their strategic planning dynamics concerning emergency preparedness and disaster response within the larger U.S. government as an organization in itself.
In the case of the FDNY, the paper analyzes details of the New York City’s governance, its effects on the fire department coupled with how these aspects, in turn, affect the station’s strategic planning for emergency response by using Hurricane Sandy as a case study.
For the New Orleans case study, the paper analyzes the NOFD’s involvement during and after Hurricane Katrina, changes in the fire department’s strategic plans, and effect of New Orleans’ government strategic plans on the department’s plans. It also provides a comparison between the two departments by indicating similarities, differences, and lessons available for each of them from the other.
Disaster management
Disaster management forms part of the core functions of most disaster-response units in most countries, including fire departments. The uncertainty and the unexpectedness of disaster make disaster management techniques an incredibly difficult subject, as they mostly strike when least expected (Abbott, 2005). Disasters expose people to both primary and secondary effects.
Varghese (2002) notes that natural disasters have “immediate impacts on human health, as well as secondary impacts causing further death and suffering from floods causing landslides, earthquakes resulting in fires, tsunamis causing widespread flooding, and typhoons sinking ferries” (p.102).
Responding appropriately to disasters require embracement of concepts such as disaster preparedness, disaster recovery, disaster relief, and disaster prevention. Disaster preparedness entails all activities designed to ensure that damages and losses of life reduce should a disaster strike (Smith, 2006, p.13).
These activities include “removing people and property from a threatened location and facilitating timely and effective rescue, relief, and rehabilitations” (Hansen & Schramm, 1993, p.56). Disaster relief refers to multi-agency coordinated responses to enhance the mitigation of the effects of disasters coupled with their results in the long term.
Some of the relief activities the agencies conducted in the event of a disaster include repairing the vital utility lines that the disaster destroyed, foods provision to the affected, and relocation of people (evacuation) in the effort to escape the ramifications of disasters. Others include provision of health care, provision of temporary shelter until the disaster is passed on, and rescue of the affected people among other activities.
Disaster recovery efforts, on the other hand, encompass activities such as rehabilitation and reconstruction of the destroyed infrastructures. Once disasters strike, measures for protection from exposure to similar disasters in the future is necessary for all affected people, which calls for the development of strategies for disaster prevention.
These strategies include “activities designed to provide permanent protection from disasters” (Nicholson, 2003, p.67). Considering the concerns of disasters management, disaster management organizations should execute their roles to restore normalcy amongst people.
New York City overview
In order to understand the significance of FDNY’s strategic plans, it is important to explore some facts on the city of New York that impact on the government and fire department’s strategic planning process and possible outcomes. The city lies on one of the world’s largest natural harbors and is home to the United Nations headquarters.
The city’s architecture comprises some of the most famous buildings in the world, including the Empire State Building, the Chrysler Building, and the Statue of Liberty. As at 2012, the city’s population was 8.4 million over an area of seven hundred and eighty-three square kilometers.
Additionally, the metropolitan area population is approximately 19.8 million. An interesting fact is that more than fifty percent of the city’s dwellers do not own personal transportation as the same would be counterproductive, given the city’s population.
New York’s government structure has remained the same since 1898. Although the government has made a few changes concerning some rules of governance such as direct management of the city’s budget by the mayor, the composition has remained the same. The city’s government is central and comprises a mayor and a governor, who both form part of a fifty-one member council in charge of the city’s policymaking.
In order to cater for the population’s needs, the council has enacted policies that support public transportation through the introduction of the New York subway system, one of the most intricate rapid transit systems in the world. It provides for the city’s transport needs while easing traffic on city roads.
It is also cheaper for most of the residents in terms of income expenditure. The establishment of law enforcement, healthcare and first responder service centers in the city has also eased the pressure on the residents in the metropolitan area.
The New York Fire Department (FDNY)
The New York Fire department is one of the many basic service delivery institutions that the government established to ensure efficiency in dealing with the residents’ needs as part of its strategic planning process. Although the city has one fire department, the department has various stations throughout the city for effective service delivery.
Its organizational structure consists of a central department with divisions according to function, which responds simultaneously as a unit. FDNY has 10,725 uniformed firefighters, over 2,000 paramedics, more than 100 fire marshals and approximately 200 fire inspectors.
Although the city’s population is large, having a single department centralizes operations and makes it easier to coordinate operations throughout the entire city according to need and availability. The FDNY offers first responder services for fires, public safety and medical emergencies and disasters, both natural and fabricated.
For instance, the department played a key role during the September 9, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, in conjunction with other departments such as the New York Police Department and the National Guard. One of its core duties is to ensure the protection of lives and property of New York residents and visitors and advance public safety.
It achieves these goals through public safety education programs, investigations on possible fire hazards, installation of preventive measures such as fire alarms, responding to distress calls and providing aid during the recovery process after disasters (The New York Fire Department, 2013).
In ensuring that the department accomplishes its goals and objectives, mainly in relation to disaster preparedness and response, the FDNY formulates and implements various strategic plans, one of which is the centralization of the department’s operations.
Other plans include continuous firefighter training, contingency plan formulation in the face of disasters, civilian education, coordination with other government agencies and setting up recovery programs for victims and department personnel.
Continuous training of fire fighters enhances endurance and adaptability to new environments and techniques, a property that makes up numbers. Although the department does not have enough fire fighters in relation to the city’s population, proper training ensures that they are able to deal with emergencies appropriately.
Central administration also plays a crucial role as it enables the department evaluates situations and determines priority in dealing with emergencies. It also ensures that communication links remain intact, increasing efficiency during disaster response. Coordination with other state departments provides the fire department with enough workforces in instances of proportionate disaster response.
An example of these strategies in application is evident in the department’s response to Hurricane Sandy, one of the most devastating natural disasters to hit the city. Although the hurricane hit a number of states along the Gulf Coast, New York and New Jersey experienced most of its wrath.
The presence of inland rivers and large coastline made the city susceptible to flooding. Shortly past midday on October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy hit New York’s coastline with a storm surge consisting mostly of ghastly wings with significant precipitation.
The storm surge caused flooding of the New York subway system, most of the streets, almost all road tunnels going into Manhattan and severe destruction of property. At least forty people lost their lives during the storm, with thousands of others losing their homes and businesses. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) suspended trading for two consecutive days and most Hospitals in the city closed down.
Heavy winds disrupted electricity supply as trees and debris from buildings fell on power lines. The damage on electricity lines and gas leaks also resulted in fires that destroyed millions of dollars worth of property. In Breezy Point, Queens, over ninety homes went up in flames leaving families stranded.
On October 28, 2012, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo declared a state of emergency for the entire state of New York, including a pre-disaster declaration that came into effect after hurricane Katrina, as a measure to mobilize federal finding to deal with Sandy’s aftermath.
The FDNY disaster preparedness procedure coupled with central administration, provided firefighters with pertinent information, enabling the department evacuate thousands of residents, especially in areas near the coastline and those with low altitudes such as lower Manhattan, much of Staten Island, City Island and areas north of Route 25A, to higher altitude areas.
By the evening of October 28, most of the railways and bus services had suspended their operations and bridges had closed until October 30. The fire department’s main obligation arose after the disaster on October 30, as firefighters had to put out more than fifty fires in areas all over the city, most of which arose at Breezy Point.
The department also helped clear debris blocking roads and remove trees and other obstructions from electricity lines. The presence of a paramedics unit also made it possible for the department to cater to medical emergencies including recovery of people from the rubble and transportation of the injured to hospitals all over the city, supplementing efforts by Homeland Security.
The government set up support centers around the city including areas of Coney Island, Rockaway and Staten Island to help displaced people access food, water, gas and mobile phone connections.
The fire department helped deliver the supplies to areas where victims needed them most and attended to simple medical procedures at the centers. The department was also helpful in collecting data on the number of injured people and populations at the support centers, enabling the government to respond appropriately.
An analysis based on these facts proves that the department’s strategic plans were sufficient in addressing disaster preparedness and response, with fluid execution leading to the desirable outcome in terms of the department’s primary objective to safeguard life, health and property. The plans present efficiency with regard to service to the population, even with the low number of firefighters available at the department.
As part of the recovery process, the department set up the Fire Safety Program in November after the disaster, with the aim reducing vulnerability of the elderly to disasters, because most of the people who died during the disaster and in fires after the disaster were above seventy years.
This age bracket formed more than forty percent of deaths from fire during and after the disaster. The program’s funding came from the Department of Homeland Security.
New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD)
The New Orleans provides a comparison to the FDNY in terms of strategic planning for disaster preparedness and response. Unlike the FDNY, the NOFD’s strategic plans comply with policies that go further back in history, creating a problem in terms of adaptation to population changes and the environment.
Although New Orleans is a much smaller city then New York, the ratio of firefighters in the department to the existing population is much lower than that in New York, making it difficult for the department to accomplish its goals and objectives.
Although the department’s choice to enroll and train volunteer firefighters as a strategy to increase the department’s workforce works, lack of creativity and adaptability in strategic planning creates problems for the department, limiting its ability to serve the people effectively.
A.A. look at some facts about the department and its effectiveness during and after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 proves the department’s inefficiency in strategic planning and implementation in disaster response and recovery.
Contrast with the New York Fire Department further enhances the planning problems and the need for drastic improvements. The New Orleans fire department’s history runs back to 1829, when a group of people came together with the aim of fighting fires within the city. This group referred itself as the Firefighters’ Charitable Associations (FCA).
The group engaged in voluntary fire fighting activities and the title of the group existed until 1891. After 62 years of existence, the FCA changed to the New Orleans Fire Department, abbreviated as NOFD, following the introduction of paid service.
The main reason for the existence of the New Orleans Fire Department is to ensure ardent provision of fire fighting and protection services within New Orleans. Ryan (2006) approximates that NOFD serves “approximately 340,000 people in a 350.2-square-mile (907 km2) area, 180.6 square miles (468 km2) of that is on land while the rest is water” (p.23).
Just like the NYFD, the NOFD’s administration is central, providing ease in communication and operational processes throughout the organization. The New Orleans Fire Department’s organizational structure comprises three levels, which include the special operations and planning, fire suppression, and fire administration. The assistant superintendent acts as the commander of the fire suppression.
It is the largest division of the NOFD. The central priorities of the fire suppression departmental division include ensuring life safety and stabilization of various emergencies related to fires coupled with preservation of property.
According to the City of New Orleans Fire Department, “fire suppression members regularly participate in daily inspections, fire safety educational programs, and numerous other fire-related duties” (2006, p.18). For effective communication in emergency response processes, administration is important for an emergency response organization.
The fire administration departmental division of the NOFD is responsible for executing communication tasks. Under the leadership of the deputy chief, the fire administration also commands investigation on fires and fire prevention coupled with ensuring that training in subdivisions takes place. The division is also responsible for ensuring timely coordination for the responses for all situations involving non-emergency responses.
Other coordination activities of the division include functions such as payrolls preparation, processing of data ensuring timely supplies, budgeting, and administration of personnel, among other tasks. In the effort to enhance disaster preparedness of the organization, the administration departmental division of the NOFD engages in tasks such as coordination of fire equipment and vehicles purchases coupled with repairs.
Special operation and planning divisions of the NOFD are under the command of the special and operations deputy chief. The division plans various anticipated future operations and activities of the New Orleans Fire Department. The deputy chief is in charge of training within the departmental division.
Hurricane Katrina was the deadliest cyclone that hit the region in 2005 during hurricane season. Katrina hit New Orleans on August 28, 2005, leaving unfathomed destruction and loss of lives in the city. Although the U.S. government had warned of the hurricane’s possible impact on the city, a large proportion of the population was unable to leave the city.
Some of the reasons people gave included their belief that their houses could withstand the hurricane’s impact as they had in previous storms, fear of leaving property behind, and lack of personal transportation with which to leave the city.
Although ninety percent of the city’s inhabitants complied with the mandatory evacuation, the government had to intervene and provide last-resort shelter for residents still stranded in the city as the hurricane approached. The Superdome in the center of the city is one of the emergency centers that got the media’s attention owing to the fact that it housed more than twenty thousand people for several days.
The most notable impact of the hurricane was extensive flooding throughout the city owing to poor infrastructural planning and slow completion of levees in a city with a high percentage of water as part of its overall area.
More than 1,400 people lost their lives and property worth billions of dollars was lost to floodwater and fires. In addition, oil and other industrial chemicals turned floodwater toxic, causing diseases. Unlike New York, the city government lacked the capacity to cater for needs such as food, clean drinking water and medical assistance, causing unrest.
Most of the police officers that form part of the New Orleans police department abandoned their posts, some taking government-issued police vehicle and fleeing the city to avoid the aftermath. The combination of these occurrences made it nearly impossible for the fire department to deal with the effects of the hurricane independent of other government departments.
Before the occurrence of the hurricane in 2005, the goal of the NOFD was to ensure evacuation of people from disastrous areas and ensure safety of citizens and property. After the occurrence of the hurricane, the goal was to rescue the affected people and put off possible raging fires to protect property and lives. The two goals reflect the missions and purposes of the organization.
The organization seeks to achieve these goals through its human resource and interventions of various response equipment. Although the evacuation exercise was successful, since accomplishing of the task took place before striking of the hurricane occurred, the hurricane-affected the recovery and rescue mission enormously.
Destruction of the equipment of the NOFD occurred; hence, deterring the realization of the goal of rapid response. However, this does not mount to total failure on the department’s end. Considering the fact that most of the department’s personnel receive training in fire-related response and not much on medical emergencies, it is safe to say that the firefighters and volunteers did their best in adapting to existing circumstances.
Evans and Drabek (2004) posit that managing disasters gives rise to formidable challenges to the government’s emergency and disaster management apparatus since they present a requirement for making difficult decisions on service delivery systems for the affected people (p.45). Therefore, the affected jurisdictions source aid from other jurisdictions not affected by the disaster.
In the absence of a disaster, a given state cannot place diplomatic call for help should an emergency or a disaster occurs in the future. This assertion implies that the internal emergency and disaster management apparatus only have resources adequate for development of emergency and disaster preparedness strategies, but not for relief, rescue, and recovery.
Drawing from the above arguments, the New Orleans disaster management systems could not have prevented Hurricane Katrina from striking the Gulf coast. Hurricane Katrina rendered the Gulf coast roads impassable and destroyed communication networks.
The City of New Orleans Fire Department (2006) posits, “There were hundreds of hazardous material incidences such as overturned tanks cars and runaways barges and ships” (p.6). The entire city of New Orleans also went without power supply accompanied by various incidences of gas leaks in the area where gas supply lines had not drained.
This aspect caused several rages of fire across the city of New Orleans, thus prompting the need for fire management and response services of the NOFD to come for the safety of the city. As water levels continued to rise, the NOFD service personnel got into action to save lives in an environment lacking communication networks.
The NOFD lost vital equipment including fire stations, communication equipment, and vehicles among other facilities required for ardent response. However, with the aid from firefighters based in Louisiana, Illinois, New York, and other places rebuilding of the NOFD was possible.
In the process of rebuilding, the NOFD realized that it needed strategic plans for the recovery process. In the process of making effective strategic plans, an organization has to engage in planning to plan as the first stage of the planning process.
During this step, the NOFD sought the help of the U.S. fire administration coupled with International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) to help in the development of a recovery plan from the events of Hurricane Katrina.
The City of New Orleans Fire Department (2006) reckons, “The NOFD officers and staff aided by many fire services professionals from around the country have formulated a blueprint of recovery for the NOFD” (p.6). Through strategic plans, the NOFD believes that a clear blueprint for responding to disaster enhances aiding the organization to achieve its aim of protecting and rescuing people and property.
In the pre-planning phase, the department addressed several interrogatives based on the model for strategic planning.
These interrogatives included questions seeking to establish the current position of the organization, future anticipated position of the organization, and the mechanisms of ensuring that the NOFD would reach its anticipated position in the future. These departments identified areas of focus and made plans to addresses them through the mission, values, goals, and the visions of the NOFD.
Significant similarities and differences between FDNY and NOFD
The main similarity between the FDNY and the NOFD is that both departments share a central structure in their administration that increases efficiency in communication and prioritization of incidents to which they respond. Secondly, both departments serve a wide area and a larger population in comparison to the sizes of their personnel.
Additionally, they base their strategic planning on government funding for their operations, their goals and objectives.
For instance, preference of public modes of transportation formed an essential consideration when mapping out plans on how to evacuate areas that proved most vulnerable to the effects of the hurricanes. Both cities also have water bodies running through the inland area, an aspect that increased chances of flooding proportionately.
The main difference between the two lies in the creativity of their organizational models. While the NOFD chooses to base its model on fire emergencies, the New York model embraces creative diversity, choosing to incorporate medical emergencies as part of its areas of expertise.
Another notable difference between the two departments in terms of strategic structuring for emergency responses is that the FDNY applies convergence, incorporating other government departments to increase the workforce available, especially in emergencies. In sharp contrast, the NOFD uses volunteer firefighters as an extension of their workforce, creating uncertainty on the exact number of respondents available at any time.
Regarding responses from the two departments in relation to the respective hurricanes, New York had an advantage over New Orleans as it applied lessons from Katrina to enhance its preparedness for disasters. However, the NOFD learned valuable lessons from the disaster and has since made arrangements for better plans, including incorporation of community sensitization programs.
Conclusion
Although it is difficult to prepare adequately for any disaster owing to unpredictability, especially for natural disasters, it is possible to develop measures that make the recovery process easier and reduce damage to property while safeguarding lives.
Assessment of business models, adequate training, diversity in areas of operation, creativity in organizational arrangement and adaptability to circumstances are some of the important elements the true hurricanes brought out as part of the essential components in disaster preparedness and response for both fire departments.
Reference List
Abbott, B. (2005). A legal guide to Homeland Security and Emergency Management for State and Local Governments. Chicago, IL: American Bar Association.
City of New Orleans Fire Department. (2006). Strategic Recovery and Reconstitution Planning Process for the City of New Orleans Fire Department Decimated by Hurricane Katrina. Web.
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