Category: Battle of Midway

Almost everyone remembers and knows the date, many facts, and have heard stories about D-Day when our troops stormed the beaches on at Normandy. But many people are not fully aware of one of the most important naval air battles during World War II. The Battle of Midway was a huge victory for the United States Navy. The air and sea battle happenened only six months after the horrible surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii by the Japanese. The battle lasted only 4 days from June 4th to June 7, 1942. Midway Atoll is located 1,136 miles west of Hawaii, almost halfway between Hawaii and mainland of Japan, making control of the island very critical for either side that could maintain control over the region. Up until the battles in the Coral sea in May of 1942, the Japanese Imperial Navy had basically defeated and pushed back all of its enemies from the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The United States Navy was outnumbered but managed to stop the Japanese navy from advancing. The Japanese had planned to take over the U.S. base on Midway and use it to establish dominance in the Central Pacific Ocean.

The battle commanders, Nimitz and Yamamoto, both had outstanding and distinguished military careers and war expierences. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was a 1905 graduate of the Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD. During World War I, Nimitz served as Chief of Staff to the Commander of the U.S. Atlantic Submarine Force. In 1933 he was in command of a heavy cruiser ship and by 1938 he had become a Rear Admiral for Battleship Division One. Nimitz was promoted to the Chief of Navy Bureau of Navigation in 1939.

On December 8th, 1942, the day after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor at Hawaii, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called for a joint session of the Congress where he described the attack on Pearl Harbor as ‘ A date that will live in infamy.’ The President demanded Congress to formally declare war between Japan and the U.S.A. Germany and Italy openly declared war against the U.S. on Dec. 11th. President Rooseveldt quickly appointed Admiral Nimitz as Commander in Chief of the entire Pacific Fleet, giving Nimitz complete command of all the air, land and sea forces within the Pacific theater. General Douglas MacArthur was appointed to command the southwest Pacific areas.

Isokura Yamamoto was a 1904 Japanese Naval Academy graduate. He had been wounded whikle serving in the Russo-Japanese War. He studied English at Harvard and was assigned to a Japanese Admiral stationed in Washington, D.C. Yamamoto did not like Americans but he was very impressed with western industry and production methods. He later spent ten years as a top-notch aviator for the Japanese Air Corps. Yamamoto went on to command several aircraft carriers before being promoted to Rear Admiral as Chief of Technological Division of the Naval Air Corps. During that time, he helped develop the famous ‘Zero’ fighting plane. By 1934, Yamamoto was the Commander of the First Carrier Division. In 1939, he became Vice Minister of the Navy and Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet.

Yamamoto viewed the battleships as obsolete and favored using tactics that involved aircraft carriers. Admiral yamamoto was prepared, expierienced and ready for a war against the USA. The Japanese Emperor, Hirohito had also adopted Yamamoto’s viewpoints and became focused on controlling the Pacific Ocean and defeating the United States in war. Admiral Yamamoto’s general plan was to launch a surprise on Pearl Harbor, then take control of Midway and the Aluetian Islands near Alaska at the same time, which would split the U.S. naval defenses and give Japan the upper hand in the Pacific.

The United Sates was still recovering from the Pearl Harbor attack and still had many ships and aircraft being repaired at Hawaii. The U.S. Navy only had one submarine, three aircraft carriers, three cruisers and four destroyers and about 300 aircraft in the immediate region of Midway. Stationed at the small base on Midway were another one hundred and four aircraft including thirty-one PBYs, six TBF Avengers, nineteen SBDs, seven F4Fs, three Wildcats, seventeen SB2Us and twenty-one F2As.

The Japanese Combined Fleet under direct command of Admiral yamamoto was comprised of four aircraft carriers. seven battleships, fifeteen submarines, one hundred and fifety support ships, over 1400 aircraft. Yamamoto planned to have the small force attack Midway to draw in more American ships while his main fleet with more ships waited three hundred miles of the coast to trap the incoming Americans and destroy the ships with all the extra aircraft on the decks. The American s were definitely outnumbered and at a disadvantage but because of ongoing intelligence and an excellent code-breaking unit at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz had a few days to send more bombers and a large detatchment of repaired ships to the area to intercept the main Japanese Fleet. Nimitz hoped to catch Yamamoto in his own trap.

At 9:04 am on June 3, 1942, an American reconnaissance plane sighted lead ships of the Japanese invasion fleet some 500 miles west of Midway. The plane was fired upon by Japanese deck gunners. Admiral Nimitz then ordered the initial attack early in the morning on June 4, three days earlier than Yamamoto had originally planned to attack. A PBY Catalina flying boat torpedoed a Japanese tanker transport, striking the first blow of the Battle of Midway. At 6:00 am, 108 Japanese bombers and zeros bombed the U.S. base on Midway. The USMC soldiers stationed there shot down a number Japanese key pilots. Midway’s remaining planes were quickly scrambled and began shooting at enemy planes and ships. The U.S. submarine, SS Nautilus, joined the attack and aimed torpedos at the Japanese ships within range.

U.S. Task Forces 16 and 17 launched multiple strikes on the Japanese ships that were closing in on Midway. It was only then that Yamamoto became aware of the larger U.S. Navy Carrier Force was fast closing in on them. U.S. bombers penetrated through the anti-aircraft shells and destroyed three Japanese aircraft carriers and one of their heavy cruiser ships with their decks still full of aircraft and fuel. The only Japanese carrier to escape the destruction was the Hiryu which, in turn, released their fighters and bombers left onboard to seriously damage the U.S. carrier, Yorktown. A few minutes later the USS Enterprise returned the favor and mortally damaged the Hiryu. The battling continued on. Yamamoto still had many ships left, but without the carriers and their aircraft, he was forced to abandon the attack and retreat westward. The U.S. Task Force pursued the Japoanese Fleet but bad weather cut them off.

By June 5th, the skies had cleared and the U.S. aircraft resumed the attacks and sunk another cruiser and damaged several other warships. Meanwhile, a Japanese submarine torpedoed and sank the damaged Yorktown. The ship rolled over and sank on June 7th, ending the battle.

During the four day battle, Japan had lost four aircraft carriers, a heavy cruiser, 292 aircraft and 3,057 men. The U. S. suffered the lose of the carrier Yorktown, the destroyer USS Hamon, 144 aircraft and only 362 men. The mighty Imperial Japanese Navy and Admiral Yamamoto had been foiled.

The victory at Midway Atoll was indeed a turning point for the USA during World War II. It prevented the Japanese from establishing a forward military presence in the Pacific Ocean. The USA’s win at Midway made Japan remain more defensive in regards to our military power throughout the remainder of the war.

Though Japan appeared to be the probable victor during the first six hours at the battle at Midway, pivotal decisions made by Americans altered the fate of Midway, influencing the course and outcome of the Second World War. The victory for the United States of America in the battle of Midway has often been attributable to God’s will; a miracle . June 4, 1942, was a battle over the Pacific Ocean which favoured the victory of the Imperial Japanese combined fleet: the Kidō Butai. The Kidō Butai, translated as a mobile striking force, was the powerful concentration of aircraft carriers which Japan would rely on for the battle of Midway . The Battle of Midway, written by Craig L. Symonds, offers a compelling argument on the role of chance at the battle of Midway, both before and during this crucial battle. The outcome at the battle of Midway was the result of the American leadership superiority over Imperial Japan’s overconfident and dismissive leaders and American intelligence. In this decisive battle, the role of chance was inadequate in determining the outcome, rather it should be commemorated as the result of the people, decisions, and war strategies involved at the Pacific battle.

American naval-aerial leadership was a crucial component in the outcome of the battle of Midway. The Pacific American fleet was under the command of an aggressive and calculating leader, Admiral Chester Nimitz . Nimitz not only recognized the advantages and weaknesses of the American fleet and Kidō Butai, he also acknowledged the American Carrier, CV-5 Yorktown was an essential factor in withstanding the Japanese combined fleet at Midway . Yorktown under the command of Frank Fletcher, had been moderately damaged at the battle of the Coral Sea between May seventh and eighth, 1942, a confrontation off the coast of northeast Australia between the Kidō Butai and American carriers of Task Force 17, though unlike Japanese leaders, Nimitz made it a priority to fix the Yorktown in time for Midway, a seemingly impossible task . He also allowed commanders of the fleet to make independent choices, while cautioning them to be patient and prepare for the Kidō Butai to change plans unexpectedly. This leadership exhibited by Nimitz was crucial in ensuring the complete potential of the American fleet presented itself in the battle of Midway; with Nimitz calculating mindset, the officers on the American fleets became more resilient to unanticipated circumstances during the battle of Midway. Nimitz also assigned a dozen submarines to the Midway operations but clarified that the only submarine that would be used to attack would be Nautilus, controlled by Lieutenant Commander William Brockman . Brockman played a crucial role in helping the commander of the Enterprise air force, Lieutenant Commander Clarence Wade McClusky in locating the Kidō Butai . From 0800 to 1000 hours on June fourth, Brockman and Japan’s destroyer, Arashi, commanded by Watanabe Yasumasa were in pursuit of one another, causing the Arashi to delay behind the Kidō Butai, leading McClusky directly to the Kidō Butai . It is plausible that without Brockman’s interference with Watanabe’s Arashi, McClusky would have struggled to locate the Kidō Butai, potentially altering the outcome of this battle. A final notable leader in Midway was Frank Fletcher. Fletcher was the Midway commander of American carrier forces and like Nimitz, made calculated choices at Midway resulting in a success. Fletcher weighed the advantages the Americans had while continuing to consider the consequences of the choices he made, valuing the element of surprise. The decisions made by these leaders all influenced the outcome of the Midway battle with the consequences they prompted. The American commanders at the battle of Midway were exceptionally decisive and calculated which, contributed to the American victory, whereas the Japanese leaders were excellent contrasts to the leadership presented by American commanders.

Japan’s leadership was inefficient as opposed to their American adversary due to their overconfidence and dismissive attitude. Following Pearl Harbour and several other victories over the course of four months, Japan struggled with a ‘victory disease’ of overconfidence that remained evident in the subsequent planning for the Midway operation. Japan’s operational admirals and veterans met on the evening before Midway intending to refine the weaknesses of their operational battleplans, this gathering hosted by Rear Admiral Ugaki Matome. Ugaki was expected to make judgements on the strategy’s potential weaknesses; however, Ugaki was dismissive on several scenarios he ruled improbable, which contradicted the purpose of strategizing war-games as though Americans had obtained the battle operation plans. Another distinguished leader that was in attendance at this meeting was the Kidō Butai commander, Nagumo Chūchi, who remained quiet throughout the strategizing though he should have been challenging the consequences of the improbable circumstances that Ugaki dismissed. This dismissive attitude displayed by the leaders of the Kidō Butai later played a key role in the outcome of Midway. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku was the commander in chief of Imperial Japan’s combined fleet, usually recognized as a confident show-off that enjoyed gambling, even against fate . Unlike Nimitz and Fletcher, who carefully considered each decision, Yamamoto chose to impose his bets on everyone, including his fleets. The Japanese carrier Shōkaku was damaged at the battle of the Coral Sea, though the damage was not irreparable it was kept out of the Midway operation, as well as the undamaged carrier Zuikaku which lost many pilots and aircraft’s . This decision made by Yamamoto proved fatal because it limited the Kidō Butai to only four carriers and contrasts his prioritization to Nimitz who ordered the carrier Yorktown to be fixed in a seemingly impossible amount of time. Consequently, this dismissive attitude displayed by the Kidō Butai’s leaders and the gambling addiction of the chief commander Yamamoto both contributed to the American victory at the battle of Midway by creating an incapability to adapt in unforeseen circumstances that transpired in the battle. Though the Imperial Japanese combined fleet had a higher quality of aircraft, the Americans had a significant advantage over Japan, the American codebreaker intelligence.

Ensign Joseph J. Rochefort, was assigned to breaking admiral codes of the Japanese navy. Rochefort contributed greatly to the outcome of Midway with his successful code-breaking career, helping to increase the American intelligence of the Pacific fleet. Japan often changed their codes to ensure that adversaries were unable to break their codes. It was on the eve of the battle of Midway that Rochefort along with several junior code breakers were able to decrypt Japanese messages confirming the target, key elements of the Kidō Butai, and a confident estimate of the quantity of carriers that the enemies would approach with. Though the decrypted messages did not lay out the sequence of events in Japan’s battleplan, this information was pivotal in the preparation for American fleets. It was the American tactical intelligence that set up the opportunity for victory at the battle of Midway. Though America had this significant advantage, the Kidō Butai appeared to be winning during the first six hours at the battle of Midway up until the crucial turning point for the Americans.

The turning point in the battle of Midway should be credited to the resilience of the American soldiers. After several attempts of dividing the Kidō Butai, resulting in the annihilation of John Waldron’s torpedo squad, the resilience and perseverance of the American fleets began to pay off. It was between 1020 and 1030 hours that the divided Kido Butai would recognize the mistake of disregarding improbabilities in preparation for the decisive Pacific battle.