The Tenerife disaster is often referred to as the crash of the century. The tragedy took place on March 27, 1977, in Los Rodeos Airport on one of the Canary Islands (Weick, 2001). 583 people have lost their lives during the attempt of KLM Boeing 747 to take off and its colliding with Pan Am 747 that was taxiing at that very moment (Misra, 2008). KLM was first to land; Pan Am landed around 40 minutes after it. The latter was expected to park behind KLM and could not depart before it. When the passengers of Pan Am returned on board and KLM started taking off, Pan Am was directed to another, parallel, runway. The controllers denied its request to stay off until the KLM departure and ordered them to pull in behind the KLM plane (Weick, 2001). The KLM plane made a 180-degree turn and collided with Pan Am 13 seconds after this. This tragedy remains the deadliest plane crash in the history of aviation (Ripley, 2008). The whole chain of events contributed into this disaster; they ranged from bad weather, human errors, fatigue, and impatience to the lack of communication between the captain and the crewmembers in the case with KLM flight.
KLM Crew Errors
One of the greatest contributing factors was the KLM captains ignoring the concerns of his crewmembers. Captain Jacob Veldhuyzen van Zante was the chief pilot and a rather senior person. He behaved arrogantly for he got used to other people obeying his orders due to his age and experience (besides, he was Dutch, and, in accordance with this peoples traditions, the higher authority should not be questioned). This accounted for the steep command hierarchy that could be observed on board (Nemeth, 2008) and the failure of the first officer to be assertive because of his fear of the captain. Neither the first officer nor the flight engineer dared to make objections when Pan Am reported about its not leaving the runway yet and the KLM captain misunderstanding the reply and deciding to take off.
ATC Communications
Communication between the ATC and the captains of two planes was another contributing factor. The tower did not expect the KLM plane to take off this is why, on hearing the captains We are now at takeoff position (Martin, 2002, p. 191), they interpreted it incorrectly and the controller replied, O.K., & stand by for taking off & I will call you (Weick, 2001, p. 127). The second failure took place when Pan Am said they would report when they are clear of the takeoff runway and the KLM captain misinterpreted this. Thus, when the flight engineer asked him Is he not clear then, that Pan Am?, the pilot replied, Yes (Martin, 2002, p. 192). Moreover, blocked transmissions also affected the event much. In the case with the Tenerife disaster, two important transmissions have been blocked, one made by ATC that informed KLM to stand by and hold the position and the other made by the Pan AMs pilot who informed that they were still on the runway. If the transmissions were not blocked, this could have prevented the catastrophe.
Fatigue and Weather
Two final contributing factors were fatigue and weather. Due to the thick fog, the pilots of both the planes could be guided only by the ATC controllers. In addition, the crew members (of KLM, especially) were exhausted and the captain was rather impatient. The first time he even wanted to take off without clearance and, even though his copilot reminded him of this, he still decided to take off while the latter was getting the permission.
Conclusion
Therefore, the greatest contributing factors into the Tenerife plane crash were human errors (of both the crews and the ATC controllers), bad weather, fatigue, and impatience of the KLM captain to take off sooner.
Reference List
Martin, J. Organizational culture: Mapping the terrain. London: SAGE.
Misra, K.B. (2008). Handbook of performability engineering. London: Springer.
Nemeth, C.P. (2008). Improving healthcare team communication: building on lessons from aviation and aerospace. New York: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
Ripley, A. (2008). The unthinkable: who survives when disaster strikes and why. Ann Arbor: Michigan University.
Weick, K.L. (2001). Making sense of the organization. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
The crash of Colgan Air Flight 3407 in 2009 involved certain changes in policies adopted nationwide. The company as well as other airlines revisited their procedures and policies to ensure the safety of flight. The flight from Newark (NJ) to Buffalo (NY) ended in a crash, in which 50 people died (including 45 passengers, four members of the crew and one person on the ground) (Stark and Khan par. 2). It is necessary to note that all the aircrafts systems were operating properly. More so, the errors the pilot made is regarded as amateurish (Garrison par.1). Therefore, the discussion of the accident led to a specific attention paid to policies and companys adherence to these policies and regulations.
According to the results of the investigation carried out after the crash, the causes of the accident were the crews failure to monitor airspeed , failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures , the captains failure to effectively manage the flight , and the companys inadequate procedures for management during approaches in icing conditions ( Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc. x). One of the causes (which received a lot of attention) was the pilots fatigue (Stark and Khan par. 9). Importantly, flight standards director of the FAA noted that he had some concerns about the safety culture in the company (Zremski par. 2). It is possible to assume that the accident was preventable as the FAA officials pointed out particular issues that led to the catastrophe.
The companys culture played an important role. On the one hand, the crew obtained the necessary training on flight management. It included training on sterile cockpit procedures, and the companys employees reported that they adhered to these regulations ( Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc. 45). It is also reported that the issues concerning pilots fatigue were addressed in the companys culture ( Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc. 48). However, it is also clear that the problem was rather persistent as many pilots had to commute, which contributed to their fatigue. The company also did not have any particular written documents where reasons for fatigue and strategies to prevent it were provided. According to the report, the companys safety officers were working on such documentation ( Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc. 49).
The comprehensive investigation revealed major causes of the accident. These were mainly the crews errors. The NTSB issued a set of recommendations aimed at prevention of similar catastrophes. It is necessary to add that these recommendations are quite effective and can contribute to the flight safety. For instance, one of the recommendations was to enhance training of the crew aimed at the development of monitoring skills. One of the causes of the accident in question was the pilots inability to monitor and cross-check important indicators (for example, speed) ( Safety Recommendations 6).
It was also noted that alert systems could also be improved as due to the workload or other reasons pilots may fail to respond to the emergency situations timely. This was the case with the Colgan Air Flight 3407. Leadership training should also be a part of the pilots development ( Safety Recommendations 10). It is clear that the pilot of the aircraft failed to take complete control over the situation, and the crew was not conducting properly, which contributed to making additional errors and the crash.
The NTSB also recommends initiating the development of comprehensive guidance concerning sterile cockpit procedures ( Safety Recommendations 15). Although pilots and officials note that such procedures exist and are mainly followed, it is clear that the wide discussion may improve the situation. Another serious issue to address as seen by the NTSB is fatigue mitigation. It is recommended to implement the Fatigue Risk Management System that can help mitigate fatigue-associated risk. It is possible to assume that these recommendations are appropriate as they address common issues related to flight safety.
It is also important to note that the Public Law 111-216 provides the necessary legislation to increase safety. The law presupposes regular inspections concerning companys compliance with safety regulations ( Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 2362). Such aspects as fatigue, safety management systems and crews management skills will be the major focus of these regulations and inspections. This will enable companies to improve their operations and safety.
In conclusion, it is necessary to note that the accident provides many valuable lessons. First, it is clear that the procedures and systems existing are not sufficient to ensure safety. The areas of major concern are adherence to existing procedures (for example, sterile cockpit procedures), pilot leadership, monitoring and cross-checking as well as the crews fatigue. Some policies and laws have been implemented to address these issues. It is also clear that training provided is inefficient as the crew do not follow some recommendations due to many reasons (lack of skills and knowledge, fatigue, workload and so on). One of the most important steps to undertake is the introduction of a sophisticated training program for existing airlines employees as well as students. The training should address the most common issues. This will help improve flight safety.
As established by the National Transportation Safety Board, this paper discusses the probable cause of Beech King Air 200, N501RH as related to human factors. The accident occurred because the crew lost situational awareness while making an attempt to land (Wise, Hopkin, & Garland, 2016). For instance, throughout the approach of the localizer runway, the aircraft was actually five miles ahead of what the first officer and captain believed they were. Despite having an accumulative 12,000 hours of flight experience, the crew miscalculated their position when communicating or getting instructions from the ground control tower (Strauch, 2017). Specifically, the aircraft ought to have been at an altitude of 2,600 feet and not 4,000 feet at the outer locator market (LOM). The variance of almost 1,400 feet is not negligible. This means that the plane approached the landing point when it was at an altitude of about 2,600 feet instead of the recommended 1,340 feet. The miscalculation as contributed by human error resulted in the missed approach point (MAP).
Another mistake made by the crew was a wrong climbing turn at the MAP. Actually, the first officer and the captain ought to have made a right climbing turn towards the LOM in order to level off at an altitude of about 2,600 feet, which is safe for approaching a landing attempt. However, even after passing the missed approach point, the aircraft continued to steadily descent from an altitude of 2,600 feet before leveling off at about 1,400 feet. Again, the plane climbed further ahead for about two extra miles after passing the airport by 8 miles. The miscalculation resulted in a collision with the rising terrain. These revelations indicate that the flight crew failed to properly and accurately execute the standardized approach procedure instrumentation despite constant communication with the ground control. The crew did not effectively implement the published missed-approach procedure (Griffin, Young, & Stanton, 2015).
The flight crew members were victims of human error by failing to use the existing navigation aids to constantly monitor or confirm the position of the aircraft before and during the landing approach. Moreover, the air accident investigation report indicated that the flight crew might have ignored the DME and ADF and instead relied on King KLN 90B GPS. Although the GPS is IFR-capable, its usage in pre-accident circumstances is not certified, especially in IMC (Lowe, 2016). As a result, the crew might have assumed the planes approach as normal despite having been on the wrong waypoint.
Another probable error in human judgment as contributing to the accident is the wrong reference. Since the flight crew over-relied on GPS in LOM navigation instead of the standard ADF. Moreover, the crew was given a landing clearance sooner than they expected and decided to continue the aircraft turn with the same altitude in the final landing approach (Strauch, 2017). The crew could have avoided this confusion if they had relied on the ADF. In addition, the data recorded on the radar indicated that the aircrafts position at the time of attempted landing was not at the proper altitude or point.
Avoiding the Accident
The management of Hendrick Motors could have adopted several measures to prevent this accident from occurring. For instance, they could have created a standardized flight guideline manual that incorporates all the support instruments instead of overreliance on GPS. For instance, if ADF was activated, the accident could have been avoided since this instrument can give accurate information to the crew about the position of the aircraft and surrounding terrain at the time of landing (Strauch, 2017).
References
Griffin, T., Young, M., & Stanton, N. (2015). Human factors models for aviation accident analysis and prevention. New York, NY: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
Lowe, P. (2016). Hendrick King Air crew lost situational awareness. Web.
Strauch, B. (2017). Investigating human error: incidents, accidents, and complex systems. New York, NY: CRC Press.
Wise, J., Hopkin, D., & Garland, D. (2016). Handbook of aviation human factors (2nd ed.). New York, NY: CRC Press.
Even, though, plane accidents are uncommon they habitually result into baffling catastrophes. This is accredited to the increased numbers of individuals on board and wiry probabilities of endurance. Prior researches point out that roughly 90% fatal cases arise from the accidents furthermore; passengers plane crashes typically affect persons on the ground (Coppola 82).
A falling plane may thrust into a structure, a metropolis or rupture into the fire which thus affects many people. Airline incidents have been blamed on inapt weather leading to diminished vicinity and human errors including carelessness and physiological disorders. Other causes include motorized failures especially the engine due to pitiable servicing processes.
A sole plane crash of immense significance was illustrated at Lockhart River, while moving towards the airport on May 7, 2005 (Barnes 3). A frightening catastrophe thus incorporated a Fairchild metro, 23 aircraft, this happened at 11.43am. The mishap lead to the loss of close to fifteen lives in a jagged up terrain. It is further noted that this occurred a few miles from the Airport best referred to as the Iron Range.
The concerned plane was heading towards a place known as Carins, from Bamaga; however, it was to make a halt at the mentioned airport. It is equally notable that the 19 seater Metroliner had crew members that totaled to two; furthermore close to 15 passengers were on board, thus including 12 men and 3 women. In the end, the spoils were revealed lying on a hillside roughly 11 km from the river (Lockhart).
Preface examination indicated that the facts recorder, cockpit, did not document any information for the air travel or flight. It is central to mention that the release and rescue teams held responsible the cruel weather conditions for effectual reply services. The scene was characterized by heavy clouds and grave raindrops that contributed to the occurrence of the accident.
It is further affirmed that clouds hanging at about a 1000 feet above the airdrome were hazardous for the plane because of the increased presence of vicinity issues. Another issue of concern is the ruggedness, which complicated the situation thus rendering it inaccessible to the calamity team.
This situation could even exacerbate the situation because of the impact arising that may be caused by the rocky places. It is further indicated that the pilot did not conform to the required routes as illustrated by the certified set of laws of the airline itineraries.
The report consequently indicates that the copilot had not received approval to put into practice runway operations prior to the plane taking off. It is also indicated that both descent and approach speeds that ought to have typified operations in the plane were not followed by the crew and team. It is crucial to affirm that the TransAir authorities were thus to blame since they failed to scrutinize the pilots conformity with the air guidelines.
(Picture indicating the scene of the accident)
Even, though, the cause for the accident lies with the deceased pilot, it is apparent from the retrospective examinations that the administration, pilot and copilot should be held culpable for occurrence of the catastrophe. The aptitude of the plane crew analyzing the plane was in doubt since they lacked approvals from knowledgeable pilots.
The certifications of the TransAir were inconsistent with the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (Barnes 3). It is also reinstated that failure of the cockpit to document any information indicates that the plane was deficient, further exemplifying the motorized and methodological problems. The concerned authorities were not able to establish the problem and apply apposite measures.
Issues Arising
Plant and Equipment
It is noted that the plane had apparatus failures like the incapability of the cockpit to document and verify information. This further highlights the concept that that the plane had motorized setbacks which went unobserved (ASN). Consequently, it is realized that the devise features of the Jeppesen instrument, which serves critical roles that entailed detection of approach chats had several limitations and failures. Its incapability to provide clear and valid charts led to the lessening of watchfulness and confusion.
The report outlines that the apparatus responsible for viewing the process did not identify issues associated with the ecological terrain. It is equally mentioned that the Jeppesen instrument did not depict the procedures for changing the gradient but only recognized the contours that were white in color. Regarding the plant issues, it is specified that the plane crashed on a rugged terrain, a factor that contributed to the writing off of the airline since the repair process would have been futile.
The incompetent co-pilot could not save the situation because of the unawareness of the technical issues which were unfolding. He had pilot formal training requirements to carry out his duties effectively. The crew on board did a lot of work for the period of the approach and this must have vanished situational understanding of the planes position.
Physical environment
The Iron Range, the park where the crash occurred was heavily timbered thus increasing the impact of the fall (ASN). The region around Lockhart River is a thick forest and extremely ragged which increased the severity of the situation. The vegetation in the region reduced the visibility thus obscuring the vicinity for the pilot and the crew. It is further mentioned that dense vegetation usually attracts rainfall, hence reducing visibility.
The scenery of the accident made it difficult to attain easy access especially for the rescue team so that they can offer their services in apt time. This eventually made it difficult for the catastrophe and examination team to locate the wreckage within the stipulated time. It is further clarified that delays caused by the ruggedness or the region contributed to increased death since people did not receive the crucial care.
People and skills
The crew team started initiating airport landing strip approach with the full knowledge that the co-pilot was not capable of conducting such mechanism approach. Issues pertaining to skills are also recognized when the pilot neglected to conform to issues pertaining to recommended descending speed limits, consequently descending at escalated speeds.
Furthermore, there was ignorance of the sections lowest harmless height drop thus propagating the crashing of the plane. It is thus certain that the plane was directed into the terrain by the pilot due to increased negligence of the rules. In the end, the passengers could not live on due to the severity of the impact. This concept is further emphasized, upon analysis of the wreckage since centers of escape were blocked.
The travelers were confined in the crashed plane, this coupled with brutal ground impact culminated in their demise. The disaster team could not approach the scene easily due to the ruggedness of the area. This means that passengers who could have been easily rescued eventually died. It is also clear that the radar squad did not continuously observe the position of the plane; furthermore, it was fathomed minutes later that the plane was absent (Barnes 21)
Systems and Methods
The cause of the catastrophe is accredited to the disregard of the system guidelines by the pilot. Other concepts include the presence of non functional instruments and diminished experience amongst the personnel. It is worth mentioning that the pilot could have comprehended clear indications by this instrument and taken apposite actions.
It is common knowledge in the aviation industry that descent at high speed could not allow for safe landing. This is because it would eventually culminate in system technicalities. It is thus crucial to determine why the pilot disobeyed the rules and descended quickly prompting the plane to lose control. In the end, it plunged into the dense forest. The co-driver could have used other methods of controlling the plane if he was experienced (Pritchard & Leavitt 14)
Timeline of Events
Table 1: Events from the departure to the time of crashing
08:30
09:50
09:58
10:39
11:07
11:32
11: 35.
11:39
11:41.
11:43
Departure at Cairns
Engine switched off at Lockhart River
Departure at
Lockhart River
Arrival at
Bamaga
Departure from
Bamaga
Commencing descent.
Copilot estimates arrival time
Crew conduct runway approach
Plane reached a fix descent
The plane crushed
Post incidence responses
Table 2: Timeline from the detection of the missing plane to the recovery of human remains
11:40
12:05
12:30
12:32- 16:00
16:30
Day 2
Day 5
Mr. Peter Friel heard radio call about a nearing plane.
Mr. peter assumed that the plane passed due to weather conditions
Mr. Peter contacts Aero-tropics why they decided to pass.
Communications went on to ascertain the whereabouts of the plane
The site of crash identified
Recovery of human remains begins
Recovery completed
Table 3: outlines the organizations and people involved in the actual incident and participation
Organizations and people involver
15 passengers
2 The crew
government
Air control point
The rescue/recovery team
Air companies
The type of organizations and people involved
All passengers
-employers
-employees
-students
-Captain Brett Hotchin
-Copilot Timothy Down
police
-executive
-ministry of transport
transport safety bureau
-Lockhart River airport
-Mr. Peter
-The Queensland Police Service Disaster Victim Identification Squad.
Tonge centre Captain
-doctors
-TransAir
-Aero-tropics
Parties in the sphere
Even though, no single life was saved several parties were involved in the Lockhart plane crash to bring things back to normalcy. The man at the control point, Mr. Peter, played a very vital role in detection of the missing plane.
It is clear that his contact with the Air-tropics led to the comprehension that Fairchild airplane went missing. All other officials at the airport acted swiftly to make certain that the crash point is identified almost immediately after the incident. The two air companies, TransAir and Air-tropics, were exclusively liable for the accident.
They took part in locating the crash spot and giving all-purpose information about the plane and the crew. Various administration officials like the police division and the ministry of transport took the first move to set contact strategies to gather information relating to the calamity (Barnes 5). The police and other government sectors assisted in the initiation of prelude investigations. The media was in the front in the spreading of information to the public on the proceedings of the incident.
It is noted that the disaster team played a very crucial role during the catastrophe aftermath. They assisted in the removal of the human remains, consequently, they aided in the constructive classification of the victims. More so, the medics at the Tonge centre helped in the final positive recognition of the crash victims (Barnes 23).
It was therefore, possible for the relatives of the victims to obtain their true members. It is also believed that the captain and the copilot applied their methodological experiences to evade the accident, but this is not known because they perished together with the passengers. It is also imperative to distinguish the roles of the general public because they are the users of the airplanes. All the interventions after the incident and avoidance of future accidents are aimed at satisfying the public needs.
Hierarchy of control
Elimination is accredited as one of the most suitable and recognized methods since they do not depend solely on people for its execution and sustainability whilst controlling accidents. Risk exclusion is considered the most sensible means of preventing hazards from causing ruthless effects to human beings and machinery (Ferrett & Hughes 105). The airline authorities could have eliminated the out of order equipments like the cockpit and Jeppesen among others.
These paraphernalia required thorough fixing and maintenance so as to serve their functions. Non functional paraphernalia need to be eliminated in the arrangement so as to avoid future happenings. The exclusion of the incompetent copilot who could not assist in saving the situation could have reduced the impact on the accident. Personnel, who are unable to meet the training requirements, consequently can not perform their duties effectively.
This is the next level of hierarchy of control which involves the substitution of the dangerous constituents by less hazardous so as to reduce the shock of the risk (Ferrett, Hughes 105). The faulty machines like the Jeppesen need to be replaced with effective equipment capable of giving apparent guidelines and situational attentiveness.
The accident was blamed on this equipment; hence similar gadgets should be eliminated with effective ones to deter future accidents. It could not read clear contours for the pilot thus prompting him to lose focus. An effective replica of cockpit which is able to record the required information is necessary in other planes.
Engineering is the third level of hazard management which involves the upgrading of existing appliances to dissuade future accidents (Ignacio& Bullock 250). This involves enhancing the efficacy of the equipment to reduce the catastrophes in the future. Moves to install habitual controls can help the pilot avoid hazardous areas like the forested and cloudy areas. The planes should be controlled robotically at the disappearance and approaching ports, since this helps in recognizing looming accidents at untimely hours.
The next level of control is administration which involves ample training of the personnel. The plane crew and the pilots must undertake all the required schooling for their jobs. It is indicated that the co-pilot of the luckless plane did not undergo the formal training required for his duties. It is the liability of the administration to ensure all the employees meet their minimum qualifications to execute their duties.
Training and instruction alone does not ensure protection but the employees should adhere to the set stipulations. The pilot commanding the plane disobeyed the rules by descending at a faster rate than the required speed thus losing control (Coppola 82). It is also specified that the crew were overwhelmed by the work, meaning that the administration had less employees on board. This should be ensured so that the crew do satisfactory work, and to the required standards.
The last step in the control of accidents is the use of individual protective equipment (Ignacio & Bullock 251). This is considered last in the chain of command because it does not manage the accident but reduces the brutality of the impact after the exposure or accident. The planes belonging to this company need to be fitted with protective devices like parachutes which passengers and the crew can use when accident strikes.
It is noted that no single person on board used a parachute to get out of the crashing plane. Furthermore, the fitted safety jackets and parachutes should be easily accessible by all the passengers in case of accident. The passengers should be inducted on the straightforward guidelines of using the paraphernalia for them to be well acquainted with the devices. The crew should be at the forefront in ensuring that all passengers get these services.
Best solutions for the long and short terms
The airline company should apply apposite long and short term elucidation in the future. The best long term answer to analogous accidents is the eradication of faulty gadgets and replaced with new ones. Equipment like the Jeppesen should be eliminated and fixed with novel permitted gears so as to avert future failures.
The incapable personnel should be eliminated and get replaced with competent workers who are able to execute the required duties. The short term approach to the problem is the issuance of shielding devices to the crew and passengers, which will help in the reduction of accident impact. The planes should be well fitted with safety belts and other associated appliances to be used by the people on board in cases of tragedy.
Making changes
It is noted that the administration in collaboration with the government should be responsible for the changes. The government should offer decision-making and dogmatic measures to ensure that all the necessities are installed in the airplanes. It is essential for the state to get involved, since it is charged with the liability of safeguarding the lives of its people. The financiers and other donors are also involved in the achievement of the long term solutions since fiscal matters are involved in such executions.
The admin should be at the fore front to ensure that long-term solutions are implemented. In particular, the management should provide strategy and headship in the abolition of faulty equipment and other policy changes (Kanki, Helmreich & Anca 10). It should be able to give solutions to methodological matters during the creation of the blueprint and implementation of the proposed solutions.
Short term changes should be initiated by the administration and implemented by the passengers and other staff on board. The administration should seek advice from experts like the Red Crescent to give guidelines on the finest safety measures to employ (Pritchard & Leavitt 14). It should make certain that protection measures and devices are well fitted in the plane. The association should ensure that safety belts, parachutes and other protection devices are reachable to the passengers (United States Air Force 155).
It is imperative to note that the passengers get enough training and sensitization on the application and usage of the safety gadgets. It is decisive to note that every personality has a duty to safeguard his or her life. The state should also get involved in creating the changes by ensuring all safety apparatus are well installed in the plane. It can do this through presenting supervisory services to the airline companies.
There was no indication of any type of problem that could have warned the pilots of the impending disaster that would force them to crash-land the DC-10 that carried 285 passengers and eleven crew members. One engine gave way due to metal fatigue and as a result parts of it broke off and just like shrapnel the bits and pieces tore into three hydraulic systems of the DC-10. This meant that the pilots lost control of the aircraft the only thing it can do was to turn right. Later on, other pilots tried to understand what really happened to flight UA232 and using simulators they discovered that it was impossible to land that aircraft safely. Flight UA232 crashed into a runway at an airport in Sioux, Iowa. There was extensive damage to the DC-10 there were 110 fatalities including an infant. Everyone on board could have died, except for the skill and bravery of the pilot as well as the coordinated effort of the emergency response units that waited for them below.
Background
It was already past noon, on July 19, 1989, when the flight crews, flight attendants, and all the passengers on board the ill-fated aircraft were looking forward to a safe flight. It was supposed to be a routine trip because Flight UA232 was regularly scheduled to fly from Denver, Colorado to Philadelphia and then Pennsylvania with only one intermediate stop at Chicago, Illinois (Krause, 2003, p.445). It should have been business-as-usual.
The DC-10 was in capable hands. On the flight deck was Captain Haynes who was a a28-year veteran. Haynes had at least 30,000 hours of flying experience under his belt (Kilroy, 2008, p.1). The First Officer was William Records and the Flight Engineer was Dudley Dvorak (Kilroy, 2008, p.1). After crossing Iowa the crew began a right turn to take the DC-10 to Chicago. Then all of a sudden there was trouble.
Something went terribly wrong and then they heard a loud explosion. It was said that human error played a major role in the failure to detect the metallurgical defect of the stage 1 fan disk of the engine (Kolstad, 1990, p.10). The National Transportation Safety Board determined the same saying that there was an inadequate consideration given to the human factor limitations in the inspection and quality-control procedures used by the United Airlines engine overhaul facility (Krause, 2003, p.445). The crack was never discovered and so flight UA232 was given the green light to continue hauling passengers back and forth from Denver to Pennsylvania.
There was separation, fragmentation and forceful discharge of stage 1 fan rotor assembly parts from the No. 2 engine led to the loss of the three hydraulic systems that powered the airplanes flight controls (Kolstad, 2003, p.1). The pieces that broke away from the disintegrated rotor cut through all the hydraulic systems making it extremely difficult to guide the plane and to at least make it glide in the event of a crash-landing (Reason, 2008, p.200).
One report said that the aircraft was designed with redundancy in the system and with regards to the controls there were three separate sets of hydraulic controls that if one will fail there would be two on standby. It was even reported that the probability of losing all three hydraulic systems was considered by the designers to be less than one in a billion (Reason, 2008, p.200). This is the reason why there were no emergency procedures that was creat to deal with this particular scenario (Reason, 2008, p.200). Haynes, Records, and Dvorak had to fly the plane using everything that they know and they also need all the help that they can get.
There were so many things that took place but remarkably it only took thirty minutes, from the time that the pilots heard the explosion to the time that they were fast approaching Sioux Gateway Airport, Iowa (Krause, 2003, p.445). Even if they can manage to the land the plane the absence of adequate emergency response units and other trained personnel will result in a significant loss of life because of asphyxiation and injuries that when left untreated will result in death. But this is not the case with UA232 and the responders present at Sioux airports runway.
Emergency Response
The reason why an almost out of control aircraft coming in too fast and heavy did not result in the death of all the people involved in the crash-landing can be attributed to the well-coordinated effort of the emergency response units on the ground. They were able to do so because they were prepared to tackle such type of crisis. It was discovered later that the Emergency Response Group in Sioux City had a disaster drill two years prior to the event wherein the organizers had drawn up a scenario similar to the upcoming emergency crash-landing: a wide-bodied jet that did not serve Sioux City crashed on the airports close runway (Reason, 2008, p.204). In addition there was one more thing that enhanced the preparation process; the organizers added another facet to the plan that allowed more services to participate and to even involve emergency response units coming from small communities around the Sioux area (Reason, 2008, p.204). This means that the whole community was ready to tackle an emergency as significant as UA232.
The drill that was conducted two years prior to the incident not only prepared the leaders of Sioux community to handle the crisis but it gave them an a clear idea how ineffectual their present management system can be in the event of a major disaster. But on that day when UA232 was about to crash there were 14 of the countys basic life support ambulances that were dispatched to the Sioux airport (Hogan & Burstein, 2007, p.102). Eighty city firefighters, both on-duty and off-duty were also present at the crash site (Hogan & Burstein, 2007, p.102).
State officials from Iowa also took part in the emergency response and because of that the state emergency operations center was able to dispatch six Army National Guard helicopters from Boon, Iowa, near Des Moines (Hogan & Burstein, 2007, p.102). Iowas state-wide law enforcement agency also sent a teletype message that broadcasted a request that if there be ambulances located at a reasonable distance from Sioux airport should respond immediately (Hogan & Burstein, 2007, p.102).
The response was immediate and it was significant because there were 35 ambulances that came from 29 communities outside Sioux City. Aside from that there were also four civilian EMS helicopters that responded and remarkably these helicopters came as far as 70 miles away from Iowa, Nebraska and even South Dakota (Hogan & Burstein, 2007, p.102). The outsiders were an impressive group composed of 20 paramedics, 100 basic emergency medical technicians, and 40 outside fire departments (Hogan & Burstein, 2007 p.102). It was indeed an overwhelming response that benefited the survivors of UA232.
At the same time the two local hospitals were able to activate their mass casualty plans and assembled resources and personnel (Abkowitz, 2008, p.242). Due to this immediate response the first patient that came their way experienced an orderly and efficient medical disaster response system (Abkowitz, 2008, p.242). This was critical because based on the investigation many died not by the impact of the crash itself but because of the circumstances in the crash site such as smoke inhalation. One could just imagine what the casualty rate could have been without the readiness of the emergency responders.
Al Haynes who became a sought-after speaker in management training seminars after the crash pointed to one crucial factor that made it possible for the convergence of ambulances, medical personnel, and other emergency response units from outlying districts and communities. The captain said that it can be attributed to a mutual aid program (Haynes, 2008, p.1). Gary Brown the Director of Emergency Services in Sioux devised a mutual aid program that enabled him to work with more communities in the general area and the captain added: I have seen pictures in magazines where a fire truck is sitting on a country border while the house across the street burns because the communities do not have a mutual aid program (Haynes, 2008, p.1). This was not the problem in the UA232 disaster response.
Due to the mutual aid program initiated by Brown, representatives from surrounding communities were invited into the meetings wwherethe Emergency Disaster Service would draw up plans and execute drills and so many leaders from the State of Iowa were familiar with Sioux City and they knew what to do in the event of a major disaster. This allowed the emergency dispatcher to easily contact one community to the next requesting help. Even those who are not part of the community aid program came to help (Haynes, 2008, p.1). In addition, the meeting conducted by Brown allowed for the inclusion of post-traumatic stress units (Haynes, 2008, p.1). The captain said that this health group was an invaluable part of the whole emergency response system.
Another factor that improved the chances of survival of the crash victims was the timing of the accident. Since the town of Sioux was alerted of the impending crash-landing in the afternoon, it coincided with the shift changes in the local hospitals and as a result the workers for the morning and evening shift were able to converge in the hospitals and they were ready to handle more patients than what was normally possible for a small town (Reason, 2008, p.202). As a direct result of the convergence of medical personnel in the two local hospitals, there was one doctor and assisting staff that could be assigned to every ambulance when it arrived adding to the efficiency of the triage system in place.
Aside from medical workers it was also important to have trained personnel that can handle crowd control, vehicular traffic, and the safety of the people who were there to assist or to know what happened to their loved ones aboard the plane. It so happened the day of the month in which the 185th Iowa Air National Guard was on duty and this means that there was 285 trained personnel who were there to help in dealing with the crash (Reason, 2008, p.202).
United Airlines also played a major role in coping with the disaster. The airline responded to the crash by directing large numbers of personnel from San Francisco and Seattle to assist the emergency response units and because of ,that there was at least one United Airlines employee for every family that went to the crash site (Reason, 2008, p. 206). It created a sense of order at Sioux City when it began to swell with people.
The DC-10 came in fast and strong at 215 knots which were 75 knots faster than normal and with a rate of descent of 1,854 feet per minute when the normal was only 300 feet per minute (Reason, 2008, p.) Thus, at the initial point of impact, there was an 18-inch hole that punctured the one-foot thick concrete (Reason, 2008, p.). There was a huge fireball because of the fuel that still remained in the tank and the plane broke into many sections. The impact, the destruction of the aircraft as well as the fire and smoke could have killed everyone but thanks to the emergency responders the survival rate was more than they could hope for.
Conclusion
The results of the simulator tests revealed that it was impossible to land UA232. The plane came in with an abnormal rate of descent and speed that bore a huge hole in the concrete, broke it into many sections and ignited a huge fire because of the fuel. Even if there were survivors all of them could have been killed afterwards because of asphyxiation from smoke and internal injuries that proved fatal to some. It was the well-coordinated emergency response built on the foundation of a mutual aid program between Sioux City and outlying communities that allowed emergency response units to efficiently gather near the runway to help. The Emergency Disaster Service at Sioux also played a major role especially when it comes to communication and coordinating local and even state resources to help cope with the disaster.
References
Abkowitz, M. (2008). Operational Risk Management: A Case Study Approach to Effective Planning and Response. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Flin, R. et al. (2008). Safety at the Sharp End. VT: Ashgate Publishing.
Hogan, D. & J. Burstein. (2007). Disaster Medicine. Lippincott Williams & Wilkins: PA.
Kilroy, Chris. (2008). Special Report: United Airlines Flight 232. Web.
Kolstad, J. (1990). National Transportation Safety Board: Safety Recommendations. Web.
Krause, S. (2003). Aircraft Safety: Accident, Investigations, Analyses, and Applications. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Reason, J. (2008). The Human Contributions Unsafe Acts, Accidents, and Heroic Recoveries. VT:Ashgate Publishing.
The Tenerife disaster is often referred to as the crash of the century. The tragedy took place on March 27, 1977, in Los Rodeos Airport on one of the Canary Islands (Weick, 2001). 583 people have lost their lives during the attempt of KLM Boeing 747 to take off and its colliding with Pan Am 747 that was taxiing at that very moment (Misra, 2008). KLM was first to land; Pan Am landed around 40 minutes after it. The latter was expected to park behind KLM and could not depart before it. When the passengers of Pan Am returned on board and KLM started taking off, Pan Am was directed to another, parallel, runway. The controllers denied its request to stay off until the KLM departure and ordered them to pull in behind the KLM plane (Weick, 2001). The KLM plane made a 180-degree turn and collided with Pan Am 13 seconds after this. This tragedy remains the deadliest plane crash in the history of aviation (Ripley, 2008). The whole chain of events contributed into this disaster; they ranged from bad weather, human errors, fatigue, and impatience to the lack of communication between the captain and the crewmembers in the case with KLM flight.
KLM Crew Errors
One of the greatest contributing factors was the KLM captains ignoring the concerns of his crewmembers. Captain Jacob Veldhuyzen van Zante was the chief pilot and a rather senior person. He behaved arrogantly for he got used to other people obeying his orders due to his age and experience (besides, he was Dutch, and, in accordance with this peoples traditions, the higher authority should not be questioned). This accounted for the steep command hierarchy that could be observed on board (Nemeth, 2008) and the failure of the first officer to be assertive because of his fear of the captain. Neither the first officer nor the flight engineer dared to make objections when Pan Am reported about its not leaving the runway yet and the KLM captain misunderstanding the reply and deciding to take off.
ATC Communications
Communication between the ATC and the captains of two planes was another contributing factor. The tower did not expect the KLM plane to take off this is why, on hearing the captains We are now at takeoff position (Martin, 2002, p. 191), they interpreted it incorrectly and the controller replied, O.K., & stand by for taking off & I will call you (Weick, 2001, p. 127). The second failure took place when Pan Am said they would report when they are clear of the takeoff runway and the KLM captain misinterpreted this. Thus, when the flight engineer asked him Is he not clear then, that Pan Am?, the pilot replied, Yes (Martin, 2002, p. 192). Moreover, blocked transmissions also affected the event much. In the case with the Tenerife disaster, two important transmissions have been blocked, one made by ATC that informed KLM to stand by and hold the position and the other made by the Pan AMs pilot who informed that they were still on the runway. If the transmissions were not blocked, this could have prevented the catastrophe.
Fatigue and Weather
Two final contributing factors were fatigue and weather. Due to the thick fog, the pilots of both the planes could be guided only by the ATC controllers. In addition, the crew members (of KLM, especially) were exhausted and the captain was rather impatient. The first time he even wanted to take off without clearance and, even though his copilot reminded him of this, he still decided to take off while the latter was getting the permission.
Conclusion
Therefore, the greatest contributing factors into the Tenerife plane crash were human errors (of both the crews and the ATC controllers), bad weather, fatigue, and impatience of the KLM captain to take off sooner.
Reference List
Martin, J. Organizational culture: Mapping the terrain. London: SAGE.
Misra, K.B. (2008). Handbook of performability engineering. London: Springer.
Nemeth, C.P. (2008). Improving healthcare team communication: building on lessons from aviation and aerospace. New York: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
Ripley, A. (2008). The unthinkable: who survives when disaster strikes and why. Ann Arbor: Michigan University.
Weick, K.L. (2001). Making sense of the organization. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
As established by the National Transportation Safety Board, this paper discusses the probable cause of Beech King Air 200, N501RH as related to human factors. The accident occurred because the crew lost situational awareness while making an attempt to land (Wise, Hopkin, & Garland, 2016). For instance, throughout the approach of the localizer runway, the aircraft was actually five miles ahead of what the first officer and captain believed they were. Despite having an accumulative 12,000 hours of flight experience, the crew miscalculated their position when communicating or getting instructions from the ground control tower (Strauch, 2017). Specifically, the aircraft ought to have been at an altitude of 2,600 feet and not 4,000 feet at the outer locator market (LOM). The variance of almost 1,400 feet is not negligible. This means that the plane approached the landing point when it was at an altitude of about 2,600 feet instead of the recommended 1,340 feet. The miscalculation as contributed by human error resulted in the missed approach point (MAP).
Another mistake made by the crew was a wrong climbing turn at the MAP. Actually, the first officer and the captain ought to have made a right climbing turn towards the LOM in order to level off at an altitude of about 2,600 feet, which is safe for approaching a landing attempt. However, even after passing the missed approach point, the aircraft continued to steadily descent from an altitude of 2,600 feet before leveling off at about 1,400 feet. Again, the plane climbed further ahead for about two extra miles after passing the airport by 8 miles. The miscalculation resulted in a collision with the rising terrain. These revelations indicate that the flight crew failed to properly and accurately execute the standardized approach procedure instrumentation despite constant communication with the ground control. The crew did not effectively implement the published missed-approach procedure (Griffin, Young, & Stanton, 2015).
The flight crew members were victims of human error by failing to use the existing navigation aids to constantly monitor or confirm the position of the aircraft before and during the landing approach. Moreover, the air accident investigation report indicated that the flight crew might have ignored the DME and ADF and instead relied on King KLN 90B GPS. Although the GPS is IFR-capable, its usage in pre-accident circumstances is not certified, especially in IMC (Lowe, 2016). As a result, the crew might have assumed the planes approach as normal despite having been on the wrong waypoint.
Another probable error in human judgment as contributing to the accident is the wrong reference. Since the flight crew over-relied on GPS in LOM navigation instead of the standard ADF. Moreover, the crew was given a landing clearance sooner than they expected and decided to continue the aircraft turn with the same altitude in the final landing approach (Strauch, 2017). The crew could have avoided this confusion if they had relied on the ADF. In addition, the data recorded on the radar indicated that the aircrafts position at the time of attempted landing was not at the proper altitude or point.
Avoiding the Accident
The management of Hendrick Motors could have adopted several measures to prevent this accident from occurring. For instance, they could have created a standardized flight guideline manual that incorporates all the support instruments instead of overreliance on GPS. For instance, if ADF was activated, the accident could have been avoided since this instrument can give accurate information to the crew about the position of the aircraft and surrounding terrain at the time of landing (Strauch, 2017).
References
Griffin, T., Young, M., & Stanton, N. (2015). Human factors models for aviation accident analysis and prevention. New York, NY: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
Lowe, P. (2016). Hendrick King Air crew lost situational awareness. Web.
Strauch, B. (2017). Investigating human error: incidents, accidents, and complex systems. New York, NY: CRC Press.
Wise, J., Hopkin, D., & Garland, D. (2016). Handbook of aviation human factors (2nd ed.). New York, NY: CRC Press.
The Tenerife disaster is often referred to as the crash of the century. The tragedy took place on March 27, 1977, in Los Rodeos Airport on one of the Canary Islands (Weick, 2001). 583 people have lost their lives during the attempt of KLM Boeing 747 to take off and it’s colliding with Pan Am 747 that was taxiing at that very moment (Misra, 2008). KLM was first to land; Pan Am landed around 40 minutes after it. The latter was expected to park behind KLM and could not depart before it. When the passengers of Pan Am returned on board and KLM started taking off, Pan Am was directed to another, parallel, runway. The controllers denied its request to stay off until the KLM departure and ordered them to pull in behind the KLM plane (Weick, 2001). The KLM plane made a 180-degree turn and collided with Pan Am 13 seconds after this. This tragedy remains the deadliest plane crash in the history of aviation (Ripley, 2008). The whole chain of events contributed into this disaster; they ranged from bad weather, human errors, fatigue, and impatience to the lack of communication between the captain and the crewmembers in the case with KLM flight.
KLM Crew Errors
One of the greatest contributing factors was the KLM captain’s ignoring the concerns of his crewmembers. Captain Jacob Veldhuyzen van Zante was the chief pilot and a rather senior person. He behaved arrogantly for he got used to other people obeying his orders due to his age and experience (besides, he was Dutch, and, in accordance with this people’s traditions, the higher authority should not be questioned). This accounted for the steep command hierarchy that could be observed on board (Nemeth, 2008) and the failure of the first officer to be assertive because of his fear of the captain. Neither the first officer nor the flight engineer dared to make objections when Pan Am reported about its not leaving the runway yet and the KLM captain misunderstanding the reply and deciding to take off.
ATC Communications
Communication between the ATC and the captains of two planes was another contributing factor. The tower did not expect the KLM plane to take off this is why, on hearing the captain’s “We are now at takeoff position” (Martin, 2002, p. 191), they interpreted it incorrectly and the controller replied, “O.K., … stand by for taking off … I will call you” (Weick, 2001, p. 127). The second failure took place when Pan Am said they would report when they are clear of the takeoff runway and the KLM captain misinterpreted this. Thus, when the flight engineer asked him ‘“Is he not clear then, that Pan Am?,” the pilot replied, “Yes”’ (Martin, 2002, p. 192). Moreover, blocked transmissions also affected the event much. In the case with the Tenerife disaster, two important transmissions have been blocked, one made by ATC that informed KLM to stand by and hold the position and the other made by the Pan AM’s pilot who informed that they were still on the runway. If the transmissions were not blocked, this could have prevented the catastrophe.
Fatigue and Weather
Two final contributing factors were fatigue and weather. Due to the thick fog, the pilots of both the planes could be guided only by the ATC controllers. In addition, the crew members (of KLM, especially) were exhausted and the captain was rather impatient. The first time he even wanted to take off without clearance and, even though his copilot reminded him of this, he still decided to take off while the latter was getting the permission.
Conclusion
Therefore, the greatest contributing factors into the Tenerife plane crash were human errors (of both the crews and the ATC controllers), bad weather, fatigue, and impatience of the KLM captain to take off sooner.
Reference List
Martin, J. Organizational culture: Mapping the terrain. London: SAGE.
Misra, K.B. (2008). Handbook of performability engineering. London: Springer.
Nemeth, C.P. (2008). Improving healthcare team communication: building on lessons from aviation and aerospace. New York: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
Ripley, A. (2008). The unthinkable: who survives when disaster strikes and why. Ann Arbor: Michigan University.
Weick, K.L. (2001). Making sense of the organization. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
The crash of Colgan Air Flight 3407 in 2009 involved certain changes in policies adopted nationwide. The company as well as other airlines revisited their procedures and policies to ensure the safety of flight. The flight from Newark (NJ) to Buffalo (NY) ended in a crash, in which 50 people died (including 45 passengers, four members of the crew and one person on the ground) (Stark and Khan par. 2). It is necessary to note that all the aircraft’s systems were operating properly. More so, the errors the pilot made is regarded as “amateurish” (Garrison par.1). Therefore, the discussion of the accident led to a specific attention paid to policies and company’s adherence to these policies and regulations.
According to the results of the investigation carried out after the crash, the causes of the accident were the crew’s “failure to monitor airspeed”, “failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures”, “the captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight”, and the company’s “inadequate procedures” for “management during approaches in icing conditions” (“Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc.” x). One of the causes (which received a lot of attention) was the pilot’s fatigue (Stark and Khan par. 9). Importantly, flight standards director of the FAA noted that he had some concerns about the safety culture in the company (Zremski par. 2). It is possible to assume that the accident was preventable as the FAA officials pointed out particular issues that led to the catastrophe.
The company’s culture played an important role. On the one hand, the crew obtained the necessary training on flight management. It included training on sterile cockpit procedures, and the company’s employees reported that they adhered to these regulations (“Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc.” 45). It is also reported that the issues concerning pilot’s fatigue were addressed in the company’s culture (“Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc.” 48). However, it is also clear that the problem was rather persistent as many pilots had to commute, which contributed to their fatigue. The company also did not have any particular written documents where reasons for fatigue and strategies to prevent it were provided. According to the report, the company’s safety officers were working on such documentation (“Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc.” 49).
The comprehensive investigation revealed major causes of the accident. These were mainly the crew’s errors. The NTSB issued a set of recommendations aimed at prevention of similar catastrophes. It is necessary to add that these recommendations are quite effective and can contribute to the flight safety. For instance, one of the recommendations was to enhance training of the crew aimed at the development of monitoring skills. One of the causes of the accident in question was the pilot’s inability to monitor and cross-check important indicators (for example, speed) (“Safety Recommendations” 6).
It was also noted that alert systems could also be improved as due to the workload or other reasons pilots may fail to respond to the emergency situations timely. This was the case with the Colgan Air Flight 3407. Leadership training should also be a part of the pilots’ development (“Safety Recommendations” 10). It is clear that the pilot of the aircraft failed to take complete control over the situation, and the crew was not conducting properly, which contributed to making additional errors and the crash.
The NTSB also recommends initiating the development of comprehensive guidance concerning sterile cockpit procedures (“Safety Recommendations” 15). Although pilots and officials note that such procedures exist and are mainly followed, it is clear that the wide discussion may improve the situation. Another serious issue to address as seen by the NTSB is fatigue mitigation. It is recommended to implement the Fatigue Risk Management System that can help mitigate fatigue-associated risk. It is possible to assume that these recommendations are appropriate as they address common issues related to flight safety.
It is also important to note that the Public Law 111-216 provides the necessary legislation to increase safety. The law presupposes regular inspections concerning company’s compliance with safety regulations (“Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010” 2362). Such aspects as fatigue, safety management systems and crews’ management skills will be the major focus of these regulations and inspections. This will enable companies to improve their operations and safety.
In conclusion, it is necessary to note that the accident provides many valuable lessons. First, it is clear that the procedures and systems existing are not sufficient to ensure safety. The areas of major concern are adherence to existing procedures (for example, sterile cockpit procedures), pilot leadership, monitoring and cross-checking as well as the crew’s fatigue. Some policies and laws have been implemented to address these issues. It is also clear that training provided is inefficient as the crew do not follow some recommendations due to many reasons (lack of skills and knowledge, fatigue, workload and so on). One of the most important steps to undertake is the introduction of a sophisticated training program for existing airlines employees as well as students. The training should address the most common issues. This will help improve flight safety.
Safety is one of the major concerns in modern civil aviation. For this reason, it is crucial to prepare pilots and crew members for various scenarios. It means that realistic training is essential to practice under existing conditions. Respondents need to undertake practical training to prepare them to deal effectively with these types of emergencies. In the discussed video, the communication from the crew to air traffic control (ATC) was delivered about twenty minutes out (Haynes, 1991).
That is why there is a need to enhance specialists’ skills to deal with these types of emergencies effectively. The Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) and the local military unit were prepared to assist with the aircraft’s response (Haynes, 1991). At the same time, it is vital to establish such processes on the aircrew and on the ground to ensure successful reactions to unusual conditions.
Another possible way to improve emergent situations’ responses is to train personnel to a standard methodology to allow for cross-functional understanding and interoperability. The training of individuals is a crucial part of the current safety measures and procedure of how to act in unexpected situations. Moreover, training should presuppose the ability to function in different scenarios as various types of risks can precondition the crash of aircraft. For this reason, it is crucial to enhance crew members’ skills by using simulations and realistic training.
Government involvement is another fundamental aspect of emergency response training. It helps to gather additional support for organizing such courses and standardize them. Moreover, there is a need to involve other agencies in these activities because they can monitor and collect useful information. The involvement of these actors will contribute to a better planning and response procedure. The discussed video shows that ARFF operations are crucial for creating a safe environment and can benefit from the involvement of additional actors (BBC, n.d.). It means that the establishment of a new approach can help to reduce the risks.
Furthermore, it is possible to state that federal control is a crucial asset needed in managing emergencies and responding to them. The federal government took part in the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and all requirements are outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The Federal control is essential in guaranteeing that all response activities are verified and enacted in due time. On the other hand, the local authorities are demanded for the response as they observe that everything is organized in accordance with AEP. The local organization should be responsible for making sure that the personnel engaged in the operations are qualified. In such a way, government, federal, and international agencies’ involvement is vital to attain higher interoperability levels and better risk management.
As stated previously, safety is the central concern for civil aviation, and it has a functional system in place. However, the previous accidents prove the necessity for higher flexibility levels and the need for continuous improvement. The major aspects of the framework should be reconsidered with the technological advances and alterations in aircraft. The CFR sections also support this position as they emphasize the need for enhancement to meet new challenges. Observation of this approach will ensure that the system in place is functional and works effectively.
Thus, cogitating about ARFF, my position is that this aspect should continuously alter to meet the state-of-art air travel and current safety demands. The current process is successful and effective; however, there is also a place for improvement, guaranteeing more stable functioning. Some local ARFF units are managed separately, and according to the ARFF team, it can be viewed as a drawback. That is why I would ensure that these departments belong to a bigger system managing better coordination and cooperation. This approach will also help to save money and cultivate a better response to different situations that emerge today.
References
BBC. (n.d.). The unflyable plane. BBC. Web.
Haynes, A. (1991). The crash of United flight 232. John Clear. Web.
