Intersectionality Laws Is The UK And Europe

Intersectionality, coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 19891, draws analytic attention to the fact that no social identity category exists in isolation of others. Rather, we are all simultaneously positioned within multiple social categories including gender, social class, sexuality, disability and racialisation among others. These categories reciprocally construct each other when they intersect, forming qualitatively different meanings and experiences that are situated in different contexts, times and power relations. Hence, intersectionality alerts us to the fact that we cannot understand a single category without appreciation of those around it2. Despite the widespread acknowledgment of this theory in international law, contemporary law and policy fail to recognise intersectionality in practice. This essay will examine how intersectionality remains unrecognised in UK law as well as EU law and policy. Through the analysis of government policies and case law, this essay seeks to demonstrate how the law in the contemporary world has failed those at the intersection of different social categories.

Intersectionality in UK law and policy:

a. The Equality Act 2010

UK discrimination law has historically, in instruments such as the Race Relations Act 19763 and the Sex Discrimination Act 19754, taken an approach to discrimination that allows only for a single characteristic to be considered, and treats identity characteristics as discrete, homogenous groups. This trend is continued in the Equality Act 2010 where direct discrimination is defined as unfavourable treatment on the basis of ‘a protected characteristic’5. The Act mentions age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage or civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation as ‘protected characteristics’. Section 146 of the act contains a provision to cover direct discrimination on up to two combined grounds – known as combined or dual discrimination. Despite the recognition of multiple discrimination, this section has never been brought into effect as the government deemed it too ‘complicated and burdensome’ for businesses. This commitment to a “single-axis” model raises obvious problems for the capacity of the law to respond to intersectional discrimination. However, even if section 14 is implemented, its scope remains limited; it applies only to two grounds of direct discrimination. This notion of dual discrimination remains problematic for it artificially limits the number of characteristics which interact in incidents of discrimination. Furthermore, by providing only for ‘direct’ discrimination, section 14 does not cover harassment or forms of indirect discrimination. Therefore, the scope of the current law is very narrow.

The Equality Act sought to introduce the concept of multiple discrimination into legislation but failed to deliver on its objectives. Several academics like Iyiola Solanke7 argue that the approach to incorporating protection from multiple discrimination in law needs to move away from the current additive or cumulative approach. Additive, or cumulative, multi-discrimination is where a person is treated less favourably because of more than one protected characteristic and, although the two forms of discrimination happen at the same time, they are not related to each other. For example, a lesbian experiences both homophobia and sexist bullying from her employer during the same incident. Instead, law makers should recognise the more complex and deeper dimension of intersectionality that characterises multiple discrimination. Although using the language of intersectionality, British law has in fact deprived this concept of its content. In leaving the substance of the concept behind, the provision in the Equality Act has not made the analytical shift from a single dimension to multiple consciousness8. Hence, the act has incorporated multiple discrimination without multiple consciousness. Discrimination law has in textual terms taken a step forward yet conceptually it has not moved at all. There have nevertheless been attempts to bring about recognition of intersectional discrimination judicially, despite legislative barriers.

b. Mackie v G & N Car Sales Ltd t/a Britannia Motor Co [2004]

Cases like Mackie9 are evidence that lower tribunals are willing to consider claims that raise intersectional discrimination. In this case the claimant was an Indian woman who had worked for the defendant company for a short period. The directors of the company were of Indian origin and a colleague had told the claimant that they did not approve of Asian women working for their company. The claimant was dismissed without reason after five months. Her claim for race and sex discrimination was successful, with the Employment Tribunal using a hypothetical comparator who was male and of an origin other than Indian. Crucially, the Tribunal found that the claimant had been treated unfavourably because she was an Indian woman, not solely because she was a woman or an Indian.

c. Nwoke v Government Legal Service and Civil Service Commissioners [1996]

This case provides a clear example of the courts endorsing additive discrimination. The claimant was a Nigerian-born woman who applied for a job with the Government Legal Service10. On examining the rankings used for candidates following interviews, it was discovered that the claimant had the lowest possible ranking, with all white applicants, regardless of gender, ranking higher, despite having a lower degree class than the claimant. The tribunal found that the discrimination was on the basis of her race.

d. Bahl v Law Society [2004]

While the aforementioned cases indicate a judicial willingness from the lower courts to recognise additive discrimination, the only case involving an intersectional discrimination claim to reach the higher courts was the case of Bahl11. It was met with firm opposition from the Court of Appeal (CA). Ms Bahl was the first woman of colour to enter the senior management of the law society, holding the post of Deputy Vice President and then Vice President. She resigned however, in the face of allegations of aggressive and bullying behaviour, and brought a claim for discrimination on the grounds of sex and race. While successful at the Employment Tribunal, Ms Bahl lost at both the Employment Appeals Tribunal and the CA. Peter Gibson LJ’s judgment mentioned: “If the evidence does not satisfy the tribunal that there is discrimination on grounds of race or on grounds of sex considered independently, then it is not open to a tribunal to find either claim satisfied on the basis that there is nonetheless discrimination on grounds of race or sex when both are taken together”12. Bahl highlights the constraints placed on courts by the inadequacies of legislation which confines discrimination to the single-axis model13. This case drew attention to the difficulties of dealing with intersectionality in the UK.

While claims of multiple discrimination have appeared in the British courts, intersectional claims have not fared as well here as compared to additive claims14. This inflexibility compromises the ability of anti-discrimination law in the UK to respond to discrimination arising from the interaction, rather than mere addition, of grounds. Such intersectional discrimination is said to be qualitatively different to additive discrimination15. Race and gender, for example, have accumulative effect that is more than a composite of the two parts, yet the current structure of UK discrimination law precludes a ‘holistic’ approach16. The refusal to recognise intersectional claims would leave women without a remedy in the face of discrimination. There is not only an unwillingness by the government to acknowledge the need to provide this remedy, but also a failure to recognise why it is essential. There are several issues with single-axis models of discrimination. Firstly, such an understanding ignores the fact that people have multiple identities. We all have an age, a gender, a sexual orientation, a belief system and an ethnicity; many have or acquire a religion or develop a disability as well. Secondly, such an approach assumes that identity groups are internally homogenous. Often known as ‘essentialism’, such an approach obscures the very real differences within identity groups17. Therefore, intersectionality in UK law and policy still remains unaddressed and does not take intersecting identities into account in anti-discrimination law.

Intersectionality in the law of the European Union:

The European Union (EU), a pioneer in gender equality policies, is moving from predominantly attending to gender inequality, towards policies that address multiple inequalities18. While this seems to suggest that the EU is open to recognising intersectionality in practice, the reality is quite different. This essay seeks to seeks to critically assess the way the EU guarantees the protection of individuals who are discriminated on multiple grounds. Through the analysis of policy, this essay hopes to conclude that the EU legal framework is merely juxtaposing inequalities rather than intersecting them, and is not giving equal importance to the different inequalities.

As EU law does not recognise that multiple identities can intersect, it is argued that the current anti-discrimination legal framework is not adequate to deal with claims of multiple and intersectional discrimination19. Recent legislative developments have, however, raised the issue of multiple discrimination and intersectional disadvantage but they remain guarded and often take a simplistic, rather than an intersectional approach20. People’s identities are fluid, complex, and are made up of multiple elements. Accordingly, the protection of individuals’ identities demands an equally elaborate and adaptable anti-discrimination legal framework because if one is ―to assume that groups are rigidly delineated by race, gender, disability, sexual orientation or other status, [then one] is to render invisible those that are found in the intersection between those groups”21.

Article 13 of the treaty establishing the European Community (EC), in allowing for the adoption of legislation and other measures to combat various forms of discrimination, can be regarded as a significant advance on the position that obtained prior to revisions introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty22. However, the scope of the article in acting as a protection against discrimination is narrow. Firstly, the European institutions are under no obligation to act under Article 13. Rather, they may ‘take appropriate action to combat discrimination’ on the grounds specified only where unanimity for such action is attained in the European Council of Ministers. In addition, as the European Parliament is merely to be consulted it is given minimal influence over the content of legislation. Furthermore, the provision has no direct effect. Accordingly, in the absence of specific implementing measures, individuals cannot invoke Article 13 EC in and of itself as protection against discrimination23. Furthermore, it has a fairly limited scope in that it applies only within the limits of the competencies enjoyed by the European Union. Therefore, the forms of discrimination referred to in the provision may be challenged only in the fields falling within the powers of the EU, such as employment, education, social security, access to goods and services, accommodation and health care. This means that other areas, such as sport and policing, lie outside the reach of Article 1324.

The implementation of intersectionality in legally binding documents remains weak or non-existent25. While references to multiple forms of discrimination have been progressively incorporated in international and EU legal instruments, the majority of European countries segregate the grounds of discrimination and ignore the intersections among different axes of inequalities in their political and legislative agendas26. National experts report very little case law, whether or not States have an explicit provision for multiple discrimination. Indeed, out of the countries with explicit provision, only Austria, Germany and Italy point to cases before the courts where there is even a suggestion of multiple discrimination. Where there have been cases, the full implications of intersectionality are rarely developed27. Nevertheless important advancements toward the recognition of multiple discrimination have been marked by the EU Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC)28 and Framework Equality Directive (2000/78/EC)29. However, these directives mention multiple discrimination only occasionally when recalling that the EU aims to eliminate inequalities and promote equality between men and women: “especially since women are often the victims of multiple discrimination”. An additive, rather than an intersectional, approach remains dominant in international and European discourse30.

Greece: European Paddock For Refugees

Over 1,200,000 refugees cross the Aegean Sea every year (EU Council on Foreign Relations), fleeing their homes and searching for a better life, yet too few find one. People leave their homes because their countries are not safe anymore, and flee thousands of miles, across continents, to reach Europe. Throughout each of those journeys, countless lives are lost, and families are separated. Starting four years ago, Greece has been viewed as an entry point to Europe from people fleeing violence in the Middle East and Central Asia. Today, Greece has turned into something like a paddock for refugees seeking asylum. The 500,000 plus refugees now stuck in the Greek islands can not legally travel deeper into Europe, and most will likely remain in the country (Asylum Information Database). This is not only a humanitarian crisis, but also a political one. The European Union (“EU”) was founded on a dedication to international law and human rights that has pushed policies for 60 years. Recently, however, the EU adopted border restrictions that have prevented people seeking sanctuary from entering Europe, putting the world’s most vulnerable population increasingly at risk. The EU’s policies also mean that Greece, along with Italy, are being asked to shoulder much of the responsibility for the lives of those who have reached Europe in search of safety. For instance, according to The Guardian, since the March 2016 agreement restricting border crossings, some 160,000 refugees—the majority from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan—remain stuck on the Greek islands of Lesbos, Chios, Kos, Samos and Leros (Current State of Greek Crisis). Greece and Italy cannot be expected to deal with this extremely difficult job on their own. Although there is not a single solution, this problem needs to start being addressed with more long-term plans. This humanitarian crisis is killing thousands every year and strips many more from their basic human rights, and Europe as a whole needs to stand up to this challenge; this is a response that cannot be dictated by geography.

Europe’s refugee crisis has been described as the worst of its kind since World War II, at the end of which there were more than 40 million refugees in the region and led to the creation of international laws and organizations that would become the foundation of the world’s refugee response today. Fast-forward to 2014: 219,000 refugees crossed the Mediterranean into Europe, according to the U.N. So far this year, more than 300,000 people have made that journey, many of them to escape civil wars (PRI’s The World). From a financial standpoint, since the beginning of 2014, 2 million refugees and migrants have entered Greece and in line with UPI News Current, $254 million in refugee-related funding has come from the European Commission. Of this total, the Greek government received $12 million, a further $15 million went to organizations dealing with refugee protection, asylum and migration (‘Breakdown of spending on refugee crisis in Greece.’): the International Organization for Migration, the U.N. refugee agency and the European Asylum Support Office. Helpful as it is, this amount of money is not anywhere near what is needed, and if it were to be divided evenly for all refugees, each individual would have to live with around $18 a year. Refugees are not aiming to displace other people seeking entry to Europe, defenders argue, but merely trying to escape the violence and chaos of their home countries.

A 10-year-old child tried to commit suicide in a Greek refugee camp. Perhaps the most shocking thing about this story is that it is not unique. Routine police beating and squalor in Moria, the largest camp on the island of Lesbos and home to about 8,000 people, have pushed the situation to a breaking point. Moria fails to meet just about every standard set by the UNHCR. New arrivals are crammed into inadequate sports tents, or on to farmland where lighting has not been installed, and up to 190 refugees share one filthy toilet. The EU started closing its borders to migrants in October 2015, when Hungary blocked asylum-seekers who had previously been waved through the Balkans and Central Europe so they could reach Western Europe. It was the height of Europe’s refugee crisis. That month alone, the U.N. recorded more than 200,000 migrants crossing from Turkey to Greece — all of them bound for Western Europe (Democracy Chronicles). By the end of 2015, more than a million migrants had entered the EU. Most were from war zones, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan.

Despite their marginal economic status, Greeks felt a stronger willingness to help entering Syrians at the outset of the refugee crisis because of their history with Syria argues Greek newspaper Kathimerini. In the 1920s, after the Asia Minor catastrophe, thousands of Greeks in Anatolia sought refuge in Syria (‘Greece, Europe, and the refugee crisis.’). Early on, Syria supported them with food and other staples garnered from various charities. Presently, the tables “have turned,” and Greece—although willing in principle—finds it increasingly difficult to manage the onslaught of Syrian refugees as resources are strained. In NPR’s radio show Parallels, Many Stories, One World, it is underlined that Europe’s stalled assistance with this humanitarian emergency occurring in a struggling member nation is obvious and the only help refugees in Greece receive is from organizations working in the islands (Parallels, Many Stories, One World). There are over 200 organizations working everyday to help, and they have made significant changes such as providing clean water in the four biggest refugee camps in Lesbos, the addition of free medical clinics to help the injured and vaccinate babies. This help is a tremendous step towards a better future but most of these organizations work on short-term projects and with new waves of refugees constantly entering the country, there is a need for more long-term plans that affect more people than an individual case basis. Given the harsh economic reality of Greece since 2010, it is rarely the final destination of choice for refugees. In ‘The Refugee Crisis in Greece: Lesson for the United States’, the author describes that, “when authorities enacted the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016, refugee organizations estimated 50,000 displaced people were trapped in Greece”(Fragkias) . The EU implemented an Emergency Relocation Mechanism to help countries like Greece grapple with the refugee crisis. Under this plan, nearly 100,000 asylum seekers would be relocated to various EU member states (66,400 from Greece and 39,600 from Italy). Part of the agreement was that all “irregular” refugees and migrants that land in Greece would be returned to Turkey. This policy raises several human rights and legal questions, especially concerning efforts at family reunification.

The Greek islands need to be decongested immediately. Currently, over 12,000 people are being forced to stay in overcrowded, ill-equipped hotspots. The International Rescue Committee, along with 23 other organizations, has called on the Greek government and EU leaders to dramatically improve conditions on the Greek islands and take immediate steps to ensure that people are transferred to the mainland. The risk is real that people will, once again lose their lives this winter due to the conditions in which they are forced to live on the islands.

Asylum processing must be properly resourced – so that individuals, who have a right to stay because it is not safe for them to go home, are allowed to do so, and those who do not qualify for asylum are returned. The funds exist for this and should have been spent long ago. Arrivals in Greece have to wait often as long as a year or more to have their cases decided. The IRC has been calling for proper staffing for the asylum process both on the Greek islands and the mainland.

Most importantly, it is long past realistic to assume that Greece and Italy can carry the bulk of the responsibility for this response and Europe as a whole needs to stand up to this challenge.

The lack of adequate international support for displaced populations is directly linked to the rise of nationalism around the globe. The Greek refugee crisis offers several interesting points of comparison to current socioeconomic and political tensions in the U.S. Our views are developed in the context of our summer 2017 research in Greece, including interviews with staff and volunteers working with refugees, and displaced populations.

The lack of adequate international support for displaced populations is directly linked to the rise of nationalism and neo-Nazi sentiments around the globe. The Greek refugee crisis offers several interesting points of comparison to current socioeconomic and political tensions in the U.S. Our views are developed in the context of our summer 2017 research in Greece, including interviews with staff and volunteers working with refugees, and displaced populations. In the midst of all the hate, and the rise of nationalist movements in European countries such as Austria and Hungary, it is more important than ever for Europe to unite and address the countless deaths happening all together to help end this refugee crisis. The EU has been ignoring this serious crisis that needs immediate attention and aid, and putting it aside for “later”, while Greece and Italy are struggling with little to no funds to tackle this crisis head on. This negligence is horrible, as it is putting aside the deaths of thousands of humans like us, that are fleeing death in their countries, only to be met by more danger in Europe. It is up to us, the people around the world to raise awareness about this and force the politicians to make a change, because the real change happens there. With the drastic changes in Europe and the new European elections coming up, it appears even more possible that this crisis will be met with seriousness and effectiveness.

Federalism as a Model for Explaining the European Union

The European Union (EU) is a remarkable and world widely unique case of regional integration (Hix, 2017, p. 580). After the two world wars in the first half of the 20th century, some of the European countries decided to voluntarily yield part of their sovereignty to supranational institutions to ensure a long-lasting peace through regional integration and to enjoy the greater advantages of collective cooperation. The EU, at that time called European Community, was first formed at the beginning of the 1950s as a common market for coal and steel, but it later evolved in an economic and also a political union. It is not based on a constitution, meaning on a specific document setting the fundamental norms of the organization, but on a set of Treaties, which are introducing the institutions of the European Union and their rights and duties in the ensuring of the functioning of the EU. The European Union institutions have their own competences in the areas such as the single market or in monetary policies of the countries that have the euro as their currency. They also share some competences with the member states, based on the principle of subsidiarity, however, the important areas of taxation or the public spending, such as health care or welfare benefits still belong to the competences of the EU member states (Hix and Hoyland, 2011, p. 4).

As the nature of the European Union is unique and no such a form of regional cooperation exists elsewhere in the world, it is widely discussed how exactly can be the EU characterized and studied. There is a little agreement on what the European Union actually is since it is not a state nor it is a typical international organization (McCormick, 2011, p. 13). The aim of this essay is to analyze how useful a model of federalism is in explaining the European Union. Federalist theory significantly influenced the founders of European integration (Benson and Jordan, 2011, p. 2). However, its position in the debate about the European Union, especially its future, has shifted, since federation was proclaimed mainly by Eurosceptics as a final state which the EU should not reach (McCormick, 2011, p. 16). According to Kelemen (2003, p. 185) federalism can be defined by using three simple characteristic features. Firstly, there exist different levels of governments which all have a direct effect on the citizens, secondly, these governments have some separated competences in areas where they make decisions independently of each other, and the last characteristic is an existence of a supreme federal court. McCormick (2011, p. 16) adds other aspects important for a system to be regarded as federal, such as a constitution, which sets the competences of central and local governments, use of a single currency or an exclusive right to the use of coercion. This essay is going to argue that federalism is to a high degree useful in explaining the EU, as it, unlike other theories, can provide an explanation for many features of the European Union, especially its multi-level governance. However, the EU is still missing some of the characteristics of the federation and cannot be regarded as a truly federal state and as such cannot be wholly explained by using federalism. The first part of the essay is going to introduce the features of the European Union which can be explained by the federalism theory. On the other hand, the second part is presenting aspects of the EU that are not typical for the federal systems.

Even though the European Union cannot be formally considered a federal system, federalism can be used to explain many of its features. The first one is the multi-level governance of the European Union. For federal systems, it is typical that powers are separated between different levels of governance (Abromeit, 2002, p. 4). Each level has its own exclusive competences, however, there are some areas in which they share powers to attain better efficiency, as various problems can be more effectively addressed at different levels of decision-making (McCormick, 2011, p. 16). Furthermore, all level of decision-making in the federal systems have a direct effect on the citizens. Looking at the issue of the multi-level governance, federalism is more useful than any other theory of international relations for explaining the case of the European Union, because the decisions in the EU are made not only at the national level, meaning the level of the member states of the Union, but also at the supranational European level (Benson and Jordan, 2008, p. 81). Additionally, decisions made by the European Union institutions have a significant impact on all member states, as they directly affect the EU member states and their citizens (Abromeit, 2002, p. 4).

Moreover, as in the case of the federal states, the different levels of decision-making in the European Union have their own autonomous competences. From the establishment of the EU to the present time, the European Union member states shifted part of their sovereignty in a number of different policy fields to the institutions of the EU. The first supranational policy project of at that time the European Community was the Common Agricultural Policy, which was adopted in the late 1960s (Hix and Hoyland, 2011, p. 2). Over the years the number of areas where the EU institutions can make autonomous decisions significantly increased, especially with the creation of the European single market, which was connected with an adoption of a wide range of common policies (Hix, 2017, p. 574). In the current state, the European Union has exclusive powers in areas of a customs union, monetary policies for those member states, which have euro as their currency, or commercial policy. From the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union can also act on behalf of its members and independently sign international treaties with third parties as a single unit (McCormick, 2011, p. 17). Apart from the exclusive competences of the European Union, a large number of other important policy areas is shared by the member states and the European Union institutions, examples being the internal market, transport, environment or social policy. For all European Union policy areas applies the principle of subsidiarity, which sets that in cases where it is more efficient the policies should be dealt with at lower levels of decision-making (Church and Dardanelli, 2005, p. 179).

Besides from explaining the division of sovereignty powers between different levels of governance within the European Union, federalism can be also useful for an explanation of some specific features of the particular EU institutions. The European Union was firstly created with the goal to achieve economic integration between its members (Borzel, 2005, p. 246), however, it soon evolved in more complex political union with its autonomous supranational institutions, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. On the European level, there also exist institutions based on the intergovernmental principle, which means that they are composed of the members of the national governments. As financially and legislatively independent units, the member states hold significant powers in these European institutions (Borzel and Hosli, 2003, p. 190) and the representatives of their national governments directly participate in the EU decision-making process (Benson and Jordan, 2011, p. 4). Examples of these institutions are the Council of the European Union and the European Council.

Over the years with the reform of the European Union and the adoption of new treaties, also the EU institutions underwent some noteworthy changes. These changes added more federal features to the character of the EU. The institution than went through the most significant transformation is the European Parliament. From its establishment, it was elected by the national parliaments. This procedure was, however, not transparent enough, and so in the year 1979 the first direct elections of the European Parliament were held and the European Parliament became the first and also the only European Union institution directly elected by the citizens of the member states. This change was supposed to link the citizens with the European Union through their direct participation in influencing the composition of the EU institutions and to make this process more democratic. At that time the European Parliament did not have any real impact on the decision-making process but this has changed with the reform of the treaties and in the last forty years the European Parliament gained significant powers. After the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament gained major competences in approving the European legislation, budget and in the appointment of the European Commission. The direct participation of the EU citizens and increase in the powers of the European Parliament can be considered as a federalist shift in the transformation of the European Union (Kelemen, 2003, p. 197), as the linkage of the institutions and decision-making process with the individual citizens is an important aspect of federal systems to be democratic and legitimate.

Even though the federal shift can be most significantly recognized in the case of the transformation of the European Parliament, it is not the only European Union institution with features typical for federalism. Another example is the Council of the European Union, which compose of the ministers of the EU member states, who according to the ordinary legislative procedure approve the European legislation together with the European Parliament. Typical federalist feature in the decision-making of the Council is the increasing number of areas where decisions are approved by qualified majority voting instead of by unanimous vote (Kelemen, 2003, p. 197). However, another aspect of the voting in the Council goes against the federalism principles, and that is the weighting of the votes (Abromeit, 2002, p. 9), as through this procedure the votes of the member states are not equal and are influenced by the number of states’ citizens.

Another institution which makes the European Union more federal is the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Kelemen (2003, p. 185) argues, that one of the three fundamental characteristics of federalism is the existence of a supreme federal court. This is the case also of the European Union. The European Union law is supreme over the national law and has a direct effect on the EU citizens (Church and Dardanelli, 2005, p. 179). The ECJ serves a supreme court and is dealing with the disputes not only between the European Union and its member states but also between citizens and their member state, as the citizen can sue the member state for a breach of the European law (Borzel and Hosli, 2003, p. 187). There also exists a direct connection between the national courts and the ECJ. Through the preliminary ruling procedure, the national courts can ask the ECJ for an interpretation of the EU law (Kelemen, 2003, p. 193)

Apart from institutional features, another typical characteristic of federal systems is the existence of a constitution, a document which sets the fundamental rules for the functioning of the state, such as the competences and rights of the particular institutions. The European Union on its own does not have a constitution like that. The member states aspired to create such a document with the Constitutional Treaty, which was signed by the leaders of the European countries in the year 2004. Yet, this treaty was rejected in the referenda in the Netherlands and France in the year 2005, which led to its abandonment (Hix and Hoyland, 2011, p. 2). Even though that the EU does not have a constitution in its typical meaning, its function is in context of the European Union fulfilled by the Treaties, which set the fundamental rules for the functioning of the EU. The norms set in the complex of the EU Treaties are binding to all member states and are enforced by the European Court of Justice (McCormick, 2011, p. 17).

As was illustrated above, the European Union has many characteristics typical for federal systems, however, the EU cannot be regarded as a truly federal state, as it also has features, which cannot be explained by using the federalism theory. Firstly, the European Union member states still hold competences in the most important areas, such as taxation or public spending (McCormick, 2011, p. 17). The European Union does not have the competence to impose direct taxes on the citizens of the member states or corporate taxes (Borzel and Hosli, 2003, p. 188). It also has only a minimum of its own financial sources such as customs duties, taxes on imports from third countries, a percentage of the value-added taxes by the member states and mainly the financial contributions of the member states (Borzel and Hosli, 2003, p. 188). This makes the EU to a great extent financially dependent on the member states. The issue of the low number of independent financial sources is connected with another aspect which makes the European Union not suitable for being a federation, namely its budget. Compared to the budgets of the member states the EU budget is quite small, as its value is only one per cent of the gross national income of the whole European Union (Hix and Hoyland, 2011, p. 13). The fact that the European Union is not financially independent cannot be explained using federalism.

For federal systems, it is also characteristic to have a single federal currency. A European currency exists, namely the euro, however, the member states are not all compelled to adopt it as their state currency in the future (McCormick, 2011, p. 17). So even though that the EU can independently set monetary policies of its member states, it can do so only for those that already adopted euro. Another non-federalist feature of the EU is the fact that unlike in the federal systems all around the world the European Union does not have an exclusive right to legitimately use coercion, as only the member states have their own independent military forces (Hix and Hoyland, 2011, p. 14). Apart from military the member states also remained their sovereignty in other spheres, an example being the foreign policy. Despite the fact that the European Union can sign treaties with third parties on behalf of its member states, the governments of the member states can also sign international treaties autonomously (Hix and Hoyland, 2011, p. 12). However, in federations, this can be done only by the highest level of governance.

To sum up, the European Union is a worldwide unique integration project, which cannot be easily described and understood by using a single theory. This essay applied the theory of federalism in the case of the European Union and showed, that federalism can be used to explain a wide range of the characteristics of the European Union. However, the EU still has some aspects that cannot be attributed to a federal system and therefore the European Union cannot be as a whole explained by federalism and cannot be classified as a federation. Federalism is to a high extent useful in explaining the system of the European Union multi-level governance, as the EU has a supranational and also national level of decision-making. Like in the cases of federal systems also the governance levels of the EU have their own separate competences. Additionally, they also share powers in some policy areas to achieve greater efficiency. Federalism can be also useful for explaining the adoption of the direct elections of the European Parliament and the significant increase in its powers over the years. Same goes for the increase in the number of areas decided by qualified majority voting in the Council of the EU. Another significant feature which has the European Union in common with federal states is the supremacy of the European law over the national law of its member states, and the direct effect of the law and also of the decisions made by the EU institutions on the citizens. Unlike federations, the European Union does not have a constitution, but its role is in the context of the EU supplemented by the Treaties. However, even though that federalism can explain many of the EU characteristic features, it cannot be used for the explanation of the absence of an exclusive right to the use of coercion, the absence of general single currency, or the EU’s small budget and its financial dependence on the member states. In conclusion, federalism can be highly useful in explaining many aspects of the European Union, especially its multi-level governance, division of powers and allocation of competences. However, because of how unique the system of the EU is, federalism cannot be used to explain all of its features.

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The Advantages and Disadvantages of Federalism: An Essay

Introduction to Federalism: A Mixed Government System

There are many different types of government in twenty first century politics. Federalism is a mixed method of government based on democratic rules that combines a general government with regional governments in one single political system. The two methods share an equal relationship, and the powers are divided between them equally. There are many different countries that use a federal system of government. It is one of the most practiced political systems in the world. The earliest example of federal countries is those of the United States and the Netherlands. Some scholars argue that the European Union is the pioneer of federalism in a multi-state setting. It is referred to as the federal union of states. History has shown that federal systems can be successful, but that they can also create many problems for a state when things start to go wrong. Many countries continue to lead a successful federal government today, but some have tried and failed. In this essay, I will be exploring both the advantages and disadvantages of the federal system and research countries that have successfully maintained a federal system.

Evolution and Modern Interpretation of Federalism

The modern definition of what is considered a federal state has shifted since federalism was first established. In an article by Ronald L.Watts ‘Typologies of Federalism’, he claims that very few modern federal states meet the criteria of pure federalism. Many modern federal systems have incorporated constitutional ideas and practices that involve unitary elements of government. The United States, which is regarded as the classic model of federalism, has evolved into what some scholars call coercive federalism. German philosopher Immanuel Kant was an advocate of federalism. In his book ‘Political Writings’ he states that “The problem of setting up a state can be solved even by a nation of devils”. He believed that if an appropriate system of checks and balances was in place, then federal systems would be a success. He also claims that federalism can be used as a safeguarding technique for individual states against war. There are many other scholars who are also advocates for federalism because a federal system holds many advantages and can benefit countries in many ways.

Advantages of Federalism: Efficiency and Diversity

The most argued advantage of a federal system is that with the powers being divided, the work of the center government is lessened and can therefore devote its full attention on national work. In federal establishments, some rights are given to the central government and the rest to the states or provinces. As a result, the administration of the whole country becomes very efficient. A federal government has also proved to be the best system for the more diverse countries, who home many different cultures, religions and ethnicities, where the establishment of a unitary government is not possible. In these countries’ federalism is the only suitable form of government, because it provides the unity required. This also encourages the practice of peaceful political cooperation between different groups of society. Federalism provides the most advantages to the smaller states. Smaller states are less likely to be able to defend themselves against other countries. However, states are included in the federal system during a crisis. For example, the American states could not fend for themselves individually, but as the American federation, they pose a threat. This case is similar for many other countries, like India. Political scientists have argued that a federal system decreases the fear of the majority because it ensures that every element of the government is important, and they can even choose to run their own political affairs if it wants to do so.

Case Study: Federalism in the United States

A country that has successfully used a federal system of government for many years is the United States of America. The constitutional power is divided between the US state governments and the federal government of the United States. Since the US was founded, but more specifically after the American civil war, more of the political power shifted from the individual states toward the national government. But their system of federalism has progressed even more since then. There has been a long road for America to get to its current form of ‘New Federalism’. From the fourth President James Madison being the first to state his support for a federal government to the more recent complications of Donald Trump’s presidency, American federalism has seen many changes. Although federalism has also worked out fine for American politics, the 21st century has seen the state and federal power fluctuate rapidly. Martha Derthick argues in a report for the Rockefeller Institute of Government, that modern federal-state relations in the US is coming more towards centralization. But she also believes that federalism has survived the extremely aggressive presidency of Bush. The federal government increased its powers after Bush under the presidency of Barack Obama and some scholars argue that to a certain extent, the powers of the state governments grew too. According to another report by Thomas Gais for the Rockefeller Institute, Obama’s administration had engaged with the most states since the 1960’s. His work relied heavily on the participation of the states, so he felt it was important to keep all aspects of government in loop. The most recent American government of Donald Trump, however, was a lot more complicated and controversial. His executive branch of government failed to act in an appropriate manner during the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020, despite the federal government always previously being responsible for dealing with national emergencies such as pandemics and natural disasters. Some describe the pandemic as the federal event of the century and most political figures disagree with how Trump acted. The evidence from the way president Trump acted during the Pandemic suggests to political scientists that he was attempting to weaken the role of the federal government. There were many issues relating to how the federal government was run during Trump’s term of administration, some of which include his response to the Black Lives Matter movement and his decision to deploy federal troops to protests. However, despite Trumps attempts at increasing presidential power, the laws of the constitution prevented his actions being too damaging. In a 2021 book titled ‘Brookings’ the authors state that “The forces of federalism, especially state attorneys, governors and legislatures, have often undercut Trump’s executive initiatives and reduced their impact”. Although we must consider Trump’s presidency when looking at the success rate of America’s federal system, he made it clear that he had very different goals for his time as president than any other previous president in office. Despite this however, from looking at the history of America’s system of federal government, we can see that although there have been some minor issues the advantages that this system has brought to the country has clearly outweighed the problems it has made. Many people claim that America is the model country of a federal government, because it has been so successful for so long.

Challenges of Federalism: Uniformity and Accountability

Although the US is a positive example of federalism, it has also been a failure for many countries. This proves that there are also many disadvantages to this form of government. This system of government can prevent the uniformity of laws and policies for those countries. This is because every federal unit of government remains independent and can adopt any policy or law that they desire. The federal governing body cannot interfere in the affairs of each individual unit so there are many different laws in place for each unit. In some cases, this can be considered an advantage, but ultimately it causes problems between federal units as they all have different policies in place. Although the distribution of powers is one of the most attractive things about a federal system, the method used to distribute those powers doesn’t always work out perfectly. Things are constantly changing in the world of politics, so what is of local interest one day, can become of national importance tomorrow. But unless the constitution is amended, which has been done previously but is very difficult to do, the matter is extremely hard to resolve. As a result of this there are some instances where the federal government can intervene in state affairs, but it is limited. Another problem relating to this is that it leads to a lack of accountability when policies fail. The overlap of the boundaries among national and state governments makes it difficult to assign blame when things go wrong. Therefore, a federal system can instigate numerous problems for a country and its governing body.

Federalism in Russia: A Work in Progress

A country that uses a more controversial system of federalism is Russia. The Russian Federation was the largest nation to emerge from the breakup of The Soviet Union in December 1991, which makes it one of the more recent countries to develop into federalism. Soviet Federalism evolved to what it is today as a result of two conflicting tendencies: The growing national separatism and the Russian tradition of a centralized, unitary state. Following the constitutional crisis of 1993, Russia adopted a new constitution via a referendum. In an article for the ‘Routledge Handbook of Regionalism and Federalism’ titled ‘Russia’, the Russian case of federalism is described as a political process that isn’t very mature. The Scholars believe that Russian federalism has failed to develop in a classic form. Essentially, the country is described as a federal presidential republic. The reason for this is because unlike many other federal countries, the Russian constitution provides strong powers to the president individually. The president has the authority to issue decrees that have the force of law, without a legislative review. The first president of the new Russia was Boris Yelsin who was elected in 1991 and hand-picked his successor Vladimir Putin. Putin was elected for his first term in 2000 and his second term in 2004. The 1993 constitution states that a president is elected for a four-year term. In 2008, this was amended so that a president serves a six-year term and is eligible to re-run for a second term but cannot run for a third term consecutively. This meant that Putin could not be re-elected in 2008, but he ran for president again in 2012. This election was widely criticized as the opposition candidates were weak, the media was compliant with Putin and there were multiple electoral irregularities. Despite this, Putin was re-elected again in 2018. Usually, the Prime minister, who is appointed by the President, is first in line to presidency. Historically the prime minister advances to president and then that’s their service done. However, this changed in 2008 when Putin stepped down from president- as he was required to, and became Prime Minister, then once again became President. Overall, Putin will have served two four-year terms and two six-year terms as president. Constitutionally, he should step down in 2024, but he has tabled constitutional changes which will allow him to remain as president until 2036. It is very clear that Russia’s system of federalism is still a work in progress with Vladimir Putin remaining a massive influence on how the power is exercised. Scholars describe the current political system in Russia as more of a managed democracy, with some even referring to it as ‘Putinism’. It is important to consider all aspects of Putin’s presidency as he has been in power for most of the time that Russia has been a federal country. It’s obvious that the situation in Russia is far from normal federalism and is rather corrupt, but it is officially still the Russian Federation.

If we compare the federal government systems of both the United States of American and the Russian Federation, it is clear to see which one is working more successfully. America, as previously described, is the model of a successful federation which is why scholars often compare the other federations to this system. After reviewing each system, its comprehensible that they are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Where America has had time to trial and error aspects of a federal government and has found the best way to run, Russia seems to still be in the stage of development as they are a more recent federal country. However, many political scientists argue that until Putin is out of power Russia will not get much further in becoming a fully federal country, like the USA, as he is limiting the power of the state and building up the powers of the president. America has done many things to avoid this happening there. One main element that makes the American federal system more advanced than the Russian system is the instability of Russian presidencies. The American presidential role is part of the stable constitutional system that protects the rights of the people. Whereas Russia is much more likely to become a dictatorship. A study showed that culturally, the Russian people feel vulnerable if they do not have a strong leader or single party rule. So, if we compare the presidential element of each country, Russia compares quite badly to America. Overall, both countries take advantage of the federal laws set out in their constitutions and use them in the best way, such as sharing the responsibilities and powers away from individuals and over to states. Even though each country can be defined as federal, there systems are still quite different.

Final thoughts

In conclusion, there are many advantages and disadvantages to a federal system of government. Statistics show that federalism is usually more successful in larger countries. Although it is one of the most used regimes of government, it can still cause several problems, especially for countries transitioning to federalism from another form of government. An example of this as previously mentioned is Russia who are still in the young years of federalism and their system was actually called immature by the authors of the ‘Routledge Handbook of Regionalism and Federalism’. However, the advantages seem to outweigh the disadvantages in the cases of both America and Russia. Referring to Immanual Kants thoughts from ‘Political Writings’, if a legit system is in place, federalism will be a success. Therefore, it can be argued that federalism is one of the most successful forms of modern government.

Critical Analysis of the Development of the European Union in the Context of Crises

This assignment was prepared with the intent to critically analyze the European development through crises that drive integration and collaboration, strongly focusing on the impacts of the Euro crisis and elements of the recent Brexit event. A further strategic examination was carried out to address regional integration theories in the context of the EU’s development as well as confidently evaluate the political, social, and economic diversity of its member states. Qualitative data was gathered from various sources to express views and arguments prior to the essay question with elements of its history to provide a comprehensible overview.

Analysis of European Integration

The European integration can be defined as the cooperation and mutual dependence between member states to deepen economic, social and political interconnectedness (Johnson and Turner, 2016). The EU’s liberal democratic institutions hold regular elections with competing political parties where shared decision making of legal and political systems greatly rely on consensus between the countries where a high level of trust is essential (Schimmelfennig, 2014). Both positive and negative aspects emerge from such a process as the challenges to find a common response and long-lasting solutions are ongoing due to the EU’s complex structure and colossal diversity gap between nations (Suder and Lindeque, 2018). Although European integration is beneficial in terms of enhanced globalization, higher economic and social output, it has aggravated inequality through member states’ heterogeneity and questionable leadership (Rose and Borz, 2015). Furthermore, the Single Market Program was introduced to empower and protect the inhabitants of Europe. This crucial asset addresses features of trade liberalization by reducing overlaps, streamlining border controls, harmonizing government procedures, and fostering competitiveness (Suder and Lindeque, 2018).

It can be alleged that the European Union was a reaction to the disastrous events of World War II, which agrees with the statement of integration being forged from the crisis as countries that are integrated are less likely to fight conflicts and solve their problems in harmonious ways. This integration in economic terms has made it extremely costly to fight wars which is the most significant advantage of integration (Ardy and El-Agraa, 2011).

The introduction of the euro as the official currency was one of the most significant steps of unification in the past decade. Its goal was to establish more coordinated integration through simplified transactions and fewer conversions, thus being more attractive to foreign countries in terms of international trade. However, with this attempt to move away from currency heterogeneity, some member states became to doubt its sustainability and benefits due to the increased interest rates raised by Germany, which implies the nationalistic instincts through self- interest rather than the common growth. Moreover, countries which are part of the euro release their control over to monetary policy, thus giving the right to set interest and inflation rates (Johnson and Turner, 2016).

Diversity Challenges of Member States

Each EU regime is classified differently according to the key dimensions of the European Social Model of social protection, trade unions, political and economic decisions (Alesina, et al., 2010). Central to the argument of member diversity is the national tendencies towards irrationality and divergence being an ongoing barrier to efficient integration, as states share diverse outlooks and morals, thus creating challenges of socio-economic conflict and less advanced standards of living. Moreover, Hoffmann argued that diversity prevailed and set limitations to the spillover effect anticipated by neo-functionalism (Hoffmann 2009).

Nonetheless, it can be argued that such heterogeneous models can coincide to form a diversified response and solve integration challenges in a flexible manner, which is seen with the way such challenges have fostered in the proliferation of the European strategies, reflected in the succession of the European Constitutions Treaty (Cini and Borragan, 2016).

Impacts of Crises

The contemporary events of the 21st century, namely the Euro crisis and the most recent Brexit affair, have contributed to a rise of Euroscepticism as to how the EU integration system may be affected. However, it can be argued that these crises are simply obstacles of inevitable disagreement and uncertainty, which the EU would not only conquer but moreover grow stronger through them (Anderson et el., 2019).

The 2010 European Crisis has been largely challenging the integration process’s ability to meet its goals of convergence of the EU economies and strengthen homogeneous union among member states as reiterated in the Lisbon Treaty’s preamble (Alesina, et al., 2010). On the one hand, the Eurozone crisis enhanced integration as it fostered productivity in terms of better coordination mechanisms with institutions such as the European Stability Mechanism. It furthered the degree of interdependencies awareness which is shown through institutional innovation. Nevertheless, the Eurozone conflict had forged disintegrated tendencies with the decline of social cohesion and real economy and magnified polarization as it imposed an ever-larger gap in unemployment rates (Webber, 2019). As a result, there has been political threats, causing divisions between north and south cooperation, as well as increased inequality and poverty levels in connection to Marxism (Alesina, et al., 2010).

To conclude this debate, the Eurozone conflict had pushed the EU governance towards more effective community methods through fostering bargaining perspectives and elucidating responsibility and authority (The Economist, 2019). However, the confluence of economic divisions and social austerity have entrenched the economic gap, which largely restricted bargaining mechanisms, thus increasing Eurosceptic views of the countries of its involvement (Ardy and El-Agraa, 2011). A great level of disintegration can be seen with the Brexit event, where the legitimacy, values and strength of the European Union has been tarnished. It has affected sovereignty, security and stability of weaker nations, making them more vulnerable for outside force (Anderson et el., 2019).

Integration Theories

It is of extreme validity to examine integration theories as they aim to clarify the course and functionality of the European Union. To put this into perspective, the EU governance system is exceptionally complex and therefore implements elements of different theoretical approaches to explain its role in all of its dimensions.

To address this from a neo-functionalist perspective, this theory aims to integrate individual sectors to achieve spillover effects to expand the process of European unification. Elements of this theory shape the European integration process as it recognizes that socio-political cooperation is inevitable for an effective outcome. Subsequently, this constitutional framework highlights the benefits of a common currency and foreign security policy (Hoffman, 2009). However, this theory cannot provide semblance for the entire community no matter the supranational common interest of member states and their legislation, as diversity remains present. As a result, conflicts with nations’ individual self-interest and priorities emerge. Another pragmatic approach to EU integration is federalism as it introduces territory to its governance and demonstrates the role of the coexistent national authorities that share independent power. The event of Brexit strongly reflects upon perspectives on federalism through exhibiting independence and supremacy (Schimmelfennig, 2014).

Conclusion

To end, the creation of the European Union was largely in response to crises in an attempt to form harmony between nations. However, the magnitude of recent crises is intensified in terms of significant additional economic and social costs, thus weakening the European union and undermining integration (The Economist, 2019). Therefore, it is argued that the EU’s resilience in modern times may be unrelenting, and the implications of the contemporary crisis may exasperate political and economic disintegration. Moreover, it is insinuated that the Euro has caused significant harm for some member states, thus reducing support and trust in the government’s right-doing and effectiveness. Having said this, the consequences of the contradictive forces for political integration of the EU are yet to be unfolded, which is why my view at present remains uncertain.

The Issue of EU’s Monitoring Mission in Georgia

On 1st of October 2018, ten years had passed since the deployment of European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia. For over a decade the EUMM has contributed to enhanced security and stability, conducting over 65,000 patrols on the ground. Over 1,700 EU nationals have served in the Mission over the years (statistics taken from EEAS’s homepage). That staff have come from all 28 EU Member States and this can be said to be the strongest evidence referring to them being fully committed to enhancing stability, monitoring the situation and rights of the people most affected by the conflict, building confidence and reporting factually. Head of the Monitoring Mission, Mr. Erik Hoeg, noted: “The EUMM remains present on the ground 24/7, 365 days a year – ready to monitor, report and de-escalate at any given time”. The extension of the mandate of the Mission for a further two years, until December 2020, was decided recently, a loud and clear declaration of the European Union’s commitment to its cause.

Extensively

The Republic of Georgia gained its independence 1991 as part of the ongoing dissolution of the Soviet Union. The relations between Georgia and Russia got worse and worse. The climax came in a form of war between Georgia and separatists of South Ossetia and Abkhazia backed, unofficially, by Russia. The French presidency of the European Union, in the person of Nicolas Sarkozy, negotiated a ceasefire agreement on 12 of August. Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia under its control from Georgia while the Georgian government severed diplomatic relations with Russia.

The EU apart from mediating the ceasefire, also initiated the operation known as the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM). Russia, however, declared the disputed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independent states, offered them its full military protection and forbidden any act of monitoring inside their land. Erik Hoeg stated: “Now we are the only international presence, which means that we are the eyes and ears of the international community in a wider sense” (Eurasianet).

EUMM’s headquarters are stationed in the Tbilisi building that housed the OSCE in the past while it also holds field offices near the two flashpoints (in Gori,Mtskheta and Zugdidi). Daily unarmed patrols scour the line that divide Georgia from the separatist regions, often in presence of strong Russian forces, in order to patrol and tone down any incident that may occur.

The EUMM Monitors are selected from all European Union member states. Currently there is a total of 201 Monitors from 26 different EU member states. The Mission is also supported by two international colleagues based in Brussels.

The Georgian government is more than glad to have the monitors as can be seen in the comments of Georgia’s Foreign Ministry in Eurasianet: “Although the mission is denied to enter the occupied territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region, it represents an important stabilizing instrument that, at the same time, contributes to confidence-building among the war-torn societies”.

Under the protection of Russia, the aforementioned regions have little interest in negotiating their status with Georgia. But even so, all sides involved do have an interest in maintaining daily stability.

The main tasks of EUMM in Georgia are plenty. Firstly, it provides stabilization by regular patrolling the conflicted area. The Mission helps to maintain stability by operating a Hotline to deal with incidents in real time. Moreover, they aim to achieve the best normalization possible by recording the repercussions of the conflict on the people living near the ABL such as those displaced from their homes. Furthermore, it contributes to the facilitation of contacts between the two parties of the conflict aiming in confidence building. At the end, it sends information and analysis to policy-makers of the EU member states.

Of course, the EUMM is part of the EU ‘s Common Security and Defense Policy, so I deem necessary to provide some information on this high importance aspect of the Union. CSDP was created in 2009 as part of the Treaty of Lisbon and replaced the former European Security and Defense Policy (ESPD). Its aim is the establishment of a common European defense capability, when the European Council unanimously decides so. It will, however, not interfere with the defense policies of EU member-states and will respect the obligations of EU countries that are also members of NATO.

Recommendations and Conclusions

The EUMM, even though has evolved and advanced in the past decade, has more than enough problems it still faces and needs to tackle by taking measures.

First of all, the Georgian society is plagued by negative phenomena that need to be addressed, for example the gender-based violence. A viable solution is the cooperation between the staff and the majority of Georgian Civil Society Organizations. The elimination of such events that disturb the tranquility and the unity of the local society could be a major factor in bringing together the efforts of all citizens to find constructive solutions.

Moreover, villagers being arrested by Russian border guards for crossing the borders to get to their land which extends to the other side and infrastructure such as fences, observation towers, surveillance equipment, controlled crossing points being built demonstrates the lack of numbers that the staff faces, so its patrols can cover adequate space and not limited areas. Georgia herself committed 140 personnel to the newly-established EU operation in the Central African Republic. Even though forty-five non-EU states (about thirty if the countries that have joined the EU since 2004 are subtracted) have participated in CSDP operations since the first mission, there is no third state involved in the EUMM in Georgia. This could be radically changed, if EU promoted the incentives that such cooperation offers to the third states. For example, EU candidate countries’ contribution could be a mean raising their profile and acquiring a deeper operational and political connection with the Union and its members. Other countries could use such opportunities to raise their international profile via playing a valuable role in a crisis management. At last, but not least, the participation on this kind of missions could also demonstrate eagerness to become operationally experienced and solidarity among the states that coexist in another international organization, NATO, since 22 of EU’s members are also part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Finally, the relations between the Union and third states need to be recalibrated. The EU member states are seen by many to be the only ones with the privilege of deciding the actions and the undertaking of the important roles. Third states have the same obligations concerning day-to-day management of the operation, they often shoulder he economic burdens of their participation and thus, should have the same rights. The common CSDP practice of using third state contributions only to fill the gaps and the tendency for them to not being part of the decision-making processes needs to stop. EU’s persistence of ignoring possible valuable outside partners and placing its own members to the crucial positions because of its relation with the later harms the common effort. These partnerships should, therefore, move from a technical level to a more political one.

References

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  2. EUMM Georgia – Our Mandate. [online] Eumm.eu. Available at: https://eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/mandate [Accessed 20 Nov.2018].
  3. EUMM Georgia – EU Monitoring Mission Mandate Extended to 2020. [online] Eumm.eu. Available at: https://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/press_releases/6519/?year=2018&month=12 [Accessed 21 Nov.2018].
  4. EEAS – European External Action Service – European Commission. [online] EEAS – European External Action Service. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en [Accessed 25 Nov.2018].
  5. Κοινή Πολιτική Ασφάλειας και Άμυνας (KΠΑΑ) – Η Ελλάδα στην ΕΕ. [online] Mfa.gr. Available at: https://www.mfa.gr/exoteriki-politiki/i-ellada-stin-ee/kpaa.html [Accessed 25 Nov.2018].
  6. Military and Civilian Missions and Operations – EEAS – European External Action Service – European Commission. [online] EEAS – European External Action Service. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en [Accessed 27 Nov.2018].
  7. EUMM Georgia – EUMM Fights Against Gender Based Violence. [online] Eumm.eu. Available at: https://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_information/features/6525/ [Accessed 2 Dec.2018].
  8. 10 Years Anniversary of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia – “Mission Supports Stability and Security on the Ground”.[online]. GeorgianJournal. Available at: https://www.georgianjournal.ge/politics/34841-10-years-anniversary-of-the-eu-monitoring-mission-in-georgia-mission-supports-stability-and-security-on-the-ground.html [Accessed 7 Dec.2018].
  9. EU Launches Consultations with Georgian Civil Society – EEAS – European External Action Service – European Commission. [online] EEAS – European External Action Service.Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/52177/eu-launches-consultations-georgian-civil-society_en [Accessed 10 Dec.2018].

Are the Current Tensions Between Russia, the EU and NATO a New ‘Cold War’? An Essay

The Cold War was a period of extreme tension between the US and the USSR. The presence of a bipolar system, competing ideologies, and the threat of nuclear war, coupled with the global impact it had, were definitive features of the Cold War. However, today tensions between Russia, the EU and NATO are very different; Russia is no longer a superpower, there is no serious ideological competition, and they have not come close to the threat of nuclear war seen during the 1960s. Therefore, in this essay, I will argue that it is inaccurate to describe the current tensions between Russia, the EU and NATO as a new ‘Cold War’. To illustrate this, I will first analyze the ideological differences between Russia and both institutions, proving that although they clash at times, this clash cannot be equated to that of the Cold War. Secondly, I will address the attempts at cooperation from both sides, highlighting how this makes a new ‘Cold War’ very unlikely and proves one is not occurring. Finally, I will compare the structural organization of global politics now to that of the Cold War, pointing out the fundamental differences and using this to further support my argument. Although tensions between both sides have grown in the last decade, with the Ukraine crisis and the expansion of NATO in Europe, the current conditions do not constitute a new ‘Cold War’. This is not only because the fundamental and structural basis for a Cold War is not present, but also because this claim underestimates the attempts from both sides to cooperate. Moreover, the Cold War narrative being applied to Russia and the West is not only inaccurate but also dangerous as it encourages states to prepare for a military attack and is counterintuitive as it amplifies tensions.

As one of the most definitive aspects of the Cold War, the presence of competing ideologies is a crucial component when assessing whether a new Cold War is present and thus, will be used to underpin my argument. The level of ideological tension experienced during the Cold War is not present between Russia, NATO and the EU today; communism is not viewed as a significant threat to capitalism as the latter has become dominant. Moreover, as Weber asserts, “the ideological and developmental model offered by contemporary Russia… may appeal to illiberal elites and leaders, but not to oppressed and dispossessed individuals” (2016, p. 2). This illustrates the lack of appeal Russia’s ideology has across the world today, signaling the lack of competition between Western and Russian ideals. From this, is it clear that there is not a new ‘Cold War’ between Russia, the EU and NATO as the fundamental basis of the Cold War – major ideological tension- is not present. Fukuyama discussed the triumph of capitalism at the end of the Cold War, stating that it represented “the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (1989, p.4). Fukuyama (2013, p.31) reiterated this in 2013 when he highlighted that no real alternative to the capitalist system has since emerged, again pointing out the lack of ideological competition and further supporting the idea that there is not a new ‘Cold War’. Nevertheless, it is clear that the values of Russia and the institutions do clash; where NATO and the EU possess more liberal worldviews, Russia has a more conservative agenda and some argue this clash ‘makes conflict virtually unavoidable’ (Nitoiu, 2016, pp. 375-383). Nitoiu explores the impact this clash has had in Europe, arguing it has led to a “deep polarization of the societies in the region” (2016, p. 383). Although this analysis is accurate, it overestimates the appeal of Russian values in the region while underestimating the ideological tension seen during the Cold War. By arguing this, Nitoiu adopts a realist view as he does not consider how cooperation could overcome the ideological tensions between both sides. To equate the ideological differences between Russia, the EU and NATO to that of the USSR and US, and claim this represents a new ‘Cold War’ would provide an inaccurate image of global politics today as the current clash is not as influential as that of the Cold War. Ideological differences drove tensions during the Cold War and either side aimed to impose their ideology on the international community, but today neither Russia nor the EU nor NATO have that same desire and clashing values is not the main point of tension between them. Thus, it is inaccurate to describe current tensions between Russia and both institutions as a new ‘Cold War’.

Another reason describing current tensions between Russia, the EU and NATO as a new ‘Cold War’ is inaccurate is because this would overlook the cooperation that has occurred between both sides. Today the importance of a cooperative relationship between Russia and the West is obvious, especially given the veto powers Russia holds in the UNSC. For either side, an increase in tensions would not be favorable and this alone makes it unlikely that a new ‘Cold War’ would emerge, let alone be occurring currently. EU-Russia relations were compromised in 2014 by the annexation of Crimea as this heightened geopolitical tension between them and, as Nitoui argues, put them “on path towards conflict” (2016, p.375). However, during the Ukraine crisis, the EU recognized why Russia’s actions may be considered justified as, from a realist perspective, Moscow was protecting their security interests. Consequently, the institution postponed implementing the economic aspect of its Association Agreement with Ukraine, showing an attempt to work towards cooperation with Russia (Nitoui, 2016, p. 381). This supports the idea that a new ‘Cold War’ is not occurring as this attempt would have been unlikely during the original Cold War. Despite the tension created by the Ukraine crisis, Russia remains an important partner for the EU and NATO; Russia is one of the main suppliers of energy products to the EU and the EU is the largest trade partner for Russia (EEAS, 2020). Furthermore, they have cooperated on several issues, including energy efficiency and infrastructure initiatives (EEAS, 2020). This interdependence and cooperation, as liberals would argue, adds to the unlikeliness of conflict and thus, demonstrates that current tensions cannot be described as a new ‘Cold War’. NATO-Russia relations also experienced a decline with NATO’s expansion in Europe as some Russian officials viewed this as a threat and, as a result, began to feel ‘contained’ (Sakwa, 2008, p. 257). While this is reminiscent of the Cold War, it must be noted that NATO leaders have tried to ensure Russia is not excluded and have stated that NATO “do not want to see a Cold War” (Sanchez et al., 2016). Moreover, despite tensions created by US withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019, NATO claims they are still committed to non-proliferation and other international arms control agreements and that they are open to cooperating with Russia (NATO, 2020). When contrasted with the Cold War, the current situation, albeit tense, is far more benign as neither side is actively threatening the other and both are either working together or open to doing so. The importance of cooperation, emphasized by liberals, applies to the current situation between Russia and the institutions as from their actions it is clear that cooperation is possible. Furthermore, it is clear that a liberal outlook reduces the risk of conflict that a realist view would enhance as it works to ease tensions. This willingness to cooperate did not exist during the Cold War and therefore, it is inaccurate to describe current tensions as a new ‘Cold War’’.

Today the structural organization of global politics is very different from that during the Cold War as there is no longer a bipolar system; Russia has considerably less power than that of the USSR and has not become a ‘balancing’ state as classical realists would have predicted, instead it has become a ‘joiner’ (Goldgeier and McFaul, 2004 cited in Sakwa 2008, p. 243). The bipolar system was significant in the development of the Cold War as it pitted both states against each other, but today the structure is different as there is a multipolar system. As well as this, neither the EU, NATO or Russia have the equivalent influence and strength of a superpower nation which demonstrates that, structurally, a new ‘Cold War’ is not present. Additionally, despite claims that Putin is attempting to rebuild the buffer zone that the USSR once had, it is obvious that Russia does not have the same ambitions as the Soviet Union. Firstly, Russia shows no desire to become the global hegemon, they have repeatedly stated they are willing to work within the Western system and that they do not intend to set themselves up against the West (Sakwa, 2008, p. 246). Secondly, Russia’s current rate of military modernization is not comparable to that of the Soviet Union. Therefore, although it can be argued that Russia has, at times, tried to strengthen their position against the EU and NATO, especially with the annexation of Crimea and their military build-up, this does not constitute a new ‘Cold War’. Another key difference in the global organization today is the limited effect the tensions between Russia, the EU and NATO have had. East-West tensions during the Cold War shaped much of the agenda of world politics (Walt, 2018) and had far-reaching effects, however, today tensions between Russia and the institutions are far more controlled as they are more confined to European borders. At most, the tensions reach a small section of the Middle East, with the security challenges between the US and Russia in Syria, but this does not compare with the global effects of the Cold War. The structural organization of global politics today suggests that the Cold War narrative is better suited to describe tensions between the US and China as both have increasingly more power. Walt (2018) highlights the dangers of applying this narrative to Russia and the West as he claims that this distracts from more pressing issues, such as Sino-US relations. Moreover, this dialogue drives Russia, the EU and NATO further apart and makes a Cold War relationship more likely as it encourages either side to be more suspicious of the other, creating a security dilemma and thus, increasing the potential for conflict.

Overall, despite an increase in tensions between Russia, the EU and NATO regarding the annexation of Crimea, the expansion of NATO, Russia’s military build-up and the unravelling of arms agreements between the US and Russia, it is not accurate to describe these tensions as a new ‘Cold War’. There are distinct structural differences between the current situation and that of the Cold War; there is no major disagreement on global issues between both sides, there is a lack of ideological tension, and there is no longer a bipolar system. Additionally, the effects of these tensions are not felt on a global scale, as they were during the Cold War. The very fact that these differences exist proves that the conditions for a new ‘Cold War’ are not present and that the current situation between Russia, the EU and NATO is something very different from the Cold War. Moreover, the more liberal attitude adopted by both sides in regards to cooperation and increased interdependence, suggests that neither side wants to see a rise in tensions, let alone a new ‘Cold War’. Therefore, due to the key structural differences, the increased cooperation and the fact that the scale of tensions is not global, it is inaccurate to describe current tensions between Russia, the EU and NATO as a new ‘Cold War’. Furthermore, from my analysis, it is clear that those who use this Cold War rhetoric may be attempting to push their own agenda or be viewing current relations through a realist lens and doing so creates a dangerous situation. It not only encourages military build-up, increasing tensions between both sides and making cooperation on key issues more difficult, but it also provides a misleading image of global politics. This distracts from the real issues in today’s society, for example the increasing threat of a cold war between China and the US.

Analytical Essay on European Union: Critical Evaluation of the Role of Article 7 TEU

1.0 Introduction

The European Union is guided by a number of provisions that are based on diverse values that are embraced by this union. These provisions are generally categorized into seven articles. One of the most significant provisions that guide the relationships of the member states of the European Union is associated with Article 2. Article 2 provides that the European Union is founded on the critical values of respect for freedom, democracy and dignity of persons, as well as the rule of law, equity and human rights. In this respect, it is expected that the member states of the European Union should embrace pluralism (for example, the minority are not excluded in any manner), there is no discrimination of any type, justice prevails, harmony is present among the people, as well as the presence of gender equality. When these values are not embraced by a given member state, Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union can be invoked. Basically, Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union is associated with the procedures with respect to the treaties of the EU to suspending specific rights from a given member country. A member country cannot be suspended but its rights in being member of the European Union can be suspended Closa, Kochenov and Weiler, 2014). This essay is aimed at discussing critical the role of Article 7 TEU in the EU’s enforcement of its values against ‘recalcitrant’ member states. In the context of this essay, recalcitrant’ member states are member states of the European Union that endeavor to breach the core values under Article 2. In undertaking this analysis, the essay also incorporates some discussion of recent developments of Article 7.

2.0 The Role of Article 7 TEU in the EU’s Enforcement of Its Values against ‘Recalcitrant’ Member States

Article 7 TEU has become an important article that helps the European Union to enforce member countries to comply with Article 2 TEU; however, it should be noted that Article 7 TEU also guides the relationships of the member states. The article is typically enacted in the event the European Union identifies that a specific member is consistently breaching the founded values of union; the values that are breached in this case include the respect of the dignity for a person, the freedom of persons, democracy and rule of law. In this regard, the European Council, which is majorly headed by head of states/governments, the president of the European Commission and the president of the European Council, has the power of voting to suspending the rights associated with the European Union membership. With the exclusion of the member country in question, the identification of a breach would require the unanimity of all the member states. The role of Article 7 TEU in terms of enforcing values against recalcitrant can be discussed with reference to 3 sub-articles under Article 7. The sub article 7.1 attempts to identify the existence of a breach based on 3 steps that were initiated by European Commission as of 2014 (Bogdnady et al., 2012). It should be noted that the European Commission is the executive branch of the European Union and mainly submits proposals for novel legislations to the Council of the European Union as well as the European Parliament. The European Commission is also responsible for implementing policies, administering the budget, ensuring adherence to the European law and negotiating international contracts. The three sub articles, including the three steps mechanism for identifying a serious breach of the values under Article 2 TEU, are discussed in breadth below.

Article 7.1

Article 7.1 is the first sub article under Article 7 TEU. This article was improved recently with the adoption of three steps with respect to identifying a serious breach of values under Article 2. These steps were initiated by the European Commission as has been evident earlier. The first step as regards the identification of a potential violation of the major values of the European is the initiation of a proposal to figure out a Clear Risk of Serious Breach of the European Union values by the European Parliament, European Commission or 1/3 of the member countries as informed by Carrera, Guild and Hernanz (2013). For instance, at the moment, there are 28 member countries of the European Union; if 1/3 of these countries, that is, at least 10 member countries, introduce the proposal of finding a Clear Risk of Serious Breach, the process of identifying the potential breach of such values by a given member state can begin. The next step is to approve this proposal by at least 2/3 of the European Parliament’s members. The third step in terms of identifying a potential breach is where the member state in question is summoned to answer to the Council of the European Union in which the council would issue recommendations; the council can also vote to identify a violation of the major values based on 4/5 of the council (Krajewski et al., 2009). Besides this provision being important to member states since the accused member country can avoid immediate suspension of its rights as a member of the European Union, the provision is also effective in enforcing values against a recalcitrant member state since warning is provided such that fear is imposed due to possible suspension of rights in the event does not heed to the guidelines of the council. It is observed that a number of recommendations by the European Council are provided under Article 7.1 in which the accused member can easily rectify its mistake if such recommendations or guidance are followed effectively. In other words, as argued by Baeten, Vanhercke and Coucheir (2010), a serious breach of the core European Union values would not amount to the suspension of critical rights as a member of the union; the breach should be serious and persistent for a country in question to be denied its rights in being the member of the European Union. It is also after the serious and persistent breach of such core values of respecting human dignity, freedom and democracy among other rights that other Article 7.2 and Article 7.3 can be invoked, which are likely to lead to a potential suspension of membership rights.

For instance, assume that the government of country X has violated the rule of law, which is one of the key values under Article 2, by reducing the separation of power between the executive and judiciary such that the judiciary is not independent. In this regard, a proposal to figure out a Clear Risk of Serious Breach can be begun by the European Parliament, European Commission or 1/3 of the member countries. If this proposal is approved by at least 2/3 of the European Parliament, the European Commission would summon the accused country to appear before the council for recommendations/guidelines as well as the identification of breach; in order to identify the existence of a serious breach of the value in question, at least 4/5 of the European Council should vote for the existence of a breach. However, at this point in time, the Council does not vote to impose the sanctions on country X for not adhering to the European Union’s values since persistence of serious breach of the core values has not been confirmed. However, the warning provided by the council upon the recommendations may act in favor of preventing the accused country from engaging against the violation of the rule of law. In other words, the rule of the law would be highly embraced.

Article 7.2

Article 7.2 is also an essential article in as far as enforcing the European Union values against the recalcitrant member states is concerned. According to Article 7.2, if there a serious and persistent violation of the major values under Article 2, that is, the member state in question fails to heed to the guidance of the council, the European Commission or 1/3 of the member states, after the approval by at least 2/3 of the members in the European Parliament, would call again the country in question to answer to the European Union Council. At this stage, the Council of the European Union would resolve to advance in a unanimous manner to the final sub article under Article 7 (Müller, 2013). It should be noted that the European Parliament has about 751 members, and therefore, approval 2/3 of the majority would imply the approval by at least 250 members of that parliament. Article 7.2 is stricter than Article 7.1, and therefore, it is highly effective in ensuring European Union values are enforced even among the recalcitrant member states.

For example, assume that the member country X continues to violate the rule of law by failing to separate the powers of the executive and the judiciary such that the executive has powers over the decisions made by the judiciary. In this regard, 1/3 of the member countries or the European Commission can again summon the accused country to appear the council to answer to a number of questions; it should be noted that the European Commission or 1/3 of the member countries can summon the accused country to appear before the council once 2/3 of the parliament has approved the proposal of persistent and serious breach of the core values. At this stage, the council can vote unanimously to move to invoke the final Article. If the council decides to advance to the next article, the accused country has no opportunity to rectify its predicaments; it faces a high probability of the relevant sanctions being imposed on such a country, and thus may encourage a country to embrace the core values under Article 2 TEU.

Article 7.3

This is the last sub article in relation to Article 7. In regards to this sub article, when the Council decides unanimously that the country in question is persistently breaching the major values under Article 2 TEU, the Council would then vote by majority (4/5) to suspending the rights of the indicted state. These include among other rights to the voting right within the council till the duties that are in question are met to sufficient levels (Baeten, 2012). Since the rights are suspended until a country fulfill all the duties, it is arguable recalcitrant member countries would be encouraged to comply with Article 2 since it is by rectifying the situation (upholding the core values of Article 2) that the sanctions can be lifted.

Assume that the council has decided to invoke Article 7.3 by voting that the country X has continued to violate the rule of law. In this regard, the Council can vote by majority, that is, 4/5 of the members of the European Council that the rights of membership be suspended in regards to the country in question. The country’s sanctions can only be lifted if the country resolves to fulfill all the duties, that is, resolving to upholding all the values under Article; as such, Article 7 is naturally effective in enforcing the European Union values against recalcitrant member states.

Therefore, Article 7 plays a critical role in ensuring that the fundamental rights of justice, respect of human dignity, freedom, democracy and inclusivity (minority societies and persons of different gender) are considered and upheld. In the absence of such a provision (Article 7), these fundamental values, as provided in Article 2, would hardly be upheld since there would be no sanctions for violating them. Furthermore, since the violation of these values to a serious level would hardly be noticed due to lack of absolute measurements with respect to such aspects, it is critical to take into consideration the first warning. Therefore, countries that might have engaged in a serious breach of such values without their knowledge of a concrete breach of such values would quickly learn about their breach, and therefore, readjust various structures in the government to ensure such values are upheld. This further reduces the common frustrations that are likely to emerge among countries which may apportion blame on the intention of such a provision in demoralizing countries against the aspiration to adopt all the values of the European union, including the economic values.

3.0 Recent Developments in Relation to Article 7 TEU

The Article 7 TEU has experienced a significant development in the recent past. While the European Union was established as early as mid 1970s, some of the provisions associated with the European Union treaties were established in the recent past. One of the provisions that were established recently is in relation to Article 7 TEU. In the past, while all countries were required to abide by various provisions of the union, including Article 2 TEU, it was not clear as to how a non-compliance country would be intervened. Closa, Kochenov and Weiler (2014) attempted to evaluate the development of Article 7 TEU with reference to the fall of the Berlin Wall. When the Berlin Wall fell, the European Union started to consider enlarging to the Eastern Bloc countries. However, there was a concern about the ability of the European Union in interceding in the event the major values of Article 2 were not respected; as such, there was a need to initiate a specific system for intervening in the event of the aforementioned violation prior to enlarging to Eastern Bloc countries. In this regard, a treaty was established in Amsterdam (Known as Amsterdam Treaty) which demanded that the rights of a country can be suspended if it violates the European Union’s values as evident in Article 2 TEU. The Treaty of Amsterdam majorly focused on amending and improving the Treaty on European Union. The Amsterdam’s Treaty was signed as of 1997 but started to be applied in 1999.

However, Article 7 TEU was considered ineffective at the beginning. For instance, the provision was considered strict and harsh in terms of punishment and approach. The harshness of the provision was realized when it was enacted for the first time on Austria in 2000 with respect to a political coalition with the far right (Toggenburg and De Witte, 2004). For instance, it was argued that the provision did not provide any warning sign as to whether a member state has engaged in behavior that indicates the violation of values associated with Article 2 TEU (Kochenov and Jakab, 2016). It based on such a strict provision that a number of member states considered Article 7 TEU to be excessive, and as such, these states issued the threat of cutting diplomatic contacts with other member countries. In this vein, there was a need for the provision to be altered such that immediate suspension is not imposed on the violators; in other words, a warning sign was a need to provide a warning prior to full suspension. This, therefore, led to the introduction of Article 7.1 in which it was termed as the Treaty of Nice given that the establishment of the treaty took place in Nice. The Treaty of Nice was signed by all leaders associated with the European Union as of 2001 but was applied in 2003. The Treaty of Nice required the Council (4/5 of the Council) to identifying a potential breach as well as making recommendations to the member country to correct the breach prior to taking action against such a country.

In the most recent year, that is, in 2014, the European Commission initiated mechanism of 3 steps of identifying the systematic threats to the values of the European Union. These three steps, as introduced by the European Commission, include proposing to establish a Clear Risk of Serious Breach about the European Union values; this proposal can be done by different institutions of the European Union. Among the institutions that can propose the establishment of Clear Risk of Serious Breach is the European Commission, the European Parliament or 1/3 of the European Union member countries; any of the three bodies can initiate the proposal. The second step would involve the approval of such proposal by 2/3 of the parliament. The final step involves summoning the county in question before the European Council to answer a number of questions. Besides offering the recommendations, the council can also vote by 4/5 to recognize the breach (Müller, 2013; Vaszkun and Koczkás, 2018).

It is therefore observed that Article 7 TEU has undergone several changes in the past to adopt the present form. The major reason for the changes in regards to this Article is insufficiency identified with the initial version of the same act or related acts. For instance, it was identified that it was difficult to intervene in the situation where a specific member country violates the core values of the European Union; as such, prior to expanding the European Union, which would result in difficulties of intervening situations of non-compliance to Article 2, a mechanism for intervention was deemed essential, and as such, it gave rise to Article 7. However, this provision (Article 7) was considered very strict and harsh, and would discourage countries from aspiring to meet the political, economic and social targets of the European Union. As such, a less-harsh provision was demand such that the harsh one of immediate suspension of rights is eradicated. It is based on such frustrations that saw the alteration of the prevailing provision to include the aspect of warning among the member countries that are considered to violate the core values of the European Union. It is arguable that the change of Article 7 is likely to be experienced in the future so as to meet new demands by the member countries. For instance, the law remains unclear as to how a member state can be expelled in the event of a consistent breach of the core values of the European Union. Furthermore, the suspension of the rights as a member of the European Union are not considered harsh enough in punishing violators of such critical values in the society. Therefore, there is a need to adopt new laws or provisions that discourage completely the member countries from engaging in behaviors that lead to the violation of human rights, including the freedom of expression, respect, dignity and inclusivity in the society among other important human values.

4.0 Conclusion

This essay has evaluated the role of Article 7 TEU in the enforcement of EU its values against recalcitrant’ member states. It is evident that Article 7 TEU is an effective provision that helps the European Union to enforce the member countries to comply with Article 2. In other words, due to fear of significant rights (such as voting rights in the Council) being suspended, countries attempt to uphold the key values stated under Article 2 among them the freedom of people, inclusivity even among the minority groups, respecting the dignity of individuals, and upholding the rule of law among others. Furthermore, Article 7 TEU has been improved currently to an extent that the excessiveness that was associated with provision has been addressed; at least, warnings are providing to violators of such rights prior to suspending the rights of member states in question. The essay further shows that the insufficiency of Article 7 and related articles led to the development of Article to the present form of today. For example, in order to intervene situation of violating the core values of European Union, a mechanism needed to be established in which Article 7 as established in Amsterdam, was considered effective. However, the insufficiency of the Treaty of Amsterdam, especially after enacting the provision on Austria, led to establishment of Article 7.1, which provided a warning prior to imposing sanctions on the accused country.

European Union Advantages and Disadvantages Essay

Advantages or Disadvantages

The Freedom of Movement and the Schengen Agreement:

According to Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (former Article 18 of the Treaty establishing the European Community), all Union citizens are entitled to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. (Ristea, 2011) The freedom of movement has been accelerated by the Schengen Agreement, the gradual phasing-out of internal borders under the Schengen agreements was followed by the adoption of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of EU citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the EU. (Marzocchi, 2019)

The free movement and settlement of EU Member State citizens were one of the basic aims of The European Union and it was legally established by the Treaty of Maastricht 1992. The deregulation of internal borders was introduced under the Schengen Agreement. The freedom of movement for European Union member states has been essential for the development of Europe. The freedom of movement includes the four freedoms; people, goods, service, and capital.

The Schengen Agreement was signed on the 14th of June 1985 in Schengen, Amsterdam, and has been effective since 26th March 1995. It was originally signed by five out of the ten member states of the European Economic Community including; Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. The Schengen Agreement is an important milestone in the European integration process. The purpose is to facilitate the flow of goods, services, and persons across intra‐European borders. (Felbermayr, G., Gröschl, J. and Steinwachs, T., 2018)

Overall, free movement and settlement of EU member state citizens and the Schengen Agreement have been a great advantage of EU membership. All citizens of member states can now benefit from easier travel around the EU

European Union Funding:

European Union funding has been an essential part of both Ireland’s and many other member states’ development. The funding has been very beneficial in particular for things like the improvement of infrastructure, the development of industries, and the upkeeping of the agricultural sectors of the country.

EU funding has been essential for the improvement of infrastructure around Ireland. Some types of infrastructure that have been improved include roads and government buildings such as schools, Garda stations, and government buildings. The EU funding has been quite substantial for Ireland since its membership to the EU, during the period 1989-2001, Ireland received €12.4 billion in structural funds from Brussels. (Pech, 2008) This funding has also helped the development of industries in Ireland with various grants being made available through different EU Funding Schemes.

The agricultural sector within Ireland has benefitted immensely from the EU funding provided. There are two main funds provided to the agricultural sector, these include The European Agricultural Guarantee Fund and also the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. The European Agricultural Guarantee Fund finances all direct payments for farmers. The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development is available to help farmers achieve various rural development goals and the maintenance of rural areas. In 2017 Ireland received €1.5 billion in agriculture subsidies out of its total receipts of €1.8 billion. (Smyth, 2018) Both of these funds are regulated under the Common Agricultural Policy through the EU.

Overall the EU Funding provided to Ireland over the last number of years for various purposes including improving infrastructure, industrialization, and for the agricultural sector and rural development has been essential. Ireland has been fortunate to receive such an amount of funding and it is a substantial benefit of Ireland’s membership in the EU.

Problems Associated with the Euro as a Single Currency:

The introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999 represents, without doubt, a revolution in the way in which monetary matters of Europe are managed. (Temperton, 1998) The Euro is the single currency used by nineteen countries all within the European Union. Originally, the euro was an overarching currency used for exchange between countries within the union, while people within each nation continued to use their own currencies. (Beattie, 2019) In the years following its introduction to circulation, it became an everyday country and slowly phased out many domestic currencies for the Member States. Membership in the European Union does not automatically entail the use of the Euro.

Unfortunately, the Euro is causing problems all across the EU, including high unemployment rates, slow economic growth, and unsuitable interest rates in the Eurozone area. (Regoli, 2015) Unemployment in the Eurozone has brought about various secession concerns. In order to maintain stability in the Eurozone, the main priority of policymakers should be finding robust solutions to arresting the rising unemployment in the member countries. Unemployment has become a structural phenomenon as a result of the introduction of advanced technologies and the competitive consequences of globalization. (Johnson and Turner, 2016)

Other disadvantages of the euro include unsuitable interest rates which fluctuate daily and can become unsustainably high during certain periods. Finally, the euro is greatly affected by inflation and this can cause recessions in the economy of a country.

Overall the single currency can be a great convenience for many however the problems associated with it outweighs this. Issues such as unemployment, inflation, and interest rates are a big drawback to a member state’s economy and therefore a disadvantage of EU Membership.

Deregulation of Borders and Restrictions can Generate Security Problems within the Member States:

The deregulation of borders and restrictions can be seen as an advantage for many as it is associated with ease of travel for Member State citizens. Unfortunately, the deregulation has enabled an elevated level of terrorism and crime for the Member States. The free movement of Member State citizens and the deregulation of borders can make it harder to stop the movement and settlement of criminals and terrorists within the Member States.

We have witnessed a substantial increase in the number of terror attacks since the beginning of this century. One major event in terrorism history was the highly-coordinated Paris attacks in November 2015 killing 130 people. (Regoli, 2019) The Paris attacks distressed many due to the considerable number of fatalities. With open borders comes more opportunity to cause trouble. (Regoli, 2019) Other significant terror attacks in Europe include; the Madrid train bombings in 2004; the 2005 London bombings; the 2011 Norway attacks; the truck attacks in Nice and the Berlin Christmas market attack in 2015; and the Manchester and Barcelona attacks in 2017. (Ritchie et al., 2019)

Other forms of criminal activity, for example, drug trafficking and human trafficking have also escalated around Europe. This is due to the ease of movement of both criminals and weapons across international borders. Europol has warned that the number of criminal gangs operating in Europe has surged to at least 5,000, with alarming increases in human smuggling activity and digital attacks on businesses known as “ransomware”. (Neslen, 2017) These figures are quite alarming and are continuously growing.

The deregulation of borders and restrictions presents an increased threat of terrorism and criminal activity within the Member States of the European Union. This is definitely a considerable disadvantage of European Union membership.

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Informative Essay on European Integration Theories

The integration of Europe has three theories that explain its evolution: federalism, neofunctionalism, and intergovernmentalism. Federalism, evolving after World War I and becoming prominent after World War II, holds a focus on avoiding future wars within Europe and containing nation-states. Functionalism has a focus on this idea, as well so when evolved into neofunctionalism, there is a focus on integrating different aspects of society in order to avoid conflicts and have these integration policies essentially lead to more integration. Intergovernmentalism rejects the neofunctionalist ideal and highlights that a nation’s preferences should be acquired through bargaining and deciding on what is best collectively while being overseen by a common authority. These theories have intermingled to create institutions that aim to achieve successful European integration.

Federalism, one of the theories of European integration, is a theory in which a general or federal government presides over regional governments or states. After the tragedy that was World War I, there was a desire for a “united Europe that overcame national jealousies” to avoid another total war (Blair, 11). The Pan-European Union was introduced by Austrian Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1923, that gained a following of politicians such as Aristide Briand. In 1929, Briand, the French Prime Minister at the time, proposed the formation of a European Union within the League of Nations to provide a framework to contain Germany while also preserving the Versailles conditions. Briand’s proposal would focus on economic collaboration between the larger nations, as well as provide security against the threat of the Soviets. Although never adopted due to the Great Depression, Briand’s proposal served as a model for integration developments that would emerge after World War II. After the war, movements took place for a European federation, such as the Union of European Federalists (UEF) and the European Movement. Nations wanted to “engineer some fort of mutual constitutional settlement” to secure peace (Rosamond, 1). Strong advocates for federalism in Europe included the nations of Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg, mostly due to the effects felt after the war had ended. Winston Churchill, no longer the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, addressed the need to “build a kind of United States of Europe” during his speech at the University of Zurich in 1946. However, the United Kingdom wished to stay out of a federalist agenda since they still had their commonwealth, as well as a relationship with the United States that made integration useless to them. The UEF, having become active in 1946, was a nongovernmental organization that focused on campaigning for federalism. Although they split in 1956 due to disagreements, they later rejoined to campaign for direct elections to the European Parliament. The European Movement, established in 1948, was a lobbying association for European integration through federalism. The organization was able to pave the way for the Council of Europe in 1949. The theory of federalism regarding European integration was strong in the period of the wars, yet it failed to become decisive in European politics. The Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe had mentions of federalism, but the theory was never adopted as a consensus.

Functionalism is an international relations theory developed during the inter-war period that rejects ideas of state power as well as influence politically. The theory states that integration develops its own dynamics through individual areas. Functionalists held to focus on securing the “most efficient method of administering to the real material needs of people” (Rosamond, 2). Neofunctionalism is a theory of integration that reintroduces territory into importance, while also placing importance on regional organizations and groups. Neofunctionalists wanted to “apply functionalist thinking to a delimited international region” (Rosamond, 2). Jean Monnet, a French diplomat and economist, was a key figure due to his approach most closely following neofunctionalism. He believed that the integration of key factors of different national sectors would have a ‘spillover effect’, and thus continue the integration process into the other sectors. Ernst B. Haas, the founder of neofunctionalism, created “no specific temporal component”, meaning that the spillover effects of integration had no set time frame in which they would happen (Ruggie, 279). Due to this, the theory has been ‘disconfirmed’ by many scholars. Yet, Monnet’s work, while he was “devoted to eliminating the risk of war in Europe” (Ruggie, 278), led to many of the following developments of integration in the coming years. Such an idea of the ‘spillover effect’ took place with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 at the Treaty of Paris with the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg signing to take part. Neofunctionalists essentially used the ECSC and the European Economic Community (EEC) as starting points for the merging of particular sectors of the economy.

Intergovernmentalism, a theory of European integration, places states and national governments as the main participants in the integration process. Through this, the amount of power awarded to supranational institutions is limited to halt the materialization of common policies. Intergovernmentalists emphasize the centrality of national executives. In 1948, at the Hague Congress, the Council of Europe was discussed and was later founded in 1949 by Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (later to be joined by Greece and Turkey) through the Treaty of London. Although the Hague Congress was set by federalists, the organization took on more intergovernmental policies than federalist policies. Scandinavia decided to become a part of the Council of Europe because they recognized that the action was no longer potentially dangerous to them due to it not being of a federalist base. While the organization was formed to implement human rights, democracy, and law within Europe, “members quickly realized its powerlessness” because it didn’t “involve the transfer of power and influence away from nation states”, like the federalists had hoped it would (Blair, 16). It soon became apparent that proposals for political authority would be rejected, and the organization’s first president, Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium, resigned and became one of the Founding Fathers of the European Union. Another intergovernmental institution that was created was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 by the 12 original members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The organization was instituted as a military alliance and it still exists today with now 29 North American and European members. In 1950, French Prime Minister Robert Schuman proposed the Schuman Declaration that suggested placing German and French coal and steel productions under a common authority with the participation of other interested nations as well. At the Treaty of Paris in 1951, the ECSC was created, as mentioned earlier. It was hoped that this institution would cause a ‘spillover effect’ into other aspects of the nations and further integrate Europe. The ECSC formed a model for institutions made at the Treaty of Rome in 1957, such as the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), thus accomplishing what was hoped for by the ECSC. In 1967, the Brussels Treaty combined these two institutions, and the ECSC was also combined with them in 2002 to create the European Community. This was the first pillar of the European Union (EU), which was founded by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The EU is an economic and political intergovernmental organization that has established a free market to ensure the free movement of people, goods, and resources within its twenty-eight member states. Additionally, the EU functions through independent institutions and intergovernmental decisions made by its member states. Although the EU has been able to tackle common issues of integration within its boundaries, there is “still no such thing as a single common foreign policy”, which brings into question if there will ever be such a thing (Dedman, 12).

The theories of European integration are not theories that follow a specific blueprint or layout. Even the European Union, which is considered to be intergovernmental, can be evaluated and said to contain factors of the other theories. As Rosamond said, the EU is too complex to be captured by a single theoretical prospectus. As can be seen, by the different institutions which they have helped create, these integration theories overlap and intertwine to create complex economic and political ideas and organizations that aim to achieve European integration.

Works Cited

  1. Blair, Alasdair. The European Union since 1945. Pearson Education. Longman Harlow, England; New York 2005.
  2. Dedman, Martin J. The Origins and Development of the European Union, 1945-95: A History of European Integration. Routledge, London; New York, 2010.
  3. Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration/Ben Rosamond Macmillan: St. Martin’s Press London; New York 2000.
  4. Ruggie, John Gerard; Peter J. Katzenstein; Robert O. Keohane; Philippe C. Schmitter (June 2005). Transformations in World Politics: The Intellectual Contributions of Ernst B. Haas. Annual Review of Political Science. 8: 271-296. Archived from the original on 2006-12-07. Retrieved 2007-11-24.