Category: Armed Hostilities 701

Introduction

The case study offered here thoroughly analyses the circumstances that led to Operation Anaconda and the aftermath. US special operations forces (SOF) opted to coordinate with US space power and sympathetic Afghan forces to achieve early achievement in Afghanistan. It implied that operations for combined fires would be difficult to follow. Operation Anaconda is a promising paradigm for army leaders to use Mission Command concepts to overcome unexpected hurdles and achieve their dreams. The goal of this study is to provide a comprehensive examination of the six Mission Command principles and how they relate to Operation Anaconda.

Mission Command Principles

Mission command is based on unifying battle functions to enhance efficiency. The strategy is based on six principles that enable individuals in control of operations to make sound choices and involve their audience. The actions and consequences of Operation Anaconda taught future troops, commanders, and brigade valuable lessons. The initial point was that preparedness was essential for any battle to succeed. The second situation is the significance of Mission Command concepts. As stated in the research study, the new setting and challenge motivated the commanders to form cohesive teams based on mutual trust. It is the initial mission command concept. Owing to the enemys might and a lack of necessary equipment, the commanders, joined several troops and squadron to assist with the entire practice. Soldiers from the United States collaborated with friendly forces.

The result was a level of trust and understanding throughout the activity (Perry & Kassing, 2015). During two weeks of this mission, American soldiers and allied forces were heavily attacked by their adversaries. Luckily, they survived because they were brave, and their superiors constantly supplied necessary orders and recommendations. They formed cohesive teams that finally provided the desired outcomes.

The capacity to communicate a specific intent is indeed the third principle. Throughout the operation, leaders kept all soldiers aware of the intended goals, perceived impediments, and anticipated opponent size. This expertise served as the most excellent guidance for achieving the desired results. Although the current intelligence level was inadequate to forecast the specific quantity and position of the adversary, the commanders were eager to deliver the finest information about the overall missions goal. Because the established robust plans and security camera technologies did not stop the enemy position surprises, the commanders maintained clear and provided evidence-based instructions throughout the procedure.

The first provisions that were brought were eventually depleted. Resupply, therefore, became an issue. Almost all of the units could not seek good meals and consequently went without food for several days in some cases. Historical data from World War II support the discovery (Fleri et al. 2003). Because of logistical issues, the Marines on Guadalcanal could not eat for lengthy periods. Obtaining the enemys meals became an essential element of several mens diets throughout this war.

The capacity to use professional judgment is the fourth principle. The leaders urged them to maintain discipline and concentrate on the larger purpose or mission because the warriors were from several forces. They coordinated according to the established control chain to promptly handle any new issues. The principle of discipline guided the entire procedure. To address the prevailing problems, the followers respected directions, engaged each other, and collaborated as a group.

The capacity to use operational orders is the sixth principle. Those in command welcomed this trait throughout the operation to guarantee that all soldiers and combatants responded quickly to the clearly stated requirements. The ultimate goal was to eliminate the adversary while avoiding murdering civilians. After the actions of several combat forces became apparent to the adversary during Operation Enduring Freedom in the Arab World, new institutions were activated.

The willingness to tolerate appropriate risk is the last one. The commanders adopted this idea to redistribute decision-making procedures and elevate their employees (Richemond-Barak, 2018). Throughout the period, they created opportunities and gathered intelligence. Regrettably, the example does not specify if the commanders applied risk assessment and analysis principles to limit any bad results. It was the cause they could not find alternative civilians.

Nutritional considerations in permission preparation are sometimes disregarded. When planning for a mission, units are usually preoccupied with rehearsing, maintenance of equipment, and rigorous inspections. Sleep is frequently prioritized over overeating, but when troops prepare for bed, they are generally apprehensive and have problems falling asleep. It might result in the force being exhausted and nutritionally unprepared at the start of the operation. The initial 24 hours on the field are the most difficult. Well before the rest schedule can be executed, operational knowledge must be obtained, movement to a camp must be done, gun artillery cannons must be developed, and a lot more should be handled.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion described Operation Anaconda as a combat endeavor with flaws without necessarily failing. It was feasible because the commanders used Mission Command concepts to achieve favorable results. Unfortunately, they did not recognize possible threats and put in place strong countermeasures. Future commanders ought to carefully examine this situation to establish superior ideologies that will eventually increase performance.

References

Richemond-Barak, D. (2018). Underground warfare. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Fleri, E. M., Howard, C. E., Hukill, J., & Searle, T. R. (2003). Operation Anaconda case study. Maxwell, AL: College of Aerospace Doctrine.

Perry, W. L., & Kassing, D. (2015). Toppling the Taliban: Air-ground operations in Afghanistan, October 2001-June 2002. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Introduction

The battle of Verdun was scheduled to start on 12 February 1916, but it was delayed following the bad weather that characterized the battlefield (Foley 2005, 145). The battle eventually commenced nine days later on 21 February when German soldiers invaded Verdun and launched attacks against their French counterparts guarding the forts (McNab 2013, 57). Germany believed that it used huge resources on the western front without equivalent gains in terms of winning the battle. Consequently, there had to be a change in strategy in a bid to maximize the gains accruing from the huge resources deployed in the fight. The battle was one of the bloodiest encounters during the First World War and it was characterized by the loss of lives and mass destruction of properties (Doyle 2014, 123).

The battle ended in December 1916 when the German troops retreated and left Verdun following a resounding defeat by their opponents (Ousby 2009, 134). Germanys primary objective was to conquer Verdun, which was a city that hosted the historical monuments for France, and thus prompt the French administration to send troops to the area. The city hosted about 60 forts, which were deemed as historical sentiments for the French. The forts had been renovated few decades before the attack (Tunstall 2008, 35). Germany sought to take advantage of the war on the western front, which had seen French soldiers warding the city deployed to the battlefield. The deployment coupled with the French soldiers weak weaponry instilled confidence among the German troops that they would eventually win the battle (King 2008, 123).

The causes and circumstances that led to the battle

The primary objective of Germany was to divert the attention of the French army, which had focused mostly on the western front, by attempting to capture Verdun (Foley 2005, 152). Germany believed that by capturing the city, French soldiers would be deployed in large numbers to counter the seizure, thus affording the opportunity to kill them in order to weaken the French army (Tunstall 2008, 38). From the German soldiers point of view, weakening the French army would result in ultimate success for Germany since Britain, which was the key ally of France, would be compelled to enter a peace agreement with Germany to end the war McNab 2013, 89).

Britain and France were the strongest forces in the war and conquering French soldiers would make Britain the sole strong power in the war and it would eventually give in on grounds of fear of defeat by Germany (Griffith 2008, 123). Other allies of the war including Italy and Russia were considered harmless by the Germans. Therefore, according to Germany, the greatest enemy in the war was Britain. Therefore, Germany adopted an attrition strategy that would see French soldiers killed in large numbers as they mobilized to defend the city from the impending seizure. In his words, the Germanys army commander claimed that France would be compelled to bring in all its strong men to the war in an attempt to repel the conquering attempts of its historical forts (Doyle 2014, 137).

This way, Germany would inflict a huge number of French casualties, thus rendering France the ultimate losers in the battle. Britain was the only threat among the allies, and according to the Germanys commander, the British troops could not be overpowered through direct combat. British had well-trained soldiers and they were in possession of modern weapons that could see Germany defeated in a direct warfare engagement. The easiest way to win the war was to weaken the French soldiers, who contributed significantly to the British supremacy in the war. Other allies, viz. Italy and Russia, did not count in the war according to the Germanys point of view as they had a weak army that would not contribute to the battle significantly.

Strategies and tactics used

The initial phase of the battle

The war was supposed to start on 12 February 1916, but it was postponed to 21 February the same year following bad weather conditions in the city that could not allow Germanys penetrations to launch attacks. However, the newly slated date saw the German army invade the city, which was not well guarded, since France concentrated mainly on the western front and it had deported its soldiers from the historical city to the western front.

Even though France had intelligence about the attack, the report had not been executed, and thus there were no enough soldiers in the city to oppose the invasion (Foley 2005, 137). On 21 February, the German soldiers launched attacks on the city just as slated and managed to conquer Bois dHaumont village, which was near the city before penetrating the French lines (McNab 2013, 63). Motivated by the great achievement in the first day of the attack, the German troops went ahead to capture other villages and by the end of their third day in the battle, they had conquered four more villages, viz. Brabant-sur-Meuse, Wavrille, and Samogneux against the backdrop of French retaliatory attacks (Ousby 2009, 129). The initial attacks by the Germans were successful and almost unopposed. Therefore, by the 24^th of the same month, Beaumont and the Bois des Caurières villages had been captured by the invading troops (King 2008, 146).

The second phase of the battle

The second phase of the attacks was launched against the backdrop of the reports that the British were organizing an attack on Somme (Doyle 2014, 141). The focus of the German troops shifted from the primary one of conquering the city to that of disorganizing the British attacks (Tunstall 2008, 51). The German troops attacked the city fiercely in a bid to deter the planned attack, and in the process, more casualties were recorded. In response to the fierce attacks, the French general staff launched retaliatory attacks on the German troops in preparation for the allied attacks that were to be executed soon. On March 4, the German troops managed to capture the Douaumont village, set it ablaze, and placed unexploded bombs, thus rendering the village inhabitable (Foley 2005, 122). By this time, both parties in the war had suffered huge numbers of casualties due to the savage nature of the attacks.

Phase 3

The battle escalated when the German troops invaded the banks of river Meuse, thus prompting the French soldiers to launch heavy retaliatory attacks to deter the siege. However, the German troops emerged as victors, and on March 8, they managed to capture defensive works surrounding Hardaumont (Doyle 2014, 128). This win was a great blow to the French army as it weakened the ability to launch attacks against the invaders as the German troops advanced to seize the village of Vaux. The Germans launched tempestuous attacks, and by April 9, they had managed to put the left bank of the Meuse under their control. This phase took place on the banks of river Meuse when Germany invaded and launched attacks from both the right and the left banks simultaneously (McNab 2013, 156).

At this point, Germany had determined to seize the Bois Bourrus village, which was an important fort for the French undercover activities. This attack was launched on March 6 and it continued until May when the Germans managed to conquer the French army and seize the fort. The capturing of the fort involved shedding of blood since the German troops faced fierce opposition from their French counterparts who were now highly organized. The left bank was now at the hands of the German troops, which was a great blow to the French soldiers, since both the left and right banks acted as the battle frontline for the French.

Phase 4

Following the successful conquest of the left bank, German troops were motivated to instigate more attacks. Therefore, on March 8, they launched an attack on the right bank with the main target being the fort of Vaux (Griffith 2008, 128). However, the fort was well manned and heavy weapons had been supplied to the French soldiers ready for a retaliatory attack if Germans attempted to attack. Due to the advance preparedness by the French army, the German troops were repelled, and on 19 March, they gave up their agenda of acquiring the fort and retreated to the left bank. Germany received a major blow following an explosion at Fort Douaumont that claimed the lives of about 700 soldiers from its troops (Ousby 2009, 132).

This move prompted Germany to delay the attacks on the right bank and instead shifted its focus to securing the left bank. Soon after, the French soldiers launched an attack with the aim of reacquiring Fort Douaumont, but the German soldiers overpowered with mass casualties. Days after, the Germans attacked the Fort of Vaux and managed to drive away French soldiers guarding the fort despite the determination to retain control over the fort.

Phase 5  The Last German Offensive

This phase was the last stage of German attacks and it took place between the 22 of June and December 13 (McNab 2013, 121). The German troops launched fierce attacks on 22 June with an objective of seizing both Fleury village and at the same time facilitating their intrusion to the Verdun City (Tunstall 2008, 39). This time, the Germans invoked phosgene gas for the first time in the attacks, even though they never achieved the intended goal of intruding Verdun following the presence of heavily armed French troops in Fort Souville. However, Germany launched a new attack aimed at conquering the Fleury village and fort Souville after the first attempt backfired. Just like the French were in a position to counter the attack the first time Germany attempted to acquire the port, this time, things were not different as the attacks were equally repelled (King 2008, 129).

Conversely, the German troops managed to seize the village of Fleury, thus forcing the French soldiers to free the village and more casualties from both sides were recorded. On 1 July, Austria requested for help from Germany against Russia in the ongoing battle at Somme (Doyle 2014, 117). Given that Austria was an ally of Germany, some of the troops at Verdun had to be deployed to the eastern front to counter the Russian advancement towards Austria. This move reduced the number of soldiers in the Verdun battle not to mention that weapons were also reduced. The shortage in soldiers coupled with the shortfall in armories weakened the German troops and further advancement to Verdun was halted. However, on August 1, Germany launched severe attacks aimed at repelling counterattacks by the French troops who sought to reacquire Fleury and the Thiaumont fortification (Griffith 2008, 123).

The battle achieved limited success due to the shortage of soldiers and ammunition that befell the German troops. The battle continued up to 6 September when it temporary ceased due to shortages of ammunition for both parties. During this battle, each side recorded equal number of casualties, since it involved attacks and counterattacks from both sides.

The end of the war

On 21 October, the French troops launched attacks on the right bank of river Meuse in an effort to retake the region, which had been seized by the German soldiers. This move was countered heavily by the Germans, but due to the weakened state of the troops, the French soldiers managed to reacquire Fort Douaumont just three days after. Motivated by the victory, the French army went on to recapture Fort Vaux and this move that saw the German troops surrender and concede defeat on December 19 (Foley 2005, 145).

Factors that favored Germany

At first Germany was successful in conquering Verdun until the French soldiers strategized and mobilized enough weapons to fight back the attacks. Germany had two main advantages that favored its initial undertakings, viz. supremacy of arsenals and the attrition strategy adopted (King 2008, 134). In addition, Germany launched the attacks in secrecy and although France received intelligence regarding the planned attack, the timeframe would not allow good planning for counterattacks. Soldiers and weaponry had been transferred from Verdun to the western front, which was the centre of the battle

Why the battle lasted too long

Firstly, Germany adopted the attrition strategy that involved attacking the French army silently from hidden places in a bid to ensure that they did not lose their own soldiers in the battle (Griffith 2008, 123). Therefore, the German soldiers did not engage the French troops in one-on-one battle, but took cover and accomplished attacks. At first, it was more of a guerilla war since the strategy, as drafted by Falkenhayn, was meant to launch attacks on French soldiers while at the same time taking cover to avoid casualties (McNab 2013, 57).

The attrition strategy also gave the French soldiers time to mobilize its soldiers and weaponry, thus facilitating counterattacks. Germany faced heavy resistance from the French troops, which had already mobilized enough resources for the battle. The attrition strategy adopted by the German forces at the start of the war coupled with the organized counterattacks by French troops delayed efforts by Germany to conquer the city within the expected timelines.

Significance of the battle in the advancement of agenda

The Germanys loss in the battle led to the removal of Gen Falkenhayn from the position of the armys head (Foley 2005, 123). The general was determined to fight to the last minute until the defeat of the French soldiers.

In addition, he wanted to ensure that the French army suffered more casualties than its Germany counterpart. However, other scholars have argued that the Somme warfare contributed greatly to the Germanys loss, since many soldiers had to be deployed to fight Russia following the request for support by Austria (Tunstall 2008, 35). This school of thought seems to suggest that Germany would have succeeded in its quest to weaken French. Consequently, France would be compelled to sign a peace agreement with Germany, if Russia did not start the Somme war. This point is justifiable from the fact that German troops had advanced so well before the Somme attacks commenced.

Although France suffered more casualties as compared to its opponent, both parties suffered almost equal losses since Germany did not achieve its agenda of crippling the French army (King 2008, 156). The Germanys agenda in the war was to make sure that the French army suffered as many casualties as possible in order to make Britain, which was the major threat, quit the war on grounds of fear of defeat. However, Germany did not succeed in its agenda as it was finally defeated and it suffered an equal number of casualties as France. The war was one of the bloodiest and long lasting encounters in the period of the World War 1. It involved mass killings of soldiers from both parties. The battle cost Germany approximately 350,000 casualties while France recorded about 400, 000 casualties. Unfortunately, Germany did not accomplish its primary goal of crippling the French troops by causing massive casualties (Doyle 2014, 127).

Conclusion

The battle of Verdun refers to a fierce warfare between Germany and France as the former fought hard to capture the city of Verdun in order to attract the attention of the French soldiers before killing them in mass numbers. It involved a change in strategy that saw Germany withdraw its forces from the western front and mobilize its forces to conquer the Verdun City. The strategy was in response to the complexity of the battle on the western front where Germany concluded that it spent many resources without equivalent gains.

General Erich von Falkenhayn believed that the only way the war could be won is through shift of focus from the western front to Verdun in a bid to prompt retaliatory attacks from the French soldiers who would then be killed in huge numbers by German troops taking cover in the forts. However, the Germanys attack was met with great resistance from the French soldiers, who were determined to deter the invasion that would see the historical monuments conquered by the foreigners. Each of the two warring parties recorded many casualties and Germany did not achieve its intended agenda in the war.

Reference List

Doyle, Peter. 2014. 5 Minute History: First World War Leaders and Commanders. Charleston: The History Press. Web.

Foley, Robert. 2005. German strategy and the path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the development of attrition, 1870-1916. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Web.

Griffith, Paddy. 2008. The Great War on the Western Front: A Short History. South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword. Web.

King, Jonathan. 2008. The Western Front Diaries: The ANZACs Own Story, Battle by Battle. New York: Simon & Schuster. Web.

McNab, Chris. 2013. Battle Story Verdun 1916. Charleston: The History Press. Web.

Ousby, Ian. 2009. The Road to Verdun: World War Is Most Momentous Battle and the Folly of Nationalism. New York: Anchor. Web.

Tunstall, Graydon. 2008. AustriaHungary and the Brusilov Offensive of 1916. Historian 70, no. 1 : 30-53. Web.

Introduction: The Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

For many years the debate has been ongoing regarding the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While some argue that such an attack was needed to limit the subsequent number of casualties during World War II (further  WWII), others suggest that the US should not have implemented the attack due to the deadly impact on thousands of Japanese civilians. Both perspectives have some significant support as each side of the argument can provide some persuasive evidence. Thus, the purpose of the current paper is to offer two viewpoints on the issue while also arguing in support of one of them using the Toumlin model of argument (Figure 1). The key argument of the paper will be centered around the fact that the bombing was a necessary act of evil that had to be done in order to end the inhumane opposition between countries in WWII.

Background on the Issue: The History

On August 6, 1945, the US-owned B-29 bomber deployed the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. The impact of the large explosion destroyed around ninety percent of the city and instantly killed eighty thousand people, with tens of thousands more dying from the severe impact of radiation exposure (Greenwell 35). On August 9, a second bomb was dropped on the city of Nagasaki, killing around forty thousand people (Bodden 15). The devastating effects of the attacks led to Japans Emperor Hirohito announcing immediate surrender in WWII, attributing the countrys defeat to the great power of a new and the most inhumane weapon. The deployment of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was linked to the successful trials of the Manhattan project in using plutonium bombs. Funded by the US government, the project led to the creation of a deadly weapon that gave the country a significant advantage in WWII and showed the strength with which others could not compete. The decision to drop the bombs was made based on Japans vow to battle to the end regardless of the fact that their allies were already defeated. In addition, the countrys government refused to demand its allies to surrender in late July, fueling the desire of the US to attack as soon as possible. With the support from General Douglas MacArthur and other high-rank military commanders, President Truman made the decision to deploy the weapons. The bombs were expected to not only put war but also place the US in the leading position in determining the course of the post-war period.

One Side of the Issue: In Support of the Bombing

The United States should have attacked Hiroshima and Nagasaki because the act was a justified evil, which helped to stop WWII, helped to establish a global agreement on nuclear disarmament, and prevented the deaths of American troops. In August 1945, the United States found itself in the position to play a defining role in ending one of the darkest periods in global history. The costliest conflict in terms of human life led to millions of casualties, and the use of nuclear weapons presented a chance to end it. It was reasonable for the United States to use the weapon because the country suffered the loss of more than 418,000 lives of both civilians and military (Mesika). The losses were considered worth it for preventing thousands of American troops from losing their lives when invading Japan. The grave consequence of losing soldiers was taken seriously by the government, which ordered the deployment of the atomic bombs, knowing the abhorrence of the act but recognizing that without it, the war could lead to unprecedented consequences.

The bombings should have taken place because only after six days since the Nagasaki bombing, Japan announced its surrender, which also marked the end of WWII (see Figure 2). Therefore, the defining role of the event in putting a stop to war is indisputable as it gave the Japanese government every reason to stop fighting. Before the attack, the Japanese Supreme War Council could not reach an agreement on whether or not to surrender. The deadlock that the United States put on Japan was a justified evil that ended the war officially.

The attacks are warranted since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki disasters led to the establishment of global programs of nuclear disarmament. The attacks were the first and the last times when nuclear bombs were used and additionally showed the global society how devastating they could be. After WWII ended, numerous nuclear disarmament programs were developed to prevent the use of atomic weapons of mass destruction (NTI). Such organizations as the ATOM Project, European Nuclear Disarmament, Global Zero, Friends of the Earth International, and dozens more facilitated the signing of treaties and sanctions preventing nuclear catastrophes from occurring again. The continued collaboration between countries exists to this day, with the current focus placed on disarming North Korea with the help of the United States influence.

Despite the criticism of the fact that the attack on Japan led to the killing of tens of thousands of people, the event still saved lives. By the end of WWII, the total number of American Army troops who were missing or dead in the Pacific region and southeast Asia was 41,592, with an additional 145,706 ground troops wounded (Mesika). In this region, Navy corpsmen and Marine Corps faced the casualties of 23,160 killed or missing people and 67,199 wounded (Mesika). Based on these estimations, the US government decided to drop the weapons on cities that in the majority were populated by civilians (see Figure 2).

Another Side of the Issue: In Refutation of the Bombing and Rebuttal

The United States should not have deployed atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki because the country was already at a disadvantage, the devastation that emerged was too enormous, the unequal rate of civilian and military deaths, as well as the initiation of the Cold War. Thus, on the opposite side of the argument, there is an opinion that the United States government was not justified in imposing the destruction upon the Japanese people (Stover 2). For instance, the US secretary of war Henry Lewis Stimson thought that the country had to limits its need for the invasion by saying that Japan had no allies; its navy was almost destroyed, its islands were under a naval blockade, and its cities were undergoing concentrated air attacks (Was the US Justified in Dropping Atomic Bombs). The industrial resources that the United States had at that time were enough to achieve the surrender of Japan, which meant that the country did not have to deploy atomic weapons.

When refuting the opinion that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were pure evil and not justified, most argue that the devastation of cities was worth it in the end. In Hiroshima, almost ninety-two percent of buildings and other structures were destroyed or severely damaged by the impact; however, this caused the government of Japan to see the immense power that the US had and surrender immediately. Regardless of the fact that civilian lives were taken, the justified evil that was done aimed at ending the war and establishing an environment of peace and understanding between countries.

One of the ley common grounds between the opposing sides of the argument refers to the fact that the attacks on the Japanese cities killed and wounded civilians in their majority (ICRC). As wars should be fought between armies and not among civil communities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings gave a new meaning to collateral damage. The death toll of civilians to military personnel was 6:1, which points to the fact that the number of civilians killed was significantly unreasonable and could have been avoided. Lastly, while the attacks ended WWII, they did not prevent the Cold War, and both sides agree on this point. Importantly, some believed that the atomic bombings on the Japanese were used for showing the Soviet Union the strength that the country has. Unfortunately, the plan ended up backfiring on the US and lead to an arms race in which the Union managed to develop their own bomb by 1949. It is possible that if the bombings did not occur, there would not have been a push for the Soviet Union to work on their atomic weapons. To summarize the argument against the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it must be mentioned that the decision could have been avoided. Moreover, there were other areas that the US could have targeted instead of civilian cities. For instance, Tokyo Bay could have been a better target because it was next to all of Japans leaders and the emperor (Shepherd). Thus, the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an unjustified evil that led to the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians who should not have been involved in the war from the beginning.

Concluding Remarks

The civilians should not have been the targets of the destruction, which points to the fact that the decision of the US government was evil although justified in some instances. The fact that the bombings played a defining role in ending WWII and led to the establishment of globally accepted policies of nuclear disarmament represents the positive outcome for WWII overall. However, the destruction of the population of civilians the result of the bombing that should never be overlooked. Thus, in answering the question of whether the bombings were justified, the answer of required evil can be given. Although the issue has multiple layers of complexity and cannot be viewed just from one perspective, the consensus regarding the attacks ending WWII can be reached. In further studies, it is proposed to look at the bombings from Hiroshima and Nagasaki both from utilitarian and consequentialist perspectives as choosing only one of them will not lead to the desired level of argumentation. The events were horrific, and regardless of what critics said afterward, human lives were taken in the act of necessary evil, but evil nonetheless.

Works Cited

Bodden, Valerie. The Bombing of Hiroshima & Nagasaki (Odysseys in History). Creative Paperbacks, 2016.

Greenwell, John. The Atom Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Were They War Crimes? ISAA Review, vol. 12, no. 2, 2013, pp. 35-44.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. LA Times, Web.

ICRC. 70 Years on Red Cross Hospitals Still Treat Thousands of Atomic Bomb Survivors. ICRC. 2015.

Mesika, Lee. The Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Necessary Evil or Just Evil? The Perspective, 2018.

NTI. Nuclear Disarmament Resource Collection. NTI, Web.

70 Years Ago: Japans Surrender in World War II. Sputnik International.

Shepherd, Geoffrey. Its Clear the US Should Not Have Bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Quartz. 2015.

Stover, Dawn. Susan Southard: Unveiling the Aftermath of Nuclear War. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 72, no. 4, 2016, pp. 1-6.

Toulmin Model of Arguments. Rufwork.

Was the US Justified in Dropping Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki During the Second World War? You Debate. History Extra.

Joint Publication 5-0 defines an operational approach as a commanders description of the broad actions the force must take to achieve the desired military end state (as cited in Burke et al., 2018, p. 44). It requires identifying desired conditions and how they may be achieved, as well as necessary resources and possible obstacles and risks arising from the operational environment. Lines of effort, which logically connect military assets, their required capabilities and tasks, and the intended effects of their actions, form the central part of any operational approach (Burke et al., 2018). In formulating an operational approach, planning teams rely on earlier inquiries into environments, problems, and solutions (Department of the Army, 2015). An operational approach translates a forces strategic priorities and capabilities into a framework for more detailed planning, such as elaborating a specific course of action.

Although there is no hard rule for how the process of developing an operational approach should be organized, the principal activities involved stem from its nature. Firstly, the planners should review the current and desired states of the operational environment, examining all the factors that may influence operations. They should then consider the relevant strengths, or centers of gravity (COGs), of hostile and friendly forces (Burke et al., 2018). Identifying COGs and decisive points  factors that can help attack or protect COGs  allows commanders to choose direct or indirect methods of countering enemy strength (Department of the Army, 2015). The next step is to set objectives and describe lines of operation (for geographic orientation) and lines of effort that would lead to their fulfillment. Further refinements may include defining the reach, tempo, and phases of operations, as well as analyzing likely risks. Finally, it is vital to continue assessing and adjusting the operational approach once operations are underway. Unanticipated developments in the operational environment may necessitate a complete change of approach.

As an operations NCO, my role in developing an operational approach is to assist the commander and other staff members with up-to-date factual information and expertise. The required information can involve all sides of the operational environment, including the current and potential state of friendly assets, likely obstacles and risks, enemy forces and intentions, and logistical considerations. Relevant subject matter expertise, which is necessary for the accurate assessment of friendly and hostile capabilities, must come from my experience and training. I will also need to communicate the results of operational planning to other commanders, staffs, and unified action partners, ensuring the unity of understanding (Department of the Army, 2015). The full extent of those responsibilities would vary depending on my rank. The command sergeant major is most intimately involved in the operations of the staff, including operational planning and assessment during execution (Department of the Army, 2019). However, lower-ranking NCOs also play a part by supporting the operational planning activities of their superiors. To sum up, the role of an operations NCO in planning is to provide the necessary information and advice to develop a reality-based operational approach.

References

Burke, R., Fowler, M., McCaskey, K., & Miller, C. D. (Eds.) (2018). Military strategy, joint operations, and airpower: An introduction. Georgetown University Press.

Department of the Army. (2015). ATP 5-0.1. Army techniques publication 5-0.1. Army design methodology.

Department of the Army. (2019). ADP 5-0. Army doctrine reference publication 5-0. The operations process.

Wars are terrifying and devastating, and World War II brought too many challenges and destruction. Since the European countries had to deal with consequences, they could not leave any opportunity for another war to happen. Therefore, on May 9, 1950, French political thinker Robert Schuman proposed his plan, one objective of which was to prevent further military conflicts between Germany and France and create a more powerful organization. The outcome of this plan was the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) a year later.

Making relationships more positive was a challenging task the countries faced after the war. As noticed by researchers, the relations between the two countries were poisoned by the issue of the Ruhr and the Saar coalfields (The University of Luxembourg, n.d.). France had special access to these valuable resources, which meant that it was under threat. In order to solve the conflict peacefully, Schuman decided to address the problem by placing the joint steel and coal output within the framework of a supranational structure (The University of Luxembourg, n.d.). Therefore, the war between Germany and France became impossible and undesirable for both countries.

Another reason for the plans creation included the powerlessness of other European organizations. According to researchers, the Council of Europe and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation did not manage to solve the problems they faced. For instance, the Council of Europe could rarely show its power and make different governments adopt its plans. The OEEC, which was responsible for the Marshall Plan, merely limited itself to drafting vague directives, without ever achieving a genuine integration of European markets (The University of Luxembourg, n.d., para. 3). After the ECSC was created, it brought political and economic success. Consequently, it is possible to say that the Schuman plan tried to address all the mentioned problems by promoting the idea of unification, support, and peaceful co-existence of the European countries.

Reference

The University of Luxembourg. (n.d.). From the Schuman plan to the Paris treaty (19501952): The inadequacy of the international organisations. CVCE. Web.

The mandate system proposed the allocation of the Axis post colonies to the members of the League of Nations. Hence, the set of regulations was directed toward the Ottoman Empire and Germany, as their armies were defeated as a result of the war. Moreover, apart from the Empires evident loss of territory, the introduction of the mandate coincided with internal reforms of the state, leading to its abolition.

Following the Ottoman Empires defeat in 1918, the League of Nations established a set of laws controlling the re-administration of its past territories in the Middle East, including the regions of Iraq, Palestine, and Syria (Pedersen, 2014). The regions were then split between Great Britain and France, with partial independence of the states being recognized. At the same time, the Ottoman Empires position and power in the international political arena were significantly weakened, while the Western influence in the Middle East only increased.

Furthermore, the consequences of the mandate system and World War I defeat coincided with internal conflicts within the Empire, leading to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. The Armistice of Mudros further granted the Allies power to control the Ottoman army and state. At the same time, the Turkish War of Independence marked the states victory and led to further negotiations with the Allies. As a result, Ankara became the capital of a new government  the Republic of Turkey (Pedersen, 2014). Hence, the formation of a new state resulted from both internal and external events.

In conclusion, the mandate system imposed by the victors of the First World War on the Ottoman Empire included significant territorial loss for the defeated, which inevitably led to the abolition of the state. Most importantly, it is important to highlight the deconstruction of the great Empire and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey as the main result of the mandate regulations.

Reference

Pedersen, S. (2014). The guardians: the League of Nations and the crisis of empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

In the article The Changing Nature of the Modern Warfare, Thornton (2015) discusses how in contemporary environments, warfare happens not only on the battlefield. Information war, for example, is something successfully utilized by Russia and is not yet used by NATO members as a tool for defense. Russia was able to justify the occupation of Crimea in 2014 through its information war tactics with little resistance from the global community. Since NATO members are not as skilled in information warfare, this lack of expertise can cause serious harm in case of a conflict between NATO and Russia. This paper is a review of the article by Thornton titled The Changing Nature of Modern Defence.

The central claim made by the author of The Changing Nature of Modern Warfare is that NATO has to change its military doctrine and adopt information war and hybrid war methods. According to Thornton (2015), Russia has won in Crimea by affording subversive information campaigns primacy in its military operations (p. 41). The central military doctrine of the Western States has been the irregular warfare principle. This approach means that the armies of the states had to become smaller but better equipped and more agile (Thornton, 2015). This is an effective approach when fighting against terrorist organizations, such as Al-Quaeda, the Taliban, or ISIS. However, the current international environment, and especially the recent events, show that the NATO states have to be prepared to fight against not only terrorist organizations but also against states. Moreover, unlike terrorist organizations, which primarily focus on attacks and fights on the battlefield, states such as Russia utilize tools outside of the battlefield to justify their actions or gain support from the global community.

Russia won Crimea in a campaign based primarily on propaganda warfare (Thornton, 2015). Consequently, the countrys military perceives the coast as a force multiplier and a crucial benefit for winning the war. Western governments and militaries must respond to Russias accomplishments through their own use of information. Any such replies must be appropriate and sound in character.

The author of the article focuses on providing specific examples of Russias military activities that happened in recent years. Thornton (2015) cites Russias military policy and the way the state managed its sphere of influence within the recent decade as the main argument to support the idea that NATO has to change its approach to warfare. More specifically, the 2008 battle with Georgia was viewed as a loss in terms of the flaws it exposed and the shortcomings that were obvious to top military leaders (Thornton, 2015). Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, was the major critic of this dismal performance and the main driver of reform, hoping to establish a force that would be a far more effective instrument of Russian influence on the world scene. Russia has been unsuccessful in expanding its influence on the neighboring states, and its president believed that the Western capitalists invested in revolutions in these countries to make them pro-Western. This could have been a danger to Russia and its government, and therefore, the state needed to act. A simple approach would be to create a bigger and stronger army to ensure that wars such as the one in Georgia in 2008 were won by Russia (Thornton, 2015). However, this approach has proven to be impossible to execute in Russia, and its government turned to other methods.

Within the discipline of warfare, this reading is very important because it highlights an understudied element of warfare. Information wars, as seen by Russias example, as something that allows weaker and less equipped armies to win and politicians to pursue their interests. Yet, NATOs officials have ignored this factor, focusing primarily on strengthening their armed forces and equipping their soldiers better. This approach can lead to detrimental consequences if faced with a conflict with a state that successfully employs information war tools, such as Russia.

The theoretical underpinnings of this article are the asymmetric approach to crafting a military strategy. Such an approach allows one to turn the enemys strength into their weakness (Thornton, 2015). Hence, the author expands the existing warfare and political science theories by citing the importance of information wars and employing tools that allow the management of information. The article is structured in a manner that provides an overview of Russias warfare tactics in recent years, followed by a discussion of hybrid wars and information wars. The author concludes by providing several suggestions to NATO states in terms of policies and warfare doctrines that should help them restructure their military powers in a way suitable for the current environment, where information war allows them to gain a substantial advantage on the battlefield.

The strengths of argumentation include the variety of facts based on Russias wars in Georgia and Ukraine. The author bases their arguments on data and historical facts, as opposed to assumptions. As Thornton (2015) suggests, the most effective way to confront Russian operations in Ukraine and the Baltics is unlikely to be military in nature. Western countries must think about security in a far more complex way and create a reaction as nuanced as the attack (Thornton, 2015, p. 41). It is necessary to develop a complicated asymmetric strategy to weaken the power vertical Russian forces use for strengthening their tactics. Indeed, applying sanctions to all people who influence Putins decision-making would enable them to lobby for ending the military operation. For instance, banning these individuals businesses and prohibiting traveling or living in foreign countries can force them to convince the president to reconsider the terrible act he has initiated.

The weakness of the argumentation is that the author does not analyze the information policy and hybrid warfare strategies that NATO states have utilized. Although, as opposed to Russia, NATO states have not used this approach in full scare conflicts, the comparison of methodologies could have provided a more comprehensive overview of how the tactics of the two opponents differ. Additionally, it would allow one to see the gaps in NATOs military doctrine more clearly, as information war is not something the member states can avoid.

Thorntons The Changing Nature of the Modern Warfare reveals that todays conflicts have a complicated foundation and require different approaches to developing resolutions and influencing the key decision-makers. This article focuses on the appraisal of NATOs and Russias military strategies, and the author suggests that the latter has been more successful in employing novel tools as a part of their military doctrine. The latter state has been using hybrid and information war in its campaigns to win new territories without providing much attention to the army forces. NATO, on the other hand, has been largely ignoring the hybrid and information war tools in its doctrine. This issue can become a serious disadvantage for the alliance in the future.

Reference

Thornton, R. (2015). The changing nature of modern warfare. The RUSI Journal, 160(4), 40-48. doi: 10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047

Introduction

It is hard to disagree that academic research plays a significant role in peoples lives. While not everyone realizes it, precisely credible research papers can test hypotheses that affect healthcare, find new ways to eliminate social issues and explore the negative and positive effects of technologies. In order for a study to be adequate and reach its aim, it is vital to select the most appropriate research methods. This paper discusses qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods research types on the example of a specific topic.

Discussion

To begin with, the focus of qualitative research is words, concepts, and perceptions, while quantitative studies consider numbers, data, and statistics. The former explores peoples opinions and views on specific questions or phenomena. For instance, to learn how the Japanese see World War II, interviews or even focus groups can be involved, allowing participants to talk about their feelings and ideas and share knowledge. At the same time, quantitative research can measure percentages or differences. If I needed to know how many Japanese people thought that Japans apologies about its participation in the war were sufficient or compare this number to a number of Americans feeling the same way, I would use surveys. Finally, mixed methods research can use both qualitative and quantitative tools. For example, after conducting interviews with several Japanese people and identifying the most common views on World War II, I would gather statistical data to compare the actual prevalence of these ideas.

Conclusion

For my topic, I would choose qualitative research because I am interested in knowing peoples perceptions, not specific numbers and data. The nature of my research aims and questions is exploratory  I would like to get a better idea of the opinions of the Japanese about World War II. As a consequence, qualitative research would be appropriate and allow me to answer my question, and as for data collection methods, interviews, focus groups, and oral histories would be helpful.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, have forever changed the American perspective on foreign policies and international security. As a result of an extensive war against terrorism, President Obama approved Operation Geronimo on April 29, 2011 (Marks, 2019). The objective of the mission was to eliminate Osama bin Laden via a rapid raid on his fortified compound in Pakistan (Marks, 2019). However, shortly after the missions execution, many people questioned the legality of Operation Geronimo and claimed that it violated international laws. According to this perspective, the United States could justify the assassination of any notable figure in the world without facing direct consequences. Nevertheless, Operation Geronimo followed both the American regulations, such as the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, and international conventions (Dunlap, 2019). Ultimately, the current essay demonstrates that President Obama had the legal authority to order Operation Geronimo and execute the plan.

The legality of Operation Geronimo is the most relevant issue concerning the mission and has been a topic of debate for more than ten years. Consequently, the controversial points include the place of the operations in Pakistan and bin Ladens physical state. Regarding the former, Pakistans officials never agreed to this mission; therefore, Operation Geronimo could be considered an illegal operation on foreign soil. As a counterargument, America and the United Nations noted Pakistans willingness to provide bin Laden shelter for years, thus supporting his criminal activity (Soherwordi & Khattak, 2020). Pakistans denial of the operations legality is outweighed by the arguments of the United Nations concerning bin Ladens critical threat to the civilized world. The implications of the operation led to additional tension in the Pakistan-US relationship, specifically due to the fact that bin Laden was able to find shelter in Abbottabad (Soherwordi & Khattak, 2020). The United States questioned the integrity of Pakistani politics, the competency of their intelligence agencies, and national security (Soherwordi & Khattak, 2020). Even though the countries collaborated prior to the operation in the war against terrorism, the United States lost trust in Pakistans security, thus, worsening the international relationship. Consequently, some people stated that bin Laden was hors de combat or physically unable to resist (Dunlap, 2019). According to the Committee of the Red Cross, shooting defenseless people is considered a war crime (Dunlap, 2019). The American officials rejected this claim since bin Laden had openly declared that he would never surrender, implying the possibility of suicide via explosives (Dunlap, 2019). Ultimately, most experts justify Operation Geronimo due to decisive arguments.

Consequently, it is essential to analyze the legality of Operation Geronimo from the perspective of international laws. In this context, one of the most fundamental regulations is Article 51 of the Geneva Conventions, which protects the civilian population during military missions (United Nations, 1977). The law states that neither of the armed conflicts parties can target ordinary citizens unless they directly participate in hostilities (United Nations, 1977). Moreover, the parties must ensure that collateral damage to the civilian population is minimized and, therefore, choose the appropriate methods of warfare (United Nations, 1977). From these considerations, Obamas choice to focus on the ground raid during Operation Geronimo satisfies Article 51 of the Geneva Conventions. If the United States agreed to the initial plan of dropping 2,000-pound JDAMs, it could potentially lead to significant human losses of the civilian population in Pakistan. This approach directly contradicts the Geneva Conventions and is deemed a war crime by international organizations. On the other hand, the chosen strategy of a ground raid allowed minimizing collateral damage and providing definitive proof of bin Ladens death, justifying the mission and satisfying the international regulations.

Lastly, it is crucial to prove the legality of Operation Geronimo from the perspective of American laws. The most fundamental aspect in this context is the relation of the United States to international terrorism after the 9/11 events. In other words, America openly declared war with Al-Qaeda in 2001, implying that all operations against the terrorist organization would be perceived as justified military actions (Dunlap, 2019). The position of the armed conflict allowed the United States to pass the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists and even conduct operations on foreign soil (Dunlap, 2019). Since Al-Qaeda was formally at war with the United States, America did not recognize bin Ladens death as an assassination. Osama bin Laden was a notorious terrorist figure who had admitted his crimes against the United States. Therefore, America perceived his death as a casualty in war and not as an assassination of a civilian target on foreign soil. Ultimately, this implication was of utmost significance to justify Operation Geronimo based on the laws of the United States.

The current argumentative essay has demonstrated that President Obama had the legal authority to order Operation Geronimo and execute the plan. The mission was conducted via a ground raid assault to minimize the collateral damage and ensure that Osama bin Laden was captured or killed. This approach satisfies Article 51 of the Geneva Conventions and other international regulations that protect the civilian populations rights. Consequently, the United States has been at war with Al-Qaeda since 2001, implying that bin Ladens death was not assassination but an objective of military action, justified by American laws. Lastly, there are certain controversies about the legality of Operation Geronimo due to military conduct on foreign soil and bin Ladens potential status of hors de combat. Nevertheless, while these issues might be debatable from the perspective of morality, they do not directly contradict American or international regulations. Ultimately, President Obama had the legal authority to order Operation Geronimo and execute the plan.

References

Dunlap, C. J. D. (2019). Yes, the raid that killed Osama Bin Laden was lawful. Lawfire. Web.

Marks, J. (2019). How SEAL Team Six took out Osama bin Laden. History. Web.

Soherwordi, S. H. S., & Khattak, S. A. (2020). Operation Geronimo: Assassination of Osama Bin Laden and its implications on the US-Pakistan relations, War on Terror, Pakistan and Al-Qaeda. South Asian Studies, 26(2).

United Nations. (1977). Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (protocol I), of 8 June 1977. Web.

The killing of one of the most notorious leaders of al-Qaeda marked the victory for justice in a decade-long conflict. Osama bin Laden was widely known as a leader of al-Qaeda. This Islamic terrorist group performed numerous terrorist attacks across the globe, such as 9/11 and the London bus bombings (Panzeri, 2014). The actions of the United States military forces in retaliation to the activities of this group have brought many crucial topics about national security to the surface. Despite its success, it raised numerous concerns regarding its legal and ethical sides from various sources regarding the practice of targeted killings (Govern, 2012). This essay analyzes the case of the killing of Osama bin Laden and attempts to provide support for the claim that there are cases in which such operations are acceptable.

The primary reason for the heated debate regarding Operation Neptune Spear was regarding the use of lethal force by the U.S. forces. The mission itself was to capture or kill the target, but it was impossible to avoid the usage of deadly force during such a task (Panzeri, 2014). It is worth noting that the U.S. forces attempted to capture Osama bin Laden multiple times in the previous years and had successfully captured several of al-Qaedas generals alive (Panzeri, 2014). There were risks that had to be taken, as the danger from al-Quaeda remained present. Ultimately, Osama bin Laden, along with four people residing in the hideout, was killed in a confrontation. Govern (2012) states that bin Laden was to be captured if he clearly surrendered (p. 363). However, there was a firefight, during which there was no opportunity presented for the enemy to surrender since it is not permissible to second-guess in such a situation. (Govern, 2012). The operation was performed with minimal losses, and the majority of people who were in the building were unharmed.

The decision taken by the United States reveals that the Pakistan government was not involved on purpose. Govern (2012) writes that Obama decided against informing or working with Pakistan due to the high possibility of information leak (p. 354). Since there were suspicions of such an incident, it was deemed acceptable to prohibit the spread of information (Govern, 2012). Some sources argue that the most ethical action was to work with the Pakistan army to capture bin Laden (Govern, 2012). While there were legal implications for the actions of the U.S. forces, previous attempts to cooperate with local government, have proven to be ineffective (Govern, 2012). Assuming that the intelligence regarding the possibility of the leak was sufficient, this decision can be viewed as the right one. It has been widely known that the United States had a deal with Pakistan that allowed them to conduct similar operations on foreign territory (Govern, 2012). It was also revealed that there were al-Quaeda training camps in Pakistan, and there was the ongoing radicalization of the civilians (Cragin, 2013). The success of this mission was placed above the diplomatic relationships, yet it brought more benefit than harm.

Many people got concerned regarding the safety and precision of these missions. There are multiple proofs that U.S. operations have caused a significant number of civilian casualties (Govern, 2012). However, Operation Neptune Spear was conducted after an extensive analysis of all available opportunities (Govern, 2012). According to Panzeri (2014), a bombing or missile strike was excluded from options since collateral damage was estimated at well over a dozen civilian casualties (p. 31). A special operation raid was authorized, and the preparation for it took over a year after scouting, constant surveillance of the location, training of the most likely scenarios, and the mission itself was thoroughly scrutinized (Panzeri, 2014). Moreover, all steps of the plan included the possibility for the target to surrender (Panzeri, 2014). These actions created a perfect opportunity for the U.S. forces to ensure that Osama bin Laden will be neutralized.

In conclusion, the apprehension of targets similar to bin Laden who posed a major threat to national security from abroad, can be necessary for the prevention of further conflict escalation and the radicalization of youth. Although Osama was eliminated during the mission, the U.S. forces made all preparations for his surrender. The modern strategies and technologies for these types of operations have been upgraded and perfected during the War on Terror, leading to their high efficiency and precision (Panzeri, 2014). Al-Qaedas operations brought grief to many nations across the globe, and it was imperative to remove its leadership in order to weaken the groups potential and quicken its dissolution. Targeted killings are not the primary method of dealing with dangers from abroad, and all other options were exhausted during this conflict. This mission provides an example of a proper approach to such a delicate matter, and the results show how efficient a highly trained special operations force can be. Although the outcome might not be ideal, it remains a crucial point in the fight against terrorism.

References

Cragin, R. K. (2013). Resisting violent extremism: A conceptual model for non-radicalization. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(2), 337-353. Web.

Govern, K. H. (2012). Operation Neptune spear: Was killing bin Laden a legitimate military objective? Targeted Killings, 347-373. Web.

Panzeri, P. (2014). Killing bin Laden: Operation Neptune spear 2011. Bloomsbury Publishing.