Free Will Vs Determinism: Argumentative Essay

Free or Determined

“We learn the influence of our will from experience alone.

And experience only teaches us, how one event constantly follows another; without instructing us in the secret connexion, which binds them together, and renders them inseparable.” (David Hume, 1737)

When we broach the subject of whether we are free or determined, we must understand that there are some theories that accept freedom or determinism (regarding them as mutually exclusive), and some that attempt to integrate the two (regarding them as compatible). To be a Determinist one will agree that all things that happen are due to the past and the laws of nature concluding in one and only one outcome. Whereas one who supports Free Will proclaims that it is sometimes up to individuals to determine outcomes by way of choosing them themselves. It is the aim of this paper to show we are free and undetermined based on the Agency Theory. If we are to take the position that we are free and undetermined, even after close analysis we must account for an element of mystery. I will do my best to prove why we are free and undetermined allowing for and explaining this element of mystery.

Let us take a closer look at Determinism and Free Will. Determinism is the theory that everything that happens at any time is entailed by what happened at prior times, in accordance with the laws of nature. Simply stated, it is that the past added to the laws of nature yields one possible future. In contrast, Free Will (or freedom) states that it is sometimes up to the individual what they do in each moment as long as there are no obstacles or impediments as well as no constraints or extraordinary forces acting upon them.

We must then reasonably look at Determinism and Free Will in regard to behavior and morality. Determinism can address and explain behavior (responsibility for behavior is more difficult) because the past and laws of nature can and will be the only cause of all actions. Richard Taylor, in his book Metaphysics, grants that “[T] here is no moral blame nor merit in any man who cannot help what he does” (Taylor, 40). Thus, the “responsibility” then lies in the first cause of all things. For example, Joe is verbally abusive to his wife. When Joe was growing up his father was verbally abusive to him, and his father’s father to him, etc., etc. Even if one argued that their behavior came from within themselves, therefore they caused this to happen; we must take it even further according to Determinism and look at what caused them to feel that way inside. The chain of causation would eventually lead back to the first cause of all things in the universe. Therefore, Joe could never have been any other way, which raises many questions of morality and responsibility. How could Joe be morally responsible for anything?

Determinism and morality must have a bit more clarification. When we say morality, we must look at in a metaphysical light, not an ethical light. Showing consistency of ethics and Determinism will only show that we are comparing theory to theory as Taylor points out. However, if we apply a metaphysical approach by comparing Determinism to some specific data that most people would agree they believe to be true, then we can begin to argue whether Determinism has validity or not. Free Will can almost effortlessly explain behavior and morality simply because, under its premise, the choice is up to the individual to begin with, thus the responsibility of behavior and morality lies within the person himself. Keeping these points in mind, let us now apply the data of deliberation and responsibility to both Determinism and Free Will.

According to Taylor, we could apply these two pieces of data, and most would agree, that (1) I sometimes deliberate and (2) sometimes it is up to me what I do (Taylor, 42). This is where Determinism starts to break down. How can one deliberate if the future is already determined? One must believe the future is up to them in order to deliberate. It also must be up to them. They must have and believe they have true options. We have already established that Determinists would say that nothing about the future is up to them. The person that believes in Free Will would be able to apply both articles of data to their argument’s validity. Our example about Joe then becomes more understandable, when considering his behavioral and moral responsibility as an adult. His decision to abuse his wife was from a position of Free Will. Joe now has the ability (provided no constraints, etc.) to deliberate, and he should be able to recognize that it is sometimes up to him what he does.

However, we must look at his past: was it up to Joe to be abused when he was a child? Was it up to his father to be abused as a child either? Did they deliberate about how they were going to process these traumas as adults? Or did they not have a choice being that there were impediments and forces acting upon them from the past? If we agree that they had no choice, (it was already determined) it is then true that they did not have free will at that time. If we accept that they did not at the time and that later on in the future they did, then we are now Compatibilists, accepting both Determinism and Free Will to be attuned with each other. Let us take it a step further and even say that we are now Soft Determinists. The Soft Determinist would argue that “all human behavior is caused and determined” (Taylor, 48), voluntary behavior occurs as long as there are no unusual constraints, and that behavior is based on states, events, and conditions within a person.

It is tempting to leave the argument there, neat and neutral, acquiescing to Soft Determinism. However, we must now ask if the “causes of my own actions…are themselves caused?”. Taylor refutes Soft Determinism (Taylor, 48): Because we are embracing Determinism, we must answer yes. We could also deduce that if the condition of the inner states were different then the decision would have been different. But this is an inadequate argument for reconciling freedom and determinism. We have eliminated the sort of choice required for Free Will. The decision ‘could have been different, but only if conditions that are themselves beyond our control (the distant past and the laws of nature) had been different. There is no sense in which the action ‘could have been different that is relevant to (that rescues) Free Will.

Let us apply this to Joe and his situation. If the causes of his own actions are themselves caused, then he does not have any choice in what he does as an adult and that is absurd. We cannot really understand human beings without supposing they are at least sometimes responsible. Therefore, we must reject Determinism altogether. When we do this, we now become Indeterminists as well as Incompatibilists.

Indeterminism being the antithesis of Determinism seems to solve the problem: we could say we are undetermined and free. In other words, if faced with a decision, let us say to choose white wine or red wine at dinner; being free and undetermined we will be able to deliberate on either one, provided there are no constraints, and decide based on our inner states and conditions. Let us say we choose red (a lovely pinot noir). We now run into the problem of being able to explain why we chose that particular wine. For if we say we chose it because we are having Italian cuisine, or perhaps because we have been drinking white lately and would like a change, then we are conceding to the fact that frequently drinking white or deciding to have Italian food was what led us to make that decision. Therefore, there was an event chain of causation that led up to that decision. We have arrived back at Determinism. Peter Van Inwagen in his book Metaphysics, explains this idea:

It is a plausible idea that the only way to have a choice about the outcome of a process is to be able to arrange things in ways that will make it inevitable that this or that outcome occur. If this plausible idea is right, then it would seem that there is no way in which anyone could have any choice about the outcome of an indeterministic process (Van Inwagen, 193).

He answers this dilemma with another option of how an event is caused: agent causation. The Theory of Agency is one that is supposed to reconcile Free Will and Indeterminism. Taylor, as well, describes and considers the Theory of Agency.

Under the Theory of Agency, we need to consider and support 3 things. To begin we can say that we are sometimes, but not always self-determining beings. Secondly, sometimes we cause our own behavior. We are the cause of the action and no precursor condition was needed or used to make this action occur. Thirdly, there is a reason for the person to take the action, but this reason cannot be the cause of it.

Once we have thoroughly considered and embraced these three points, we need to also consider the action and the agent. There are two metaphysical concepts. The first is the idea of self or person. We are a substance and not an event. We are also self- moving beings. Therefore, the person himself/herself is the cause of his or her actions. Secondly, although the person is a substance and not an event, the person can be the cause of an event. As Taylor has said, “The theory of agency avoids the absurdities of simple indeterminism by conceding that human behavior is caused while at the same time avoiding the difficulties of determinism by denying that every chain of causes and effects is infinite” (Taylor, 56). The key now lies in the chain of causation having a definitive beginning, the agent, therefore; proving we are free not only in action (behavior), but also deliberation on the action, laying the groundwork for what soon becomes our past.

Joe, as an adult, has the ability to deliberate on his feelings, behavior, and his final action through Free Will. His past is then explained by his father’s ability to have chosen his behavior resulting in the abuse of his son. We can concede that Joe, as a child, had no choice in the abuse due to constraints of ignorance, which would be the mystery, due to the No Choice Principle. However, once these constraints are gone due to adulthood, he enters into Free Will enabling himself to have a choice of future events. He is now the cause of such events. His past was still undetermined (or better said undetermined, pertaining to events) because, applying the Agent Theory, his father caused the events. The events were caused by people not by other events, contrary to Determinism. They were deliberated upon, allowing for Free Will, acted upon by the person, and caused by the agent (Theory of Agency). Some sort of agency theory must be true because we have free will (and free will is required for deliberation and responsibility).

Free will is incompatible with determinism, and free will without some sort of theory of agency (mysterious as that may be) is incompatible with indeterminism too. We seem to be left with the conclusion that Indeterminism and Free Will must be compatible, and something like the Agency Theory must be true.

Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism: Argumentative Essay

Neuroimaging

Topic 1: The upheaval neuroscience will bring to our legal system

Free will refers to an individual’s capability to choose amid diverse conceivable sequences of actions unhindered. Free will is linked to the aspects of praise, moral responsibility, sin, guilt, and praise, as well as other judgments that are related to actions that individuals freely chose. In addition, free will is also linked to concepts of deliberation, persuasion, advice, and prohibition. Others perceive free will as the ability to make choices in which the results are not indomitable by past events. According to Frankfurt (1966), free will requires the capability to do otherwise. Watson (1982) asserts that “free will is old,” and the same has various positions. Inwagen (1982) exacts the formulation of determinism, where he asserts, “Determinism is true if the world is such that its current state is completely determined by the laws of physics and past states of the world.” Hence, based on this school of thought on free will, determinism begins anyhow and any moves on from there because there the universe and physical laws have already set things in motion. This position of free will holds that there are powers that are outside a person’s control that push them to make a choice over one thing or the other. Therefore, in the case of determinism is true, the sagacity of having free will is a deception.

Greene & Cohen (2004) asserts that there exist three usual reactions to the issue of free will. The first reaction is in relation to hard determinism, which acknowledges the discordancy of determinism and free will; thus, affirming determinism, and rejecting free will. Secondly, libertarianism agrees that determinism and free will are discordant, but refutes that determinism is true. Lastly, there is the compatibilism position, which holds that free will may possibly at times need indefensible and unnerved metaphysics, however, upholds that the natures of free will ‘worth wanting’, are impeccably attuned with determinism (Dennett, 1984). Even though the opinions of compatibilist theory differ, every compatibilist acknowledges that free will is an impeccably perfect usual, scientifically reputable marvel and a segment of the usual human form. Compatibilists also contend that numerous types of psychological insufficiency can undermine free will, for example, infancy, or mental illness. Hence, based on a viewpoint Greene & Cohen (2004) assert, “A freely willed action is one that is made using the right sort of psychology rational, free of delusion, etc.”

The forward-looking consequentialist tactic to punishments is applicable to all the rejoinders to the dispute of free will with the inclusion of hard determinism. The rationale for this concept is that consequentialists are not alarmed with the question of whether any individual is guilty or blameless in some definitive sense that may rely on an individual’s free will, however, simply with the probable outcomes of punishment. The retributivist strategy, on the other hand, is conceivably considered as necessitating free will and the denunciation of hard determinism. Retributivists neediness to discern whether the respondent justly warrants to be reprimanded. Supposing, that individual merit to be reprimanded only for acts that they did liberally, hard determinism then stipulates that no individual warrants to be reprimanded. Therefore, based on the school of thought of hard determinism, as well as retributivism, punishment should be eliminated, which is very unreasonable. In the instance, where punishment is eliminated, then the aspect of accountability will be elusive, and people will do as they wish, even though their actions are wrong. Hence, the concept of punishment is to help society remain orderly, rather than allow people to do freely, what they deem is fit in their minds. Consequently, based on this argument, the idea of free will does not exist, as there are laws govern the manner in which people are supposed to act and behave.

According to Morse (2004), the law is a field that has dealt with problems of criminal responsibility. As such, there is nothing new it cannot handle, especially in regards to the neuro-scientific horizon. Morse explains, “The reason that the law is immune to such threats is that it makes no assumptions that neuroscience or any science is likely to change. The law assumes that persons have a general capacity for rational choice.” Therefore, the law is not ignorant to the fact that persons have needs and dogmas, but at the same time, such individuals have the ability to make rational choices. Consequently, the law only holds rational individuals legally responsible for irrational behavior. According to Greene & Cohen (2004), “neuroscience will eventually change the justice system to be consequentialist.” The rationale the authors provide for this argument is that every individual has the ability to make a rational decision in a given case. As such, neuroscience can assist individuals in understanding which individual was rational, and who was not rational at a crime scene, as accomplished previously. Nonetheless, neuroscience will not rationalize any significant alterations in the laws in relation to accountability, unless it is established that individuals in general individuals are unsuccessful in seeing the law’s negligible prerequisites for prudence.

Greene and Cohen (2004) further assert that science exhibits no indication of doing such things, and hence, the rudimentary principles of legitimate accountability stand well founded. Neuroscience will change the justice system because; the legal system ignores if individuals have ‘free will in whichever profound philosophical logic that may be susceptible to determinism, as the law merely cares about those individuals are generally minimally rational. Hence, if this is the case, then the law deems people as free based on the compatibilist school of thought and such individuals are held accountable for their misdeeds. The only exception for holding individuals accountable is in instances where certain people do not obtain the prerequisites of wide-ranging rationality. Furthermore, the law hinges on significantly replicating the commitments and moral perceptions of people. Subsequently, if neuroscience has a way of changing the intuitions of society, then it has the ability to change the law, which is not the case now.

Greene & Cohen (2004), are correct about the change that neuroscience will bring to the justice system when it comes to determining responsibility and punishment. The authors contend that the legality of a legal system hinges on the law sufficiently replicating the commitments of society and moral intuitions. Hence, in an instance where neuroscience has a way of altering the said intuitions, then it has the ability to alter the law. Morse (2004) believes that this is not possible because the same would require novel ideas that are not possible at this point; nonetheless, Greene & Cohen disagrees with this line of thought where they assert that the seed of discontent in this area has already been sown. As such, the ‘fundamental pyscholegal error’ is not a mistake per se, but a replication of the vacuum amid the aspects of what individuals care about and what the law cares about. Therefore, the disparity between the law and neuroscience is in regards to the questions asked, by both the court and people.

For instance, the main question that the courts ask is whether the defendant was adequately rational while committing a crime. However, what people really want to understand is whether there is an underlying issue to the accused person’s misdeeds. Such underlying issues may be rooted from the accused genes, upbringing, personal choices, brain, or circumstances. In case such questions are raised, then the accused did not have free will. Green and Cohen’s (2004), the idea of dualism, supports this idea where they stipulate, “Mind and brain are separate, interacting entities.” The concept of dualism is suitable for libertarianism, as liberalist believes that the mind is different from the body. Materialism, on the other hand, holds all events with the inclusion of the manner in which the cognizance works, are in the end operations of substance that abides by the rules of physics.

In relation, to concerns that the idea that people will think no one deserves to be punished if determinism is true I agree with Greene & Cohen (2004). The justification for this is that the mind and brain are said to work differently, as such, in case an individual is found on the bad side of the law, then it is imperative for the law to look into the reasons the person committed the misdeed rather than whether the person acted rationally or not. Greene & Cohen (2004) in support of this principle assert, “so far as the law is concerned, information about the physical processes that give rise to bad behavior is irrelevant. But to people who implicitly believe that real decision-making takes place in the mind, not in the brain, demonstrating that there is a brain basis for adolescents’ misdeeds allows us to blame adolescents’ brains instead of the adolescents themselves.” Consequently, this should be the case for adults who are believed to have developed brains and who are expected by the law to act rationally. Nonetheless, there is a need to understand the law should look further than rational behavior to underlying issues such as genes, circumstances, or other factors that may have lead an individual to commit the misdeeds. The authors indicate, “Rationality is just a presumed correlate of what most people really care about. What people really want to know is if the accused as opposed to something else could be the accused’s brain, genes, or environment” (Greene & Cohen, 2004). Therefore, I agree with this conclusion that, for an individual to commit a crime that must have been forced beyond their control that pushed them to act in the manner that they did.

Punishment is relevant whether there are forces that pushed beyond an individual that pushed such individuals to commit misdeeds. The rationale for this is that, despite external forces, it is imperative for individuals to understand that every action whether good or bad has a consequence. As such, if the law determined that every individual that committed a crime was coherent at the period of committing, or breaking the law, but external forces pushed him or her to go ahead and commit the crimes then this would defy the law of physics. Therefore, regardless of whether or not determinism is true, people should be answerable for their engagements. The reasoning that Greene and Cohen provide on the adolescent mind and Mr. Puppet are not adequate to illustrate that external forces determine the actions of an individual.

This line of thinking or objection fails because, determinism is true, and scientists stipulate that people are the product of their environment. For instance, a child that is born in a region that is violent and begins to peddle drugs as a child, are likely to continue with this line of work into adulthood unless the circumstances that they are living in change. Therefore, in such a case, if the child grows into an adult and is arrested for selling drugs in the streets, he is not criminally liable, because his actions are as a result of his environment something that he does not have control over. Therefore, the argument provided is more compelling because it explains how the functions of the brain and the mind are different from each other and the rational choices that individual makes are because of forces beyond their control.

In conclusion, the argument presented by Greene and Cohen (2004) is correct on neuroscience changing the law. The rationale for this is that the law needs to see beyond rationality and understand why an individual may choose to do something irrational. Furthermore, determinism is true as such; external forces are to be blamed for the actions of individuals, especially ones that are caught committing crimes. Hence, it is no longer a question of rationality, but rather a question of the reason an individual may decide to commit the crime, or what aspects of their life pushed them to commit the said crime.

References

  1. Dennett, D. C. (1984). Elbow room: The varieties of free will worth wanting. mit Press.
  2. Frankfurt, H. G. (1966). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The journal of philosophy, 66(23), 829-839.
  3. Morse, S. J. (2004). New neuroscience, old problems. In Neuroscience and the law: brain, mind, and the scales of justice (ed.B. Garland), pp. 157–198. New York: Dana Press.
  4. Van Inwagen, P. (1982). The incompatibility of free will and determinism. In Free will (ed. G. Watson), pp. 46–58. NewYork: Oxford University Press.
  5. Watson, G. (ed.) (1982). Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
  6. Zeki, S., Goodenough, O. R., Greene, J., & Cohen, J. (2004). For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 359(1451), 1775-1785.

Attack on Hard-Determinism: Argumentative Essay

The choices we make in life all depend on the situation we are in. Choices like choosing to go outside on a sunny day or eating ice cream on a rainy day. We are entitled to decide what we want to do without being forced. Some people would think otherwise. Others would object to the view of a hard-determinist in saying that there is no free will in our decisions. Whether we believe Free Will and Determinism are similar or not, there are arguments for each one. Free will is allowing yourself to choose without having a doubt. Determinism is already decided on the choice you are to make with no freedom. I will attack the view of a hard-determinist because in the actions we perform free will and determinism apply in any situation given. Nagel is wrong for deciding that free will and determinism don’t apply to a situation together. I will argue that our actions can be the cause of free will and determinism with our emotions. Feelings are what make us do the things we do in our lives. Though our emotions can be determined, we can still take action freely. The choices that are determined beforehand are still free because it’s up to us to do them.

The author holds the view that both free will and determinism are not the same. He only sees that determinism can be wrong in situations and only free will applies, and vice versa. In the reading “Free Will” by Nagel, he demonstrates to the audience that if determinism were true in most situations then it would already be decided beforehand that you would perform a certain action in the future (pg. 183). The author sees that determinism can be right in some situations but not all where it matches the actions done with free will. Nagel used the example of choosing by choosing between a peach or chocolate cake for dessert. This demonstrates the free will of deciding to pick the chocolate cake without being impulsed to choose otherwise. If it was already determined for them to choose which specific dessert to eat then Nagel would say that they are not free.

Free Will and Determinism may have different meanings, our actions that we perform every day are determined by what we feel. Free will is choosing without having a doubt but we can still make a choice freely with emotions. Using the example from Nagel of choosing a chocolate cake over a peach, it could have been decided because that day, the presentation of the cake looked good. This would be a free choice because as they see the desserts, they would pick the chocolate cake because of the appealing sight which would trigger their emotions of choosing that. Nagel claims that determinism does not apply in the situation of choosing desserts or any situation that is done freely. I would disagree because we are able to determine in making the choice right then and there whether it is for the right or wrong reason. Nagel states in his reading, “Some think that if determinism is true, no one can reasonably be praised or blamed for anything…” (pg.184). Like in the example Nagel uses, determinism is true because before walking into the cafeteria and seeing the sight of the chocolate cake, it would be determined at that moment to pick that one. No one necessarily pushed them to choose the cake except for the person themselves. When the next day comes that person would feel they gained more because of choosing the cake. It is technically their responsibility for the action the choice because it affected their weight the next day. Though a person shouldn’t be blamed for picking the cake because of its presentation.

Though I believe that Free Will and Determinism are similar in any decisions we make in life, Nagel would disagree. His view shows that no action is done freely if we are forced to do something. If we choose to do something freely without having doubt then it would demonstrate that we are capable of performing actions with no reasoning behind it. As if we were to make our decisions ahead of time then determinism would be the reasoning of the actions performed. I claimed that our emotions are what cause us to make the decisions we choose in life. Though Nagel would disagree because he believes the choices we already have determined come from our past experiences. Nagel states, “If I thought that everything I did was determined by my circumstances and psychological condition, I would feel trapped.” (pg.185). In this case, it’d make sense because we all make our own choices and if we are forced to do something that isn’t under our liking then it wouldn’t be considered free will. If we are forced to do a certain action to meet another person’s satisfaction, it would not be our responsibility because we are being told to do so. As if it was an action that is free, it would be their responsibility.

I understand the views of how Nagel believes that free will and determinism are not similar and only one can be right in a situation. In response to the rejection, I still believe that both are the causes of what actions we do. Our emotions can be determined because of our past experiences but the feelings we have when we approach a certain situation and act free, we would be responsible for that action. It is understood that both free will and determinism can not apply to one situation but there are other cases where they both can apply. In the author reading “Free Will”, he states that “You believe that you determined what you would do, by doing it.” (pg. 184). We can go outside to get fresh air because we are free to make that choice of going out. Also, it can be determined as we’re standing outside that it relieves us from being in a house for too long. The actions we do can be done free and later be determined.

Philosopher Thomas Nagel tells the audience that determinism can only be the cause of an action that is not done freely. To my understanding, he doesn’t think free will and determinism are not quite similar. In the case of whether or not everyone else would agree, I believe in the actions we perform are caused by the act of free will and determinism. I have argued that Nagel is wrong for thinking free will and determinism cannot apply to one situation. First, I pointed out how the choices we make can come from our feelings. I also argued that our choice of action is made without a doubt, it can still later be processed determining whether that action was for the right or wrong reasoning. Second, I was able to demonstrate that the choices we choose to do in life are responsibilities of our own. It would be given that if our action consisted of free will and determinism, it would be our own responsibility for taking that certain action. Thirdly, I presented an objection to my own argument stating that Nagel would definitely disagree because if our actions are free and determined at the same time, it would feel as if we were trapped from allowing ourselves to explore more. In response to the objection, I still seek to believe our choices are destined by what our emotions are whether it’s acted freely or not. Free Will and Determinism are alike since our actions are based on what we believe is right and it can be done freely.

Works Cited

  1. Nagel, Thomas. “Free Will .” Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology, edited by Steven M Cahn, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 181–188.

Critical Analysis of Spinoza’s Determinism

Humanity has witnessed numerous philosophical theories that have attempted to offer a clear understanding of the universe. It is an extremely fascinating, yet controversial subject because it attracts different opinions from various spheres. In the field of philosophy, Baruch Spinoza`s views have had one of the most significant implications on how humans perceive issues related to the universe, and for that matter, God and morality (DeJoy 25). Spinoza`s discourse in philosophy has

covered various areas, but metaphysics, in particular, is an area that he demonstrated succinctness in philosophical arguments and interpretations, for example, the fact that nothing can be a contingency in the universe. Theoretically, Spinoza`s Substance theory and advocacy for pantheism played a central role in the development of determinism as a key concept of his philosophy.

The characteristics that define the scope of Substance theory roots form the fact that Spinoza inherently believed that substance is homogeneous, infinite, and self-caused, implying that the aspect of contingency in the evolution of substance is not applicable. In addition to substance theory, another key concept that contributed to the development of determinism ideas as argued by Spinoza is pantheism, which is a doctrinal belief that fosters the concept that the universe is a manifestation of God.

Technically, this gives an implication that according to Spinoza`s view, God is everything and everything is God. However, Spinoza`s approach to concepts that define God or Ungodly is unorthodox; it doesn’t incorporate religious perceptions and classification of God (Spinoza 13). These models are extremely vital in facilitating a deep understanding of determinism, the primary objective of this paper.

The ultimate development of determinism as a concept of philosophy suggested by Spinoza is a complex integration of divergent ideas, especially in relation to infinite and finite modes of systems on the universe. In essence, Spinoza`s conceived notion of determinism is underlined by the fact that he explicitly indicates that the systems of nature are exclusively deterministic such that the law of nature allows everything to act and happen naturally, with or without the influence of mankind. In nature,

nothing is contingency, but all things have been determined from the necessity of divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way (Spinoza 3). The paradigms of this interpretation relative to Spinoza`s deterministic arguments focus on the incidental admission that nature is controlled and determined by a superior being and that human beings are simply props. Unlike other theories, determinism is categorical on the necessity of God without exploring the issues of religion. In fact, determinism is equivocal on highlighting the role played by God, basically connecting the divine of nature to the existence of substance. Causal determinism, in particular, emphasizes the inherent value of finite medications and the attributes of God that are extremely necessary for maintaining the divinity of substance and modes. In fact, the theory imperatively suggests that the occurrence of contingency is a consequence of a defect of knowledge in the part of God or order of causes.

The discussion on the proposition of Spinoza on the concept of determinism cannot be complete without incorporating aspects of freedom, free will, voluntarism, and pantheism; each providing extremely relevant points of view. For instance, freedom has been a key issue in the modalities of this theory, partly due to the fact that Spinoza’s views tend to give a different impression of freedom and free will. Determinism is based on the congruence of making choices based on nature`s predetermined order.

In fact, Spinoza`s theory basically invalidates the idea of free choice which begs a very fundamental question regarding the incompatibility of freedom with human character. The relative perspectives that support determinism are based on the essence of denying that man has the discretion of making free choices (Lane 105). Spinoza argues that there is no possibility that man could have the choice of will and desire to impact on anything that could have happened or happened, incredibly accounting

that the notion of freedom of choice among men stems from a lack of knowledge and delusions that ascribes them to subsequent imaginations. The general assertion is that human actions depend on the will, something that Spinoza strongly refutes likening it to a particular mode of thinking and idea that does not possess substantiated evidence of proof. In fact, determinism according to Spinoza highlights that will require a cause for conditioned existence and action, something that only the divine nature can provide regardless of whether it is finite or infinite.

Conceptually, it is implicit that the view of freedom and choice from Spinoza`s determinism is something that is due to generate a lot of discussions on morality. Humans are rational beings and to repudiate the aspects of free will and choice from their character as suggested by determinism has far-reaching outcomes such as actualizing complacency and in extreme circumstances justifying the occurrence of preventable disasters or immoral behavior. This is because the general opinion would identify with the divinity of nature and causal order as unchallenged. The paradigms of freedom, desire, and will according to this theory are built from an understanding of divine nature. Spinoza`s suggestion implies that will is related to God, which means it exists because of God, and it is only Him who can condition it; a contradiction to that only fosters the manifestation of ignorance and inherent lack of knowledge on what causes behavior in humanity. In that case, it is clear that determinism as an idea of philosophy relative to human freedom is objective in undermining the essence of making imperative decisions by suggesting that everything is predetermined by causal order (DeJoy 24).

Perhaps, for many philosophers, the notion of God is hypothetical and relatively imaginative and that applies to a substantial majority of the human population. However, part of determinism is built on a concrete valuation that demonstrates Spinoza`s beliefs in the deity and the fact that everything is God and God is everything. Doctrinal pantheism is evident in the components of determinism; Spinoza categorically indicates that God is the only free cause, having the capacity to determine the first and the final occurrence of events in the universe. Ideally, it is a tall order that determinism undertakes in trying to validate that humanity has been denied free will by the divine of nature and substance due to the infinite nature of God`s intellectual ability. In this case, Spinoza`s determinism is rather focused on addressing the ambition and survival of humanity (Lane 105). In perspective, the philosophy points out that will, desire and choices are the dominions of man but what makes it even more interesting is the fact that Spinoza attributes all these characteristics to God. For him, man is an individual being and that means a man is nothing but a modification of God`s attributes or modes in which the attributes of God are fixed and expressed in a determinate manner (Spinoza 27). Accordingly, the pantheism point of view of determinism further alienates the concept of free choice from man; basically, classifying humans as restrictive materials and attributes that make up the divine of nature.

The clear assertion validates God as the final causality whose actions are eternal and infinite (DeJoy 25).

Determinism as a philosophical model is quite compelling based on its outlook of issues that outline humanity, nature, and God. These aspects are extremely critical, but is Spinoza`s determinism as a model of philosophy relevant in modern discussions? Perhaps, one of the key areas in that modern philosophy focuses its energy is on human intuitions and behavior. Ideally, Spinoza’s suggestion of human behavior and decision-making is negatively skewed; implying that human beings have no control or active engagement on their behavior and actions. Instead, that is determined by the causal of order and God. In modern society, philosophy is objective in studying and explaining the variability of behavior, decision making, and success of certain categories of individuals. Perhaps, this theory can provide critical answers on whether these attributes are predetermined by nature or whether human beings have the capacity to make decisions that would affect the outcomes of personal lives. Spinoza`s theory emphasizes on the lack of knowledge or rational determination as aspects that promote the notion of free will and desire, which can be extremely vital in the modern-day discussion on the issue of servitude (Pereboom 10).

Additionally, there is a corresponding surge of discussions attempting to establish distinctions between morality and deity. Arguments are precise on the issue of morality and how acts of misconduct or immoral behavior occur. According to Spinoza`s determinism on the issue of pantheism, he disregards human discretion in making decisions; suggesting that everything that occurs is determined by God whether negative or positive. This contradicts on the issue of morality because there are pretty bad

things happening out there. Relevantly, such perceptions may tend to trigger discussions on the perfect and flawless nature of the deity. Does it mean that God`s will allows immoral behavior in society since determinism suggests will is God and man is an individual being that constitutes the attributes of God (DeJoy 23)? All these questions that determinism prompts are extremely relevant in modern philosophy.

In conclusion, Spinoza`s opinion as indicated in the theory is profoundly inconsiderate of the moral foundations of society. Much as it offers the ultimate philosophical understanding of the divine universe, there are issues that are glaringly inconsistent with the general practicability of the nature of human beings and God. It is general knowledge that human beings have the capacity to generate free will and choice, otherwise, we will not be talking of morality since God`s nature as extensively covered in the theory is perfectly flawless.

Works Cited

  1. Spinoza, Baruch. The Philosophy of Spinoza. New York: Modern library, 1927.
  2. DeJoy, Joshua. ‘Deus, save Natura: Substance and Determinism in Spinoza’s Ethics.’ Aisthesis: Honors Student Journal 8.2 (2017): 22-25.
  3. Pereboom, Derk. ‘The phenomenology of agency and deterministic agent causation.’ Horizons of authenticity in phenomenology, existentialism, and moral psychology. Springer, Dordrecht, 2015. 277-294.
  4. Lane, Jan-Erik. ‘Spinoza’s Political Theory: Naturalism, Determinism, and Institutionalism.’ Open Journal of Philosophy 7.02 (2017): 105.

Principle of Determinism by Peter Van Inwagen: Analytical Essay

Peter Van Inwagen was an American Philosopher born in 1942 and was a prolific leader in the field of free will. Incompatibilism or otherwise known as “The Consequence Argument” was made popular by the famous philosopher Van Inwagen. However, prior to discussing Peter Van Inwagen’s first formal argument for incompatibilism, it must first be established what incompatibilism is. Incompatibilism or The Consequence Argument claims that if agents have no control over the facts of the past then the agent has no control of the consequences of those facts. However, prior to discussing this argument, I will provide more depth to Van Inwagen’s points.

In order for Peter Van Inwagen’s first formal argument for incompatibilism to be comprehendible and succinct, I will first explain the principle of determinism. Peter Van Inwagen’s definition of determinism relies on three notions: that of a proposition, that of the state of the entire physical world at an instant, and that of a law of nature. Firstly, propositions, are taken to be non-linguistic bearers of truth-value which have three main properties: there corresponds a proposition to every way the world could be, every proposition is either true or false and the conjunction of a true position and a false proposition creates a false proposition. Secondly, Van Inwagen’s explanation of the state of the entire physical world at an instant is very vague but he provides that this notion is not the core of the argument. With regards to the law of nature, Van Inwagen says that it is a proposition itself. In order to classify a proposition as a law of nature, the test is whether it is within our power to falsify the proposition, if so, it is not a law of nature. Determinism has many definitions but is broken down, Van Inwagen says it is made up of two theses: one being that for every instant of time, there is the proposition that expresses the state of the world in that moment; as well as if there are two propositions which express the state of the world at that moment, then together one of those propositions with the law of nature entails the other proposition.

This breakdown of determinism provided by Van Inwagen creates a better understanding of Determinism as a theory. As it clearly provides that every action or incident are entirely decided by already existing decisions. While Van Inwagen defines Determinism as the thesis that, given the past and the laws of nature, there is only one possible future. And this definition certainly has that consequence. It also has the consequence that the future determines a unique past”. Both these definitions and explanations of the theory of Determinism explain it very clearly as certain actions or events and provide an answer as to why future events happen in the manner which they do.

Incompatibilism or more commonly understood as “The Consequence Argument” is an argument for the incompatibilism of determinism with free will. If determinism is true, then we do not act freely and every action we make is not that of free will. This links to Van Inwagen’s presupposition that if you are acting in free will, then that requires that you could have chosen otherwise but did not; while if you could not have chosen otherwise, then you did not choose freely. For example, if you were offered a drink but the only option was apple juice, this is not free will as there is no other option of juice except for apple juice, providing that you said yes to the drink offer. This demonstrates that in order to be acting ‘freely’, there must be another option available to choose in every instant.

I will now present Van Inwagen’s first formal argument for incompatibilism. Van Inwagen explains his argument by way of an example which I will formulate as well. If a judge refrains from raising their hand and thereby issuing a pardon at a certain time. Premise 1 provides, if determinism is true, then the conjunction of a proposition that expresses the state of the physical world in an instant and the laws of nature entails the state of the physical world at the time of the judge refraining from raising their hand. This follow’s Van Inwagen’s definition of determinism as explained above. Premise 2 provides it is not possible that the judge have raised his hand at the time of him not raising his hand. Therefore, it is impossible for the judge to raise his hand at the time and for the judge to not raise his had at the same time. Premise 3 is that if premise 2 is true, then it is impossible for the judge to raise his hand, so if the judge was able to raise his hand at the time, then he would render the proposition false. Van Inwagen adds to this when he states that “to be able to render a proposition false is to be able to arrange or modify the concrete objects that constitute one’s environment”. Premise 4 states that if the judge could have rendered the state of the world false, and if the conjunction of the state of the world prior to the judge’s existence and the laws of nature entail the state of the world at the time of the judge not raising his hand. Then the judge could have rendered the latter false. Following this, if the judge could have rendered the latter false, then the judge could have rendered the laws of nature false. However, the judge could not have rendered the laws of nature false, this is because a proposition is a law of nature only if it is not within our power to falsify, as explained previously.

Therefore, if determinism is true, the judge could not have raised his hand at the time when he ‘chose’ not to. This leads to the conclusion that if the judge could not have raised his hand, then he did not freely choose to refrain from raising his hand at all. As described before that if one performs an action, then one could have done otherwise than execute said action. As demonstrated then, if determinism is true, then the judge did not freely refrain from raising his hand. David Lewis provides an interesting insight to the consequence argument and adds depth to Peter Van Inwagen’s consequence argument. In if determinism is true, then this would lead to certain contradictions; such as the ability to change the past or the ability to break or change the laws of nature. Both of which are “absurd” to even consider as being a possibility and as such prove Peter Van Inwagen’s first formal argument for incompatibilism.

In order to determine whether Peter Van Inwagen’s first formal argument for incompatibilism is sound, I will look to discuss other arguments of free will. Although many agree and it is widely established that Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument is the strongest argument in favour of incompatibilism. This is due to the fact that if determinism is true, then no decision we make is our decision, no everyday choice is our decision, and no individual has the power to do anything except the action or decision that is ultimately ‘made for us’. Van Inwagen’s consequence argument is so blatantly obvious and in contrast to the determinism, theory to prove it correct. This is due to the fact that it is almost impossible for any individual or person to think that in order for determinism to be true, free will must be false and any decision made is not their own; which almost always results in individuals deciding that determinism must be false. Although this Van Inwagen does admit and come to terms with the fact that his argument is not a complete argument in its entirety as if there was a possible way in which determinism can work in line with being able to do or decide otherwise then his argument will fail.

Although this, there have been many arguments that break down Van Inwagen’s argument for incompatibilism and provide a further viewpoint that cannot be ignored; due to their critical analysis of the consequence argument. One significant contradicting argument which is rarely discussed with regard to Van Inwagen’s consequence argument is one involving the presuppositions with regards to the physical state of the world and under the laws of physics, as well as when acting as a free agent what they are able to do. As Van Inwagen presupposes that there is a way in which can accurately describe and discuss fundamental physics as well as conscious free will decision making. Although as a philosopher it may be easy to dismiss the complication this presupposition infers, however, I find it very difficult to use the same language to discuss all of these areas. As it should be explicitly easy to see that when discussing physics and when discussing free will, these must be described in two fundamentally different ways. Due to this, it is difficult to justify an entire argument’s premise and point when the description and explanation of the argument itself is made up of two forms of description that in my view do not match.

Further to this, in everyday life, each individual has the same common-sense view that we are in control of what we do, each decision we make, and our general free will all include the fact that what is in the past, is set in the past. While what is in the future is still open to choices, decisions can change with each choice made. The consequence argument by Van Inwagen provides a defense to the way we justify these common-sense views. As it is instinct to believe that we can only ‘do otherwise’ if the past was different, and following that then is it possible for us to ever ‘do otherwise? James’ belief was that “determinism says that the actual future is necessary and any other future is impossible. What will be, must be. What will not be, cannot be.” Although this conclusion may sound convincing, I find it too quick to jump to this simple conclusion. While difficult to explain, I find that the future is a follow-on from the past and as such any action or decision made, will ultimately change the outcome of the future. The future is not set in stone and it is ridiculous to assume or even pretend it is such. However, the past is set in stone; there is no decision or action which will have the outcome of changing the past and in turn changing the future. Although there may be another world, in which a different outcome in the past from the same circumstances has resulted in a different future, none of the outcomes in these other worlds impact the world in which we are in. Our future is open to change due to our dependence on our choices. Our choices can be different, in the sense that I am able to critically evaluate Van Inwagen’s argument. Is this then compatible with determinism? It is for this reason, that Peter Van Inwagen’s first formal argument provides one of the best arguments for the conclusion that if determinism has any truth value, then no individual has a choice about anything in everyday life. It is as such why I find Van Inwagen’s argument so convincing and sound as a conclusion.

The Consequence argument is a highly important argument that has provided an incredibly insightful view into many underlying metaphysical questions.

The Manifestation of Technological Determinism

Critique

The article in question can be regarded as a manifestation of technological determinism. Shapin (2007) claims that people know little about the way technology develops as it is impossible to predict which innovations and technological advances will be used and which will perish. The author also stresses that people still tend to utilize things they are accustomed to as they know how to use them and know the benefits of this usage.

It is possible to note that the author provides sound arguments and helps understand the lack of awareness of technology and its development. Shapin (2007) provides examples of the way some innovations become widespread while others disappear. The example of the telegraph and mail tubes is quite stunning. However, one of the most valuable insights provided in the article is concerned with the view of innovation.

It is necessary to stress that the author questions the innovation-centric account of tech. People do not try to create something new (innovative), but rather upgrade old things. People’s futurism is somewhat ridiculed as humanity still drives cars instead of flying, and there are no Moon resorts. Shapin (2007) claims that people often focus on things while innovation is something more complex. It is the way things are used.

Finally, the author’s argument concerning the social shaping of technology is quite remarkable. It becomes clear that the development of technology is determined by the values (as well as goals) existing in the society. Philosophical views and even preferences shape the world of technology that is aimed at making people’s lives more comfortable. All in all, the article provides helpful insights into the way technology and society are interconnected.

Clarify

The second paragraph of the article entails one of the major ideas of the article and one of the most intriguing points to consider. Shapin (2007) claims that every innovation has elements of some older (or even ancient) artifacts. Thus, laptops are upgraded variants of the typewriter while cars are new carriages. The nature of innovation can be regarded from a new perspective.

Thus, people often think of innovation as something brand new. Things people have never seen or done before. Nonetheless, it appears that innovation is the alteration of something that existed for a while. This understanding can upset someone as people like thinking their might is limitless. However, the understanding of the nature of innovation and technology can help in the development of a clear view of human society.

Shapin (2007) unveils the nature of humanity. A human is a “Tool-using animal” (as cited in Shapin, 2007, para. 2). In other words, people are not concerned about creating something but rather focus on their needs and ways to achieve them more effectively. There is no need in creating new things as it is easier and faster to change some existing tools. Killing an animal for a meal or searching for edible berries were quite time-consuming processes that transformed into buying convenience food and cooking it with the help of a microwave oven within seconds.

Going to the nearest fast food restaurant is even a less time-consuming process. Of course, instead of hunting and gathering, people have highly-developed industries that make human life more comfortable. This comfort is associated with the social construction of technology. People shape the way technology develops. They have not tried to live without food but created numerous ways to meet this basic need.

Compare

Kelly (2010) explores the nature of technology. It is possible to note that the author’s ideas are quite similar to the views of Shapin (2007). Both researchers argue that technology is shaped by people’s needs and desires. The two authors also agree that technology develops in ways that can be hardly predicted. However, Kelly (2010) has quite a specific view on technology and its nature.

Shapin (2007) focuses on the way technology evolves without trying to explain its nature in detail. More so, the author notes that it can hardly be perceived. At the same time, Kelly (2010) coins a term Technium, that unveils the author’s view on technology. Kelly (2010) argues that technology is not confined to innovations in things, but it includes such spheres as art, philosophy, and so on. Shapin shares this view and states that technology is not just things but ideas and intentions.

However, Kelly (2010) stresses that the technological world develops by certain rules that are similar to the ones applied in nature. The author almost assigns the existence of consciousness in technology assuming that it has its needs, which drives its development. This is the part where the views of the authors differ. Shapin (2007) believes that technology is shaped by people’s needs, not their desires.

I would agree with Shapin (2007) as I also believe that technology and innovation serve people’s needs. Humans are the drivers of technology, not vice versa. At the same time, I agree with both authors who claim that technology can be regarded as a bulk of tools used for people’s needs.

Reference List

Kelly, K. (2010). What technology wants. New York, NY: Penguin.

Shapin, S. (2007). The New Yorker. Web.

Technological Determinism and Society

Modern humanitarian knowledge calls the current period the era of the second industrial revolution. It has become obvious to many researchers today that understanding social processes is inextricably linked with understanding the problems of scientific and technological progress. This is due to the fact that if earlier the influence of technology was largely limited to the production of material goods, today this influence permeates the entire life of a person. The qualitative changes in social relations that scientific and technological progress entails confirm the need for a socio-philosophical understanding of these processes. New social realities are getting inevitably altered by the continuous development of technologies, or even created by it – such as cancel culture, for example.

Technological determinism, in its essence, is based on a natural scientific approach that promises to reveal the laws of technological functioning or evolution. In turn, the ability to reveal the laws of technology serves as a condition for effective influence on technology itself. Thus, in a broad sense, technological determinism is understood in modern sociology as a specific method of explaining social processes and phenomena. According to it, changes in technology have been and, most likely, will be the primary basis for changing institutions, practices, and ideas. However, a question arises: to what extent and how exactly does technological advancement influences the direction of social development? Moreover, could it also be bilateral in nature, meaning that society, in turn, influences the course of this advancement? This paper argues that the social reality is the ultimate driver behind any and all technological development, as it constantly creates a specific demand the technological development has to follow and fulfill.

Background and Relevance

The term “innovative technologies” has become very popular with time; however, it has an ambivalent character. On the one hand, innovative technologies give hope for solving the urgent problems of mankind; on the other hand, they are characterized by the unpredictability of the consequences of their application. The reality shows that innovative technologies constantly create new risks for society, which is why it is crucial to address this topic. Despite the wide range of opinions of modern researchers who adhere to the concept of technological determinism, all their theories have a single methodological basis. It lies in the understanding of technology as a certain entity that has long gone out of the control of society.

A striking example of the influence of technology on social processes is the automotive industry. The car was created by man to satisfy a set of needs, for example, in a sense of superiority over other subjects. The fact that more and more people have a car leads to a worsening of the criminogenic situation and the environmental situation. The satisfaction of some needs through technology leads to the emergence of other needs, which are again satisfied with the help of technology – alarm systems, exhaust gas neutralizers, and others. The huge influence of technology on society is undeniable, but no matter what concepts of technology modern scientists create, society will not do without it. And as long as technology exists, new concepts of technological determinism will be created, contributing to the relevancy of the issue.

Literature Review

There is a significant body of research covering the topic of technological determinism, especially as a philosophical concept. For this research, three studies were chosen as the most relevant and connected to the sociological aspect of changes brought by technological advancement. Each of the articles reviews specific aspects of the complex relationship between technology and society, differentiating perspectives and drawing various conclusions from their findings.

Boyd and Holton (2017) discuss in their work how robotics and artificial intelligence – the directions science places the most faith upon nowadays – participate in social and economic transformation of the world. Boyd and Holton (2017) focus “on the economic, political and historical dynamics of technological innovation, and its consequences for employment and economic re-structuring, mediated through sovereign and discursive power” (p. 331). The study conducted by Brey (2018) follows the question of technology’s influence on the society; however, the author aims at the qualitative evaluation of the consequences of technological advancement on a “good” society. Brey (2018) argues that “the goodness of society can be defined as a number of values, thus impacts of technology can be analyzed as either contributing to, or detracting from, the realization of such values” (p. 39). Finally, Hauer’s (2017) research concentrates specifically on the technology’s contribution to the emergence of the new media, and how changes in the processes of information and knowledge distribution have changed the society.

References

Boyd, R., & Holton, R. J. (2017). Journal of Sociology, 54(3), 331–345.

Brey, P. (2018). The strategic role of technology in a good society. Technology in Society, 52, 39–45. Web.

Hauer, T. (2017). . International Journal of English Literature and Social Sciences, 2(2).

The Theories of Technological Determinism

The term ‘technological determinism’ was coined by American sociologist and economist Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929). This is a ‘reductionist’ theory, the premise of which is that the entire social and historical framework, such as cultural values, social and family structure, history, is rooted in one defining factor – technology. It is the belief that new technologies have an intrinsic, independent power to shape and transform society. Some prolific people in this field have summarized technological as: “The belief in technology as a key governing force in society…” (Merritt Roe Smith), “… the belief that social progress is driven by technological innovation, which in turn follows an “inevitable” course.” (Michael L. Smith), “The idea that technological development determines social change…” (Bruce Bimber), and “… the belief that technical forces determine social and cultural changes.” (Thomas P. Hughes) (“Technological Determinism”)

Technological determinism is one end of the spectrum whereas the other is social determinism, which says that society and its influences are the defining forces behind the innovation of technology as well as its outcomes. Two ideas at the core of most theories of technological determinism are (a) technology is developed in a fairly predictable manner, which is not affected by any sort of cultural or political stimuli and (b) once a technology has been introduced, it largely influences society to the extent that society itself champions the technology further along.

Hard determinists and soft determinists are the two schools of thoughts, the former believing that technology has a huge impact on social structure, the outcome of which can not be controlled by us. The latter school has more of a passive view of technology’s interaction and consequent impact on society, believing that we do have the power to control the ways in which technology shapes our society (“Technological Determinism”).

Raymond Williams (1921 – 1988) was a Welsh academic and a staunch critic of technological determinism. He believed that this theory ignored the powerful effects of social hierarchies, their dealings with each other and the consequences of social events. He gave the example of the development of broadcasting technology to explain how a definite social process is carried out through which decisions to convert an invention into an available technology are made. Broadcasting was developed not in isolation, but rather as a consequence of the urban changes in society, which signaled the need for such a technology (Williams, 1974).

Williams (1974) also criticized technological determinists on their point that innovation of technologies is a predetermined event. He believed that the way technologies are innovate upon and the functions they eventually end up serving are strongly influenced by decisions humans make regarding them. An example of how this happened was when radio was still being developed, an idea to make it as something similar to the telephone was proposed. However, this was shot down by the main American telephone network showing how power positions at any given time in society determine the nature of the technologies being innovated then. In the same manner, a technology might not end up becoming what it was initially intended to as it would be impacted and shaped by the social struggles of that age. Events happening in the political economy could possibly influence technology’s forms and functions, but never in an absolute manner so as to become its sole determinant.

He also disagreed with the notion that a new technology is an unavoidable fact of life. He believed this to be something marketers convinced people about solely to ensure that the new technology is easily absorbed into society and even welcomed by it.

Television was a technology which Williams paid close attention to and was highly bemused by, especially regarding the extensive advertising that had started becoming absolutely unavoidable. In his famous 1974 book, “Television – Technology and Cultural Form”, written more than 30 years ago when television was nowhere near what it is today, Williams prophesized how television could strongly influence and control society.

“Over a wide range from general television through commercial advertising to centralized information and data-processing systems, the technology that is now or is becoming available can be used to affect, to alter, and in some cases to control our whole social process.” (Williams, 1974, p. 151)

He wrote about how this one technology could lead to a number of extensions such as “inexpensive, locally based yet internationally extended television systems” which would facilitate communication and information-sharing in ways that would not have seemed possible in pre-television days. His political economist views were that these modern communication tools could lead to an “educated and participatory democracy” and effective communication in multi-tiered urban and industrial societies. However, aside from the above uses of contemporary tools of communication, Williams offered a valuable insight which might have seemed ahead of his times when the book was published in 1974. He proposed that these tools could also be used by corporate players who, under the pretense of competition and providing consumers with choice, would “further reach into our lives, at every level from news to psycho-drama, until individual and collective response to many different kinds of experience and problem became almost limited to choice between their programmed possibilities.” This was the way in which Williams believed technology to be influenced by societal forces and used by the “powers-that-be” to further their own interests. He also quoted the early history of television as an example in this regard. This was a promising technology which was exploited in significantly different ways by the different cultural and political regimes that comprised Britain, the United States and the Nazi Germany (Williams, 1974, p. 151).

He argued that people must understand new technological innovations, specifically those relating to communications, and the ways in which other technology, society, culture, law and economic conditions shape them. He believed this was necessary otherwise technological determinism as a concept was a dangerous one to believe in, politically and morally. It premised that people do not have the power to avoid the harmful aspects of new media or to derive social and moral benefits from it and he did not agree with this. His research suggested that the impact of new technology, and he stressed on innovations in media, was not revolutionary, but evolutionary. It would cause debates and discussions but would not have the sole power to transform society. It would be dealt differently by people depending on how open or resistance they were to change, whether they were new players or well-established ones. Some would publicly announce their support or lack of it, while others would reserve their opinions and operate covertly. These factors would all have a role to play in the way the technology develops and affects society and way of life (Williams, 1974).

Ithiel de Sola Pool was a pioneer in the field of social science. He believed that “technology shapes the structure of the battle but not every outcome”. He belonged to the school of thought of weak or soft technological determinism, which claimed that when technologies are developed, they enable, facilitate or create potential for opportunities which may be furthered by societies or not. In his book, Technologies of Freedom (1983), he laid the groundwork for the relationship between communication technologies and democracy. His book is still considered a very momentous work in the field of communications as it shows the relationships between emerging digital technologies with human freedom and social and political setups.

He accepted that whenever modes of communication become easily available and are decentralized, such as the case with printing presses and microcomputers, it encourages freedom. And in the opposite case, when means of communication are highly centralized and scarce, there is greater control in the centre and with fewer entities. In that age where the mainframe computer symbolized a monopoly of power, Pool proposed his vision of a media age where power would lie with each participant and a democratic culture would prevail. He believed that home computers would lead to a stronger democratic framework, as citizens and organizations would be able to spread their thoughts and ideas farther than what was earlier possible. But he did not think that this was the only outcome possible, or was inevitable.

“The characteristics of media shape what is done with them, so one might anticipate that these technologies of freedom will overwhelm all attempts to control them…” (Pool, 1983, p. 251)

He gave the example of the printing press, that while as a technology it formed the very basis of modern democracy, the responses it got ranged from one extreme to another: it resulted in censorship at times and greater freedom of the press at other times. Different situations and times will determine the outcome. At one instance, the new media welcomed the opportunity for more open debates and discussion, while at another instance, all opportunities for discourse would be strictly discouraged for fear of the barrage of criticism or another unwanted outcome. Not only this but emerging media is often treated as another variation of an existing or older technology and is hence regulated in the same way, which has a restrictive effect on the progressive capacity of the innovative technology. As a consequence, the drastic transformations that had been predicted as the technology’s impact are often subdued by the conservative curbs implemented on it.

He, along with Raymond Williams, had envisioned Television to have been developed, marketed, and regulated in a very different way from what it is now its reality of being a centralized mode of communication. They had predicted it to be similar to a two-way participation, open system, like the phone system, in which viewers are also broadcasters. Hence, technology’s power to alter society is determined to a large extent by the restrictions placed on it or freedom given to it to allow it to grow. Technology’s function and form, and consequently its impact, is influenced by the cultural and societal forces prevalent at the time of its inception, development, introduction and even later in its life cycle. Technological determinists might purport their theory of all historical and cultural phenomena being driven by technology, but the relationship is more of a mutually influential one, a complex two-way street with various forces at play.

Bibliography

  1. Pool, I. d S. 1983, Technologies of Freedom: On Free Speech in an Electronic Age, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
  2. Williams, R. 1974, Television: Technology and Cultural Form, Routledge, London.
  3. ”, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Web.

Technological Determinism and the Social Shaping of Technology

The era of technical and scientific progress presented mankind with numerous inventions. In machine building, the term technological determinism gained a crucial significance. Utopian ideas in terms of technical implementation of the early twentieth century began occupying the concept of scientific thought (Smith, 22). The concept of technocracy, however, confronted critics of T. Jefferson and R. W. Emerson’s negative approaches but faced with Henry Adams’s improvement of technological devices’ value in facilitating life (Smith, 26).

Lewis Mumford along with Jacques Ellul and Langton Winner contributed greatly to the provision of technocratic perspectives. In Mumford’s work “Technics and Civilization” the point that culture emerged before technics in their evolution, as well as the point that rivalry between peoples and countries provoked the flow of technical thought, are underlined. The notion of the word technique falls into the complex integration of mechanical devices and technologies of mental and organizational activity into society (Smith, 29).

Social shaping of technology (SST) is a debatable theory that contradicts points used in technological determinism in order to emphasize the social factor to provide the unity of form and substance of technologies erected by other than just subtle nature (Russel & Williams, 39).

Before it appeared SST underwent several direct approaches on the internal and external context of historical events to force on SST; economical interest in terms of gaining more productivity and profits; delivery and maintaining scientific insights within closely related sciences. In recent times when progress has drawn to a head, such trends of SST are identified: mutual integration of scientific thoughts in terms of collaboration; growth of idea implementation according to social co-relation of change and productivity; perpetual influx of innovations caused by individuals’ activity. In fact, social sciences and their variations in reciprocal impacts on the technological results determined the socio-cultural nature of shaping technologies.

The framework of technology essence strikes with the philosophical treatment of whether technology has a political coloring. The historical and social artifacts assist people’s life helping to simplify their life. Many devices needed for different uses or various layers of society appeared due to lending demands to politically conscious officials. Moreover, many technological devices serve to stimulate order and action within people.

According to Winner’s theory, one of the requirements for technologies to have political background is the emergence of specific social circumstances; another one concerns the controversial approach that relationships of social and political character do not identify the similarity in their intentions (Winner, 32). In other words, what for the economy is a great source of profit, metallurgical plants, for instance, is for the society harm toward ecology and people’s health respectively. Also, technologies are supported by means of acts agreements and amortization efforts due to activities of politics.

Science is realized by many people through the extent of technologies. Their values can be used a money-making for the tycoons. That is why technocracy is the connection of technological supplements worked out by a group of interested people in order to gain some advantages. James Burnham criticized the current intention of predominant technocracy possession by the elite of technocrats outlining the idea of the capitalist impact on wrong management of technologies fruits. In ‘Self-interested elite’ model he saw the resolving of the problem by governmental and intellectual support.

Thus, new frameworks of economic and social restructuring with a generation of the new elite can provide greater development of technologies. Servants of the power model state that the crucial importance of technology for society and economy tends to confront state restructuring to prevent the current elite of people (Eliot & Eliot, 66). This approach coincides with the theme of the intellectual safeguard program so needed in society.

The scientific thought forestalled its further dimensions. Before the eighteenth century mankind was poorly provided attempts to find out and form the mechanisms to facilitate their life and relationships concept in it. Factories forgot about hand-made labor, many devices proved the efficient and productive work in machinery, medicine, metallurgy, etc. All terms and ideas above served in their historical cut as a factor to force on the nature of technique causing an exponential increase of science.

Such steps as separation of working process between employees and supplying them with contemporary amenities to shorten terms of producing goods are the favor of plenty of mechanisms and devices provided theoretically and practically by means of such streams as technological determinism, the social shape of technologies as well as concepts of technological policy and technocracy (Dickson, 47). These ones fastened the process of new theories and innovations promotion for mankind in the twentieth century until now.

Reference List

Smith, MR, ‘Technological determinism in American culture’, in RM Smith & L Marx (eds.), Does Technology Drive History?: The Dillema of Technological Determinism, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 18-35.

Russell, S & Williams R 2002, ‘Social shaping of technology: frameworks, findings and implications for policy with glossary of social concepts’, in KH Sorensen & R Williams (eds.), Shaping Technology, Guiding Policy: Concepts, Spaces, and Tools, Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 37-131.

Winner, L 1986, ‘Do artefacts have politics?’, The whale and the reactor: a search or limits in an age of high technology, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 19-39.

Elliott, D. & Elliott, R. (1976) ‘The Technocracy’, The Control of Technology, Wykeham Publications, London: 51-101.

Dickson, D. (1974) ‘The ideology of industrialization’, Alternative Technology and the Politics of Technical Change, Fontana, London: 41-62.

How Free Am I: Co-existence of Determinism and Moral Responsibility

Determinism refers to the philosophical principle that all actions are pre-determined by a series of causal events and laws of nature. The theory pre-supposes that human decisions are a product of the conditioning of various factors.

This presents several challenges to the concept of free will or moral responsibility. It would appear that, if all human decisions are pre-determined and caused by various laws of nature, then there is nothing like free will. However, these seemingly contradictory concepts of determinism and free will continue to co-exist today.

One group of philosophers is convinced that determinism and moral responsibility are compatible (Pink, 2004). Another group believes that the two are inconsistent and thus, ought to not co-exist. The purpose of this paper is to show that determinism and moral responsibility co-exist and that human decisions or actions cannot contradict the pre-existing laws of nature.

Determinism is generally described by philosophers as the concept of every event having a cause. This causation applies the quantum physics laws of cause and effect (Williams, 1980). A popular kind of determinism is the social determinism.

It asserts that human behavior is influenced by, and is therefore a result of, social interactions and environment. Social determinism is one of three explanations for human behavior; the other two being free will and biological determinism.

Free will as an explanation for human behavior depicts that human beings consciously choose to act the way they do and are responsible for their actions, whether good or bad. Biological determinism school of thought claims that human behavior is a result of heredity and genetic makeup (Kattsoff, 1965).

In order to present how determinism and moral responsibility are compatible, it is essential to state several assumptions. The first assumption is that determinism is a materialistic worldview (Williams, 1980). This is especially in the respect to free will.

What this means is that human beings have no control over the actions of quantum physics both in the world around them or in their own brains. Secondly, moral responsibility in this case is based on the theory that the concept of goodness is an objective fact (Williams, 1980).

This means that goodness cannot be regarded as a product of language and is thus not subjective but is universal. In other words, the choice between what is moral or immoral is subject to an objective standard of good or bad which is outside the person making that choice.

The first example to illustrate the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism is the concept of punishment. This paper will show why it is not against the laws of logic to punish a person for their action while still holding on to the claim that we live in a deterministic world. First of all, punishment achieves two main goals.

The first goal is to prevent the person from repeating the action again while the second goal is to deter others from doing the same. This means that, even though the person’s present actions were determined by the current state of affairs or laws of nature, the future actions of the same person under the same laws of nature will be different.

While one may argue that the punishment is a deterministic factor for the future behavior of the person being punished, the fact that the punishment acts as a deterrent to people other than the one being punished indicates a sense of moral responsibility in the unpunished people.

Secondly, a closer look at moral responsibility indicates that there exist compatibilities between moral responsibility and determinism. It is essential to appreciate the fact that the laws of nature do not necessarily cause actions such as human decision and other free-will choices (Honderich, 2005).

They do, however, influence how interactions between the mind and the physical world take place. The actual cause of human actions is the natural interactions that happen within their brain, as opposed to the world around them. The primary cause of one brain state is earlier brain states.

However, all these brain states are a result of previous inputs. Therefore, the moral or legal responsibility of a person making a decision is actually a resultant effect of the collective responsibilities of his teachers or the people that influenced him.

The person, however, bears the greatest responsibility because it is only at his point that the thoughts are translated into action (Honderich, 2005). This does not disprove human responsibility, it only points to the concept of shared responsibility, which is already a reality even in the present legal systems.

For example, while one person may actually be responsible for pulling the trigger, his accomplices also share in the responsibility and part of the punishment.

The above example clearly shows that human behavior is a complex subject. Social determinism would have people blame behavior on the environment one is exposed to, especially one they are brought up in and their social interactions (Honderich, 2005).

For instance, young people living in poverty areas are more likely to engage in crime compared to those living in the suburbs. Adults who have had humble and poor backgrounds are likely to turn out more ambitious and put more effort in their studies and talents compared to those who never lacked.

However, when it comes to social determinism, determinism is used to predict, rather than cause behavior. The evidence is not definitive proof. There are countless people who are brought up in ghettos and slums and still grow up to be responsible adults.

There are just as many brought up in slums who eventually engage in crime. Crime cannot be blamed on poverty exclusively or even partially, since poor people make up a very high percentage of the population (Pink, 2004).

Social interactions, especially during childhood, are responsible in large for attitudes, beliefs and values inherent in human beings. This is not to say that values and beliefs instilled during one’s childhood are cast in stone. They often change as one matures, but not easily.

Parents, while raising their children, can instill in them values such as honesty, confidence, hard work, integrity and ambition through training and disciplining. On the other hand, they can also end up encouraging negative values such as laziness, low self-esteem and pessimism.

The environment also affects attitudes and values. For instance, a person living in a war zone or a hostile homestead is more likely to exhibit traits of melancholy or paranoia compared to a person living in a peaceful and happy environment (Widerker, 2006).

It has been proven that human beings are well aware of the difference between what is right and what is wrong. They also are not pre-conditioned to think and act in a certain way but have the capacity to learn and to improve. Their actions therefore, whether right or wrong, boil down to choice and free will.

Determinism can be viewed as influencers of behavior and choice, but not the causes. For instance, a positive environment is likely to contribute to an individual’s moral decision not to hurt other people. A hostile and poor environment is likely to greatly influence an individual’s decision to steal.

Therefore, biological determinism factors such as one’s level of intelligence and temperaments and social determinism factors such as attitude, values and beliefs – though not causal factors of human behavior – are major influencers of choice (Widerker, 2006).

Among the reasons determinism cannot be used to explain away human behavior is its implication that human beings act based on uncontrollable environmental conditions and animal instincts inherent in them.

If human beings were preconditioned and could not control the effect their environment had on their character and individuality, then it would be pointless to punish and to advocate for moral responsibility. Determinism would have humanity question the aspect of decision making by implying that individuality is preconditioned (Widerker, 2006).

This also questions the causation theory which would make what one perceive as a cause not to be a real cause but a subjective effect of previous causes. The second reason determinism does not hold water, is the fact that there is no way of proving that human behavior in a particular environment would not be the same in a different environment.

It also does not explain why two individuals placed in the exact same environment with similar social conditions and interactions would have very different individualities and perceptions. If determinism was a valid explanation for human behavior then it would be expected that individuals with similar backgrounds would exhibit similar individualities.

Free will depicts that human beings are free to choose how to act regardless of their environment and socialization and are in control of their behavior. It however does not negate the possibility of being misled, coerced or brainwashed which would make it harder to make a rational choice based on will.

These conditions, however, do not necessarily mean that the individual is not in control of their actions (Honderich, 2002). Moral responsibility is acquired as an individual matures through disciplining, experience, teaching and learning.

It is almost an obligation especially in relation to acts carried out towards other people. Moral responsibility bases its principles on the fact that an individual’s actions are not based on natural causes but on a brain process that the individual is responsible for, hence the concept of punishment.

Punishment, especially in regards to children is intended to instill morals, to make the child see the error of his ways and refrain from making the particular mistake again. Punishment in regards to adults is also intended to prevent the offender from repeating the particular mistake they are punished for as well as to dissuade other people from making that particular mistake.

Sometimes punishment is a form of attaining justice for the wronged party and to ensure the wrongdoer pays for his actions. If determinism was a reliable explanation for behavior, it would not make sense to punish people for wrong deeds or to praise or reward individuals for commendable actions.

The very fact that human beings feel the need to reward and appreciate good deeds and to condemn and punish wrong deeds means they are conscious about their actions and that they recognize that choosing to be morally responsible in spite of the worldly factors that would influence us to act otherwise is commendable.

In conclusion, human behavior and actions is a product of conscious choice and free will. These choices and their intensity, their moral standards and frequency may or may not be influenced by social and biological factors.

However a couple of other valid factors, such as lack of proper instruction by teachers and parents to their children, could cause tendencies of moral irresponsibility. Sometimes repetitive wrong choices and undisciplined behavior and morals could cause an individual to continually make wrong choices without conscience.

Even then, they would be making these decisions consciously aware that they are wrong and therefore would have to be held responsible for such actions. The extent to which determinism can be considered a cause of human behavior is yet to be established but the aspect of choice and free will whatever the circumstances is proven.

References

Honderich, T. (2002). How Free Are You?: The Determinism Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Honderich, T. (2005). On determinism and freedom. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Kattsoff, L. O. (1965). Making moral decisions: An existential analysis. Hague: M. Nijhoff.

Pink, T. (2004). Free Will: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Widerker, D. (2006). Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities: essays on the importance of alternative possibilities. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing.

Williams, C. (1980). Free will and determinism: A dialogue. Indianapolis, In: Hackett Publishing.