The Mumbai Attack of November 26, 2008

Introduction

The Mumbai Attack of November 26, 2008, is a national tragedy for India. As a result of the attack, from 160 to 166 people died, and another 350 people were seriously injured (Joshi, 2019). The police and public security systems have demonstrated catastrophic unpreparedness to meet the threat. Subsequently, the state apparatus had to admit its incompetence and carry out reforms in homeland security. This paper aims to analyze the probability of the alternative response to the Mumbai Attack.

Government Response

The attack was carried out by ten people from the Lashkar-e-Taiba terror group led by Hafiz Saeed. After the terrorists were stopped, political and governmental measures were taken to strengthen national security. Federal bodies of the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC), and NATGRID, the nationwide information-sharing system, were created (Joshi, 2019). The activities of the Multi-Agency Center (MAC), an intelligence agency clearinghouse, were also revitalized. No less important, four National Security Guard (NSG) hubs were organized in Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Chennai to enhance internal security (India should have Actioned a Kinetic Response after 26/11, 2021). The National Investigation Agency was created to ensure the proper investigation of the terrorism issues.

Domestic and Foreign Policies

As part of domestic policies, the government focused efforts on building more robust coastal and maritime security and increasing the number of inter-agency centers (MACs). Equipping police officers and modernizing the coordination mechanism were other critical steps (26/11 Mumbai Attack, 2018). The Youth Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) was created to de-radicalize misguided youth and bring them back to normal life. India tried to put pressure on Pakistan, but there were no proper mechanisms for combating terrorism due to the lack of political will. After the charges were filed, Pakistan said it had nothing to do with the actions of its non-state actors. The international community supported India, and the US Secretary of State and British Prime Minister visited India and Pakistan for diplomatic talks. As a result, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against the Jamaat-ud-Dawaa group, which covered Lashkar-e-Taiba, and both groups were officially declared terrorist organizations.

Unintended Consequences

The governmental response was reasonable, and most experts are unanimous that the terrorists failed to hinder Indias democratic development path. The country benefited from international support and thus has stopped further terrorist threats. Through difficult diplomatic negotiations, India and Pakistan managed to maintain a shaky peace and avoid inadvertently encouraging terrorism (Achom, 2018). Despite provocations in subsequent years, including unfair accusations of terrorist involvement or intentions of Muslims living in India, such critics went unanswered and did not cause the expected aggression.

How Other Countries Were Impacted By the Response

The attention of the international community to the region and the diplomatic presence of the United States and Britain helped to change the situation in the region for the better and prevent the terrorist threat in neighboring countries such as Bangladesh. The terrorist threat from Pakistan has also decreased due to the close attention and control of the situation by the international community. Just as importantly, India mobilized domestic defense resources and improved domestic security.

Pros and Cons of the Governmental Response

Some valuable lessons could be learned from the governmental response. In particular, the countries must maintain neutrality, but India and Pakistan can also begin to establish closer diplomatic ties. This requires diplomatic work and the creation of a diplomatic course, stating the potential benefits for both countries. Improving the speed and coordination of national security systems is also the right thing to do, although there are criticisms of the Coast Guard system and small craft inspections, as well as the security potential in more remote rural areas.

Specific Different Responses

Today Mumbai Attack is part of the political discourse and is perceived as a milestone in the democratic development of the state. There are advocates in the Indian Congress for softer or harder counter-terrorism measures. In November 2021, Congressman Manish Tewari tweeted an excerpt from his book where he opined that a kinetic response to the 2008 terrorist threat, for example, direct aggressive responses, would be more effective (India should have Actioned a Kinetic Response after 26/11, 2021). Notably, calls for stricter action can lead to aggressive action by various groups.

Alternative Response

The terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba, which carried out the Mumbai Attack, was outlawed, and its members who carried out the attacks were killed during an operation to eliminate the terrorist threat in 2008. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa group, which covered up the actions of terrorists, was also outlawed. This means that any actions of these groups fall under the jurisdiction of the international security services, which is the maximum possible guarantee for the elimination of the terrorist threat. Any other measures would be less effective since, so far, there is no alternative international mechanism for combating the terrorist threat.

Conclusion

Thus, it was analyzed how the Mumbai Attack could have been addressed alternatively. Unfortunately, Indias national security system failed to cope with the threat, which led to tragedy. Subsequently, India has streamlined security coordination and strengthened police systems, although Coast Guard systems need further improvement, as do police equipment and rural policing. A diplomatic response to the terrorist threat was the only way to signal the states readiness and prevent new attacks.

References

26/11 Mumbai Attack: Here are the steps taken by the government to improve the security system. (2018). MoneyControl. Web.

Achom, D. (2018). 26/11 Mumbai Attacks: How India fought back  a timeline. NDTV. Web.

India should have Actioned a Kinetic Response after 26/11: Manish Tewari in a book; BJP attacks Congress. (2021). News18. Web.

Joshi, M. (2019). India learned valuable lessons from 26/11. But so have terrorists across the border. Wire. Web.

The Mumbai Attack on November 26, 2008

Introduction

On November 26, 2008, the commercial hub for India came under a horrific terrorist attack. Ten gunmen believed to be members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba simultaneously struck Mumbai city in five different areas. The terrorists, armed with automatic weapons and hand grenades, targeted civilians in the southern part of the town. Areas under attack included the busy CST railway terminus, the popular leopard café, two hospitals, and a theatre. Although most of the attacks lasted a few hours, the terror unfolded in three stations where hostages were taken and held in the Nariman House, Oberoi Trident, Taj Mahal Palace, and Tower. The attack lasted for three days and left 174 dead people, including 20 security personnel and 26 foreign nationals (Arce, 2018). More than 300 individuals were injured, marking this attack the most tragic terrorist activity for decades in the history of India.

Analysis of the Attack

The Mumbai attack impacted the field of global terrorism in various ways. These influences were heavy and long-lasting though they may change over time. This terror act gave repressive yet preventive policies to curb more attacks. In addition, it exposed the existing loopholes in the security system worldwide, forming a significant change in the forces. The event is considered a terrorist attack because it involved rooted training, financing, planning, onsite reconnaissance, and well-equipped automatic weapons such as the AK-47. Samples taken from the attackers revealed that they had taken cocaine and LSD during the attack to sustain their energy levels (Mohan, 2018). Also, the attack included a series of well-coordinated shootings accompanied by bomb blasts.

The Global Nature of the Attack and Ideologies

The 9/11 attack was well planned and coordinated, employing tactics and methods reflecting a familiar virulent ideology. The evolution of both homegrown terrorists and foreign tactics shows how they have emerged in creating new threats to the world. The underlying motivation of the terror group responsible was to attain more casualties as possible. This is evident in the discipline displayed by the attackers during the final phase of the activity. A key striking aspect of the attack was the challenge it presented to the government of India, which was hard for New Delhi to ignore. Heated confrontations in the 2001 Islamic attack on the Indian parliament triggered the relationship between the two neighbors, Pakistan and India.

The attackers intended to draw attention to the Indian government by placing Jews and well-to-do guests in five-star hotels in the interest of the activity. Also, the bombing and gunfire in other areas, such as railroads and hospitals, show a more general purpose to spread terror in the hub of India and cause casualties. To further its global cause, Dekkan Mujahideen claimed responsibility for the act through email, which was later traced to a Russian IP address implying an international connection (Sonawane et al., 2020). The Mumbai attack gave rise to new confrontations in the Indo-Pakistan political war geared towards earning Islam a favorable political outcome.

The Impact of the Attack

Counterattacks involved the National Security Guards, Elite Naval Commandos, and army forces from various units. The FBI obtained approval to assist in uncovering the possible attackers of the city. Also, local government agencies such as the India intelligence and SWAT group were deployed in the response. This globally strengthened the international ties between India and the United States while sending an alert message to other countries. The signal intelligence linked the Mumbai terror to Pakistan though the government of Pakistani was reluctant to help apprehend the shooters.

Countries involved in the Mumbai attack included Pakistan, accused of the act, and the United States, who came to help in the response. The spell in the Taj Hotel trapped several European Parliament Committees on international trade delegates from various countries. The attack impacted the terrorist group as well. It helped the terror groups objective by straining the slowly recovering international relationship between India and Pakistan (Scott, 2019). In addition, the attack caused fear when Pakistan moved its troops towards the Indian border, hinting at a possible attack. There were many casualties, and more people were wounded, signifying a win to the terrorist group. The terror group gained the support of followers as the international reactions to the attack were widespread, with much attention from media coverage and social media sharing. This was a win to the attackers because the event received world attention and was heard by many countries. Though the shooters involved were all killed, and the only live survivor served with the death penalty, it was a massive win for the Islamic terrorist organization from Pakistan.

Conclusion

Conclusively, the Mumbai attack is remembered for its coordination, execution, and number of wounded people. The episode first targeted western nationals and Indian citizens to gain a more significant global interest in identifying the terror group. All the shooters were Pakistan nationals who attacked multiple sites in the densely populated crowds. One of the terrorists was captured alive by the Indian forces, who gave insights into the attack. New Delhi wanted the United States to declare Pakistan a state sponsor of terror activities after the broken ties with Pakistan after the attack.

References

Arce, D. G. (2018). On the human consequences of terrorism. Public Choice, 178(3-4), 371396. Web.

Mohan, S. (2018). Military capabilities and regime type: The emergence of IndiaPakistan rivalry. International Politics, 56(1), 4969. Web.

Scott, B. (2019). The mysteries of Mumbai: Terrorism and banality in sacred games. MFS Modern Fiction Studies, 65(2), 285307. Web.

Sonawane, D. V., Garg, B. K., Chandanwale, A., Mathesul, A. A., Shinde, O. R., & Singh, S. (2020). 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack revisited: Lessons learned and novel disaster model for future. Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, 12(1). Web.

The 9-11 Commission Report Recommendations

Introduction

The 9/11 Commission Report, commonly known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States Final Report, is the official description of the events leading to the terrorist assaults on September 11, 2001. It was written at the request of US President George W. Bush and Congress by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. On November 27, 2002, the Commission was constituted, and its final report was released on July 22, 2004. The report was due to be issued on May 27, 2004, but House Speaker Dennis Hastert agreed to a 60-day delay, which was extended to July 26. The 9/11 Commission Report investigated the USs planning and response to the attacks, as well as making suggestions for future threats.

The report was published by a commission created by Congress and the President after many people had inquired how it happened and how the nation could avoid such tragedy. The commission evaluated almost 2.5 million pages of documents and examined over 1,200 people in ten countries as part of their assignment (Authenticated U.S. Government Information, 2014). It included almost each senior figure from the recent and historical managements in charge of subjects covered by their mandate. They aimed to be unbiased, objective, detailed, and neutral. They made it clear that they wanted to disclose as much of their inquiry as possible with the Americans. They convened 19 days of proceedings and received a public hearing from 160 people to that goal. The study described the al-Qaeda attacks preparation and execution, as well as the intelligence and legislative communities responses to intelligence cautions of an assault in the preceding months and the national security systems response to the assaults after they occurred.

The 9/11 Commission Report looked into the United States readiness and response to the attacks and suggestions for future threats. In 2003, the 9/11 commission held its initial sessions in New York City. The report delivered its conclusions in a public report on July 22, 2004 (Auerswald, 2005). The Commission recommends the National Intelligence Director to replace the Director of Central Intelligence, information procedures to provide incentives for sharing, and a specialized and integrated National Security Workforce to be developed at the FBI. The United States can only overcome these political and philosophical distortions (NSS, 2017). The report was presented by ten commissioners, five republicans, and five Democrats, who were all elected by chosen leaders from the nations capital during a great partisan division.

The Recommendation that the National Intelligence Director Replace the Position of Director of Central Intelligence

The splitting of the governance of aptitude community capabilities was a significant problem. While the CIA was formerly at the center of our national intelligence abilities, it has had less influence over the use of the states images and signs intelligence assets. This problem has been applied in three federal agencies situated inside the Department of Defense since the Cold War. Another issue was a lack of ability to prioritize and shift resources. The organizations mainly were structured across what they collected or how they collected it, although the agencies set the collecting priorities at a national level.

The DCI must be able to reach beyond departments and redistribute effort when making challenging resource decisions. A lack of clear principles and norms throughout the foreign-domestic split was another issue. The intelligence communitys leadership should be allowed to merge data gathered abroad with data gathered in the United States. This information collecting can then subject all work, regardless of where it is done, to a consistent degree of value in how it is gathered, processed, presented, shared, and assessed. A set of universal intelligence personnel norms can help a team of experts collaborate more successfully by removing service-specific mindsets from the equation.

Factors

The term Director of National Intelligence was coined in 1955. A study commissioned by Congress recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence select an assistant to control the CIA so that the director may concentrate on general intelligence synchronization. Several further examinations of the Intelligence Community performed by the governmental and managerial branches reiterated this theme over the following five eras. The September 11 assaults hastened a long-standing demand for massive intelligence reorganization and the appointment of a Director of National Intelligence (Devine, 2018). The 9/11 Commissions report, released in July 2004, called for significant changes to intelligence organizations, including creating a National Intelligence Director.

Discussion

On major matters, the National Intelligence Director must be in command of state security centers that would offer all-source assessment and intelligence processes to the entire government. The Commission believed that the center should be the analytical component of the proposed National Counterterrorism Center in this case. It would be placed alongside the systems integration unit in the Presidents Executive Office, establishing the NCTC. Other state intelligence centers, such as those devoted to counter-proliferation, criminality, pharmaceuticals, and China, would be housed under the appropriate agency.

The National Intelligence Director would present a consolidated state intelligence budget that represents the primacies of the National Security Council and includes an ideal stability of scientific and human intelligence collection and examination. They would be set aside for aptitude agencies with the authority to apportion cash to the suitable agency if the budget is approved. They will also have the power to reallocate budgets among national intelligence services to encounter any new priorities. The National Intelligence Director should commend and present to the president those who will direct national intelligence capabilities (Best Jr, 2011, p. 9). CIA, DIA, FBI Intelligence Office, NSA, NGA, NRO, Department of Homeland Securitys Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate are state intelligence capabilities. This national effort would be supervised by the National Intelligence Director, aided by three assistants, each of whom would embrace a crucial place in one of the constituent organizations.

Findings

The national government quickly implemented reforms after the Commission released the statement. In August 2004, President Bush approved four Executive Orders that, to the extent practicable, reinforced and reorganized the Intelligence Community without the need for legislation. Both the Congress and Senate enacted bills in Congress that made significant changes to the 1947 National Security Act (The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2015). The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted into law by President Bush on December 17, 2004, culminated in extensive negotiations to bring the two pieces of legislation together.

President Bush entitled U.S. Ambassador to Iraq John D. Negroponte as his first state security adviser in February 2005 and promoted U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden to General. On April 21, 2005, Ambassador Negroponte and Gen. Hayden were sworn into office in the Oval Office, and the ODNI began its processes on April 22, 2005 (Fingar, 2022, 141). The Western intelligence agencies have been focused on combating terrorism since the dawn of the twenty-first century, particularly the worldwide Islamist terrorist threat. As a result, intelligence services and resources have been restructured and reoriented to prioritize tactical C.T. intelligence. While this has shown to be effective in general, it has come at a strategic cost.

The Recommendation that Information Procedure Should Provide Incentives for Sharing

Problem

There were several recommendations for enhancing the exchange of information among federal agencies at all stages in the United States. The private industry, and certain alien states, to counter terrorists and strengthen homeland security were among the reactions incited by the terrorist invasion on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States was one of the most current to make recommendations in this area (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). Because the Commissions report came at a period when progress on information sharing was already well underway, its suggestions were broad.

The United States administration has access to a tremendous quantity of data. When non-traditional intelligence files, such as customs and immigration data, are included, the reservoir grows exponentially. However, the U.S. governments mechanism for processing and utilizing what it possesses is inadequate (UNT Digital Library, 2005). Officials begged the Commission to bring devotion to problems with the unfulfilling back-end side of federal programs in interviews across the government. Due to consequence of the Cold War, each intelligence department has its exclusive security measures (Sylvia et al., 2013, 3). Counterintelligence concerns remain even if other spies have replaced the old Soviet foe.

Factors

This commission suggestion identified the need-to-know culture of data security as a severe hindrance to thorough intelligence analysis. The Commission concluded that, while the national government has access to vast amounts of data, administrative and organizational cultural impediments limit the governments capacity to exploit these assets. According to the panel, two key elements have aided in perpetuating need-to-know information practices. One was a lack of comprehensive internal information-sharing mechanisms, which led to information compartmentalization as a standard practice rather than regular distribution to the exterior community of users. As per the Commission, current processes only enabled information to be given if someone directly requested it and only followed classification and other safety precautions. Such a strategy aimed to prevent releasing information that might represent a security risk. However, according to the Commission, these security processes can negate the benefits of states exchanging information if carried too far.

Another element the Commission as maintaining need-to-know information practices was a corporate culture that promotes disincentives to information sharing, which is widespread across agencies. There are no penalties for not sharing information, according to the report. However, if the information is given or divulged in violation of protocol, criminal, civil, and organizational fines may be imposed, depending on the circumstances. The report claimed that the focus on security had resulted in over-classification and information compartmentalization among agencies. By contributing to insufficient analysis and duplication of work by numerous organizations, impeded access to data can have logical and financial costs.

Discussion

Whether gathered in Pakistan or Texas, intelligence about international sabotage should be evaluated, turned into information, and disseminated per the quality criteria. The logical counter-argument is that materials and procedures may differ significantly between locales. As a result, the Commission recommends that data be segregated from the methods and techniques used to get it when a statement is first generated (Kaiser & Halchin, 2012, 4). The report should start with the most accessible but useful data. As a result, the most significant number of participants can somehow have access to that information. Any user may query further if further information is needed, with access given or prohibited according to the networks rules and questions, leaving a paper trail to govern who retrieved the information. However, the queries may not arrive unless specialists at the networks edge can quickly find the indications that lead to them (Congress, 2014). The Commission recommends distributing data horizontally, spanning new systems that span multiple agencies.

Findings

Given the importance of information technology security in recent years, the subject of information security sharing across organizations to reduce security breaches has piqued the interest of professionals and scholars alike. Under a Presidential Decision Directive, the U.S. federal government sponsored the construction of various industry-based Information Exchange and Analysis Centers (ISACs) to encourage discovering and sharing network security information among businesses. The ISACs primary purpose is to share security vulnerabilities and technology solutions linked to ways for preventing, detecting, and fixing security breaches. Nevertheless, there are a variety of intriguing economic challenges that will impact this goals realization.

The Recommendation that a Specialized and Integrated National Security Workforce Should be Established at the FBI

The FBI has historically prioritized its unlawful justice mandate over its national defense duty, which is a source of worry. The primary aim for this is the high claim for FBI assistance in criminal cases around the country. The law roundly chastised the FBI in the 1970s for the excessive domestic intelligence probes made public. In the 1980s and 1990s, the FBI established an extensive surveillance mission and was the central organization examining alien terrorist collections working inside the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2001, 416). However, the country had gone away from such types of inquiries.

The FBIs role will be more concentrated under the Commissions recommendations, but it was still critical. The FBI must be capable of guiding tens of thousands of officials and other workers to gather astuteness in Americas towns. The guidance could be interrogating informants, gathering intelligence and searches, monitoring individuals, collaborating with local officials, and doing it with utmost precision and legal compliance. The work of the FBI on the cities of the United States is, therefore, a domestic version of the CIAs operations officers abroad, functioning under the United States Constitution and different rules and norms.

Factors

The 9/11 Commission members were delighted by the agents diligence in chasing down facts, tolerantly going the additional mile, and functioning an additional month to provide truths in place of supposition. To become better intelligence officers, FBI representatives and researchers in the ground needed consistent support and devoted resources. They needed to be awarded for obtaining informants and assembling and sharing information in different and broader ways than what would usually be done in a formal criminal investigation (The Donovan plan for the establishment of a central intelligence authority, 1994)). Employees of the FBI must report and analyze their findings in ways that the Bureau has never undertaken before.

Discussion

The FBI is a minor part of the national crime control group in the United States, primarily of national and native law implementation organizations. The information-sharing network and the FBIs work via local Security Task Forces should foster a mutual association. Through this relationship, the federal and municipal agents know what data they are searching for and, in turn, obtain some of the data being established about what is going on in their communities. The Defense Department will also play a crucial role in this collaboration. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 delegated broad powers to the undersecretary for data analyses and infrastructure protection. This directorates job is to record terrorist intimidations to the country against our evaluated weaknesses to guide the nations efforts to counter terrorist threats (Congress.gov, 2022). One of the directorates designated responsibilities is assimilating and evaluating data from Homeland Securitys core departments. To ensure that the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate can carry out its duty, the receptionist of homeland safety must certify that these constituents operate together.

Findings

After the 9/11 attacks, Director Mueller stated that the FBI would refocus its operations, with counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cybercrime as the top three priorities. He also promised to strengthen the FBIs intelligence program by bringing together and centralizing command of the Bureaus previously dispersed intelligence capabilities, both at headquarters and in the field. He also claimed that intelligence has always been a core competency of the FBI and has always been at the heart of the organizations investigative mission (DOD. 2014, p. 8). Mueller said that the process of intelligent specifications, collection, assessment, and dissemination had and would continue to discipline the organizations intelligence efforts.

In 2005, the FBI announced that it would create a devoted subsidized staffing needs for agents in the intelligence platform. Those agents were assigned to function as collectors, target inventors, and reporters. It also intends to establish a strategic intelligence section within the DI. The FBI also intends to include strategic analysis in each FIG and completely integrate Security and Intelligence Community partners (Intelligence Community Directive, 2013). In addition, the FBI will appoint an Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) for each of the Field Offices that now have only one ASAC. Before accepting the position, this employee will be trained in intelligence methods and procedures and will be responsible for steering that offices national safety mission.

Since 9/11, the FBI has implemented or been urged to implement several organizational, business, and resource distribution changes to improve its intelligence program. The Bureau originally formed an Office of Intelligence to focus its covert operations, currently renamed the DI due to P.L. (Intelligence Community Capability Directive, 2022). Field Intelligence Groups were also established in each of the Bureaus 56 field offices. Additional intelligence experts and Special Agents committed to intelligence collecting have also been hired.

Conclusion

The Federal Reserve, the New York State Banking Department, and the Securities and Exchange Commission have been working together to analyze events following the September 11 terrorist attacks to improve the financial systems overall resilience. Over the last few months, discussions with prominent financial sector representatives have aided this effort. The results of these sessions, which are detailed here, suggest that adopting more strong business continuity strategies all over the financial sector might have considerable benefits. The 9/11 Commission suggests a global plan to combat terrorism that includes targeting terrorists and their institutions, preventing and planning for future terrorist acts, and limiting the formation of terrorist organizations. These objectives can be met by a concerted effort that involves interagency intelligence sharing, the recruitment of a National Intelligence Director, the establishment of a National Terrorism Center, and a better structure of Americas homeland defenses.

References

Auerswald, D. (2005). The evolution of the NSC Process, p. 45. Georgetown University Press.

Authenticated U.S. Government Information. (2014). One hundred thirteenth congress of the United States of America.

Best Jr, R. (2011). Intelligence Issues for Congress, 6-9.

Congress. (2014). Intelligence authorization act for fiscal year 2014, 1390-1423.

Congress.gov. (2022). H.R.5077  Intelligence authorization act for fiscal year 2017. Congress.gov.

Devine, M. (2018). Background and selected options for further reform, 1-16. Congressional Research Service.

DOD. (2014). Department of defense directive, 1-21. Department of Defense.

Fingar, T. (2022). Office of the director of national intelligence: Promising start despite ambiguity, ambivalence, and animosity, 141-142.

Intelligence Community Capability Directive. (2022). Intelligence community capability requirements process, 1-6. Intelligence Community Capability Directive.

Intelligence Community Directive. (2013). National Intelligence Program (NIP) Budget Formulation and Justification, Execution, and Performance Evaluation, 1-5.

Kaiser, F., & Halchin, L. (2012). Congressional oversight of intelligence: Current structure and alternatives, 5-6.

NSS. (2017). National Security Strategy of the United States of America December 2017, 1-55.

Sylvia, M., B., Kmeger, A., Munoz, C., & Holdren, J. (2013). Memorandum to the heads of departments and agencies, 3.

The Donovan Plan for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Authority. (1994). The Donovan Plan for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Authority, 1-4.

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. (2015). The United States Militarys Contribution to National Security, 1-17.

The 9/11 Commission Report. (2004), 411-428. Web.

The 9/11 Commission Report. (2014). The 9/11 commission report, 1-449. Web.

UNT Digital Library. (2005). Memorandum for see distribution. UNT Digital Library.

The Japan-Based Atomic Bombing

The US invasion of Japan through atomic bombing after World War II (WWII) is hotly debated. Since 1945, historians have argued in favor of and against using atomic bombing to stop WWII. Those opposing the act describe it as being inhumane and unmerited, besides culminating in the modern atomic age and standing as a threat to the launching of the nuclear war.

Historians state that the Japan-based atomic bombing was unjustified and unnecessary because it was inhumane. Regardless of nature, bombs are devastating, alongside having the potential to cause death and damage. As noted by some historians, atomic bombs have toxic radiations with the ability to penetrate human tissues and cause harm or death. For example, Robert Oppenheimer, through introspecting the role of atomic bombs in his Manhattan project, discovered that the bomb contained active materials, which were also toxic (Beck, 2016). Indeed, the bomb contains 10 billion times as many poisonous materials as needed for a lethal dose. Due to its harmful content, the bomb was inhumane and should have been avoided.

According to historians, atomic bombs are inhumane due to their associated injuries and destruction. Ideally, these bombs destroyed Nagasaki and Hiroshima, as outlined by P.M.S. Blackett (Brinkley, 1993). On 6th August 1945, the American B-29 plane dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshimathe so-called Enola Gay (Beck, 2016). It led to the mass killing of 70-80K Japanese, and tens of thousands of people were exposed to the radiations harmful effects. Beck (2016) noted that on 9th August 1945, another US plane dropped the second atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki, culminating in the killing of 40K people. Therefore, atomic bombs were part of the deadliest weapons that should not have been used to stop WWII because they caused more destruction and injuries valued way above the gain.

Japan was on the verge of conceding defeat, as argued by some historians. Deploying the deadliest weapons against arch-rivals on a war-exit door is unjustified and unnecessary. Japans surprise attack on Pearl Harbour was more potent at the beginning of Pacific Theatre in 1941 (Zachmann, 2016). Nonetheless, by employing Island-hopping strategy in 1945, the US managed to calm Japan and successfully push the Japanese back to the south pacific, the main homeland island. As such, during the launch of atomic bombs, Japans power was limited, and it could not fight back in a meaningful way.

References

Beck, E. (2016). Reasons against the atomic bombing of Japan. Research Paper. Web.

Brinkley, A. (1993). The Unfinished Nation: A concise history of the American people, Volume II (Vol. 12, p. 7229). McGraw-Hill.

Zachmann, U., M. (2016). From Nanking to Hiroshima to Seoul: (post-)transitional justice, juridical forms and the construction of wartime memory. Journal of Modern European History, 14(4), 568-588. Web.

Analysis of Cults in Modern Society

Introduction

Creating new radical groups is a common social and political activity in many countries today. In the United States, many militia groups develop their ideologies against the federal government to criticize the chosen techniques and policies and impose some threats related to public events (McCarthy, 2021). Some activities are easily predicted and expected, while others remain dangerous and provoke new attitudes toward leaders.

Discussion

According to Harmening (2014), individuals who abandon their involvement in dominant cultures gather in cults and promote new belief systems and separatist worldviews. In most cases, cults are determined by their beliefs and intentions, and each group has specific characteristics and prefers to choose a location far from the watchful eye. Their isolated lifestyle includes the rejection of civic affairs and the preference for individual education for children. Sometimes, people compare cults with other dangerous groups like terrorists or extremists, but these judgments should be thoroughly examined to understand if the justification of cult activities is possible.

The activities in which cults have participated vary, depending on their types and membership. Harmening (2014) defines four major cults: violent-apocalyptic (imminence and salvation through conflict), passive-apocalyptic (avoidance of conflicts), social-isolationist (isolated existence and free from outside influence), and new world order (violence to achieve the desired change). Historical examples like the Manson Family or Aum Shinrikyo prove that cult activities could be dangerous and life-taking. The desire to introduce their beliefs and impose their lifestyles did not have clear boundaries, leading to innocent deaths and murders. Therefore, it is correct that some (not all) cults become dangerous emerging groups due to the decision to participate in extremist activities that significantly affect life quality.

Sometimes, militia groups are related to domestic terrorism because of the intention to implement criminal acts to achieve particular ideological goals. These two concepts have similar characteristics, like being located within one country, having victims with the same citizenship, and pursuing the purpose of persuasion and ideological change. Although not all cults are associated with human victims, it is possible to consider some of them as domestic terrorists because of the desire to manipulate people and use violent threats, blackmail, and intimidation.

The reasons for cults to do what they do are not always clear, but the main factor is usually the same  people are unhappy with the offered conditions and want to change something. Spiritual and religious beliefs are not always dangerous, and the police should follow Constitutional rights, including the right to speech (Harmening, 2014; McCarthy, 2021). Thus, it is possible to justify the activities and choices made by cult members. If no violence, guns, and abuse are noticed, the existence of such a cult is a normal social activity. There should be a leader who takes responsibility, a group of followers, and a list of behavioral norms. Today, such groups as cults are interpreted and accepted differently, and some people feel that the label of a dangerous emerging group is inappropriate. More attention has to be paid to analyzing and recognizing militia groups and their styles. Isolation is not always dangerous if led by a charismatic and sufficient leader.

Conclusion

In conclusion, cult membership should not be similarly treated and recognized. These organizations may emerge in any part of the world, following different purposes and methods. History shows that many lives could be lost due to cult activities, and these threats cannot be ignored. It is also wrong to impose common labels on cults because of differences in characteristics, types, and leaders. Sometimes, cults take the same steps terrorists do, determining themselves as dangerous extremist organizations. However, not all cults follow the same examples, and their desire to live in isolation, reject social norms and regulations, or enhance their beliefs should be respected and justified.

References

Harmening, W. M. (2014). Crisis intervention: The criminal justice response to chaos, mayhem, and disorder. Pearson.

McCarthy, N. (2021). The evolution of anti-government extremist groups in the U.S. [Infographic]. Forbes. Web.

The Halifax Harbor Explosion: History of the Atlantic Region

The world has witnessed a few incidences where explosions caused by the human race have claimed many lives and caused wide-scale destruction. The Hiroshima bombing is recorded as the largest man-made explosion of all time. Before this incident, in 1917, the world witnessed the first largest-ever explosion. It happened in Halifax Harbor, involving a collision between two sea-bound vessels. Records indicate one of the ships, the Imo, was docking when it collided with the already docked SSMont Blanc. There was a serious explosion that caused enormous deaths and numerous casualties and destroyed almost half of the city. Since the above-mentioned incident, maritime agencies have worked to improve disaster response, relief, and recovery. More secure shipping regulations and vessel design qualifications have been established to promote maritime safety. The Halifax Harbor explosion created a firm foundation for healthcare nursing sector, and major reforms have been initiated to reduce similar incidences.

The Halifax Explosion was one of its kinds, and it was the most devastating maritime occupational hazard of its time. The escape happened after a collision between two ships releasing approximately three kilotons of energy that destroyed half of Halifax and Dartmouth city. The SSMont Blanc was a French cargo ship loaded with munitions that contributed to the immense explosion after colliding with the Norwegian vessel SS Imo. The French vessel was under guidelines to deliver her cargo from New York through Halifax to Bordeaux (Rostis, 2019). On the other hand, the Norwegian ship was a chattered relief vessel to collect supplies in New York and deliver them to Belgium. The ships collided at low speed, mainly because the SS Imo vessel was unladen and invisible in the early morning darkness. Sparks from the collision ignited the munition on the French ships deck, causing a massive fire outbreak.

As mentioned above, the explosion in coherence with collapsing buildings, fire, flying debris, and the shockwave from the blast, half of Dartmouth city, located at the Halifax harbor, was destroyed. The explosion set off a massive shockwave that grounded buildings and destroyed all nature within half a mile of its radius. Vessels around the harbor sank, including the Imo ship that was later washed ashore by the Tsunami formed after the explosion. Along with the city, approximately 2000 people died, and roughly 9000 were severely injured (Rostis, 2019). The number of victims can be explained by the lack of reliable responders to contain the fire and provide relief for the injured. If the fire on the SSMont Blanc could have been contained, the explosion that resulted from the collision could have been avoided.

The world still celebrates in the remembrance of the Halifax explosion that happened over a century ago. A prominent exhibition was established to commemorate the incident and is showcased across prominent art galleries. The maritime disaster revealed to marine agencies and the healthcare sector of Canada that precautions and better medical initiatives were required to handle similar emergencies (Baker, 2018). The incidence resulted in the establishment of the Halifax Welfare Bureau, tasked with training medical employees and developing advanced medical institutions. The most iconic change that resulted from the explosion was that the nursing sector received more appreciation and was tasked with more responsibilities since their role during the escapade was irreplaceable.

Conclusively, the Halifax harbor explosion created a firm foundation for healthcare nursing sector. During and after the explosion, nurses were actively involved in tending to the casualties and providing first-aid treatment. Furthermore, the explosion caused massive destruction, loss of lives, and numerous casualties. Infrastructure and nature within half a mile of the blast radius were completely annihilated. The munitions on the SSMont Blanc contributed to the massive exposition that almost destroyed the whole of Dartmouth city. The maritime organizations and the healthcare sector have made drastic improvements to ensure that similar incidences are better handled.

References

Baker, L. (2018). New approaches to the Halifax Explosion. Journal of the History of the Atlantic Region, 47(2), 151-156. Web.

Rostis, A. (2019). One hundred years of certitude? Disaster response and recovery since the Halifax explosion. In D. Werle, M. J. A. Butler, D. Griffiths, and I. Porter, The future of ocean governance and capacity development (pp. 431-435). Brill Nijhoff. Web.

Elimination of Osama bin Laden

Operation Geronimo is an operation carried out by the US Navy SEALs to eliminate Osama bin Laden. He was a member and leader of the Islamist terrorist organization Al Qaeda. As a result of an operation at his home in 2011, he was liquidated along with his son, a courier, his brother, and his wife (Lahoud, 2022). Due to many aggravating circumstances, such as collateral casualties, there has been a long debate about whether the operation was legal. Many studied facts and sources suggest that President Obama had no authority to plan and organize such an operation.

American Legislation

Many concerns about the legitimacy of Geronimos planning and execution have to do with consistency with Congress. The use of military force without its permission and regulation is an action that separates the branches of government. Thus, the President took military power into his own hands without consulting anyone in the administration or with the legislature. However, such a decision as conducting a military operation in another country should be decided collectively.

The constitution is the main set of rules of a democratic country and the president must comply with them. Moreover, the US Constitution provides that only in conjunction with Congress can the President declare any military action (Burns, 2019). Based on this, it can be argued that the actions that Obama took were illegitimate from the point of view of legality. Joint decision-making by the executive and legislative authorities in the military sphere provides for a system of checks and balances. Thus, power is not concentrated in the hands of the President, and responsibility is distributed to everyone. Moreover, it is unknown what the decision of Congress would have been if Obama had followed the rules and turned to them. There is a strong possibility that the President did not do everything according to the rules because he feared Congress would not give permission. In this case, Obamas actions are explained by his wanting to bypass the planning approval procedures and start the operation as quickly as possible. Despite the fact that this is because, during the time of bureaucratic procedures, a terrorist could change his place of deployment, the norms of the law should be first of all.

The powers of the President of the United States in military operations are significantly limited. To begin planning for the operation, he had to pass a congressional review under the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (Betts, 2019). Thus, this action can be regarded as an excess of his powers by the President. Carrying out Geronimos operation without congressional authorization casts doubt on its legitimacy because the President did not seek approval. This situation undermines the legislatures role and casts doubt on the effectiveness of the overall constitutional system in the United States. Such an overreach by the President and a disregard for the balance of power is a negative factor and defines the operation as illegal.

Obtaining a warrant from a federal court is a mandatory procedure before making any decisions regarding detentions. This process is also provided for by the Constitution and was violated by the President when developing Geronimos plan. Since the United States is a model of a democratic system, it has no right to violate this state structure while remaining an example for many countries. Such disregard for clearance procedures could be due to the secrecy of the operation, and the passage of checks and debates about the legality could provoke information leakage. This could be the reason that the special forces would miss bin Laden, and he would have time to relocate.

International Legislation

The elimination of a dangerous terrorist was positively perceived by the public and the world community, despite the illegality of the action itself. During the preparation of the plan to eliminate bin Laden, the operation was legitimized by almost all international organizations, such as the UN. This action had great weight and foundation to recognize the actions taken as legal. International treaties and organizations to which the United States belongs were supposed to be a deterrent against violating international law. In this context, this concept includes provisions on the right to life and the right to a trial. There is no doubt that Osama bin Laden was a terrorist and guilty of many crimes resulting in many victims. However, the judicial system is an integral part of justice that should not be overlooked. The trial was to be a whole part of the punishment process. Instead, the President set a precedent by summarily executing a man. Thus, these actions could negatively affect the countrys global position in the legal aspect.

In addition, international hostilities are only legal in self-defense. In this case, calling the operation to eliminate a specific person in the countrys self-defense is difficult. The official position of the United States on Operation Geronimo was precisely its self-defensive context. Self-defense involves using equal force compared to the threat when there are no other options (Thomas, 2023). However, the state did not provide evidence that it was impossible to detain the terrorist alive for trial. Accordingly, it can be said that he was killed for no reason, due to a formal order.

Another major problem in the operations approval was Pakistans invasion. The fact that the US military forces entered the sovereign space of another country is contrary to international rules. Thus, the President neglected the countrys territorial integrity instead of coordinating the operation with the head of Pakistan. International law is the determining factor in the relations of all countries, and neglect of it makes the United States the guilty party. The execution of a person makes the state such that it does not rely on a fair trial when conducting any operations. Accordingly, such a country cannot be fully called legal if it allows the elimination of a person without trial. In addition, it is worth noting that along with the head of Al Qaeda, some third-party people were eliminated, such as his son, the courier, as well as the couriers wife and brother. Thus, the actions of the United States became even more severe.

Conclusion

Geronimos operation was undoubtedly crucial in the fight against world terrorism. However, when holding such events, the President of a democratic country must rely on domestic and international law. This should be done in order to properly follow all procedures for the approval of the operation and its planning. The United States at that time ignored all the requirements of international norms and its own Constitution. Such actions of the President can be regarded as going beyond the limits of authority. Any military action must be reviewed by several types of authorities to regulate the balance of power. In this case, all the procedures for formalizing and approving the planning of the operation were skipped, which gives grounds to conclude that Geronimos operation was illegal.

References

Betts, R. K. (2019). The grandiosity of grand strategy. The Washington Quarterly, 42(4), 7-22. Web.

Burns, S. (2019). The politics of war powers: The theory and history of presidential unilateralism. University Press of Kansas.

Lahoud, N. (2022). The Bin Laden Papers: How the Abbottabad Raid Revealed the Truth about Al-Qaeda, Its Leader and His Family. Yale University Press.

Thomas, A. J. (2023). Skepticism, Self-Defense/Help and Global Justice. In The Open World, Hackbacks and Global Justice (pp. 37-82). Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore. Web.

Operation Geronimo Against Terrorism

In May 2011, former US President Obama ordered an operation that eliminated the worlds most dangerous terrorist, Osama bin Laden. The process, known as Geronimo, was a welcome success in the fight against terrorism, but it also raised many questions and controversy in the US and beyond. Critics argued that Obama overstepped his authority by ordering an operation and that its results should be subject to legal and political review. In this essay, it should be argued that Obama had a legitimate right to order Operation Geronimo and that doing so was necessary for US national security.

First, it should be noted that Operation Geronimo was carried out following the law. The operation was based on intelligence that confirmed the location of Ben Laden in Pakistan (Soherwordi & Khattak, 2020). Obama has consulted legal experts and made sure that under international law, the US has the right to self-defense against terrorists who pose a threat to national security. In this case, Ben Laden was the leader of al-Qaeda and was responsible for many terrorist acts, including the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington (Krishna, 2019). Hence, Obama had a legitimate right to order Operation Geronimo as a US self-defense measure.

Moreover, it should be noted that Operation Geronimo was necessary for US national security. Al-Qaeda was the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world, and Ben Laden was its leader. He was responsible for the deaths of many people in the United States and worldwide. Ben Laden continued to threaten the US and promote his terrorist ideology, and eliminating it was necessary to protect national security (Hendrix & Major, 2022). Had Ben Laden been caught alive, he could have been the target of terrorist attacks or used as a hostage to extort political or economic concessions from the US. In that case, the execution of the operation was the only way to guarantee the safety of the US and its citizens.

Critics argue that Obama exceeded his authority by mandating an operation. However, this assertion needs to be more realistic. Under the United States Constitution, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and is empowered to take measures to protect national security (Hendrix & Major, 2022). Obama had all the necessary authority and authority to decide on the operation based on intelligence and legal advice. Moreover, it should be noted that Obama was not the first president to order such operations. Previous Presidents have also resorted to using military force to counter terrorist threats. For example, President George W. Bush rated the invasion of Iraq in 2003 based on speculation that weapons of mass destruction could threaten the US (Krishna, 2019). Obama acted based on accurate intelligence on Ben Ladens whereabouts and his role in terrorist acts.

It is important to note that Geronimos operation was not the only successful counter-terrorism operation conducted under Obama. Many other terrorist leaders had been eliminated during his presidency, and many successful operations had been carried out against terrorist groups. Some of them were held in cooperation with US allies, which allowed for improved international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

Despite criticism from some political forces, the legitimacy and validity of Operation Geronimo were recognized by most of the international community. This underlines the importance of cooperation and coordination among countries in the fight against terrorism. It should also be noted that all legal and ethical standards must be respected in the fight against terrorism to avoid violations of human rights and international treaties.

Critics likewise declare the procedure was illegal because it was not negotiated with the Pakistani government. However, it should be noted that the United States has the right to self-defense against terrorist threats, even if they are in the territory of other countries. In addition, Ben Laden was a foreign national who participated in terrorist acts against the United States and other countries, so his removal could be considered a legitimate self-defense measure.

Some critics argue that Geronimos operation was ineffective because it did not eliminate the terrorist threat. However, it should be noted that the removal of Bin Laden has led to a severe weakening of Al Qaeda and a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks (Soherwordi & Khattak, 2020). After Bin Ladens death, al-Qaeda faced internal divisions and lost its leadership in global terrorism. This has enabled the US and its allies to improve their security and reduce terrorist threats. Moreover, Operation Geronimo allowed the US to demonstrate its determination to fight terrorism and protect national security. This has raised the US in the eyes of the world community and made clear that the US is prepared to take decisive measures to protect its citizens and allies.

In conclusion, it can be said that Obamas order to accomplish Operation Geronimo was legitimate and well-founded. Ben Laden was a dangerous terrorist involved in numerous terrorist attacks against the United States and other countries, and his removal was necessary to protect national security. Operation Geronimo was carried out using intelligence and all legal aspects. The consequences of the operation were positive and led to a reduction in the level of terrorist threats and an increase in the US credibility in the world community.

References

Hendrix, P., M., & Major, J., S. (2022). Communicating with intelligence. Rowman & Littlefield.

Krishna, S. (2019). Manhunt Presidency: Obama, race, and the Third World. Third World Quarterly, 40(2), 284297. Web.

Soherwordi, S., H., S., & Khattak, S., A. (2020). Operation Geronimo: Assassination of Osama Bin Ladin and its implications on the US-Pakistan relations, War on Terror, Pakistan and Al-Qaeda. Soherwordi | South Asian Studies. Web.

Electronic Warfare and the Iraq Surge

Introduction

In 2007, the President of the United States unveiled a new strategy of the country in Iraq, which was unofficially called the Surge. The core of the operation lied in the need to increase the American contingent in Iraq (King, 2016). During his speech to the American people, the president stressed that the main reasons for the previous failures were the lack of troops and insufficient freedom of action of the American command. The purpose of the paper is to analyze the 2007 Surge and reflect on its contribution to todays military operations.

Main body

It is worth noting that the basis of the strategy was the additional entry of 20 thousand troops into Iraq. The main innovation proposed by the US authorities was a new set of military and police measures. Up to this point, the policy of the occupation forces in Iraq could be characterized by sufficient passivity (King, 2016). The troops that were in the country at that time spent most of the time at the base since they needed to protect themselves from terrorist attacks. Moreover, operations outside the base walls (such as patrolling, working at stationary checkpoints, and so on) were minimized. Many people criticized the strategy for concentrating on protecting the US own units, which led to the physical and psychological separation of America from the people of the country which it sought to protect.

The new strategy included measures to reduce the use of aircraft in the fight against militants. The leadership decided to resort to these measures since the widespread use of aviation led to unreasonably large casualties among the civilian population (King, 2016). The task of the command was to expand the land-based infrastructure for the protection of the territory, especially in Baghdad and in regions of the country with high terrorist activity. For this reason, it was necessary to carry out temporary reinforcements, and additional troops consisting of 20,000 soldiers entered the country (King, 2016). Such measures were supposed to stabilize the situation and provide an opportunity to regain control over the setting. In 2007, a peak of hostilities was observed in Iraq with the greatest losses among foreign troops. However, after the Surge, a sharp stabilization and reduction of losses among military and civilians were noted. Moreover, the intensity of hostilities and the level of terrorist activity in Baghdad have significantly decreased.

To implement the strategy, several individuals were appointed to leadership positions. In particular, John M. McConnell was appointed US National Intelligence Director, and Navy Admiral William Fallon took over as a commander of the unified armed forces command organization. In addition, General David Petraeus became the Commander of Multinational Force Iraq. The number of brigades functioning in the area was extended to 20. These included airborne, mountain, and infantry divisions; marines were also deployed and took part in the activities (Minkov & Tikuisis, 2016). The army personnel was extended to include up to 150,000 people. It is important that the strengthening of the contingent was to last for quite a long time. Unlike previous strategies in which US troops would leave the areas cleared of militants, the Surge campaign stipulated that they would remain on the territory for continued security (Minkov & Tikuisis, 2016). Iraqi insurgents reacted to the Surge plan by announcing the start of their own operation, which aimed to force the US government to sign a surrender act.

During the Surge, the average monthly boots on the ground indicator reached the number of 148,300. The Brigade Combat Teams were extended from 15 to 20 units. These measures were essential for realizing the counter-insurgency policy of the US (Minkov & Tikuisis, 2016). Interestingly, the process of extending the size of troops occurred within seven months, and then troops were gradually decreased. This approach allowed reaching an increase of 30,000 and boosting troop strength up to 243,000.

The timeline of the 2007 Surge entails series of steps. In June 2006, the leader of al Qaeda was killed by the American side. During the autumn winter, several operations were repeatedly launched by the US but failed (King, 2016). In January 2007, President Bush gave a public speech during which he announced the initiation of the Surge, and later that month, outposts were located in Baghdad. Next month, the US forces launched the first operation attempting to secure Baghdad. During March-June, Brigade Combat Teams and divisions arrived in Iraq, and counter-insurgency activities were implemented to the full extent (King, 2016). In August, forces launched Operation Phantom Strike through the additional military. In 2008, the final operations were held, and the brigades were gradually withdrawn from the location.

The mission of the campaign underwent significant alterations under the leadership of General Petraeus. The core of the strategy lied in the need to get the hearts and minds of the local people. This was to be achieved through building relationships, averting causalities, and protecting people instead of killing insurgents. Since the greatest percentage of violence was observed in Baghdad, it was decided to locate troops there (Minkov & Tikuisis, 2016). Previously, during earlier operations, Coalition forces distanced themselves from the local people and lived in isolated bases. During the Surge, units were interacting with the population uninterruptedly to establish a long-term relationship through improved security.

Curiously, one of the main deployment strategies was the introduction and initialization of new technologies. The core of the approach was to disrupt the communication networks of the insurgent commanders. Such tools as Suter network exploitation programs were effective in hearing the interlocutors and checking the enemys sensors. Apart from that, various updated technological solutions and devices were used (Minkov & Tikuisis, 2016). Prowler electronic attack planes were helpful in catching and disrupting signals that were sent to explosive devices, especially to those along convoy routes. These systems were actively used to manipulate sent and received signals (Minkov & Tikuisis, 2016). Other defensive approaches included the application of such systems as the Shortstop Electronic Protection System. It was used as part of preventive measures to protect the US forces from artillery and mortar fire.

To detect and identify enemy emitters such as radios and phones, targeting tools were employed. For instance, L-3 Communications Network-Centric Collaborative Targeting system was utilized by the US forces to handle explosive devices. Suter programs were particularly effective in terms of localizing antennas (Minkov & Tikuisis, 2016). The US side could embed into the commanders interaction without being spotted. Interestingly, the program was used for both hand-held and aid defense technologies. One of the adversities of which the US electronic warfare came across was the fact that the territory was electronically polluted, which complicated the use of technologies discussed above (Minkov & Tikuisis, 2016). Some of the devices would conflict with one another, causing interference. To resolve this problem, the units placed antennas higher than usual. For advanced enemy technologies, the US also used more complex devices and systems (Kaempf, 2018). Warlock Duke was introduced to catch malicious signal and disrupt specific types of devices through a series of jamming responses. This measure was particularly useful in disrupting the activities of insurgents who exploded roadside bombs.

The factors of urban terrain and weather were of great importance for operations, and they influenced the nature and effectiveness of the actions of American troops directly. The terrain was analyzed according to the OAKOC (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment) method. The main strategies of guerrilla warfare during the Surge were terrorist attacks, attacks by maneuverable combat groups, and the use of improvised explosive devices (Kaempf, 2018). All this posed a serious problem for the United States and coalition forces, so the OAKOC method contributed to the determination of the correct strategic points significantly. Based on the results of the analysis, typical installation sites for improvised explosive devices were identified (Kaempf, 2018). In particular, these were bridges and passages, roads, areas where equipment slowed down, areas of the terrain that provide masking to installers of explosive devices. In this regard, it is crucial to note that the weather factor influenced both the visibility of explosive devices and targets and the choice of location for their installation.

In addition, it should be emphasized that the activities undertaken by the US Army were complicated by terrorist attacks throughout the campaign. In general, the number of terrorist attacks began to increase, starting from 2003 until the second quarter of 2007. In 2007, more than 1.5 thousand people suffered as a result of the terrorist attack (King, 2016). In order to attack the Yezidis living in this territory, the terrorists used a fuel truck in combination with three other vehicles filled with explosives. Another instrument of warfare on the part of the partisans was targeted armed attacks and shelling of the enemy (King, 2016). Partisans fired at the enemy with 122mm rockets, mortar shells, and sniper shells. The actions of the insurgents were relatively effective due to the fact that the electronic circuits created by the partisan technicians did not respond to the operation of the electronic warfare equipment of the Americans in their usual ranges.

One of the main difficulties during the 2007 Surge was resistance from the side of the mobile partisan units. Despite the technical advantage and widespread use of electronic warfare, the US was not able to suppress the partisan movement in Iraq quickly (Minkov & Tikuisis, 2016). For this reason, the leaders had to resort to tactics that were based on strengthening military-police control over the occupied territory and intensifying patrols.

The effectiveness of the campaign was a subject of debate for many people. On the one hand, after the start of the operation, the death toll in Baghdad fell by almost half. The number of abductions and killings decreased, but such results were achieved at the cost of an increase in the loss of American troops (Minkov & Tikuisis, 2016). Moreover, outside of Baghdad, the number of victims of terrorist attacks has increased, and it can be assumed that security in Baghdad has been improved at the expense of other areas of the country. Some experts in the field also argue that, politically, the United States was defeated because, in the long term, it failed to build democracy in the country.

Nevertheless, despite the conflicting views of the effectiveness of the 2007 Surge, the operation allowed detecting some tactical and technological features that accompanied the fighting on the part of the groups opposing the coalition forces. For example, the command may take insurgent warfare tactics as the basis of their strategy or prevent the implementation of such a strategy by the enemy in the future. During the operation, partisan detachments avoided direct combat clashes with the regular army (Minkov & Tikuisis, 2016). Also, the partisans used all kinds of improvised explosive devices massively and carried out terrorist attacks against regular troops, other groups, and the civilian population (Minkov & Tikuisis, 2016). At the same time, they actively used simple technical resources as well as human resources, while civilians and culturally significant places were used as a kind of shield and means of information warfare (Kaempf, 2018). Therefore, with fairly small financial costs, operations based on insurgent tactics can be successfully carried out, which can be generally characterized as an effective asymmetric response.

Conclusion

Thus, it can be concluded that the Surge launched in 2007 in Iraq was an operation during which the US used updated and sophisticated electronic warfare and tactics. In addition, this was a series of events that provided crucial insights for the tactical groups and leadership. The main goal of the campaign  to reduce the death toll in Baghdad  was achieved. Nevertheless, opinions exist that the US has lost in a political battle while winning in a physical one.

References

Kaempf, S. (2018). Saving soldiers or civilians? Casualty-aversion versus civilian protection in asymmetric conflicts. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

King, E. G. (2016). Obama, the media, and framing the U.S. exit from Iraq and Afghanistan. New York, NY: Routledge.

Minkov, A., & Tikuisis, P. (2016). Revisiting the 2007 surge in Iraq. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 17(3), 37-72.

McCarthyism and the Second Red Scare

During several decades of the Cold War, there could be no doubt that the main adversary facing the USA was the international Communist block led by the Soviet Union. While the interests of the USA and the USSR collided all over the world, the struggle occurred on American soil as well. Involved in a political conflict of exceptional magnitude and eager to see the defeat of Communism, some American politicians could go too far in their zealous effort to oppose Americas enemies. A particularly noteworthy example was Senator McCarthy, a prominent figure during the Second Red Scare  a period of an extensive search for supposed Communist agents in American government agencies in the early Cold War. McCarthy was correct in the fact that Communism expanded its global influence after WWII, but his specific accusations were untrue, and the practices they encouraged went against American liberties.

McCarthy outlined his vision of the struggle between the democratic USA and the Communist USSR in his famous 1950 speech in Wheeling, West Virginia. According to him, there could be no peaceful coexistence between democratic Christian nations and atheist Communist countries (McCarthy, 1950). The very fact that Communism was anti-capitalist and anti-Christian made it a dire threat as far as McCarthy was concerned. He also pointed out that international Communism has expanded its global influence over 800 million people, likely referring to the Communist victory against nationalists in China (McCarthy, 1950). It is unclear what the Senator meant when he said that the United States, as the leader of the democratic world, only influenced about 500 million people by the same date. However, the most worrying prospect for McCarthy was not that the Soviet Union increased its influence in other countries but the possibility of Communist agents or sympathizers infiltrating the American government. Therefore, McCarthy called for a vigilant search for and uncompromising defense against the suspected Communist influence in American politics, culture, and society at large.

McCarthys claims were an interesting mixture of true facts and unsupported accusations. T was undoubtedly true that the United States and the Soviet Union were bitter political rivals at that point, and that the sphere of Communist influence in the world increased since 1945. However, when it came to particular accusations against specific people, the Senator did not fare so well. The centerpiece of his speech was the claim that John S. Service, a State Department appointee to China in the 1930s and 1940s, essentially supported Chinese Communists instead of American ally Chiang Kai-Shek (McCarthy, 1950). Even though the Secretary of State fired Service after McCarthys accusations, they did not hold well historically. In 1957, a unanimous Supreme Court decision ruled that the Secretary of State could not fire Service for the lack of evidence and obligated the State Department to reinstate him (Bridge, 2016). Thus, while McCarthy was right in the sense that Communism expanded its global presence, his allegations involving specific people were ultimately proven untrue and unjust.

Yet the Second Red Scare was not brought about by a single speech  there were numerous reasons for Americans to share the anti-Communist sentiment in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. The monopoly on nuclear weapons enjoyed by the United States from 1945, when it first used them against Japan, proved to be brief. In 1949, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb, much to the shock of the rest of the world. The fact that the leading Communist power was able to catch up with the USA so quickly raised suspicions of espionage. Thus, the idea of Communist agents or sympathizers selling American nuclear secrets to the enemy suddenly became very plausible in the publics mind (Michaels, 2017). Apart from the atomic bomb, the rapid expansion of Communist worldwide influence was also a troubling fact in and of itself. Michaels (2017) is right to call the growth of Communist global influence breathtakingly rapid (p. 108). With Communism winning in China and Eastern Europe, the idea of its encroachments against America was also valid, if often misguided.

Those accused of being Communists or Communist sympathizers faced grim prospects. Under the provisions of the Smith Act, many actual members of the Communist party were prosecuted and sentenced to prison terms (Michaels, 2017). Those who invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to testify against themselves earned a derogatory label Fifth Amendment Communists (Fagan, 2018). Public or private employers could also take the initiative in their own hands and fire or otherwise sanction political undesirables on their own (Michaels, 2017). As a result, the Second Red Scare and McCarthyism as its part contributed to a nationwide purge of those suspected as the agents of a hostile foreign power.

It might be tempting to view the excesses of McCarthyism as a thing of the past  especially since both the Cold War and the Red Scares have ended long ago. However, the events similar to the purges of suspected Communists in the 1950s may still occur in the 21st century as well. The most notable example similar to the Red Scares of the past would be the rise of Islamophobia in the United States after the 9/11 attacks accompanied by an increase in government repression. For instance, Muslim charities found themselves declared guilty by association by the Department of Justice after 9/11 despite not having any clear link to terrorism (Marusek, 2017). This development mirrors the events of the Second Red Scare, when most of those accused were not active Communists but, rather, their sympathizers or even acquaintances. While the Cold War has ended, any other political crisis may produce a popular and governmental effort aiming to suppress political undesirables, and the War on Terror is not unlike McCarthyism in some respects.

As one can see, the Second Red Scare may serve as an example of how willingness to deal with a political crisis may cause wrongful accusations and infringements upon liberties. It would be erroneous to say that Senator McCarthys claims were entirely wrong: the Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union was very real, and the existence of Soviet agents  a reasonable possibility. Rapid Communist expansion, combined with the shock of the USSR developing an atomic bomb, also provided ample grounds for the anti-Communist sentiment. However, McCarthys accusations against John S. Service proved to be unfounded, as was the case with many victims of the Second Red Scare. Even when no formal legal action occurred, public or private employers could go after political undesirables on their own. The tightening of governmental repression mechanisms and the rise of popular Islamophobia after the 9/11 attacks bear a notable similarity to McCarthyism and signal that any political crisis may cause out-of-proportion action against undesirables.

References

Bridge, D. (2016). Holding the accountability problem accountable: Response mechanisms to counter-majoritarian Supreme Court decisions. American Review of Politics, 35(1), 18-43.

Fagan, S. (2018). From Benghazi to Russia: An assessment of Congresss treatment of the Fifth Amendment in recent congressional investigations. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 31, 601.

McCarthy, J. (1950). Enemies from within speech delivered in Wheeling, West Virginia. The University of Texas. Web.

Marusek, S. (2017). Inventing terrorists: The nexus of intelligence and Islamophobia. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(1), 65-87.

Michaels, J. (2017). McCarthyism: The realities, delusions and politics behind the 1950s Red Scare. Routledge.