The Cuban Missile Crisis was very important because it redefined the military of the United States and the Soviet Union of the Socialist Republics. Before the crisis, the United States was considered to be in a better position to strike the Soviet Union first because it had its nuclear warheads strategically positioned in Italy and Turkey. It meant that in case the two countries went to war, the United States will be in a position to strike first (Part 78).
The United States also had more warheads which were very accurate compared to that of the Soviet Union. However, the growing tension between the United States and Cuba prompted Cuba to request the Soviet Union to station its nuclear warheads in Cuba. The Soviet Union accepted the offer and started constructing nuclear plants in Cuba meant for an offensive attack. For the first time in the history of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union had nuclear warheads station within a range that could strike the United States.
The United States had several options to take in response to this threat. The options included initiating a preemptive attack on Cuba, destroying the plant, and installing a US-friendly government. John F. Kennedy, the then president of the United States, ruled out this option that was considered by the military top brass as the most appropriate. He chose diplomacy instead of military attack (Fink 44). However, this came at a cost to the United States. The agreement that the United States made with the Soviet Union was that the government of the United States had to dismantle its nuclear stations in Italy and Turkey.
This was widely seen as a loss to the United States (Booker 52). It meant that its capacity to strike the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons was significant. The agreement that the United States will not in any way try to interfere with the government of Cuba was another loss to the United States. Bernhard says that the biggest beneficiaries of this conflict were the Soviet Union and Cuba (46). The United States and its allies in Europe were seen to have lost the war.
Significance of Dien Bien Phu
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu was another big loss to NATO during the Cold War period (Gaddis 85). In this battle, the French Union Forces and the State of Vietnam fought against Viet Minh supported by the Soviet Union, China, and East German. Viet Minh was fighting the colonial power (France) to free Vietnam from the colonial forces (Phillips 62). France, on the other hand, was trying to maintain its control over Vietnam as one of its colonies in the region. Since the United States did not join the war directly, it had shared interests with France given the fact that they were both members of NATO.
The French forces had a clearly defined war plan, but it ignored the fundamental issues about the counterattack plan that Viet Minh had given that it was supported directly by a strong power at that time (Soviet Union) that provided it with artillery and helped in planning the war (Johnson and Part 47). Because of these fundamental mistakes, the French forces were defeated in this war which led to the independence of Vietnam. It was a loss to France and all its NATO allies, including the United States of America.
Works Cited
Bernhard, Nancy. U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947 – 1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print.
Booker, Martin. Monsters, Mushroom Clouds, and the Cold War: American Science Fiction and the Roots of Postmodernism, 1946-1964. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001. Print.
Fink, Carole. Cold War: An International History. Boulder: Westview Press, 2014. Print.
Gaddis, John. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin Press, 2005. Print.
Johnson, Ross, and Eugene Parta. Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe : a Collection of Studies and Documents. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010. Print.
Phillips, Steve. The Cold War: Conflict in Europe and Asia. Oxford: Heinemann, 2001. Print.
The cold war ended in 1989 and a mutual peaceful mood engulfed the universe as all parties ushered in a new era. The Berlin Wall was dismantled and a disintegration of the Soviet Union as well as new independence for the Eastern Europe countries was witnessed.
This was a brand new start after a volatile era that would have seen the use of weapons of mass destruction that made people live in fear. It was described as the ‘End of History’ based on the fact that the gross conflicts between nations had come to a halt. 1 This paper looks at how the United States relations have impacted and effected Pakistani – Indian relations in post cold war.
The cold war brought about distrust and suspicion between the United States, India, and Pakistan but the events of post cold war have changed this relationship. The United States and India have developed closer ties courtesy of factors that are directly influenced by individual leadership, domestic leadership and structural leadership.
These countries now cooperate at different levels that include diplomacy, economic development, as well as strategic development. The end of the cold war led these countries to rethink their stand against each other and they came to discover that they needed to cooperate in order to move forward. However, this has not been the case with Pakistan and India who still harbor grudges against each other to date.
The United States was in support for India during the cold war and this was the main reason why it provided it with military equipment for the war. However, the US failed to get the kind of support it expected from India, which was more bent towards forging ahead, and taking part in the war independently without relying on the super power.
India’s non-alignment was disputable since it was a weak country as compared to the American and Soviet Union countries. The 1970s saw India ditch the United States despite her efforts to support it and joined the Soviet Union side that seemed more successful.
The Soviet Union in turn supported India and protected it from its enemies. Pakistan at this time happened to be India’s archrival due to its support for the U.S. in its endeavors. Pakistan in return got favors from the United States that included military and economic assistance.
The U.S. embarked on a non-proliferation process that was aimed at denying South Asia the use of nuclear weapons. India was deeply agitated by this move that was not only hypocritical but also discriminatory since the West had a right to the nuclear weapons. 2
The end of the cold war saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unresolved conflicts between India and Pakistan over Kashmir persisted. Around this time, India still harbored strong hatred for the United States that seemed to stand between them and their prosperity.
To bridge the gap left by the Soviet Union, India decided to get into a closer relationship with the United States that was mutually beneficial as it hoped to get an upper hand over china, which was becoming powerful.
To date, the U.S. has refused to accept India’s terms on the use of nuclear weapons and this is seen as a factor that would dent a progressive relationship between these two in future. India would want to test its nuclear weapons and use nuclear fuel, demands that the U.S is reluctant to meet.
On the other hand, the United States has taken to supporting Pakistan reclaim her lost glory to appear among the most prosperous and stable countries of the world. This is among the impacts and effects that the U.S relations have on the Pakistani – Indian relations in post cold war. The price that Pakistan has to pay is to support U.S. policies in the region and take part in the mitigation of nuclear proliferation.
The U.S also hopes to end the enmity that has existed between India and Pakistan since time immemorial. The U.S – Pakistan relationship is however strained in that Pakistan has lost its trust for the U.S. it blames the U.S. for the violence that has escalated in the country in the recent past. 3
Pakistan got its independence in 1947 and continued to enjoy good relationships with the West. It was aligned with the Unites States and Britain and this led to its joining the British Commonwealth of Nations. It did not loose the Britons who headed some of its vital government branches like the military and high administration.
Britain thus continued to supply Pakistan with military weapons and offered training for its troops as well. Pakistan at a point felt that it was getting a raw deal from Britain in issues that involved their archrival, India. This saw its cessation of membership from the Commonwealth in 1972 though it later rejoined in 1989.
The United States regained its firm grip on Pakistan and made it a base for its military operations in South Asia. India and Pakistan went to war in 1965 and the U.S continued supporting it with military weapons.
This angered India and caused their relationship to strain further and in 1971, India managed to defeat Pakistan in the civil war. The then Pakistan president, Zulfiqar Bhutto started loosing faith in the U.S. citing that it was in a position to prevent the attack by India. He thus embarked on severing ties with the United States since he felt betrayed.
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan gave Pakistan US$3.2 billion that was to cover military and economic support after 9 years of their fall out. This donation was increased to US$4.0 in 1986 and the United States continued its military and economic support for Pakistani citing that its nuclear weapons were used for peaceful purposes only.
The year 1990 saw to the termination of this assistance by president George Bush as the nonproliferation agenda gained ground. Once again, Pakistan, just like India felt betrayed and discriminated upon by the U.S. and vowed to keep its nuclear weapons. 4
As the cold war came to a close, the United States lost interest in Pakistan and embarked on working out a relationship with India. This was followed by sanctions in 1990 against Pakistan to loose its nuclear weapons that ironically had been supplied by the same U.S. government. In addition, India, in the eyes of the U.S government had a greater potential for commercial, political, and strategic terms as compared to Pakistan.
The then U.S. president, Bill Clinton initiated negotiations with India and this further widened the gap between Pakistan and India as Pakistan felt sidelined. 5
Regardless of all this, India and Pakistan went ahead to test their nuclear weapons and the U.S did not have a choice but to lift the sanctions in 1998. In a twist of events, the U.S. renewed its interest in Pakistan as it yearned its help in combating the antiterrorist war against Afghanistan.
Bearing in mind the love-hate relationship that existed between the U.S and Pakistan, the move to renew the relationship was not taken kindly. The U.S. efforts to offer it military and economic assistance was rejected and termed as “peanuts” and in order to win it back, the aid had to be increased.
The U.S. did not have a choice and soon succumbed to Pakistan’s demands and increased the aid to $3.2 billions. By doing so, it could now count on Pakistan’s support in conquering Afghanistan in the nuclear weapon’s war. 6
In 1988, Moscow withdrew its troops from Afghanistan and Pakistan was thrown out in the cold by the U.S. since she was no longer important to their strategies. This situation did not last long since in 2001, the U.S embarked on a war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda and as usual charmed Pakistan into a relationship for convenience purposes. The U.S. needed the support of both India and Pakistan to meet its objectives.
It needed India to fight the “China Threat” and Pakistan for the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. It therefore had to work out a harmonious relationship between these two rival countries if it was to succeed.
A conference to discuss nuclear weapons was suggested by Pakistan in 1991 but India declined to attend. Its main reasons were that Pakistan would renew its relationship with the U.S and India felt threatened. In addition, India felt that the nuclear weapons fight was not a South Asia thing but a global thing the U.S sought to distance itself from.
India felt that to beat china, which was coming up fast, it needed its nuclear weapons. More so, it felt that Pakistan would agree to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for favors that included diplomatic victory and this would single India out as the only country that had illegal access to nuclear weapons. This would have put it at the center of military action in the war against possession of nuclear weapons. 7
The nuclear weapons war has brought about grievous disputes between India, Pakistan, and Kashmir even in post-cold war. There has also been a boundary dispute for about 50 years with Kashmir though a peaceful resolution is being sought. The presidents of Pakistan and India even met to resolve the issue though the progress has been minimal judging from the past bitter relationship the two countries have been through.
Kashmir, which is located in northwest India, has brought about a major conflict between India and Pakistan since the World War II ended. India and Pakistan were meant to be one country if Mahatma Gandhi’s wishes were followed though this was not to be.
Religious differences led to the split where India was predominantly Hindu and Pakistan Muslim. The Kashmir area issues that was predominantly Muslim were left unresolved though two months later; India was given control over it. Pakistan was not happy with the decision and this erupted into a war between the two countries.
Ceasefire was called in 1949 by the United Nations and the Kashmir territory was divided between India and Pakistan. This saw Pakistan take a third of it while the rest went to the Indian government. 8
Despite this division, India went ahead and took control over the whole of Kashmir in 1956 and this only resulted into another war with Pakistan. Most terrorist activities headed by Al Qaeda have been reported in Kashmir that is next to Afghanistan. Pakistan is in full support of these activities since it claims the Kashmir territory.
This has promoted the terrorist network that the U.S. has been fighting hard and this war is now termed as “Jihad” and this has pushed matters to their worst. The region is seen to promote terrorism since it hosts the Al Qaeda groups and acts as an escape for many of its leaders such as Osama Bin Laden. 9
The United States has been fighting a hard battle with Pakistan and India as it tries to come up with good relations that will brush all the differences these two countries have aside. President Obama’s recent visit to India is a clear indication that the United States has got over its ugly past with India and seeks to turn over a new page where the two countries will be able to cooperate.
This is a delicate issue though bearing in mind that Pakistan has been the U.S puppet during and after the cold war and thus India distrusts it. The border fight between the two countries over Kashmir notwithstanding.
The U.S relations with these two countries is focused on reconciliating them with the aim of fighting transnational terrorism that has taken root in Kashmir. This makes these relations even more sensitive and if the U.S is to continue enjoying the good relations it has embarked on, there is a great need to tackle the problems that come with their rivalry first.
Otherwise, if this does not happen, this will be a losing battle since peace will be elusive and instability will settle in. The U.S therefore has to be hands-on on the case of Kashmir and attempt to resolve the underlying differences between Pakistan and India. 10
Conclusion
The U.S is at the center of the conflict between India and Pakistan as evidenced by this paper that focuses on how U.S relations have impacted and effected Pakistani – Indian relations in post cold war.
It has repeatedly supported Pakistan against other countries in the Soviet Union for its personal interests. It has been picking and dropping it at will and it is a pity that this comes up as a major cause of the post cold war unrest witnessed in these two South Asian countries.
It is evident that U.S relations have impacted negatively on Pakistan and India. For the U.S to drop Pakistan in favor of India is seen as adoption of double standards where despite Pakistan remaining loyal, the U.S uses it for its convenience in anti-terrorism wars.
No wonder the two countries have remained at logger heads even in the Kashmir’s case and appear adamant to subscribe to the cessation call of nuclear weapons. The war against terrorism will therefore remain a dream if the U.S retains the same kind of relationship with Pakistan.
At the same time, the U.S may have succeeded in forming better ties with India but their varied stance on nuclear weapons could derail the progress since the goodwill generated could evaporate.
Bibliography
Chou, David. “U.S Policy toward India and Pakistan in the post-cold war era.” Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 27 (2003):1-30.
Fair, Christine. “Time for sober realism: Renegotiating U.S. Relations with Pakistan.” The Washington Quarterly, 2009, A32.
Ganguly, Sumit. “The Kashmir Conundrum.” Foreign Affairs 80 (2005): 40-45.
Kapur, Paul and Ganguly, Sumit. “The transformation of U.S. – India Relations. An explanation for the rapprochement and prospects for the future.” Asian Survey 47(2007): 642-656.
Keen, Emily. “India, Pakistan and Kashmir. What have been the recent developments in the dispute between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir?” Batch News, 2004, A10.
Laquer, Walter. “After the cold war. The euphoria did not last.” America Government, 5(2006): 2-3.
Pant, Harsh. “Pakistan and Iran’s dysfunctional relationship.” Middle East Quarterly, 2009, A16.
Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. “Analysis: Critical issues in India – U.S. Relations,” Daily Times, A new voice for a new Pakistan, 2010, E2.
U.S Library of Congress. “The United States – Pakistan.” Country Studies 1(2006): 1-3.
Footnotes
Walter Laquer, “After the cold war. The euphoria did not last.” America Government 5 (2006): 2-3.
Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The transformation of U.S. – India Relations. An explanation for the rapprochement and prospects for the future.” Asian Survey 47(2007):642-656.
Christine Fair, “Time for sober realism: Renegotiating U.S. Relations with Pakistan,” The Washington Quarterly, 2009, A32.
U.S Library of Congress, “The United States – Pakistan.” Country Studies 1(2006): 1-3.
Harsh Pant, “Pakistan and Iran’s dysfunctional relationship.” Middle East Quarterly, 2009, A16.
Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan – U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress 33 (2008), 4-9.
David Chou, “U.S Policy toward India and Pakistan in the post-cold war era.” Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 27 (2003):1-30.
Sumit Ganguly, “The Kashmir Conundrum.” Foreign Affairs 80 (2005): 40-45.
Emily Keen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir. What have been the recent developments in the dispute between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir?” Batch News, 2004, A10.
“Hasan-Askari Rizvi. Analysis: Critical issues in India – U.S. Relations,” Daily Times, A new voice for a new Pakistan, 2010, E2.
In the 1980s, Zimbabwe used to be one of Africa’s most promising and sustainable economies (Makaye & Dube, 2014). Unfortunately, poor political and economic policies in the country eventually led to continuous decay and deprivation. Experts and political analysts believe strongly that the failure of Zimbabwe as a state is something attributable to its political structure (Bratton, 2014). One of the interesting facts about this country is that Robert Mugabe’s party, the Zimbabwe African National Unity-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), has been in political power since independence (Bratton, 2014). A turnaround in Zimbabwe’s political climate is needed in order to put it in a new path of economic recovery. The purpose of this research is to identify and describe a diplomatic doctrine that was used by Robert Mugabe during and after the infamous Cold War. The paper goes further to examine the major factors and issues that have led to the creation of this failed state.
Presidential Doctrine
The selected foreign policy for this paper is the Eisenhower Doctrine. This policy was announced in 1957 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. According to this Cold War doctrine, the American president stated that any country facing threat from international communism could get the required military support and economic assistance from the United States (Brew, 2015). In this doctrine, Eisenhower indicated clearly that the Soviet Union was the main source of threat. That being the case, the American armed forces were ready to protect the territories of every country that was threatened by the Soviet Union. The role of the Soviet during the period was the main factor why the president chose to announce and use the doctrine while he was in office.
During his tenure, Eisenhower authorized the commitment of the armed forces to protect the nation’s political freedom. The doctrine also guided the U.S. forces to provide security and protection to independent nations that were threatened by international communism (Brew, 2015). History shows clearly that the doctrine was implemented due to a number of events that were taking place during the late 1950s (Brew, 2015). For instance, many Arab nations were against the ideologies of the West. The Soviets were also influencing numerous events in Arab nations such as Syria and Egypt. Such happenings occurred during and after the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956 (Brew, 2015). During the same period, Britain and France were unable to influence the course of the crisis. The new situation forced the United States to intervene. In 1958, the Lebanon Crisis forced America to arbitrate after the country’s leader requested for military aid.
The above presidential doctrine has influenced both global and regional affairs since it was announced during the infamous Cold War. For instance, the doctrine escalated the tension between the Soviet and the United States. The aftermath of the Suez Canal Crisis led to new diplomatic tensions between many Arab nations and the West. Additionally, the doctrine played a significant role towards dictating the future of many nations especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Brew, 2015). Many African nations were able to get the required support from America.
The Case of Zimbabwe
The president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, pursued a complex doctrine that sought to avoid any form of entanglement with the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War (Mapuwei, 2014). However, the doctrine was more or less similar to that of Eisenhower. This was the case because the president wanted to support the welfare of many African nations that were facing numerous struggles such as apartheid and internal insecurity (“Research and Advocacy Unit”, 2016). This is a clear indication that Zimbabwe’s president was actively involved in the affairs of different African nations.
The implementation of a doctrine during the period was to cement his internal rule and promote economic posterity. However, things changed with the political and economic situations in the country. Since 1992, Robert Mugabe has been able “to complicate things for the international community” (Bratton, 2014, p. 53). Consequently, many nations such as the United States have found it hard to deal with Mugabe’s regime. In 2002, Mugabe’s political won the elections amidst claims of unfairness and rigging (“Research and Advocacy Unit”, 2016). Since then, the country has witnessed numerous cases of injustices and loss of civil liberties.
The Creation of a Failed State
After the end of the Cold War in 1991, many nations in Africa managed to form new opposition parties in an attempt to secure political change. However, the opposition parties in specific nations such as Zimbabwe were unable to succeed. Consequently, Mugabe’s ZANU-PF has ruled the country since independence. The prevalence of political violence has led to instability and lack of transparency. It is agreeable that Zimbabwe has been holding parliamentary elections since 1980 (Mudavanhu, 2014). All these elections have always been won by Robert Mugabe’s party. Such elections have been observed to trigger violence, accusations of unfairness and fraud, and continuous intimidation (Bratton, 2014). The president has been using state resources to violate human rights. The country’s armed forces and the police receive public funds to back Mugabe’s party.
In 1988, Mugabe’s regime used the police to torture people during the Harare uprising (“Research and Advocacy Unit”, 2016). This is a clear indication that political unrest and violence are prevalent in this county. Torture has also been used as a powerful tool against journalists who question Mugabe’s leadership. In 2000, the leader ordered his followers to occupy most of the farms owned by Whites. This move led to deaths, rapes, and abuse of human rights (Bratton, 2014).
Lack of proper economic policies is another unique challenge that has contributed a lot to the state’s failure. The violence experienced in the country has always been associated with reduced harvests and exports. The continued slump in the country’s food production is a major challenge that has made it impossible for many people to realize their objectives. More often than not, Mugabe’s regime has been blocking aid from non-governmental organizations and foreign nations (Mudavanhu, 2014).
Violence has remained a major problem in this country. This culture of impunity allows more citizens in the nation to resolve their political problems using force. Violators of human freedoms and liberties are usually pardoned by the political regime. People who commit heinous crimes such as arson, kidnapping, and rape have reduced chances of been prosecuted (“Research and Advocacy Unit”, 2016). Most of the political crimes in the nation are never investigated adequately.
Corruption is the other leading factor that has made Zimbabwe a failed state. According to economic scholars, Zimbabwe remains one of the most corrupt nations across the globe (Cain, 2015). The level of corruption experienced in the country allows state leaders and officials to secure wealth without focusing on the needs of the other people. Many leaders such as Jonathan Moyo have embezzled funds from different government projects. Zimbabwe has been “described by experts as a predatory state” (Makaye & Dube, 2014, p. 231). This is the case because the policies implemented by its leaders do not support the welfare of the greatest majority. The country’s citizens do not have access to new opportunities that can transform their lives.
Actions Taken by Zimbabwe’s President
The actions taken by the president of Zimbabwe have failed because they do not support the welfare of the citizens. The president has implemented predatory laws that make it hard for journalists to practice independently (Makaye & Dube, 2014). Access to information is also restricted in this nation. Citizens have known that political disputes can only be resolved using violence.
The country’s leader does not care about the welfare of his people. The state has been unable to direct funds towards essential needs such as infrastructure, health, and education (Mapuwei, 2014). When these problems are not addressed, it will always be impossible for a country such as Zimbabwe to succeed. The laws enacted in the country do not promote the use of new technology. The elites benefit from the country’s monopolies, valuable minerals, and assets. Political power is designed in such a way that it promotes impunity, inequality, and discrimination. Consequently, Mugabe has failed to deliver desirable support and governance to the people of Zimbabwe.
The political elite in Zimbabwe depend on the state to amass wealth and cling to power (Mapuwei, 2014). This has remained the core objective of the president despite his old age. Corruption has reached epic proportions since the nation’s officials are allowed to secure huge profits without taking care of the other people. This means that wealth in this country is obtained from political power.
The “fast track land reform is another unique action that has made Zimbabwe a failed state” (Brew, 2015, p. 98). The ultimate goal of this policy was to strengthen the political status of the president. This was the case because of the increasing level of opposition from different economic elites (Cain, 2015). The president used other strategies in an attempt to restore the economic position of the nation. For instance, hyperinflation policy initiated by the government failed to offer positive results. Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Second Congo War was a major mistake since the country did not have the required resources to intervene. These initiatives undertaken by Mugabe failed and eventually affected the welfare of the country.
Prospects for Success
The situation in Zimbabwe might not change any time soon. Mugabe might rule this country for the rest of his life simply because the opposition has been divided and unable to consolidate leadership. The electoral system is always manipulated to favor the current president. Any form of electoral fraud has the potential to trigger violence. The lack of infrastructure, adequate schools, and health facilities is another huge challenge that affects the future of this country. The nation has been characterized by lack of transparency and irresponsibility (Mudavanhu, 2014). It is characterized by absence of the law, social and economic disparities, regional instability, and abuse of human liberties. The elites continue to use state resources for personal gains. The people do not have access to information. The natural resources and government monopolies benefit a small fraction of the country’s population. In conclusion, the situation in Zimbabwe is worsening and any form of violence can result in an unimaginable crisis.
References
Bratton, M. (2014). Power Politics in Zimbabwe. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Brew, G. (2015). “Our Most Dependable Allies”: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, 1956–1958. Mediterranean Quarterly, 26(4), 89-109.
Cain, G. (2015). Bad governance in Zimbabwe and its negative consequences. The Downward Review, 2(1), 1-7.
Makaye, P., & Dube, B. (2014). Zimbabwe: The challenge of democracy from below, 1980 to 2013. International Journal of Political Science and Development, 2(10), 227-236.
Mapuwei, N. (2014). A social-semiotic engagement with representations of President Robert Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai in the ZimDaily.com from June 2008 to July 2013. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 8(7), 236-243.
Mudavanhu, S. (2014). A critical analysis of whether Zimbabwe can achieve economic development through its ‘Look East Policy’. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 8(8), 280-287.
Research and Advocacy Unit. (2016). Conflict or collapse? Zimbabwe in 2016. Web.
The following is a review of the article ‘The Cold War: Did Intelligence make any Difference?’ The article was authored by Michael Herman, a former intelligence practitioner. In the article, Herman (2012) tries to establish the effects of intelligence during the Cold War. The main argument by the author is that intelligence had positive effects on avoiding threats; however, the intensity of the intelligence waged was almost warlike and worsened the Cold War.
During the Cold War, both USSR and Western allies waged intelligence war with great intensity (Corke 2008). As such, there are lingering questions about the role of intelligence in the war. For example, did it solve the crisis of fuel the differences that already existed between the opposing sides? Therefore, the article aims to provide text evidence of the intelligence collection, the complexities, and their impact on the Cold War.
In the context of the article, there is evidence that the intelligence had both positive and negative effects on the Cold War. The strategies employed by the adversaries to collect information made the situation hotter, but also helped to tamp down threats by either side.
Summary
The article provides details of the dynamics that characterized the intelligence war between the adversaries. Covert and non-covert approaches characterized intelligence collection and use. In the case of the Soviet Union, intelligence was marked by covert actions while Western intelligence used both covert and non-covert sources. It is through such complexities that the article answers the pertinent questions on the role of the intelligence on the Cold War.
The key point that the author puts forward is that it acted as both a threat and reassurance. For instance, intelligence was used to “redress the balance between Soviet’s secrecy and the more open Western societies” (Herman 2012, p. 160). In 1960, America deployed imagery satellites marked a landmark achievement in technological intelligence collection; hence, addressing tension of the unknown actions of the Soviet Union. Advancements in the intelligence collection led to great realignments of national and international interests. Intelligence resulted in reassurance as it resulted in a dialogue between the adversaries, which in extent reduced tension.
Also, it led to a threat that heightened the Cold War. For example, the destruction of the 14 American intelligence aircraft by Soviet defenses and the further downing of civilian passenger aircraft over Soviet Union airspace which led to the deaths of 269 civilians. Throughout the text, the author shows that intelligence was defined by a mixture of exaggeration and accuracy and there were no boundaries between the policy and intelligence. Therefore, the author intends to show the complexity related to intelligence gathering during the Cold War and the effects it had on either party.
Critique
The article provides key points and backs them up with examples to achieve the overall intention of the author. Nevertheless, some strengths and weaknesses surface of the article. One key weakness of the article is that it is narrative. It does not provide an analytical basis of dynamics that surrounded the Cold War and the general interests of the parties. For example, Herman (2012) pointed out that there was the politicization of the intelligence, a claim supported by Thayer (2014), and Labrosse (2015). However, there is no further analysis to denote how the politicization and exaggeration of the intelligence happened. Thus, the failure to acknowledge the fact the two antagonists had different objectives.
Despite the shortcomings, the article has addressed fundamental dynamics related to intelligence and its impacts on the Cold War. For instance, the psychological effect of the intelligence analysis that led to threat or reassurance. It is from this perspective that the key points presented in the article make the readers understand the strategic interests of the adversaries. Besides, the article gives a snapshot of how intelligence evolved. In the analysis of the effect of intelligence on the Cold War, Whitaker (2009) noted that the capabilities of the parties in the technological and human intelligence improved significantly.
Overall, the core intention of the author was achieved. However, the article can be enhanced by the incorporation of theories to synthesize the intelligence issues that relate to international relations. For example, the author could have used the Defensive Realism Paradigm to explain the security dilemma concept at the time (Holsti 2004). This could have addressed the complexity that the author attributes to intelligence impact on the Cold War.
Also, the use of institutionalism ideas could improve the text as it could enhance the understanding of some ideas raised by the author. For example, the need for the Soviet-American ‘code of conduct ‘ as outlined by the author could be understood better by analyzing whether any international rules governing the operations of the countries especially bearing in mind the factors that led to the end of the Second World War.
Conclusion
The strategies employed by the adversaries to collect intelligence made the situation hotter, but also helped to tamp down threats by either side. The review of the article has exemplified both the negatives and the positives of intelligence during the Cold War. However, the article was a narrative. To improve the article, it is recommended that the points outlined are followed by detailed analysis using relevant theories that relate to international relations. Such an improvement will enhance the understanding of the article and hence help readers have a clear understanding of the dynamics that surrounded intelligence during the Cold War.
References
Corke, S 2008, U.S Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy, Routledge, New York.
Herman, M 2012, ‘Intelligence in the Cold War: What Difference Did It Make?’ Intelligence Service in the Information Age, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 159-162.
Holsti, O 2004, ‘Theories of International Relations’, Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, vol. 1, no. 1, pp.51-90.
Labrosse, D 2015, ‘Beyond and Between the Cold War Blocs’, International History Review, vol. 37, no. 1, pp.142-166.
Thayer, B 2014, ‘Intelligence in the Cold War: what difference did it make?’ European Security, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 1-7.
Whitaker, R 2009, ’Security and Intelligence in the Post-Cold War World’, Socialist Register, vol. 28, no. 28, pp. 1-12.
This essay focuses on the doctrine of President Richard Nixon during the Cold War and its effects on United States’ diplomacy in the years that followed. Several American presidents played a significant role during the growth and decline of the Cold War. However, President Nixon’s term of leadership in the late 1960s and early 1970s formed the center stage for the Cold War. The reason is that many historians have documented him as an iconic figure in the transformation and redirection of the war to meet the United States’ economic and political interests (Jordan & Taylor, 2011).
The term ‘Cold War’ refers to the persistent state of military and political anxiety that was experienced by countries in the Eastern Bloc, including Russia and Warsaw pact allies; and the Western Bloc countries such as the United States, Japan and NATO member states. At the beginning of the war, China had close ties with Russia but it distanced itself from the resultant misunderstanding concerning the Marxism allegiance. Many historical scholars disagree on the exact period when the Cold War started and ended. However, the most commonly cited period is between 1946 and 1991.
Situational Summary
According to Hogan, the term ‘cold’ was derived from the fact that the war was indirect and without any physical confrontations between the two opposing sides apart from some isolated cases such as in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Korea (Hogan, 1994). The Cold War temporarily divided the Second World War alliances against the Nazi Germany, leaving the United States and Russia as the world’s superpowers.
The two differed on paramount economic and political ideologies characterized by capitalism, communism, liberal democracy and totalitarianism. In mid 1960s, there was a historical turn of events in relation to the Cold War when Richard Nixon failed to secure both the presidency and governorship seats in the 1964 elections. Nixon took a recess to think about the country’s international relationships which formed part of his primary interest in foreign policy making. He agreed with Chinese capitalists that the United States needed to reconcile with China. However, critics in both camps doubted the possibility of a Sino-Soviet split, which was supposed to lead to a strong and favorable Sino-American relationship (Luthi, 2008).
Richard Nixon knew that forming close diplomatic ties with China would yield positive results and strengthen United States’ position in war. This meant that if China ceased to be a threat, the United States would be able to reinforce and consolidate a single military force against Russia, which was compelled to station more than 50,000 troops along the Chinese border to counter any external threat from the West.
Nixon took over the presidency at the end of the 1960 decade when his country was seeking a way out of the warring Vietnam. Despite the imminent foreign policy problem in Vietnam, the President and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger chose to manage the United States’ relationships with China and Russia. They presumed that strengthening the relationship with the two Asian countries would provide a solution to the Vietnam crisis. Consequently, the United States pursued several protocols to ensure that China became their ally. The most recognizable one was the diplomatic doctrine envisioned and pioneered by President Nixon (Sutter, 2010).
Analysis of the Diplomatic Doctrine
After Nixon’s win in the 1969 presidential elections, many political analysts believed that his tough anti-communism ideologies would hamper the country’s foreign policy toward China. However, the newly elected President realized that his earlier support for anti-communism policies would impede the United States-China relationship. Moreover, China had the potential to be a strong ally against the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War. For that reason, he had to establish a good working relationship with China to serve the immediate and future interests of the United States. In addition, he knew that a good relationship with China would help in ending the war in Vietnam (Thies, 2013).
At the peak of the Cold War, President Nixon faced a challenging situation that required a viable decision that could shift power in favor of the United States. The earlier events of the Sino-Soviet split slightly predicted the shift of power in support of the United States. Consequently, the President concluded that a firm relationship with China during the war would make his country the only superpower. His first move to accomplish this was in 1971 after the end of the Cultural Revolution in China.
The revolution was in form of a sociopolitical movement whose main aim was to replace capitalism with communism under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the leader of the Communist Party of China at the time (Clark, 2008). President Nixon sent his senior national security advisor to China who was accepted by the Chinese officials. Through the visit, the United States wanted to capitalize on the delicate China-Taiwan dispute at the time. Consequently, Taiwan became the focal point of both China and the United States.
This prompted Henry Kissinger to propose that the United States was willing to relinquish the ownership of the island on a politically determined timescale. In return, the United States wanted China to negotiate with North Vietnam to arrive at a ceasefire. This would give President Nixon a chance to withdraw the American forces from Vietnam without showing any signs of surrender. Additionally, the President and his advisor believed that the cooperation with China would weaken Russia’s position in the Cold War.
They founded a realistic triangular relationship that would push Russia to the bottom position in the war. To ensure that their dream matured, they provided China with Russia’s military intelligence. It seemed like a well-calculated plan that favored the United States in not only the Cold War, but also in future diplomatic expeditions (Scott, Jones, & Furmanski, 2004). The country dedicated its time and resources to ensure that the proposed plans succeeded. Finally, the United States and China had a series of confrontations and negotiations, with each side seeking to benefit from the relationship (Roskin & Berry, 2010).
Analysis of the Effects of the Diplomatic Doctrine
President Nixon’s diplomatic plans with China led to the development of new ideas. In 1972, the peaceful cooperation between the United States and China captivated the President, making him to visit China. The visit led to the accreditation of the Asian state as a democracy. The two governments signed the Shanghai communique pact that proposed several responsibilities and benefits for both nations. The first responsibility highlighted in the pact was the simultaneous opening of cooperation offices in each other’s capital city (Sharp, 2012).
The two countries agreed to the proposition but differed on the particular administrative cities to set up the offices. Particularly, the United States insisted on establishing its offices in Beijing, the capital city of China, but the latter insisted that the former had earlier positioned its offices in Taiwan. In this regard, establishing another office in Beijing would go against the treaty because the United States would have two offices, one in China and another in Taiwan. The issue became complicated because Taiwan was China’s enemy at the time of the agreement. In 1972, the Watergate Scandal hampered President Nixon’s effort to find a solution to the problem in China.
The scandal led to the resignation of Nixon as the President of the United States and delayed the process of China’s recognition as an independent state. Many Chinese leaders felt disappointed by the relationship with the United States when Nixon resigned. However, they maintained and increased their rivalry against the communist Russia. Moreover, the cooperation between China and the United States led to the inclusion of China in the United Nations (UN) and the subsequent removal of Taiwan from the UN (Nixon, 2013).
Conclusion
President Nixon’s doctrine resulted in the struggle to compel China to be an American ally through Nixon’s doctrine. However, the real objective of the doctrine surfaced after President Nixon resigned following the Watergate Scandal. The legal part of the deal was set up by 1979 when Jimmy Carter replaced Nixon as President. Some of the advantages of the doctrine were the recognition of China as an independent country and the strong alliance with the United States. Additionally, the United States also got more influence than Russia, which was its main challenger in its quest to be the superpower. However, the doctrine had some disadvantages such as exposing China to a possible military attack by Russia and extending the Cold War.
References
Clark, P. (2008).The Chinese Cultural Revolution: a history.New York: Cambridge University Press. Web.
Hogan, M.J.(1994). The end of the Cold War: its meaning and implications. Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press. Web.
Jordan, A. A., & Taylor, W. J. (2011). American national security: Policy and process (6th ed.). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Web.
Luthi, L.M. (2008).The Sino-Soviet split: Cold War in the communist world. Princeton : Princeton University Press. Web.
Nixon, R. M. (2013). The real war (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Warner Books. Web.
Roskin, M., & Berry, N. O. (2010). IR: The new world of international relations (8th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Web.
Scott, G. M., Jones, R. J., & Furmanski, L. S. (Eds.). (2004). 21 debated issues in world politics (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson education, Inc. Web.
Sharp, P. (2012). American diplomacy. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Web.
Sutter, R. G. (2010). Chinese foreign relations: Power and policy since the Cold War. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Web.
Thies, C. G. (2013). The roles of bipolarity: A role theoretic understanding of the effects of ideas and material factors on the Cold War. International Studies Perspectives, 14(3), 269-288. Web.
The world order is an essential phenomenon in international politics because it helps structure various affairs among states and avoid severe disputes. After World War II ended, the United States and the Soviet Union dealt with establishing the order as they were the most powerful nation. The collapse of the USSR in the 1990s strengthened the position of the USA in the whole world. However, the information above does not mean that the US is the hegemon having no influential competitors. At present, the rise of China is considered a great challenge for the existing world order. It refers to the fact that China’s aggressive domestic and foreign policies can make the USA respond sharply to them. This state of affairs is said to result in the second Cold War, this time between the United States and China. Thus, it is necessary to apply the concepts of liberalism and constructivism to understand the real reasons and probable consequences of the rise of China for the world.
Theoretical Approaches
Liberalism is a requested political approach that is applied by many developed states. This theory is based on such concepts as equality, freedom of speech, private property, and anti-war movements. According to Doyle, it is not a homogenous phenomenon since it is represented by liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism, and liberal internationalism, each of which has its own peculiarities.1 On the one hand, liberal pacifism stipulates that countries are peaceful and do not initiate aggression of any kind. It is based on capitalism and democracy, which explains the unattractiveness of war for these states. Warfighting rarely happens to be beneficial, both economically and socially. On the other hand, liberal imperialism justifies and welcomes expansion. This expansion is said to be a response of a nation to the existence of other states with the same objectives.2 In turn, liberal internationalism is the combination of the previous two. Thus, Ikenberry mentions that this theory makes states cooperate to achieve mutual goals.3 However, Doyle argues that many liberal nations have fought wars with non-liberal ones because of the conflict of interest.4 Thus, different kinds of liberalism represent various approaches to international politics.
At the same time, constructivism represents a different political thought. This theory supposes that identities are of crucial importance in international politics since they help states realize their positions and relations in the world.5 These identities help nations make decisions and expect appropriate actions from other countries. In addition to that, constructionists emphasize that both material and discursive power are required to be a fully-fledged member of international politics.6 When everything is evident with the material strength, discursive one stands for the significance of knowledge and ideology. Finally, constructivism explains that both foreign and domestic social practices are principal for a state to shape its foreign policy actions.7 In other words, various social shocks can make a country follow either a moderate or sharp strategy in the domain of international politics.
The Rise of China
The rise of China is considered a substantial issue because it can bring some changes to the world order. This term mainly refers to developments seen in various economic spheres of the Asian country. Furthermore, the state implements foreign policy decisions that evoke severe concerns in the USA. It refers to the fact that China’s aggression is said to focus on reshaping the distribution of powers in East Asia.8 In addition to that, one should not forget that some economic and political tensions exist between Beijing and Washington. For example, higher tariffs and appropriate limitations on some Chinese products prove this state of affairs. What is more, this situation is evolving against the background of precise social problems within China. If the US responds to this sharply, it is possible to expect another Cold War that will have negative consequences for the whole world.
Case Analysis
Both liberalism and constructionism can be used to explain China’s actions outlined above. On the one hand, liberal imperialism is suitable to justify the Chinese foreign policy. It refers to the fact that Beijing sees that other states strengthen their positions, which makes China expand their interests to get an impact on the region of East Asia. At the same time, liberal internationalism stipulates that various visions of the world order can be a significant reason for China to enter a war against the US. On the other hand, constructivism mentions that the Chinese foreign policy is a response to some domestic affairs. Beijing realizes its identity and that of the United States, which makes it unreasonable to initiate severe conflicts.
Even though each theory has some value in understanding the case above, constructivism seems to be the most suitable. It refers to the fact that Chinese aggression is said to be diversionary. At present, Xi Jinping, the Chinese leader, is facing some problems with the elite because of his anti-corruption campaign and desire to rule for life9. Thus, he needs an external threat that would consolidate society and deflect attention from these domestic affairs. This decision would influence ideology, and this is another characteristic feature of constructivism. The information above makes it clear that China does not have direct intentions to enter a war against the US. However, some aggressive foreign policy actions can evoke the United States to take sharp retaliatory measures that would escalate the existing tension.
Conclusion
International politics is a complex phenomenon that is represented by many issues. Now, the rise of China is the most challenging question for the whole world. The Chinese foreign policy is considered by the US as reshaping the existing distribution of powers in East Asia, which can have negative consequences. Two political theories can be used to analyze this case, and they are liberalism and constructivism. At the same time, the latter is said to be the most suitable because it explains that the Chinese foreign policy is a result of its domestic issues. Thus, it is possible to avoid any war between China and the USA if Washington realizes the reasons for the rise of China.
Nixon and Kissinger played an important role in establishing the U.S. relationships with China and the Middle East. Following the October War, Kissinger chose Grand Strategy to encourage the Soviet Union to restrain Israel and misallocate their resources in order to prevent the conflict (Simmons et al., 2011, p. 8). Kissinger compared this approach to a chess game because the United States tried to play simultaneous chess and open the game unusually, “play[ing] both boards at the same time” (Simmons et al., 2011, p. 147). On the one hand, the United States needed to preserve peace for its citizens; on the other hand, it is prepared for any outcomes. Nixon and Kissinger preferred to keep a neutral position in the October War, thus trying to secure a desirable resolution in the Middle East. Their main goal was to maintain stability, and their approach had significantly altered U.S. foreign policy.
The key elements of U.S. diplomacy to China and the Middle East were aimed at keeping the United States out of the problems of world affairs and improving foreign relations. In 1955, the United States’ efforts resulted in the formation of the Bagdad Pact Organization, also known as METO, or the Middle East Treaty Organization (Al Sarhan, 2017, p. 458). The main purpose of this organization was to “limit possible Soviet Union expansion in the Middle East region” (Al Sarhan, 2017, p. 458). The United States realized that if the Soviet Union interfered with the military conflict in the Middle East, the outcomes would be deplorable for the U.S. After that, the States continued as a non-signatory associate, thus preserving its status quo and maintaining peace within the country.
The United States’ diplomacy has changed significantly from the beginning of the Cold War to the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. During the Cold War, the main elements of U.S. diplomacy were containment, deterrence, and détente (Al Sarhan, 2017, p. 458). The country maintained neutral relationships with its opponents and supported allies in a nonaligned way. However, in the post-Cold War era, the U.S. changed its principles to hegemony, leadership, military power, and primacy (Al Sarhan, 2017, p. 458). It maintained its military presence in the Middle East, and this decision was successful because it helped the country ensure safe access to oil and guarantee the constancy and safety of the friendly regimes. Moreover, the U.S. made available quick replies to internal and external crises, opposed radical forces and Islamic extremists, and sustained the short- and long-term foreign policy plans (Al Sarhan, 2017, p. 465). One can see that the U.S. diplomacy to China and the Middle East helped it protect its national interests despite the double standards the state preserved.
At the same time, Nixon’s diplomacy was slightly different from that of Kissinger, and the current U.S. foreign policy toward China and the Middle East partially mirrors the former President’s approach. Nixon developed his “Madman Theory” aimed to convince opponents that he was crazy and that the only way to avoid unpredictable and disproportionate American actions was concessions (Bentley & Lerner, 2021, p. 355). In such a way, the United States managed to normalize relationships with China, creating an alliance and formal diplomatic ties (Yarhi-Milo et al., 2016, p. 104). In the 1970s, the United States used China to contain the Soviet Union threat, supplying costly arms to Taiwan and practicing deterrence (Yarhi-Milo et al., 2016, p. 104). However, the U.S. did not want to harm its relations with China, and it continued to play a double game, supporting both Taiwan and China. Similarly, the U.S. did not transfer additional arms to Israel because it wanted to preserve positive relations with the Arab world and maintain the balance of power.
Nowadays, President Trump uses Nixon’s Madman Theory approach to explain his personal behavior in relation to China. However, Trump’s unpredictability differs from that of Nixon because it is more deliberate, while Nixon’s behavior was spontaneous (Bentley & Lerner, 2021, p. 355). Trump’s impulsivity, emotions, and provocations shaped the U.S.’s relationships with China. For instance, scapegoating of China in respect of the U.S. trade deficit invoked spontaneous tariffs against this country in May 2019, which led to a huge drop in stock prices across Asia, negatively affecting the whole world (Bentley & Lerner, 2021, p. 356). Currently, Trump’s anti-China rhetoric is shifting the relationships between these two countries, and this shift will continue to enhance in the future.
As to the Middle East, the U.S. current foreign policy differs from Nixon’s approach. Trump re-approaches the previous President Obama’s neutral combinations and engagement, such as encouraging democratic reforms, attaining a peace deal between Palestine and Israel, and avoiding the Sunni-Shia divide (Beck, 2019, pp. 298-299). Instead, Trump has introduced a Muslim travel ban and is promoting bloc by the Middle East countries aimed to contain Iran (Beck, 2019, p. 299). His pragmatic and adamant policy seems to be effective for the U.S., but its long-term outcomes will be seen only in the future.
References
Al Sarhan, A. S. (2017). United States foreign policy and the Middle East. Open Journal of Political Science, 7, 454-472. Web.
Beck, M. (2019). US Middle East policy shift: Trump’s administration divergency. RUDN Journal of Public Administration, 6(4), 296-311. Web.
Bentley, M., & Lerner, A. B. (2021). Introduction: Trump and unpredictability in international relations. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 34(3), 348-359. Web.
Simmons, A., McGraw, J. J., & Lauchengco, D. (2011). The sovereignty solution: A common sense approach to global security. Naval Institute Press.
Yarhi-Milo, K., Lanoszka, A., & Cooper, Z. (2016). To arm or to ally? The patron’s dilemma and the strategic logic of arms transfers and alliances. International Security, 41(2), 90-139. Web.
This paper is about Oleg Penkovsky and his profound contributions to the UK and US military intelligence. He is considered one of the most valuable double agents during the Cold War because the information he provided was critical to the United States throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis. The political race of the Soviet Union and the United States began after the end of the Second World War. It was a confrontation between the two states in economic and military spheres.
The Cold War lasted until 1989, and observing countries chose allies based on their interests. The culmination of these hostile relations occurred in the 60s. During the Caribbean Crisis, the whole world was on the verge of the start of the Third World War. Self-preservation driven by the principle of mutually assured destruction helped the sides to avoid nuclear confrontation.
The USSR and the USA tried to gain leadership on the world stage, and at that time, it was not without espionage. The task of spies was to obtain secret intelligence about the enemy, particularly data on military research and experiments. Penkovsky offered his service to the UK through a British businessman named Greville Wynne. He then, between the spring of 1961 and the autumn of 1962, passed a substantial number of photographs of classified documents to the British intelligence before being captured and executed by the Soviet government.
Summary
Oleg Penkovsky was born in the Caucasus region in 1919. His father died during the hostilities of the civil war, and his mother had to raise him alone. After high school, Penkovsky enrolled in a military school in Kyiv. He participated in the Second World War, and by the age of 30, Penkovsky already became a colonel. In 1953, Penkovsky began working in GRU and was sent to work in Turkey as a senior assistant of the diplomatic representative at the Soviet Embassy. His first alleged attempts to make contacts with foreign intelligence agencies took place in Turkey.
In 1960, Penkovsky started working as a deputy director in the foreign affairs department of the Office of International Relations. Officially, the purpose of the organization was the promotion of cooperation with other countries in all sectors. Special attention was paid to attracting foreign scientists to scientific research, but in fact, the spies traveled abroad to acquire intelligence on the latest technologies and developments. Penkovsky began working for British intelligence in 1960. He was paid well, but his account was registered in a foreign bank, and the spy needed to emigrate to be able to use his financial resources. Penkovsky was arrested and executed after the discovery of his connections with an uncovered MI6 agent Janet Chisholm.
Recruitment
On May 1, 1960, during a traditional military parade in Moscow, an American aircraft was shot down in the sky over Sverdlovsk. Pilot Francis Powers survived but was captured by the Soviet forces. This provided the Soviets with undeniable evidence of persistent US espionage activities against their country. A month later, through a group of American students in Moscow, a letter was relayed to the US embassy. In the communication, details of Power’s capture and imprisonment were contained which have not been publicly disclosed by Soviet authorities. The letter presented an offer of cooperation and espionage against the Soviets. When US officials received Penkovsky’s message, it was determined that he was not a basic operative but had potential access to valuable classified information.
Towards the end of 1960, Penkovsky was contacted by British intelligence to discuss cooperation. Greville Wynn, a prominent English businessman in the USSR with ties to British intelligence acted as the middleman for the MI6. As part of a Soviet delegation to London in April of 1961, Penkovsky had the first meeting with CIA and MI6 officers. The Soviet colonel discussed terms of the mutual partnership with American and British agents. It is then that he was provided with tools such as a camera, tape recorder, notebooks with encrypted information, encryption keys for transmitting data, and the contact information for Western agents in Moscow. Penkovsky was initially given the codename “Alex”, and a year later, “Hero.”
It is not thoroughly known what motivated Penkovsky to betray his country, but according to his own words at the trials, he loved easy life, money, and women. He also wanted to feel himself an important person by sending classified information to foreign intelligence agencies. During the trials, Penkovsky confessed that he was promised a rank of colonel from both American and British military forces.
Discovery
Until 1959, the KGB believed that Western intelligence meets with their agents only outside the borders, and within the USSR, they limit themselves to communications through mailboxes. In October 1959, however, Colonel Pyotr Popov, who was recruited six years before by the CIA in Vienna, was arrested for espionage. It was discovered that Popov occasionally met with his foreign agent in Moscow personally. Then in 1960, the head of KGB subdivision General Oleg Gribanov decided to monitor the US and British embassies periodically. These large-scale operations were carried out twice a year for two weeks, with observations being made both on the embassy staff and the family members of the diplomats, as well as correspondents and businesspeople living in Moscow.
During one of these operations in early 1962, KGB started watching Janet Chisholm, the wife of an SIS agent, just at the moment when she left the embassy to get another batch of microfilms from Penkovsky. An observer witnessed one-touch contact between Chisholm and an unknown Russian. From that moment on, KGB knew that SIS had an agent in Moscow, but they did not know who that was. However, it remains unclear to this day how Penkovsky was compromised, and both his experience and caution do not suggest that errors in tradecraft were involved. A Soviet double agent George Blake is suspected of turning over information regarding Penkovsky’s activities.
With the help of a camera with remote control, which was installed in the flower box on Penkovsky’s neighbors’ window, the security officers managed to photograph how he carefully tuned the radio to a specific wave, listened, and then made some notes. In July 1962, when English businessman Wynn arrived in Moscow, Penkovsky held a meeting in Wynn’s hotel room in Hotel Ukraine. To silence the conversation, Penkovsky turned the radio on and opened the faucets in the bathroom. But KGB still managed to decipher the fragments of the conversation, and this was the first evidence that Penkovsky was engaged in espionage. After secretly installing a camera in his apartment, the KGB witnessed him engaging with spyware and equipment but did not arrest him immediately, in the hope that Penkovsky would lead them to a larger spy group.
Just at the moment when the Caribbean crisis reached its critical point, a miniature camera, which was hidden in the ceiling of Penkovsky’s apartment, allowed KGB to see how he was observing a fake passport. Fearing that Penkovsky was preparing to leave the territory of the USSR, Gribanov ordered his immediate arrest. In October 1962, KGB arrested Penkovsky on his way to work.
Conclusion
Oleg Penkovsky spied for the UK and the US during a crucial period of the Cold War. Known as one of the most prominent spies of the 20th century, his role in the Cuban missile crisis has been described as of great importance. Other specialists have questioned this statement, while some think that apart from working for the West, Penkovsky was a tool of Soviet strategic deception. Official documents on US and British intelligence in the Cold War have highlighted the significance of Penkovsky’s espionage and the accomplishments of Western intelligence agencies in aiding his role. Others have doubted Penkovsky’s credibility, stating he may have worked against the west. Numerous arguments and counterarguments about the benefit of Penkovsky’s spying have been given, especially concerning the Cuban missile crisis.
Penkovsky’s real-time impact is not apparent, but he indirectly played a vital role in resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis. The information that came from him may have shaped Kennedy’s rhetoric on Carribean Crisis. Eventually, what gave him away was the practice of one-touch contacts. The same method uncovered Popov, so intelligence bureaus had to develop better ways of passing classified information between their agents. Some, however, claim that it was a Soviet agent in the U.S. who uncovered Penkovsky.
Penkovsky is an example of vigorous self-acclamation because there is an impression that financial benefits were not the ultimate motivating factor, and that he may have had psychological problems. There is no single cause that may force a person to deceive and abandon his cultural values. Penkovsky was ready to leave his family, never to return. There are also numerous conspiracy theories claiming the whole story around Penkovsky was a KGB operation. Facts state the opposite, however, that Penkovsky was put on trial, and by the court’s decision was sentenced to death.
Bibliography
Duns, Jeremy. Dead Drop: The True Story of Oleg Penkovsky and the Cold War’s Most Dangerous Operation. London: Simon and Schuster, 2013.
Garthoff, Raymond L. “Documenting the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Diplomatic History 24, no. 2 (2000): 297-303.
A Journey Through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence. Harrisonburg: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.
George, Alice L. Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chapel Hill: UNC Press Books, 2004.
Hitz, Frederick P. “The Myths and Current Reality of Espionage.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 18, no. 4 (2005): 730-733.
Trenear-Harvey, Glenmore S. Historical Dictionary of Atomic Espionage. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2011.
Scott, Len. “The Spy Who Wanted to Save the World.” Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 4 (1993): 138-146.
“Espionage and the Cold War: Oleg Penkovsky and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 3 (1999): 23-47.
“Oleg Penkovsky, British Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” In Learning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History, edited by Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman, 344-374. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2011.
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The Cold War ended in 1991 with a fall of Soviet Union. Since then, one full generation has grown up who have no personal recollection of that era. The libraries are full of scholarly tomes covering the Cold War period, which tell the whole story. However, it is rare to find a book which captures the essence of the Cold War in one concise volume, readable by students and the general public. John Lewis Gaddis, a professor of history at Yale University has filled up that gap by writing his treatise “The Cold War: A New History” especially aimed at students and the laymen. This book review covers the various facets of Lewis’s book giving the strengths and weaknesses of the author’s treatment of the subject.
Analysis
Gaddis builds the story of the Cold War in a unique way of focusing each chapter on a particular theme. Gaddis explains this deliberate omission of following standard chronological method by stating that “any attempt to capture” the Cold War “within a simple chronological narrative could only produce mush” (Gaddis xi). In Chapter 1 “Return of Fear”, Gaddis states that the Cold War was caused due to the competing and divergent ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States emphasized individual liberty as its highest ideal and that capitalism afforded a way to attain that liberty. The Soviets on the other hand held that the workers of the world needed to unite to overthrow the exploitative capitalists. Chapter1 explains the build up of distrust, the fear of each others intentions and the opening moves of the prominent leaders of the period immediately after the Second World War squarely blaming Stalin for spreading the fear psychosis. According to Gaddis, “Stalin’s postwar goals were security for himself, his regime, his country, and his ideology, in precisely that order”. Gaddis informs the lay reader that the effect of Stalin’s various moves caused George Kennan, the US Moscow Foreign Service officer in 1946 to send the ‘Long Telegram’ that postulated that aggression and expansion was the characteristic of the Soviet Union and called for an American response of containment (Gaddis, p. 29). This was a seminal event, which shaped the basic contours of American strategy during the Cold War era.
Chapter II “Deathboats and Lifeboats”, sums up the various perceptions of the leaders on both the sides with regard to the unfolding events and the specter of a nuclear war. In this chapter Gaddis brings out clearly the differing attitudes of President Truman and Eisenhower with regards to the use of Atomic weapons. Truman would not allow the military to have unfettered control over the use of atomic weapons and laid down the rule that their use would be authorized only by the President (Gaddis, p. 50). However, Gaddis surmises that though Truman was chary of atomic weapons, he allowed them to be built only because he feared that the Soviets would get it first. Unlike Truman, Eisenhower was an ex-general who clearly understood the potency of the weapon as also the horrors of war. Across the Iron Curtain, Nikita Khrushchev too had a similar background. Both sought to leverage the threat of use of weapons through competing nuclear strategy. Eisenhower’s Single War plan of using 3000 nuclear weapons simultaneously against all communist countries shocked the next President – Kennedy to rationalize the strategy from Massive Retaliation to Mutually Assured Destruction (Gaddis, p. 80). Gaddis explains the significance of the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis in this chapter and concludes that though Khrushchev’s strategic gamble of placing nuclear tipped missiles in Cuba to foster Communism in Americas failed, it did achieve some successes. “Deathboats and Lifeboats” thus alludes to the dangerous moves made by both the sides as also the subsequent moves carried out to defuse tensions and manage the Cold War at less than Armageddon level.
Chapter III of Gaddis’s book “Command versus Spontaneity” deals more with the ideology of that era and less with the historical rendition. The reader here is given a treatment of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the reasons for its failures. According to Gaddis, the fundamental failure of Communism lay in the presumption of the original theory; that of inevitable class struggle, necessity for dictatorship to achieve revolutionary ends and the inflexibility of a system which did not learn from its mistakes. The author recounts the efforts of various personalities who try to change the system and fail. The tragic account of Beria whose attempt to reverse the worst of Stalinist rule ending with his execution is recounted with finesse (Gaddis, pp. 104-106). This chapter posits that the Cold War was also a ‘war of ideas’ concerned with organization of the society as well as the rights of the individuals. ‘Command’ became central to the Soviet ideology which led to brutal suppression of its peoples. This also led to spontaneous riots in East Germany in 1953 and later the centrality of ‘Command’ was responsible for erecting the Berlin wall on 12-13 August 1961.
In Chapter Four, Gaddis examines what he calls ‘The Emergence of Autonomy”.
He begins by explaining the overthrow of Nikita Khrushchev on 13 October 1964. Gaddis explains that the period from late 1950 to early 1970 was an era of bipolarity where both the parties favored decolonization of the world. In this chapter, Gaddis attempts a broad sweep of all the freedom movements that spread from Africa to Asia. The concept of non-alignment is given a Machiavellian twist by Gaddis who claims that it was a strategy adopted by some to keep their allegiance ambiguous so that either super power could be played off against the other depending upon the circumstances by the non-aligned nations.
In Chapter V, “Recovery of Equity” Gaddis expounds on the hopes and aspirations of the people on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The ‘Equity’ recovery that the author alludes to is that in the 1970s, both the peoples (West and the Soviet Bloc) showed greater resistance to the authoritarian policies of their respective governments. This is reflected in the Watergate gate scandal which led to fall of President Nixon. It also showed to the world including the Soviets that democratic principles desired the Rule of Law and the fact that popular will could not be stifled. The ‘recovery of equity’ also points to the fact that since the late 1940s the CIA had been running a secret global war to undermine the Soviets. The will of the Iranian people and their resistance to the CIA backed regime of Mohammad Reza Shah leading to his overthrow in 1979 is an expression of popular will. The equity also alludes to the concept of ‘Détente’ which Gaddis says was implemented under Nixon “to lower the risks of war and encourage a more predictable relationship among the Cold War rivals (181). Détente, according to Gaddis helped freeze Cold War in place., but ’not end it”(198).
Chapter VI deals with powerful personalities who shaped the Cold War policies. These ‘actors’ such as Carter and Reagan on the American side, Brezhnev in USSR, Deng Xiao Peng in China and Thatcher in Britain shaped the Cold War policies in the 1980s. Gaddis is generous in his praise of Ronald Reagan whom he credits with understanding that the Soviet Union was close to collapse. Gaddis claims that Reagan knew that his ‘Strategic Defense Initiative’ (SDI) popularly known as ‘Stars Wars’ program was decades away from fructifying but the Soviets did not know that and thus Reagan used the SDI as a bargaining chip for the various arms reduction talks. Gaddis is also dismissive about Gorbachev whom he labels as lacking in strength of personality and vision as compared to Reagan.
In Chapter VII, Gaddis covers the end game of the Cold war and aptly names the chapter as “Triumph of Hope”. This chapter covers mostly the events of the period 1989 to 1991 wherein the decline and collapse of the Soviet Union seemed inevitable. The ‘Triumph of Hope’ is reflective in the return of elections and democracy in Poland in 1989, the hope for democracy in China cut short by the massacre of Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the fall of Communism in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia also in the same period. The fall of the Berlin Wall and German unification on 3 October 1991 echoes this hope. The ‘hope’ is further elaborated with the dynamics of unfolding events in a rapidly crumbling Soviet Union with growing domestic unpopularity of Gorbachev, the failed communist coup of August 1991 and the rise of Boris Yeltsin as the leader of Russia. The’ Triumph of Hope’ stamps its recognition on world history when Gorbachev officially abolishes the Soviet Union on Christmas day 1991.
In the epilogue the author concludes that the Cold War had many important facts. The author reasons that before the Cold War, major powers fought many direct conflicts, but during the Cold War, they did not fight a single war directly. The primary reason for this to happen, was that the presence of nuclear weapons made it impossible to win major wars. The Cold War helped democracy to bloom the world over as people saw the relative merits of Democracy versus the stifling control and disadvantages of Communism. Gaddis posits that the Cold War also discredited authoritarianism, Marxist-Leninism, and Communism. In the final analysis, Gaddis concludes that the Soviets failed to win the Cold War because the basic premises of Marx were incorrect and that “dissatisfaction with capitalism never reached the point at which ‘proletariatans of all countries’ felt it necessary to unite to throw off their ‘chains.’” (Gaddis, p. 264).
Conclusion
John Lewis Gaddis’s book makes excellent reading for the uninitiated. The book gives a factual overview of the events of the Cold War albeit, with a distinct pro-American bias. Democratic triumphalism is evident throughout the book with Gaddis observing that democratic ideals were superior to the poorly constructed Marxist ideology. Such pronouncements can best be considered as half truths as the reasons and causes for the fall of the Soviet Union are far more complex than the simplistic view that Gaddis would want his readers to believe. The book attempts to broad brush the contributions of the Third World countries to global geopolitics during the Cold War era. The book is obviously written for a western audience in its negative portrayal of the non-aligned movement and thus loses objectivity in parts. The book though eminently readable would have benefited had the author provided a chronological timeline as an appendix for those who prefer to study and understand the Cold War in a more traditional scholastic manner.
Works Cited
Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. NY: Penguin, 2005.
This essay looks into the Cold War and how it influenced happenings in Europe. The cold war was largely between USA and USSR but it influence individual nations in Europe in a big way. This war is largely the reason why the USA was deeply concerned about affairs in Europe. In response, it pursued policies and plans that to some extend helped towards recovery of Europe. The cold war can also directly be credited with the fast decolonization period between the 1960s and 1980s.
At the center of the cold war were a fight for hegemonic supremacy and an ideological supremacy battle. A power vacuum had been left after world war due to the fall of Germany and devastation of major European nations. The USA and USSR emerged as the only contenders to hegemonic supremacy. The USA championed for capitalism while the USSR was communist. The capitalist viewed communism as an inherently evil system while the communists understood capitalism as the root of all social problems.
The USA had an advantage when it came to hegemonic or supremacy title because of its stable economy and huge military power. However, the USSR was nearly equally powerful and was threatening to topple world order through Stalin’s expansionist interests. Stalin was using the allure of communism to bring as many countries as possible into one political fold. The communists desired to wipe out capitalism and capitalist states and vice versa.
The cold war was characterized by economic sabotage, propaganda and an arms race. This war changed fortunes for Europe and also for colonized states especially in Africa (Bulliet 554). Control of Europe was at the centre of the cold war because communists controlled Eastern Europe and wanted to extent their influence to Western Europe as well (Bulliet et al 522).
The Berlin crisis was a major climax of conflict that existed between east and west Europe. It is the tussle for control or influence in Europe that led the American President Truman to declare the anti-communism policy and institute economic aid measures.
Europe was generally allied to the USA and its capitalism plus democracy crusade. The United States favored a system of government and economic policies that allowed for individual’s freedom and respect of individuals rights as human beings. Such a system called for formation of political parties, respect for right of assembly, right to speech and press freedom (Bulliet et al 488).
The communists favored communal administration of wealth and equality of all. Europe took to democracy and instituted mechanisms that would guarantee personal freedom. This move reduced much of the political anxiety that had been the case both within states and between European states.
Economically, the United States was democratic and encouraged free and fair trade throughout the world. It championed growth of trade by offering economic aid to European states through the marshal plan. Through the Breton Woods systems, it worked towards encouraging free trade around the world. Europe took to free trade and adopted economic models developed by the likes of Maynard Keynes. The Soviet Union proffered protectionist policies that cut off their territory of free participation in international trade (Bulliet et al 381).
The cold war led to each side of the divide supporting certain regimes around the world. The aim was to rally as much support as possible to their ideologies and bolster world influence. Through such like support, guerrillas in colonized countries got necessary support to fight off colonizers. As for Europe, the war led to USA joining the NATO alliance which helped against internal as well as external aggression.
Works Cited
Bulliet, Richard, W., Crossley, Kyle Pamela & Headrick Daniel R. Earth and its Peoples: A Global History since 1500. Vol. 2. California: Houghton Mifflin, 1997