Category: Competition

Oligopoly is one of the four market structures in the world and the other three are perfect competition, monopoly, and monopolistic competition. All these market structures have different features and characteristics that set them apart, but among them is a perfect competition that often serves as a benchmark for others. Indeed, perfect competition, in addition to promoting economic efficiency, provides a good basis for the comparison of different types of markets in the real world. Oligopolistic markets have two main models which are Bertrand’s competition model (BCM) and Cournot’s competition model (CCM). This essay aims to explain oligopoly and its corresponding features regarding perfect competition as a benchmark and also the difference between the two models of the oligopolistic market.

Key Features of Oligopoly Versus Perfect Competition as a Reference

An oligopoly is a market structure that involves few producers and suppliers (www.oecd.org). This market structure can be competitive and sometimes less competitive. Some of its fundamental characteristics include the existence of a small number of firms, differentiated or homogeneous products, and barriers to entry. Examples of oligopoly include cell phones (Huawei, Apple, and Samsung have over 50% market share) and motor vehicles in the United States (Toyota, Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler collectively have almost 60% market share. To identify an oligopoly, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index or concentration ratio can be used (boycewire.com).

On the other hand, is a perfect competition where the market has many sellers with no individual advantage over each other as they sell the same product at the same price. Here, firms engage in the production of identical goods, market share is not a price determining factor, barriers to entry or exit don’t apply, and buyers have perfect or complete knowledge of what they want in terms of purchase. Examples of perfectly competitive industries include agriculture, online shopping, and foreign exchange markets (boycewire.com).

While competition in an oligopolistic market is legal, collusion is generally considered illegal. Compared to monopolies, oligopolistic firms produce larger quantities and charge a lower price to advance their interests. However, companies may sometimes collude to set prices or production levels for the market to maximize industry profits. When this happens, the colluding firms act like a monopoly. Moreover, such actions are difficult to coordinate, and companies caught in such compromised practices can be severely sanctioned (Fershtman and Pakes, 1999; Besanko et al., 2013).

Moreover, firms in an oligopolistic market compete, driving down the prices of products (Bertrand’s competition model) in the market. In this sense, oligopoly resembles perfect market competition, and as such competition is a key feature of oligopoly (Besanko et al., 2013).

Furthermore, an oligopolistic market is characterized by the presence in the market of a limited number of large and small companies that determine supply and demand. In contrast, the perfect competition market involves many producers. Again, in an oligopolistic market, the number of firms often ranges from two to ten and together control more than 50% of the market share. This high percentage gives oligopolistic firms the power to control and dictate prices and supply, so companies follow the actions of competitors to maintain their position in the market. For example, if one company lowers its prices, all the others will follow (Besanko et al., 2013).

Additionally, an oligopolistic market has high entry barriers, unlike the perfect competition which has free entry and exit. In the economic context, these barriers will allow an already existing oligopolistic company (incumbents) to benefit from an economic profit and at the same time cause losses for new companies (entrants) entering this sector of activity. These barriers can be strategic or structural to entry such as patents, startup costs, and brand loyalty. These barriers to entry cause the oligopolies to maintain their position and in doing so make more gains due to insufficient competition hence the difference between oligopoly and perfect competition (Besanko et al., 2013).

Another factor that marks the difference between the oligopolistic market and that of perfect competition is the mode of operation of market prices. Indeed, in the latter, prices are slightly higher than marginal cost, which leads to low or zero profits for the companies operating there. However, due to strong market power, oligopolies can raise prices, which gives them the advantage of earning more profits. Whereas a reduction in prices in this leads to a reduction in prices by competitors, thus, most oligopolies, don’t lower their prices due to fear of not making enough profit.

Interdependence is another essential characteristic of an oligopoly. Often a company’s decision on price and quantity affects the entire industry (its competitors). In this scenario, game theory is often used to analyze the market. Even though oligopolies are interdependent, they hold shares of market power, which means that a single firm cannot dictate price or supply, although this can sometimes lead to collusion. Oligopolies are often afraid to raise their prices so as not to lose their customers to other competitors just like in perfect competition (boycewire.com).

Overview and Comparison of Bertrand’s and Cournot’s Competition Models in Oligopolistic Markets

Cournot’s Competition Model (Product)

The demand curve in the oligopolistic market is downward sloping which implies that price is related to the quantity produced and that a firm’s output affects its prices and those of its competitors. The result is a strategic environment where the profit-maximizing level of production is relative to the level of production of competitors. This analysis is based on an 1838 model introduced by Antoine Augustin Cournot, which is like the 1949 Nash equilibrium concept introduced by John Nash (Vives, 1989).

The CCM considers two firms producing identical goods which will enable them to levy the same prices for their products. In CCM, each firm chooses the quantity Q1 and Q2 to produce based on the output of the other firm and maximizes its profits by taking it as given. Price equilibrium occurs when demand equals supply (price clears the market). In this model, all companies can sell their products thanks to their commitment to producing, and this does not generate any additional cost. However, in a situation where a company cannot sell all its products, it may continue to reduce its selling price until all the products are sold. A key feature here is that this model is based on assumptions by both firms about how much product a rival firm should produce (Besanko et al., 2013).

Nash equilibrium similar to CCM is the solution concept in game theory that describes how two or more players can achieve equilibrium if they each know the equilibrium strategies of the other player (Nadav and Piliouras, 2010).

Bertrand’s Competition Model (Price Setters)

Bertrand’s model assumes that each firm sets its price based on its rival’s price and that each firm stands ready to sell the quantity demanded at that price. As a result, each firm appropriates its rival’s price and sets its price to maximize its profits. When all firms reach equilibrium, they correctly predict the prices of their rivals. An example of a Bertrand oligopoly is Coke and Pepsi in the soft drink industry.

Bertrand’s equilibrium requires only two firms to achieve zero profit and zero marginal cost. Indeed, each company will always be motivated to undercut its rival and there will always be a balance. In today’s economic environment, companies produce identical products that are perfect substitutes, and the capacity of the company is not limited. Below is a graph illustrating a BCM.

In summary, the main difference between Cournot’s competition model and Bertrand’s competition model is the fact that they use quantity and price respectively as strategic variables. The interesting thing is that even though BCM uses price as a strategic variable, the prices of their products in the market are still lower than those of CCM which uses quantity (Darrough, 1993). Although CCM and BCM are different, it is an advantage for companies considering that the two models can be used over two distinct periods (Besanko et al., 2013). Also, unlike CCM, BCM has been heavily criticized for its lack of generality given that the model depends on constant marginal cost theory. CCM is seen to be applied in most businesses, where companies decide ahead of time on the quantity of production. These companies are obligated to sell all products and are adamant to react regardless of the rise or fall of their competitors’ production levels (Besanko et al., 2013).

Conclusion

Considering this discussion, it can be said that regarding perfect competition as a benchmark, the oligopolistic market has certain distinctive characteristics. Thus, different models are used to determine them. In real-world experiments, BCM is often used because competition is price-driven, unlike CCM which is quantity-driven. Furthermore, both BCM and CCM are used in both the short run and the long run respectively. Moreover, although these two models are more important and more common in oligopolistic markets, we also find the Stackelberg.

Reference

1. Besanko, D., Dranove, D., Shanley, M. and Schaefer, S., 2013. Economics of Strategy. John Wiley.

Introduction

In today’s fast-paced and competitive world, success is often associated with being the best, outperforming others, and striving for victory at all costs. The prevailing notion is that a competitive spirit is necessary for success. However, I argue that while competition can be a driving force for achievement, it is not the sole determinant of success. In this persuasive essay, I will present arguments and examples to demonstrate that success can be achieved through collaboration, innovation, and personal growth, without solely relying on a cutthroat competitive mindset.

Collaboration breeds success

Successful individuals and organizations recognize the power of collaboration. By working together, sharing ideas, and pooling resources, people can achieve collective success that surpasses individual accomplishments. Collaboration promotes a supportive and nurturing environment where individuals can leverage each other’s strengths and complement each other’s weaknesses. Examples such as open-source software development, global partnerships, and collective research efforts demonstrate that collaboration leads to groundbreaking innovations and remarkable achievements.

Innovation drives success

While competition can drive incremental improvements, it is often innovation that leads to groundbreaking advancements and transformative success. Instead of focusing on outperforming others, individuals who prioritize innovation seek to create new solutions, challenge existing paradigms, and improve the world around them. Innovators like Steve Jobs, Elon Musk, and Marie Curie have achieved remarkable success by thinking outside the box, taking risks, and pursuing their visions relentlessly. Innovation not only propels personal success but also contributes to societal progress and the betterment of humanity.

Personal growth as a measure of success

Success should not be solely defined by external achievements or the ability to defeat others. True success lies in personal growth, self-improvement, and fulfilling one’s potential. By setting personal goals, continuously learning, and developing valuable skills, individuals can achieve fulfillment and make meaningful contributions to society. Personal growth encompasses various aspects such as emotional intelligence, resilience, adaptability, and creativity, which are crucial for long-term success in an ever-evolving world.

Collaborative competition

It is important to acknowledge that competition can have positive aspects when it is channeled in a collaborative and constructive manner. Healthy competition can foster innovation, inspire individuals to push their limits, and encourage continuous improvement. However, it is essential to strike a balance between healthy competition and destructive rivalry. By promoting collaboration and sportsmanship within a competitive framework, individuals can cultivate a supportive environment where success is not measured solely by defeating others but by personal growth and collective achievements.

Conclusion

While competition can serve as a driving force, it is not the sole determinant of success. Collaborative efforts, innovation, and personal growth play crucial roles in achieving success and making a lasting impact. By embracing collaboration, nurturing innovation, and focusing on personal growth, individuals can succeed not only in their personal endeavors but also in contributing to the betterment of society. Ultimately, success should be measured by the fulfillment and positive impact one achieves, rather than simply outperforming others.

Introduction

An article published on 20 February 2019 by the Guardian discusses the concerns associated with the merger of two supermarket giants, ASDA and Sainsbury’s. The article resolves around Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) finding “extensive competition concerns” while investigating the proposed deal. Media has raised an issue concerning consumers and welfare, which are threatened by the potential merger. Many industrial economics topics are implied in the article, these include horizontal merger, welfare, market definition, etc. In this essay I will aim to focus on welfare implications and why anticompetitive mergers are of serious concern to the regulatory authorities. First, this essay will explore the extensive economics literature regarding the subject, then analyse the article with empirical evidence. ASDA and Sainsbury’s have currently put the deal on hold, in attempt to resolve the issues.

Horizontal merger is a merger or business consolidation that occurs between two or more firms in the same industry, that were previously competitors. Generally, firms merge to maximise efficiency, productivity and sizable gains. This can be achieved through price manipulation and monopolising a local market. By merging, firms aim to exploit their strength and newly obtained market share to maximise profits. Economic theory suggests that consumers always suffer welfare losses, specifically for larger horizontal mergers.

Literature review

Economic literature regarding the drawbacks and dangers of horizontal mergers indicate two major issues. The two main hypotheses “consumer protection” and “market concentration hurdle” (Ning Gao, Ni Peng, Norman Strong, 2017) are the anticompetitive products of the merger. Competition authorities are interested in both, protection of the customers and the market. In a more empirical approach (Tiago Pires, Andre´ Trindade, 2017) focuses on the effects on variety and prices, which will clearly be affected. In economic theory, such a major market consolidation is almost certainly going to increase the prices across all firms in the market. In a study by (Robin A., Prager T. and Timothy, 1998) price effects are empirically examined in mergers which substantially increase market concentration. Their findings illustrate an increase in market price and a significant shift in market power caused by the merger. In a different study conducted by (Emilie Dargaud and Carlo Reggiani, 2015) both positive and zero price effects are said to be possible outcomes of a horizontal merger. In the groceries and general merchandise market it is unlikely that no effect on the market price will be observed, due to high competition on prices and their volatility.

Product variety is another important aspect regarding horizontal merger frequently covered in economics literature. Theoretically a horizontal merger should decrease the product variety, as the jointly owned stations have no more incentive to compete. (Steven T. Berry and Joel Waldfogel, 2001) discover that theory alone cannot predict the effect on variety. Using an OLS regression the study discovers the opposite, indicating that consolidation promotes product variety. Another study in industrial organisation argues that a successful horizontal merger decreases product variety but becomes more efficient and concise, alternatively there will be an inefficient increase in product variety (Haimanti Bhattacharya and Robert Innes, 2016). In the context of a merger between two sophisticated and experienced giants, such as ASDA and Sainsbury’s the latter is unlikely. There are many competing theories regardless this subject. The outcome is very market dependent and situational. Product variety promotes consumer welfare, but high prices do not. The effect on welfare therefore can be very complex and difficult to predict.

Another important measure of success is efficiency. Intuitively a merger should have increased efficiency. Economic theory suggests that improved efficiency is expected, mostly because of economies of scale. Market power can grant lower operating costs as well as more resources to optimise the supply chain. In a recent study by (Alison Chapin and Stephen Schmidt, 2019) it is pointed out that when larger firms horizontally merge, they often exceed the efficient scale. In economics theory at a certain point beyond economies of scale, a firm becomes more inefficient with each extra unit of output. (Gamal Atallah, 2016) conducts a very relative subject, focusing on oligopolistic markets with homogenous goods. He finds that in such cases generally all mergers lead generates efficiency gains. The newly merged entity can gain different types of efficiencies: technological, scale, supply chain. In industrial organisation these may result in long term reduction of marginal costs and operating costs, sustaining long term efficiency gains.

A study on antitrust case selection among horizontal mergers, (Ning Gao, Ni Peng, Norman Strong, 2017) argues that there is strong empirical evidence suggesting that horizontal mergers are most often motivated by efficiency gains rather than anticompetitive purposes. Competition is what protects customer surplus, however in the groceries and general merchandise market with only few firms dominating the market consumers might suffer due to anticompetitive behaviour. The gain in market power can easily drive up the prices and boost producer surplus at the expense of consumer surplus. Literature suggests that consumer protection is most likely not of high priority to the competition authorities.

Article analysis

The article focuses on Competition and Markets Authority’s concern of the merger causing numerous anticompetitive issues in the market. “CMA said the merger would create a ‘substantial lessening of competition at both a national and local level’” (The Guardian, 2019). ASDA is a British supermarket retailer owned by the US Walmart. According to Kantar Worldpanel data, ASDA currently has 15.5% UK’s grocery market share. Sainsbury’s has control of 15.7%, resulting in the potential merged entity’s market share of 31.2%, which would overtake the current dominant giant Tesco’s with its 27.7%. CMA is concerned with having almost 60% of the market split between two firms.

Although economic theory suggests an increase in market price, Mike Coupe, the chief executive of Sainsbury’s promises a 10% price reduction. This can be achieved through efficiency gains obtained from the merger, as the marginal costs can decrease significantly. However, this promise, according to industrial economics literature, will not be kept in the long run. With such a drastic change in market consolidation, the prices will inevitably increase, perhaps negating the initial 10% price cut.

The CMA laid out limited options for the two firms to follow. These include calling off the deal all together or “requiring the merging companies to sell off a significant number of stores and other assets” (The Guardian, 2019). The requirement is slightly farfetched and aggressive by the competitive authorities. Despite the legislation that can be put against the deal ASDA and Sainsbury’s say that they will press on with the deal. Such conflict can be very detrimental for the two giants.

The article also points out that the merger can lead to a reduction in the quality of choice for the consumers. I do not agree with that statement, as mentioned by (Haimanti Bhattacharya and Robert Innes, 2016) variety will most likely decrease but impove the efficiency and quality of the products. The merged entity will most definitely not make such a mistake in the short run specifically as they will be vulnerable to losing the newly obtained market share with the added pressure from the media and CMA.

The article suggests that the merger will be harmful to consumers, however CMA does not seem to be as invested in protecting consumers as it is in protecting the overall UK’s grocery market balance. The study conducted by (Ning Gao, Ni Peng, Norman Strong, 2017) supports the argument that the merged entity is most likely focused on efficiency and market gains rather than disrupting the competitive nature of the market.

The fourth largest firm in the grocery market Morrisons, which occupies 10.5% of the market share (Kantar Worldpanel data, 2019), raised its concerns of the proposed deal to the CMA. Morrisons argued that the new entity would lead to a duopoly in the market and severely damage the competition (RetailGazzette, 2018). Morrisons, supported by economic theory, believes that prices would spike and the competition between the newly two leaders in the market could become less fierce. Tesco has also made a comment about the merger, mentioning that there would be very few customer benefits and no incentives to lower the prices. Economic theory suggests that if substantial efficiency gains can be achieved a reduction in prices is possible in order to increase the competitive advantage.

Conclusion

The 10-12bn pound deal is certainly going to impact UK’s market for groceries and general merchandise. Despite the extensive literature on horizontal mergers and its implications it is hard to predict how the merger will influence the prices, efficiency and consumer welfare. I think that the newly merged entity, if the deal does happen, will reduce its prices in the short run to attract investors, please the consumers and CMA. In the long run the anticompetitive issues will most likely arise as two firms will own 60% of the market.

As I walk out the door into the courtyard, I’m caught off guard by the blaring sun. It’s summertime. The grass is vivid and freshly cut. Birds can be heard chirping in the distance. There are no clouds in sight, giving way to scalding temperatures. And, on that day, one that seemed like the hottest day of the year, I am wearing a suit.

The occasion was a competition at the end of MITE, a program introduced me to the process and cooperation of engineering. I had spent two weeks working on an engineering-based project, which happened to be a robot, with a group. At the end of the program, our robot would compete in a competition against other robots to see which team had created the most effective one. Along with this, my group and I would have to present the robot and the many engineering processes that had been considered throughout the course of the program. The competition was the easy part, as I had previously participated in events such as FIRST Robotics. The presentation, however, was an entirely different story. I could present the project in a small group without much stress and anxiety. But the thought of 10 people, even if the majority were parents, sent my heart racing.

I continue walking through the courtyard until I reach the building I would be presenting in. I use the small towel in my hand to wipe away the sweat that continued to reappear, no matter how many times I had wiped it away. The heat isn’t helping my situation. As I enter the building, I am met with a face full of air conditioning.

“Finally. Something to help me cool off and calm down,” I think to myself.

The air conditioning was able to stop the sweat, thankfully, but the stress continued to mount. With the feeling of impending doom approaching, I sat through the competition, smiling to myself as the robot easily succeeded. I nearly forgot about presenting until the competition abruptly ended, much like a daydream during class. My heart began picking up the pace again. Even with such a familiar topic, I still had trouble keeping myself from shaking. I was absolutely terrified of public speaking, and terrified by the fact that I would be judged on it.

I enter the presentation room and quickly set up the PowerPoint along with my team. Just as we were finishing the setup, the parents and judges began to swarm into the room. I began to panic, more so than I already had. I felt embarrassed. I could feel my face as it turns the bright red that it usually becomes when I’m nervous. Everyone sits down, and the sound in the room drops to nothing. The presentation starts. My partners take the first few slides, so all I can do is sit and listen to the clock ticking in my head as the time slowly increase towards my part. The mouse clicks. It’s the first of my slides. I pause, as the voices of doubt and anxiety scream in my conscience. I take a breath, and I began.

Believe it or not, I survived the presentation by taking it slowly and thinking about what points I needed to get across. Three times over, to be exact. And, to be honest, it wasn’t all that bad. I have a tendency to overthink even the simplest of things, this being one of the many instances. Each time I get past another presentation, though, I feel more confident in my abilities. I know life is going to be more stressful than talking in front of a small group of people. I’m well aware of this. And, much like the presentation, I will work myself up about the many things thrown my way. But I know that each anxiety-riddled situation I live through will help me throughout life.

Introduction

The Cartel has been defined as the “supreme evil of antitrust” shaking the foundations of an ethical structure of the existing competition in the market. In 1996 the European Union introduced the concept of the leniency programme to ease the Commission’s burden and time in detecting cartel. Leniency programme gives immunity or discount in fine to the first undertaking in the cartel, reporting the Commission. Prior to the leniency programme cartel were mostly detected by own initiatives, customer complaint, notification or other such methods which were time-consuming and by the time the investigation concluded the cartel had already affected the market flow for an adequate time period. The first cartel detected by the leniency programme was in 1998 in the British sugar case. In the recent decade, leniency has become a common detection method for the Commission.

This essay will discuss and look into the utmost concern of the authorities to look into the policies adopted by the firms engaged in a cartel for the ethical conduct of the business. The leniency provision has opened the doors to debate upon its deterrent effect on the firms. An analysis in the manner of deterrence to expose and curb cartel in an efficient and effective way has been made with the introduction of the leniency programme when the application is brought by the undertaking which had taken enough compliance programme. The essay also discusses on the discounts granted in fines in the Leniency programme if is justified when the company has taken adequate steps to comply with the Competition law prior to the formation of the cartel to discourage its employees from getting involved in any act violating the Competition law. Lastly, the essay has established a relationship between leniency application, deterrence and compliance mechanisms adopted by the undertakings.

Legislative mechanisms

Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) lays two prominent rules for the policy of European Antitrust law. Article 101 of the TFEU states that if two undertaking by mutual consensus fixes some share in the market or the price to dominate the market it leads to the creation of a cartel. “Charging unfair prices, limiting productions or by refusing to innovate to the prejudice consumers” are some of the examples of prohibitions of firm dominating the market solely to abuse its position is laid down in the Article 102 of TFEU. The National Competition Authorities are the competent authorities to look into applications of the Articles 101and 102. A complaint filed before the Commission undergoes the similar procedure as the complaint filed by other legal methods. However, in “cartel cases, the fine is increased by a one-time amount equivalent to 15-25% of the value of one year’s sales as an additional deterrent and the maximum level of fine is capped at 10% of the overall annual turnover of a company.” The European Commission amended the Leniency Notice in 2006 where the provision that the undertaking involved in the cartel to receive immunity essentially has to give evidence and information about the cartel to the Commission first. The company giving out the information about the cartel voluntary has to submit the Corporate Statement either in a written or oral medium by disclosing its identity. The EU guidelines on methods of setting fines state that the undertakings having cooperated with the Commission effectively beyond the Leniency notice or any legal obligation, the basic amount of the fine may be reduced by the Commission. However, for the undertaking to qualify for immunity it has to fulfill some of “additional qualifications” such as submitting the application procedure according to the administrative procedure of the Commission. The business is also expected to end the cartel after submitting the application still upon the desire of the Commission the business may involve in the cartel even after the application to conserve the solidarity of the inspections.

Jurisprudential views in deterrence

Deterrence is an integral element to enforce the Competition law and policy. In many instances, the employees individually involved in the cartel are not penalized and the company they are associated during the formation of the cartel has to indemnify for the losses to the authorities. The technology advancement has made the communication easier and forming a cartel has become easier with just a call.

Detecting, prosecuting and punishing the offender are the three rules of Becker’s theory of deterrence. Werden and Simon, competition economists disagreeing with the Beckerian approach in law enforcement specifically in the cases involving cartels have opinioned that fines are less costly for the society thus are given priority than the imprisonment in the competition law cases. The prison sentences for a short period of time leaves a psychological and medicatic result on the people prosecuted with the white collar-crime and the expense is cheaper than paying heavy fines by the corporations. The different views on fines are ‘charging fines against firms and individual employees can be relatively less effective than imprisonment of the managers, because firms are protected by limited liability and they can easily indemnify managers by paying their own fines when they acted in the interest of the firm. On the other hand, the design of the optimal sanction against corporations should consider that firms can be sanctioned both by the market and by the presence of a principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers, and between managers and their subordinates.’ There is a possibility that the business involved in the cartels are not always motivated by profit margins but also are the result of some personal gain of the employees. Therefore undertakings take the recourse of strong compliance mechanism to curb the practice of the cartels by its employees to avoid the deterioration of the organizational image. It is important to note that the deterrence in some jurisdiction are civil in nature whereas some have criminal sanctions for the cases involving infringement of competition law. Imposing criminal sanctions in the infringement of competition law evolved in Europe with Ireland criminalizing the infringements of antitrust law in 1996. Some of the non-EU countries like the US, Japan and Korea have also imposed criminal sanctions for the undertakings involved in the cartels. The criminal sanction in the cases involving cartel has a clear deterrent effect in the undertakings as they can imbibe more compliance mechanism to keep a check on its employees. It can be argued in support of the criminal sanction that the individual involved in the cartels when are imposed with punishment cannot be indemnified by the business undertakings and leaves a direct impact on the individual. The deterrence effect of the charging high fines because of the involvement of a few people in the cartel also creates an imbalance in the financial structure of the whole organization which may act as a barrier to the healthy competition in the market of a specified product.

The judges and the bodies generally do not favor charging high fines as the firms may reduce its credibility and there is a possibility for the firm to get bankrupt which will reduce the deterrence effect of the firm. Buccirossi and Spagnolo, competition economists taking into consideration the standards laid down in the ‘Beckerian’ cost-benefit methodology’ have argued that the European Commission sanctions have left a very little deterrence effect prior to implementation the leniency programme. Leniency programme is a beneficial tool to investigate in an existing cartel if the level of sanction increases. However, Buccirossi and Spagnolo state that higher level of sanction does not qualify imprisonment as an effective mechanism to deter an individual. Imprisonment as a medium of sanction in the leniency programme has its own disadvantages as the government has to spend more to keep up the prison cells. In determining the amount of fine it is also important for the fine amount to exceed the profit which the undertaking gained from the cartel.

Cartel culture and participation in leniency programme

Cartel culture is common among the business enterprises having its trade in metals, oil and pharmaceuticals. The singularity among these businesses is the oligopoly market. The oligopoly market is dominated by a few firms and there are very few small firms in the market operating its business in these products so formation of cartel becomes easier with such economic structure. The firms having a large-scale operation to remain supreme form a cartel fixes the price collusively. In the enforcement of law relating to a cartel, the loss incurred by the enterprises by any of the cartel member cheating should be more than the profit earned from the cartel. The participation of the firms differs from the enforcement of the law. It is pertinent to note that while determining the necessary conditions for the sustainability of any illegal agreement the disproportionately of the loss from cheating and gain from the cartel plays an important role which is known as ‘incentive compatibility or self-enforcing constraint’.

The grant of immunity from fines to encourage the compliance may be beneficial partially when the mechanism is not existent in the organization. However, it is also difficult to give discounts in fines when the cartel is formed between the enterprises registered with a different jurisdiction. The difficulty in the enforcement of immunity can be discussed with the Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) case. ADM, an agriculture processing company based in Illinois, the US was found guilty in the cartel involved with international lysine and citric acid in 2003 by the European Commission. The cartel initially involved three international companies namely Ajinomoto from Japan, Masaru Yamamoto from Korea and ADM from the US and later joined by the five subsidiary companies of the existing companies in the cartel. The cartel first met in Mexico in June 1992 followed by their meeting in Paris in the same year in October to discuss and fix the future price schedule. In the first meeting, ADM was dominated by the two undertakings and there was disagreement in the cartel for the equal distribution of the share in the market. A fake agenda and later an imaginary lysine association was put forth in the second meeting in Paris by ADM without leaving an impression on the members of the cartel about their future course of action to approach the law enforcement authorities. ADM started to cooperate with FBI soon after the conclusion of the meeting in Paris. To get substantial evidence the meetings held after 1992 were recorded in the form of audio and video recordings. The cartel continued till 1995 until the FBI raided ADM’s Decatur and Heartland Lysine office in Chicago. The Japan, home office of Heartland Lysine and Ajinomoto was duly informed about the raid and the evidence was destroyed but some of the documents were left unnoticed while destroying the evidence which was stored at the house of the individual representing Ajinomoto. When the investigation was initiated by the authorities the President of the ADM Europe food additive division, Barrie Cox was interviewed in order to determine the amount of fine. The ‘immunity agreement’, a plea agreement was entered between the government and the President to negotiate and settle the charges on the organization. It was established by the authorities that only the President of the ADM’s food division would be exempted from any charges and the CEO and the President and the Board of Director, Andreas and Wilson respectively who participated in the meeting would not get an exemption from any plea agreement. Subsequently, ADM concurred to pay a fine of $100 million and also consented that the employees would cooperate with the government. In the District Court’s appeal by Andreas and Wilson, it was contented as a defense that the cartel continued till 1995 to deceive the other members of the cartel in pursuance to help the authorities with evidence. However, their active participation in determining the sales and price level in the market per se amounted to the violation of the antitrust law and they were aware of the consequences of the act with the knowledge of the act. ‘Effect theory’ originating from the Gypsum case played a prominent role in deciding the final decision of the ADM’s case. The court held that the ‘the defendants must have intended to “help accomplish” the known goal of the conspiracy is entirely consistent with the reasoning and holding of U.S. Gypsum.’ According to the effect theory, the criminal intention includes the intent of the undertaking to enter into an anti-competition agreement and the steps taken by it in cartel conspiracy.

In the year 2000, the parties were presented before the European Court of Justice. One of the key points in the decision of the case was to determine the validity of the method applied for fining. The Commission held that the market structure plays a vital in analyzing the method of calculation of the fine and that the EUR 20 million is a hefty amount and is imposed only in very serious infringement cases. The Commission while looking into the deterrent effect of the fines stressed upon the undertaking’s prior knowledge for the commission of any anti-competitive act. The principle of ‘equal treatment’ enshrined in the Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was considered while reducing the fine imposed by the Commission by US 9th Circuit Court.

In such a peculiar situation when some of the cartel members are a non- EU members the conflict of jurisdiction arises. The fairness and equal treatment of the undertakings are possible when the principle pillars of the law are similar in nature. The ECJ held that the fairness was not observed by the courts of the US and the sanction conferred was restricted to the undertakings involved in the cartel of the US and ordered the Commission to bear ‘one-tenth of the cost incurred’ by ADM and the remaining amount of the fine was to be borne by ADM.

Thus the complexity of the law of different jurisdictions and forming a focal point in delivering the final judgment has been one of the most challenging parts in the Leniency applications. Further, the applicant’s involvements in the cartel in dominating the market and prices also have to be taken into consideration while fixing the amount of fine. Nevertheless, the involvement of the top management of the undertaking in forming a cartel shakes the foundations of the compliance mechanisms adopted by the undertaking.

Importance of compliance mechanism in determining the deterrence

Compliance methods are the steps taken by the undertaking to make the employees aware of the consequences of the formation of a cartel. If the employee of a firm engages in forming a cartel after taking steps to adhere against anti-competition practices the intensity of the deterrence is affected by the level of its compliance. Beckenstein and Gable, antitrust economists found in a survey with the independent and in-house US antitrust practitioner’s that ‘frequency of violations of the Sherman Act and on the causes that led firms to commit them’ that the ignorance of the law and ‘ambiguity in law’ were the prominent reason for the anti-competitive practices. The Nielsen and Parker research exhibit a market-oriented result stating that the compliance level is determined by the scale of business operation. Thus, the larger the scale of the business more is the compliance mechanism required.

According to the Office of Trade Fair’s report on ‘The impact of competition interventions on compliance and deterrence’ the three basic pillars of compliance are ‘knowledge and awareness of competition law, sanctions and enforcement, and voluntary compliance measures’ respectively. Knowledge and awareness help the employees of the firms in limiting their activities to dominate the market. It also helps the undertakings to avoid any breach in the anticompetitive practice and also to keep a track of the legally identified risk areas. It is interesting to note that the liability of the infringement by the subsidiary companies rests with the holding company. Sanction and enforcement encourage the management to ensure to have a strong compliance mechanism to prevent the undertaking against the penalty. Lastly, voluntary compliance measure is the measures taken by companies to implement the agenda to build a strong compliance network within the undertaking. Leniency policy is one of the most important tools for an undertaking in determining the deterrent effect.

It has been questioned by many jurists if the companies having taken strong compliance mechanisms granted heavy discount in fines in leniency programme is justified or not. The steps taken by the Commission in deciding the fines of the Leniency application clear that compliance cannot be taken as a sole method to get discount as the undertakings can set up a compliance method after fling the Leniency application to avail the discount in fines. In the case of Arriva, no discount in fines was granted as the Office of Trade Fair found during the investigation that the senior managers trained in the compliance programme were actively involved with the cartel. Thus, by making a logical analysis between the deterrent effect and compliance programme adopted by an undertaking it can be deduced that the compliance is an effective tool in determining the credibility of measures taken by an undertaking to curb any anti-competition practice but it is an easy tool for a company to escape from the heavy fines.

Conclusion

To conclude leniency and compliance form the part of the same thread to escape a heavy fine. However, compliance may be taken as an excuse to be granted a discount in fines only in certain exceptional cases where the top management is not involved in the cartel and the undertaking has taken sufficient means to comply with the leniency policy. The effect of deterrence can be determined if the undertaking filing the leniency application suffers a loss in production after the payment of the fine. Thus, the grant of heavy discount in fine is not justified when the undertaking has taken sufficient compliance mechanisms to prevent the formation of a cartel. The effect of deterrence after granting heavy discounts in fines can be described in the words of Robert McNamara, an American business executive, ‘One cannot fashion a credible deterrent out of an incredible action.’

The relationship between competition and stability is also ambiguous and dominated by two schools of thoughts in theoretical literature: “competition-fragility” and “competition-stability” hypotheses. The competition fragility hypothesis (also called as franchise value paradigm), states that increased competition among banks leads to greater banking risk-taking and thereby, greater financial fragility. This is because intense bank competition results in a reduction in market power as well as profit margin, which weakens the franchise value of banks. Therefore, in order to cover the losses from the decline in the franchise value, banks will have greater incentives to take on more risks for profits. This view is in literature theoretically modeled by Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley (1990). Using a model of risk-taking by banks with two periods and two states, Keeley (1990) shows that as competition increases in the banking market, risk-taking by banks also increases and becomes contagious. Allen and Gale (2000) corroborate this finding in a model of competition and risk-taking aimed at demonstrating the agency problem.

They pointed out that when firms are debt-financed (e.g. deposits for banks), managers acting in the interest of the shareholders have an incentive to take excessive risk since the manager’s performance is assessed based on quarterly returns, with debt holders bearing the downside risk while the shareholders benefit from upside potential return. As a corollary, Hellman et al., (2000) noted that stiff competition leads to financial institutions making riskier investments in order to generate sufficient profits for shareholders or in order to maintain their market share, thereby engendering financial stability. Besanko and Thakor (1993) show that increased competition leads banks to take greater risk because of eroding the informational rents initiated from relationship banking activities. This leads banks to decrease their incentives to screen potential borrowers, thereby, resulting in decline in credit quality of banks. As a general view of this hypothesis, deregulation which results in more bank entry and competition, leads to greater fragility. Likewise, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) assert that more competition with lower bank margins can have a negative impact on prudent behaviour of banks, thereby, resulting in more risk taking. The competition fragility hypothesis thus argues that increased competition leads to greater risk taking by banks and thereby greater fragility in banking system. In other words, higher levels of competition, increase instability risk.

The competition-stability hypothesis of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) on the other hand, assumes competition in both loan and deposit sides of the market. Focusing on the deposit side of the balance sheet, it is assumed that banks can earn higher rents since they pay lower deposit rates in less competitive markets. However, in a moral hazard environment, as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), on the lending side of the market, banks can charge higher interest rates to borrowers in a less competitive market. The higher borrowing rates may enhance the risk-taking behaviour of banks and thus, leading to an increase in the default risk of banks. This view, which is also called the ‘risk shifting’ paradigm, generally suggests that higher levels of competition results in more, rather than less stability.

Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) extend the Boyd and De Nicolo model by introducing imperfect correlation across borrowing firms’ default probabilities. As in the Boyd and De Nicolo model, their model also covers “risk shifting effect”, in the sense that more competition leads to lower loan rates, lower default and bankruptcy risk and lower risk-taking by banks. However, because their model allows for imperfect correlation across firms, it suggests the existence of “margin effect”, which purports that lower loan rates decrease overall bank revenues, and therefore, this would probably lead to greater bank risk-taking and bank failures. Thus, the resulting net effect between bank competition and financial stability is not clear, since these two effects work in opposite directions. Specifically, based on Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) model, the margin effect is shown to dominate the risk-shifting effect in more competitive markets, implying that more competition in a market increases bank risk-taking, and thus, results in greater financial fragility. On the other hand, the risk shifting effect is shown to dominate the margin effect in a more concentrated banking market, suggesting that increased competition leads to lower bank risk-taking and bank failure risk in such markets.

In short, the competition stability hypothesis argues that competition improves financial system stability due to its effects on lowering lending rates thereby reducing probability of default and consequently systemic risk (Nicolo & Jalal & Boyd, 2006). Higher levels of competition therefore result in more (rather than less) stability.

The relationship between competition and efficiency in banking is not so clear-cut and empirical findings are mixed. For instance, Beck and Hesse (2006) using bank-level data set on the Ugandan banking system during 1999-2005, found that market structure played a limited role in determining bank efficiency in Uganda. Instead, the found that bank-level characteristics, such as bank size, operating costs, and composition of loan portfolio explained a large proportion of cross-bank, cross-time variation in spreads and margins.

Banyen & Biekpe (2020) examined the causal relationship between bank competition and efficiency in five regional economic zones of Africa over the 2007–2014 period using data from 405 banks from 47 African countries. The results show a steady rise in bank competition and efficiency in Africa and the five sub-regional markets overtime. The results also support the quiet life hypothesis in Africa, especially in the East African Community, Arab Maghreb Union and Southern African Development Community.

Moyo (2018) investigated the relationship between competition, efficiency and soundness in the South African banking sector. The study used a data set of 17 local and international banks for the period 2004–2015 and stochastic frontier models to analyse efficiency. They found that the impact of competition on efficiency depended on the measure of competition used. When using the Lerner index there was a negative effect of competition on efficiency while the opposite was true when using the theoretically robust Boone indicator.

Buchs and Mathisen (2005) assessed the degree of bank competition and efficiency with regard to banks’ financial intermediation in Ghana. Using panel data, they found evidence for a non-competitive market structure in the Ghanaian banking system, which they opined could have been hampering financial intermediation. The authors argued that the structure, as well as the other market characteristics, constitutes an indirect barrier to entry thereby shielding the large profits in the Ghanaian banking system.

Schobert (2008) used quarterly data for Czech banks to investigate the relationship and causality between competition and efficiency. Using the Granger-causality-type analysis, the findings supported a negative causality only running from competition to efficiency. Based on the results, the author rejected the intuitive ‘quiet life’ hypothesis and concluded that a negative relationship existed between competition and efficiency in the Czech banking system.

Using a unique database for 74 countries and for firms of small, medium, and large size, Demirguc-Kunt, et al (2004) assessed the effect of banking market structure on access of firms to bank finance. They found that bank concentration increases obstacles to obtaining finance, but only in countries with low levels of economic and institutional development. They noted that the effect is exacerbated by more restrictions on banks’ activities, more government interference in the banking sector, and a larger share of government-owned banks.

Introduction

Current business opt to exist mainly in monopoly form so as to secure a large percentage of the market. Existence of these firms may be due to state decisions that privilege some businesses from competition (Foss & Klein, 2018). Such firms operate in less competition and goods have no substitutes. However, these enterprises cause a decrease in economic development due to saturation of supply in less fields.

Klein’s View of Monopoly

Klein’s view monopolies as corporations that are secured by the state to solely provide certain goods and services. He argues that such markets are characterized by few sellers but a large margin of buyers (Foss & Klein, 2018). Klein’s conjecture is that monopolists obtain their pricing methods from substantial sources such as, if the seller possess one unit of the good (Amir, Gama & Maret, 2019), if there exists multiple choices of the goods or if multiple sellers have the same reservation prices.

According to Klein, the state influences creation of monopolies in several ways. For instance, the government may provide patent rights of ownership to specific firms (Foss & Klein, 2018). The state also may offer exclusive grants, licenses and charters to businesses or even provide tariffs and quotas to some corporations.

Solution to Monopolies

In order to restrict existence of incumbent firms, Klein argues that the government may opt to reduce barriers to entry of firms in the market. He also argues that the government should pave way for business and not to interfere with such operations.

Klein claims that the anti-trust policy is an ‘ex post facto’. He affirms that the policy is only suitable for only an available relevant market which is practically hard to define (Kaiser, 2018). He argues that the strategy is long lasting only that firms are dynamic and keep changing over time.

I concur with Klein’s contend on monopolies. He assesses the advantages of such syndicates as well as their impact on business economy in the long run. For an efficient business society, competition is critical (Foss & Klein, 2018). Therefore, the government should opt to advocate for many businesses to ensure a diverse business environment.

Conclusion

Competition is a key factor that navigates the course which businesses take. Therefore, existence of monopolies despite their essentialness, should be limited. This helps create an advanced business economy full of competitive ideas that help yield a better society.

References

1. Amir, R., Gama, A., & Maret, I. (2019). Environmental quality and monopoly pricing. Resource and Energy Economics, 58, 101109.
2. Foss, K., Foss, N. J., & Klein, P. G. (2018). Uncovering the hidden transaction costs of market power: A property rights approach to strategic positioning. Managerial and Decision Economics, 39(3), 306-319.
3. Kaiser, B. (2018). Antitrust and Regulation in American Economic History. The Oxford Handbook of American Economic History, 2, 325.

Sports are an integral part of the lives of billions of people around the world, with most if not all types of sport bearing the use as an outlet of competition. Now then, competition in sports can be thought of as a contest with the goal or objective of defeating the opposition resulting in a zero-sum game as there can only be one side which wins and another side which does not, so goes the nature of competition (Simon, R. L., Torres César R., & Hager, P. F., 2019). To go along with this nature, it means that there is an overemphasis place on winning as the process of playing the sport is rendered nil in comparison to winning like that is where the value lies in this case with the losing party being considered a failure due to their incapability to win. The consequence of this might be that sometimes, competition can be thought of as completely immoral due to reinforcing the social value that only winning matters.

Competition itself is intrinsically self-centered because the purpose is to defeat the opposition although it may be more team centered at group type sports such as basketball, baseball, soccer, etc. Therefore the purpose of competition is to enhance the capabilities of a participant to ensure the victory by any means possible. However, this is not without limits as there needs to be a set of rules in place to ensure proper sportsmanship and fair-play (Simon, R. L., Torres César R., & Hager, P. F., 2019).

Normally these rules take form as a constitutive set of strict rules to define a legitimate guideline of possible moves within the boundaries of fair-play to prevent as much as possible unfairness and define the conditions of victory and defeat within the respective sports. This means that within competition there are a set of rules especially in the context of sports as the rules will specify different accounts of actions that may be taken as cheating within different sports since one rule set cannot cover the bases for the difference in how different sports are played.

Within the context of sports-based medication, the term doping is used to refer to a subject that has had an indication of the use of performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs), along with inappropriate use of pharmacologically active substances or abuse of certain medical therapies (Negro, M., et al., 2019). According to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) substances or methods may be prohibited if it able to account for any two of the following three criteria: (1) the capability to improve performance in sports; (2) represents a potential health risk to the user; and (3) if it is determined to violate the the ‘spirit of sport’. The ‘spirit of sport’ concept is explained further within the fundamental rationale of the World Anti-Doping Code (Sumner, C., 2017). This meant that doping is already considered as a factor that violates the principle of sportsmanship

The situation depicted under scenario A defines a tender process for the government of Queensland Beaujolais. The whole scenario related to dissolution of the state run courier and distribution of the relative service through private tenders. This process is a largely incorporated system of disintegration of services under a tender based obligation for the state based courier services. The essentials of this entire process is based on the Competition and consumer Act 2010 . This act signifies the availability of sufficient jurisdictional conservation to the customers as well as the companies operating across the product or service sectors in Australia. The fact that there are specific limitations in the ways of doing business and these specifications need to be assessed and acknowledged in context of the entire proceeding based over this particular act. The act provides consumers additional opportunities and that too in reference to smooth transition across the service segments . The overall operability factor which is based on determining effective results are put in to place under this act.

Scenario A describes a crucial process of corporations managing the competitive attributes that are related to a system of service management. The entire system of managing services under this scenario is impacted by their respective partnerships and alliance based operational structure. The fact that a tender process needs to be carried out efficiently and fairly is not at all liable under the available conditions. Two of the major service providing organizations have been involved under certain agreements and conditions that initiate breach of the part IV B of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 . The misconducts are linked to Misuse of Market Power: section 46 Exclusive, Dealing: section 47 and Resale Price and Maintenance: section 48 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. The act suggests availability of strictly competitive ideology for promoting cost effective operations and increased service orientation across the organizations . On the other hand, companies involved under this particular agreement have decided not to compete with each other and have a self designed approach to the entire process of tender management. This is a complete violation of part IV B of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and thus cannot be undertaken. The overall operability index across this design segment is also based on limiting the competition factor across the sector and improvise the detailed orientation of adjectives all along the process. The limitations and obligations are based on identifying a less effective aspect for the common interest and a more self centred approach for the two participating institutions.

Decisions taken by the CEO’s of both the companies that are the Petasos Couriers Australia Ltd and All Queensland Deliveries Ltd are far from being in to public interest and thus are definitely not according to the part IV B of the Competition and consumer Act 2010 . Both the CEO’s have targeted exclusion of public interest and work ethics by complying over an agreement on their own. This agreement has several illustrations that signify the limitation of the act and its ineffectiveness. The introduction of this agreement entitled them with additional support factor for them and also initiated them with relative accomplishments which are not available generally . A major illustration of the irregularities which are available across the agreement can be assessed by acknowledging the clause 7 of the agreement 1. This clause clearly signifies that in case this agreement was not in place, there must have provided a much higher price range as compared to the current figure. In addition to this, acknowledgement of the fact that there are minimized competitive pricing across the related segments of services. The entire pricing process is to be carried out according to the agreement and thus there is a significant chances of irregularities which can occur with the availability of this particular agreement. The agreement limits the chances of competitive pricing, negotiation and benefits for the consumers. It also limits the entry of any new player under this industry and thus the overall operational accomplishments under this sector tends to enhance the entire resulting process and involves less fortunate advancements across the jurisdictions. Both of the companies involved under the agreement are responsible for exercising full control over the process of courier delivery and thus initiate a more advanced set of design attribute linked to the process.

This scenario describes a typical business structure that is put in to place for elimination of competitive attribute across the process of business management. The accomplishments and attributes for success are directly linked to each other and thus the illustrations under this section are perfectly justified all along the entire process of business management. The scenario describes attributes of an Australian online bookstore named BPL . This bookstore has been using its influence over two major courier service providing organizations named PCA and AQD. This initiative is put in to place for cutting the entry of a new online bookstore company named DPL that is backed by an American bookstore giant Congo Inc. The process used under this particular segment can be considered as less constitutional and law abiding as it limits the competitive attributes that are available across the respective regions. Each of the companies must be provided with sufficient supportive attribute to function independently and thus prohibiting them for attaining a responsive structure is more likely to affect the entire situation. The interventions carried out by BPL are a direct violation of the section 45(2) of Competition and consumer Act 2010 under the obligations of anti-competitive arrangements. The fact that there are significance based operational illustrations that are linked to assess the growing needs and requirements of the markets must be assessed by the companies and competitors available along the industry.

The activities carried out by BPL across the Queensland market by development of agreements are liable to signify the overall impacts and disassociate it from the legal framework of business conduction. The Competition and consumer Act 2010 provides equal opportunities to each of the fragments across a sector to flourish on the basis of equal opportunities and challenges . But the process carried out under the provided scenario describes a constant breach of the part VI A of this act. Thus, the whole process can be considered as less significant in accordance with the described attributes and association factorials. The overall operability index that is linked to the process of managing a competitive association is more likely to affect the process and indulge less liberal operational ideology across the online bookstore industry. In addition to this, the obligations that are put in to place justify the lacking competitive identity presented across the process. This signifies the entire framework and illustrates limitations that are facilitated to promote better decision making across the industry. Depriving of subordinate services to any new entrant by an established organization across a sector is not at all useful under an efficiently organized and competitive market . This is also directly related to influencing the strengths and opportunities under an organizational dimension. The availability of a fairly organized sector through competitive attributes are largely helpful in managing better product pricing and efficient service quality all along the process. Each of the participants across an industry have equal rights to indulge in to services or products facilitation and interruption from any of the relative competitors can be considered as unlawful as well as unethical. Thus the initiatives taken by BPL for controlling its traditional hold on the respective sector. DPL is liable to avail equal opportunities across the sector and thus is eligible for a better design across the industry in order to cope with the attributes put in to place by BPL. In addition to this, the initiatives taken by BPL are also liable to limit the services for available consumer strength.

BPL must undertake suitable approach for improving its operational expectations despite of indulging in to the agreements for limiting developments at DPL. The agreement is not only restricts the growth prospects for DPL but its also affects both the courier companies as they would have got better business while working with DPL. However, they are being compensated well by BPL, but the increase in organizational proceedings would have been largely helpful for the company. In addition to this, BPL is one section across this agreement process that has been taking on the additional burden of expenses which it has to pay based on the agreement. The entire process of this agreement based business limitation is liable to subordinate better accomplishment and attitude for helping the industry grow and eventually develop as a whole . In addition to the financial obligations, BPL is also liable to indulge under a strict legal framework as there are specific limitations that are intended to promote less complex competitive approach for the participants under this sector. Thus the obligations linked to the part VI A of Competitive and consumer act 2010 are violated and thus a smooth design must be put in to place for describing a better relativeness and coordination across the process.

This scenario describes an authorization based process that is put in to place for making decisions in an informed manner and achieving better understanding of the resource based approaches all along the process. The entire scenario is based on discussions for relative association and accomplishment of better understanding that is ideally placed across the delivery market comparisons . The website providing updated information across the delivery perspectives provides its users to include any lacking attributes and make changes according to the available scenario. As long as the information that is being provided is genuine and in compliance with the website’s regulations, there is no legal consideration involved. The entire process of managing the reach and accomplishment process is assessed across the website and a detailed report is provided. This particular factor is capable of providing the facilitators an equal and even opportunity for progress and customer acquisition. The platform is also helpful in being in to a whole engagement process and is liable to engage across defined attributes extensively . The whole structure of program is based on building a smooth transition and a functional process that is highly effective in acknowledging the changes and additions across the whole process of delivery management.

This process also helped in availing promotional attributes across the desired networks. Promotions are the basic developmental designs associated with a courier delivery company. As most of the operations are largely associated with the design segments and there are suitable amount of obligations related to the structure marketing and advertising, the companies can also provide innovation and creativity across its promotional aspects related to such comparative websites. Social media platforms and online website for comparisons based promotions can be the two major attributes which can be used by the company in order to avail efficient promotional obligations. The promotional process can be initiated with providing a desired range of diversity and inclusion of better technological tools which can eventually bring a major impact across the desired network of operation. The process of managing operational aspects for promotions can be sufficient to impact and associate better outcomes for managing diverse range of customers and the related promotional abilities.

Availability of controls at each subsequent level of operation is largely based on achieving better results in a marketing process. The overall operability index is based on amount and extent of controls which are involved in the process. Controlling these attributes are largely incorporated to achieve better design sections and suitable operability indexes for the whole process of operations management . The overall operability across these attributes are based on distribution of controls across executives and management personals. The entire structure of control system is based on designing the obligations and attract eventual outcomes and design attributes for associating the increased requirements across the sections. Controlled and coordinated operations are suitable for facilitating better design based inclusions and are liable to operate on defined perspectives across the business. Another major factor which is associated with the included marketing plan is based on associating differential designs and associations across control segments. Thus the whole system of obligation is linked to promote better control to the participant companies across the relative attributes. This initiative will also help the customers in getting improved services and a through undertaking across the industrial obligations.

In the second section of the assessment, it is desirable that there are limitations and attributes for formulating a distinctive amount of support to an acquisition process. The whole acquision process is liable to formulate and signify the growth possibilities all along the process. The decision made by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is based on sufficient evidences under the section 50 . This section describes the availability of sufficient possibilities for a merger process to be accomplished. The undertaking provided by Nutrien Ltd is sufficient to acknowledge the decision’s importance in making the whole process of acquision efficient. The entire structure that is linked to the whole sector is assessed ideally through including better results and achieving smooth transition through the industry. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s decision for availing better responses are directly supported by the available attributes suggested by the two participating companies. The accomplishments are perfectly based on diversifying the challenges and retaining better outcomes for the entire acquision process . The availability of supportive attributes placed the foundations for finalization of the decision. The decision taken under this particular attribute must be kept in accordance with the described obligations and associate the design fragments for improvising the relative development inclusion. In addition to this, the review that is being reconsidered is not at all required and it can be eliminated. The entire process has been justified by the section 87B and thus it can be validated to promote better responsibilities all along the process. The obligations and attributed are perfectly framed and settled, thus there is not at all any reconsideration is required. If any further amendment across the decision is made, it would be considered as a major violation in terms of the section 87B that has been widely used earlier . The accountabilities that are linked to each fragment of decision is sufficient for justifying the approach and thus it needs to be intact based on the initial associations.

References

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Introduction

Competition is an inherent aspect of human nature, driving individuals and societies to push their limits, innovate, and achieve greatness. In this persuasive essay, we will explore why competition is necessary for success. By fostering personal growth, promoting excellence, and driving innovation, competition acts as a catalyst for achieving one’s goals and reaching new heights of success.

Personal Growth

Competition challenges individuals to step out of their comfort zones and strive for continuous improvement. When we compete, we are forced to confront our weaknesses, identify areas for growth, and develop the skills necessary to excel. It pushes us to set higher standards for ourselves, leading to personal growth and self-discovery. Through competition, we learn valuable lessons about resilience, perseverance, and determination. It teaches us how to embrace failure, learn from setbacks, and come back stronger. The journey towards success, fueled by healthy competition, molds our character, shapes our values, and instills essential life skills that are vital for personal growth and development.

Excellence and Achievement

Competition is a driving force behind excellence and achievement. When individuals and teams compete against each other, they strive to outperform one another, raising the bar for success. The desire to succeed and be recognized for one’s achievements ignites a sense of motivation and dedication. Competition fosters a culture of excellence, where individuals are encouraged to give their best efforts, surpass their limits, and achieve outstanding results. It creates a platform for individuals to showcase their talents, skills, and capabilities, ultimately leading to personal and professional success.

Innovation and Progress

Competition spurs innovation and progress in various fields. When multiple individuals or organizations compete, they are compelled to think creatively, develop new strategies, and find unique solutions to outperform their competitors. The pursuit of success in a competitive environment drives the need for continuous improvement and innovation. It leads to the creation of groundbreaking technologies, advancements in scientific research, and improvements in products and services. Competition fosters an environment that rewards innovation, pushing society forward and driving progress in all aspects of life.

Motivation and Goal Setting

Competition provides individuals with a sense of purpose and motivation. It sets clear goals and benchmarks to strive for, providing a sense of direction and focus. The desire to succeed in a competitive environment motivates individuals to work harder, dedicate their time and energy, and make the necessary sacrifices to achieve their objectives. Competition provides a platform for individuals to challenge themselves, measure their progress, and celebrate their accomplishments. It fuels ambition, determination, and the drive to succeed.

Collaboration and Networking

Contrary to popular belief, competition also fosters collaboration and networking. When individuals or teams compete, they have the opportunity to interact with like-minded individuals, exchange ideas, and learn from each other’s experiences. Healthy competition encourages individuals to build relationships, share knowledge, and collaborate to achieve common goals. These connections and networks built through competition can lead to future collaborations, partnerships, and opportunities for success.

Conclusion

Competition is a necessary ingredient for success. It drives personal growth, promotes excellence, fuels innovation, provides motivation, and encourages collaboration. Embracing competition enables individuals and societies to reach their full potential, achieve remarkable accomplishments, and contribute to the advancement of our world. By recognizing the value of healthy competition, we can harness its power to propel us towards success in all aspects of life. Let us embrace competition as a catalyst for growth, excellence, and the realization of our dreams.