Category: Al-Qaeda

Introduction

Al-Qaeda is an infamous terrorist organization whose actions have shaped global politics in the last three decades. The terrorist group has relied on spreading an anti-Western Islamic ideology by calling on its followers to wage war against governments in Islamic lands and beyond. Al-Qaeda’s ideology focuses on establishing an Islamic caliphate in the Middle East and other areas with large Muslim populations to stem the influence of the U.S. and its allies.

However, there is a larger challenge because the top leadership of the group has constantly differed with its affiliates on their modes of operations (McCants 26). The group has consistently used various media channels to spread the propaganda of its true purpose to win new followers.

It has used audio, video and social networks to insist that it has taken up the responsibility of avenging Muslims who died in Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq, in the hands of Israeli, American or British troops. As a result, this propaganda has made some Muslims perceive the involvement of the U.S. and other western countries in Middle Eastern affairs as an act of imperialism.

This paper will discuss the extent to which al-Qaeda influences various Islamic societies and how this has enabled the organization to further its agenda across the globe.

Roots of Hatred

Al-Qaeda’s political ideology is guided by three major principles: the creation of Islamic states ruled by Sharia principles, kicking out oppressors from Islamic lands and respect for personal liberties of every Muslim. The extremist position taken by al-Qaeda in its ideology has labeled people from other religions as inferior infidels (non-believers) whose actions go against the Holy Quran.

More importantly, they also criticize governments in Islamic lands for serving as puppets to western oppressors who do not have respect for Muslim’s dignity. The group was formed in the mid of the 1990s comprising bin Laden and other supporters who shared an Islamic ideology that focused on limiting American influence in the Middle East (Atwan 54).

Since he hailed from wealthy family background, bin Laden was able to finance the group’s activities and encouraged other affiliate groups to adopt radical Islamic leanings. Consequently, the term ‘jihad’ became the alternative interpretation of terrorism by the group.

Al-Qaeda’s ability to use both the propaganda and the militant tactics to achieve its objectives has made it difficult for many governments to understand its complex organizational capabilities. The terrorist group has relied on its extensive networks with other terrorist groups that operate in different countries to promote its agenda.

As a result, affiliate extremist groups in Africa, South East Asia, and Europe have launched attacks against key government officials and civilians to gain attention and credibility. Violent attacks that constantly occur in Nigeria, Somalia, Pakistan, India, the Philippines, and Afghanistan are carried out by extremist Islamic groups which are linked to al-Qaeda.

For instance, Boko Haram has waged a violent campaign in Nigeria to oppose formal education. The group’s militants attacked the Christians, government officials, and students in schools in northern Nigeria because they insisted that their main objective was to establish a new Islamic state (Acharya 76).

Information technology platforms are widely used by terrorists because this enables them to get in touch with their counterparts in different parts of the world. As a result, al-Qaeda easily spreads its radical ideology to gullible young Muslims and non- Muslims in different countries.

The organization uses social media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, to engage with its followers by misleading them to think that all the forms of jihad are justified. This approach has made it easy for al-Qaeda to recruit militants who are used to execute terror campaigns in their own countries and abroad (Acharya 79).

More importantly, this has allowed the organization to decentralize its operations because its radical ideologies inspire many young people to adopt militancy as the main way of addressing various grievances. Consequently, the group has shown a lot of dynamism by relying on its affiliates to engage in different acts of terror against governments and other perceived enemies.

Traditional and social media have helped al-Qaeda deflect attention from various violent incidents it commits against innocent people. It rationalizes its actions by claiming that it serves the will of Allah (God). More often than not, al-Qaeda leaders have insisted that the violence unleashed by the group’s militants protects Muslims and their lands from desecration by non-Muslims (Trofimov 43).

It constantly uses the narrative that Muslims have a more special purpose on Earth, and they need to stand together to overcome social, economic as well as political challenges they may face.

The rise of political Islam, as advocated for by al-Qaeda, has brought to the fore sharp cultural differences between western nations and Middle Eastern nations and how they influence relationships between the two groups. Therefore, this shows that al-Qaeda has capitalized on the failure by western governments to appreciate complex cultural issues that shape global politics.

September 11 Attacks and the War on Terror

Osama bin Laden’s profile in global politics was raised by the terrorist attacks against the U.S., British, and Israeli installations in different parts of the globe. Henceforth, this changed people’s perceptions of global terror, and it became more defined by suicide bombings, kidnappings, and wanton killings of civilians.

More importantly, al-Qaeda made global governments more aware of the political aspects of Islamic ideology, and they influenced Muslims’ collective thinking. For instance, the twin terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 showed that al-Qaeda’s military and organizational capacity had improved substantially (Trofimov 47). This allowed the organization to align its jihad strategy with well-executed propaganda messages.

Bin Laden and other top leaders were able to publicize the organization’s activities through audio and video recordings. The constant media attention directed to Osama bin Laden made it possible for the group to capture the attention of many people globally. As a result, he was perceived as a hero, who was brave enough to challenge the might of the U.S. by some Muslims.

Al-Qaeda’s popularity in some quarters increased due to their blatant attacks on western citizens and their sympathizers because they were perceived as enemies of Islam. As a result, some people have been misled to think that it is the only organization that is willing to stop the U.S. from imposing its agenda on other states. Additionally, al-Qaeda’s propaganda brainwashed its followers to think that Islam is under the attack of other religions.

Thus, Muslims need to stand up together to protect their rights. One of the turning points that made al-Qaeda achieve global attention was the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York (Quiggin).

Hitherto, the U.S. government did not anticipate that the terrorist group was capable of staging a serious terrorist attack of such magnitude on U.S. soil. This affected the collective American psyche because the attack was an affront to the principles of liberty, justice, freedom, and economic prosperity.

The September 11 terrorist attack was symbolic because it was used to inflict pain on the whole nation to remind U.S. citizens that they were not safe even in their own country. Former U.S. President George W. Bush and his foreign policy, as well as national security advisers, reacted on that by using America’s strong diplomatic and military might to deal with al-Qaeda.

The U.S. government relied on the support of its other allies in the region, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to invade Afghanistan and later on Iraq (Chaliand and Blin 73). The mission was to hunt down bin Laden and his associates who were hiding in Afghanistan under the protection of Taliban rulers. However, the two wars had a lot of casualties, which made it easy for al-Qaeda to inspire more people to become extremists.

As the U.S. and other forces were fighting against extremist militants in the country, the terrorist group was able to activate more cells in different parts of the world. Since then, global terrorism has become a more complex phenomenon.

The aftermath of the War on Terror

The unilateralist approach used by the Bush administration against terrorism made it difficult for the U.S. to win the hearts and minds of the people from other nations who were opposed to the Iraqi war, which toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime. More people have adopted extremist ideologies, and they use operational strategies popularised by al-Qaeda to carry out attacks against government institutions in different countries.

This has made it difficult for global governments to fight against terrorism more effectively (Sanfilippo 70). The number of American soldiers that have died in both Iraq and Afghanistan in the hands of militant groups with close ties to al-Qaeda has dumbfounded the U.S. administration.

Moreover, the economic implications of the war have drained a lot of financial resources, and this has considerably weakened the political and economic power of the U.S. Consequently, this has confirmed the assertion that America’s foreign policy strategies failed to appreciate the complex religious and cultural issues at play, which made it easy for al-Qaeda’s message to resonate with millions of people.

Another important factor that has emerged in the new decade is that there has been an increase in political and sectarian turmoil across the Middle East, in countries, such as Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Egypt. Therefore, some Muslims have associated the violence in countries, such as Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as a direct result of America’s imperialist agenda in the region.

Therefore, this has made it easy for terrorist groups that draw their inspiration from al-Qaeda to fill the void left by the death of Osama bin Laden to further their agenda (Forest).

Also, the localization of al-Qaeda’s center in North Africa, Nigeria, Mali, Philippines, and Pakistan shows that the ideological influence of Osama bin Laden has continued to grow even after his death. Even though he is dead, some militant groups still rely on his propaganda to attack innocent civilians in different places across the world.

The Boko Haram and al Shabaab insurgents in Nigeria and Somalia respectively are struggling to set up strict Islamic states in their countries. These insurgent groups use the tactics which were popularised by the al-Qaeda, for example, suicide bombings in crowded places, attacks on senior government officials, and brutal executions of people who do not espouse their ideology.

Therefore, even though the terror group has lost its top leadership, its radical Islamic ideology has remained relevant because younger militants are willing to carry on from where the older militants left (Forest). In a nutshell, for global governments to fight terror successfully, they need to counter al-Qaeda’s propaganda to ensure they educate Muslims and other terrorist sympathizers that violence goes against the teachings of Islam.

The U.S., together with other countries, needs to adopt appropriate publicity strategies that enable moderate Muslims to understand the difference between jihad and terrorism.

The U.S. foreign policy has failed to distinguish between propaganda and motive. Since the U.S. has always supported Israel in its political and military struggles against Palestine and other hostile Arab states, it is perceived as an evil empire by al-Qaeda and other Muslims. Therefore, September 11 and other subsequent terror attacks in London and Madrid allowed the organization to increase its global appeal and credibility.

More importantly, since the U.S. is the archetype of western civilization and power, al-Qaeda found it easy to sway people‘s attitudes against liberal ideologies which America is known for (Greenfield). A clash of civilizations between liberal, modernist, and conservative, religious ideologies has made it easy for al-Qaeda to win more followers in different parts of the world.

For instance, the number of young Muslims in the U.S. and Western Europe has been increasing rapidly, which shows that they can easily be influenced to follow extremist Islamic ideologies which justify terrorism.

Global governments need to convince young Muslims who are mainly targeted by al-Qaeda’s propaganda of hate that terrorist group’s actions do not advance the collective interests of Islam as a religion. Since it is known as a religion of peace, they need to make people understand the effects of terrorism and how it endangers the lives of innocent civilians in different countries (Greenfield).

A message of tolerance and peaceful coexistence will reduce high levels of mutual suspicions between Muslims, on the one hand, and people of other religions, on the other. Consequently, this will render al-Qaeda’s propaganda irrelevant, and the terrorist organization will not be in a position to endanger global peace any longer.

The U.S. and other global governments need to make the prospect of engaging in terrorism unattractive. This will dissuade young people from getting involved in extremist activities which endanger peaceful coexistence between people from different religious and cultural backgrounds.

Conclusion

Global governments need to change negative perceptions that have been entrenched in the minds of some Muslims that al-Qaeda is a protector of Islam and its followers. This will go a long way in addressing the jihadist ideologies which have been used by the terror group to win the support of the masses in different countries. This will help to turn the tide against global terrorism, which endangers peace and stability in many states.

Works Cited

Acharya, Arabinda. Ten Years After 9/11: Rethinking the Jihadist Threat. New York. NY: Routledge, 2013. Print.

Atwan, Abdel Bari. The Secret History of Al-Qaeda. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006. Print.

Chaliand, Gérard and Arnaud Blin. The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al-Qaeda. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007. Print.

Forest, James J.F. “Perception Challenges Faced by Al- Qaeda on the Battlefield of Influence Warfare.” Perspectives on Terrorism 6.1(2012): n.pag. Web.

Greenfield, Daniel. “How Al-Qaeda is Winning the War on Terror.” Front Page Mag., 2014. Web.

McCants, William. “Al-Qaeda’s Challenge.” Foreign Affairs 90.5 (2011): 20-32. Print.

Quiggin, Tom. “Understanding al-Qaeda’s Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work.” Perspectives on Terrorism 3.2 (2009): n.pag. Web.

Sanfilippo, Kristin. “Al-Qaeda: A Future in Question.” Xavier Journal of Politics, 3.1 (2012): 69-74. Print.

Trofimov, Yaroslav. The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine. London: Penguin Adult, 2008. Print.

Today, more than ever before, it is important for criminologists, law enforcement officers and other stakeholders to have adequate knowledge in differentiating between organized crime and terrorism, particularly in light of the fact that scholars now believe that the convergence of international terrorism and organized crime is increasingly becoming a reality (Shelley & Picarelli, 2005).

The present paper uses La Costra Nostra and Al Qaeda criminal enterprises to demonstrate the similarities and differences of organized crime and terrorism.

Among the similarities, it can be argued that organized crime and terrorism have well established hierarchical structures of authority and control (Shelley & Picarelli, 2005). La Costra Nostra, an organized criminal organization, is structured around the so-called families, each with a boss who controls the family, makes executive decisions, maintains order, and develops strategies to maximize profits on behalf of the family. Al-Qaeida, an international terrorist organization with networks across most parts of the world, is structured around a bureaucratic perspective which is governed by a hierarchy with strict rules and regulations.

Additionally, both La Costra Nostra and Al-Qaeda are similar in terms of the systematic employment of force, threats, and intimidation to perpetuate their criminal agenda (Angjeli, 2003; Mallory, 2007). In both groups, threats, intimidation and violence are used to enforce discipline and compliance among members in the lower ranks. Another similarity is that organized criminals and international terrorists operate beyond the boundaries of legality with the view to influencing global stability and prosperity (Angjeli, 2003).

Among the differences, it can be argued that the motives of organized crime are to a large extent different from those of international terrorism (Shelley & Picarelli, 2005). La Costra Nostra’s engagement in international drug trafficking, for instance, is motivated by the desire to gain financially through illegal means.

In contrast, it is evident that Al-Qaeda’s involvement in the 9/11 terrorist attacks was fueled by hate and religious extremism. However, as has been illustrated by many scholars of organized crime, the funds received from organized crime are in some instances used to sponsor international terrorism (Shelley & Picarelli, 2005).

Although both La Costra Nostra and Al-Qaeda have well established hierarchical structures of authority and control, it is important to note that the former uses a patron-client network while the latter can be largely described as a bureaucratic criminal enterprise (Mallory, 2007).

Additionally, although the mode of operation is similar in both organizations, the motives are somewhat different as La Costra Nostra employs force to protect markets, while Al-Qaeda employs force and/or religious fanaticism to cause political upheavals and disorient the social fabric by igniting fear among the populace (Angjeli, 2003; Mallory, 2007).

Lastly, it is evident that both La Costra Nostra and Al-Qaeda form an interaction with other similar groups to pursue commonly held beliefs in the case of terrorism, and profit gains in the case of organized crime (Shelley & Picarelli, 2005). So, essentially, the scope of interaction with other similar groups is grounded upon the motives behind the formation of the organizations.

For example, Al-Qaeda has been known to interact with Al-Shaabab, an active terrorist group in the horn of Africa, to cause political upheavals in countries perceived to be sympathetic to western interests. Equally, La Costra Nostra has been known to interact with other organized criminal groups in Italy and France to facilitate the trafficking of heroine and hence gain financially.

In essence, therefore, the scope of organized crime and terrorism is primarily determined by the motives behind the formation of these groups. These motives further determine the kind of interactions established with similar groups.

References

Angjeli, A. (2003). The challenge of terrorism and organized crime. Mediterranean Quarterly, 14(3), 34-40.

Mallory, S.L. (2007). Understanding organized crime. Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett.

Shelley, L.I., & Picarelli, J.T. (2005). Methods and motives: Explaining links between transnational organized crime and international terrorism. Trends in Organized Crime, 9(2), 52-67.

Terrorism is a term that strikes fear into the nerves of most people. Humankind has practiced terrorist acts since the beginning of recorded history. The acts have made kingdoms rise, fall, and enabled individuals to gain authority. Terrorist acts are increasingly becoming a major difficulty in the current unsteady world. The al Qaeda training manual, found in May 2000 by British investigators in Manchester, England, provides guidelines for training operations of potential terrorists (Thetulsan.com, n.d.).

At the beginning of the manual, I am shocked to find out that even women are potential al Qaeda recruits. Moslem women are most of the time regarded as inferior to men; hence, it shocks me to find out that they can take part in responsibilities endowed to men. I feel that Moslems should not look at other religions as sabotaging their existence. This is because, in reference to Adam, Moslems are able to trace their ancestry to a similar sources as the Christians and Jews. The manual indicates that the overall purpose of al Qaeda is to get rid of ‘godless regimes.’ The strategy is to employ covert agents to commit terrorist acts.

Sanctioned activities of the terrorist organization vary from small, destructive acts to causing death, to reckless use of weapons (Gaines, 1987; Townshend, 2002). In this, I get the hint that the manual was made to be used mostly in developing countries. This is because the performance of acts is motivated to look at tourists and some uncomplicated pieces of infrastructure as worthwhile targets. The goal of the jihadis not just to form a united country of Moslems, but a global community of adherents declaring loyalty to one individual. The terrorist group intends to have a leader whose decrees will be absolute and reckoned as though from God himself (Marc, 2004).

I think that by referring to the ‘Afghan armies,’ dates the manual to the early ’90s. The noticeable absence of any reference to digital information is also proof that the manual was written then. This is the period when the Taliban overthrew the Russian puppet government in Kabul. The manual has made me realize that the recruitment process for terrorists follows strict rules since certain qualifications are closely looked at. The terrorist organization has a separate Finance Committee. This committee is responsible for collecting, dispersing, and recovery of the funds of the organization. I think that this committee might have contributed to the writing of the section of the manual about finances. In communicating, the organization adheres to strict tenets of secrecy.

In conclusion, this manual gives the inner workings of al Qaeda, and its discovery is a remarkable effort towards preventing future terrorist acts. I am a little bit amazed at the elaborate structure of al Qaeda. The group has well laid down procedures to ensure that they carry out their purposes with immense accuracy. However, if so much is known about al Qaeda, why then do we allow them to continue with their training operations in broad daylight? From the manual, it is evident that terrorists are committed to fulfilling their purposes. The threat of terrorism in our world is still a huge problem (United States Marine Corps, 2007). Therefore, concerted efforts must be made to reduce these acts by implementing adequate initiatives for prevention, detection, and action. It is my belief that the global War on Terror can only be won by enacting appropriate counter-terrorism measures to suppress the training activities of al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.

Reference List

Gaines, P. (1987). Terrorism Past, Present and Future. New York: Bantam.

Marc, S. (2004). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Thetulsan.com. (n.d.). The Declaration of Jihad against the county’s tyrants. Web.

Townshend, C. (2002). Terrorism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

United States Marine Corps. (2007). Individual’s Guide for Understanding and Surviving Terrorism. New York: Cosimo Publications.

Abdel Bari Atwan is regarded as a knowledgeable Al Qaeda expert who has concentrated on the activities of the organisations for more than fifteen years. Atwan is the editor-in-chief of one of the most renowned Islamic newspapers based in the western world, Al Quds al-Arabi. The journalist interviewed Osama bin Laden in the 1990s. Atwan has also developed certain connections with members of the organisation. Therefore, the journalist has information which comes from reliable sources within the organisation. The author’s latest book, After bin Laden: Al-Qaeda, the Next Generation, is an extensive analysis of the organisation which lost its leader.

In his book, the author argues that even though the organisation has lost its leader, it has not lost its grip. According to Atwan, the organisation is now “stronger and more widespread than ever”, and it is present in all continents (13). The author notes that the assassination of bin Laden made him a martyr whose message is being spread all over the world. Atwan also states that the assassination of the leader haunted by a variety of groups contributed to the development of the organisation as Al Qaeda has evolved into something bigger than an organisation. It is now “an ideology” which does not “depend upon a centralised leadership” (Atwan 14). The author stresses that numerous smaller groups are operating globally. The journalist claims that the organisation has developed new strategies focusing on the cyber world. Atwan concludes that the organisation has become a more serious threat to the western world as the influence of Al Qaeda is strong in the countries of the Middle East and Africa. Needless to add, that Al Qaeda’s rule in these regions may dramatically change the geopolitical situation as these countries have significant amounts of natural resources.

It is necessary to state that the book can be a valuable contribution to such disciplines as Middle East Studies and Political Science as it provides insights into the development of an organisation which has a considerable impact on several societies in different parts of the world. Atwan employs some theories and concepts in his book. For instance, he exploits The Three Degrees of Influence Theory to analyse the impact Al Qaeda has on young generations of Muslims as well as western youth (Atwan 244). The author also mentions several concepts, e.g. the concept of the umma, i.e. a global society of Muslims (Atwan 23). However, the author does not use any particular theory or concept to frame his argument as such frame is inappropriate for the book in question. The book can be seen as an extensive feature article where the author provides some information on a topic as well as his opinion on the matter.

Due to the book’s specific genre, the author extensively uses endnotes, which makes the information in the book more accurate and reliable. The book includes a select bibliography where all major sources are given. This contributes to the reliability of the book, as it is clear that the author uses valid data. Remarkably, the notes provided at the end of the book contain a lot of links to a variety of online sources. This is effective as the reader can easily access the primary data used by the author. The reader does not have to rely on the writer’s opinion and can come to his/her conclusions. It is necessary to note that the book contains the most meaningful dates and names. However, the author does not make a list of specific data out of his book. As far as the methodology of the book is concerned, the author exploits interviews, such secondary sources as books and newspaper articles, historical accounts and personal observations. This methodology is appropriate for the book, as any feature writing requires a balance of facts and opinions.

Apart from reliability, the book is also characterised by clarity and specific style. Atwan does not employ difficult structures; he does not resort to complicated terminology or literary devices. The author uses his journalistic approach to expressing his opinions and telling stories. Atwan uses clear and simple terms to analyse a variety of concepts. Whenever he exploits a term, a name or an abbreviation, he provides an extensive explanation. It is easy to follow the book as its narrative is concise. The author often tells stories from different people’s lives to illustrate his arguments. Admittedly, this makes the book under review easy to comprehend.

It is also necessary to add that the evidence given by the author is sufficient. As has been mentioned above, the author employs a variety of sources to support his argument. He also tells numerous stories which support his viewpoint. However, it is also important to state that the author’s personal opinion is vivid. The book is not an analytical analysis of the events. The author tries to be unbiased, but it is still obvious that Atwan is against some concepts promulgated by Al Qaeda as well as western societies. Though the author arguments are persuasive, and the reader cannot but share the same view on the matter.

This precision and convincing reasoning can be regarded as one of the strengths of the book. Clarity of facts presentation is also one of the book’s strong sides. As has been mentioned above, the book is properly referenced, and the reader can easily access some of the primary sources used in the book. Nonetheless, the book has several limitations. One of the major limitations of the book can also be regarded as one of its strengths. Thus, the author’s opinion that the organisation is becoming stronger is supported by a variety of facts, stories, etc. However, the author does not properly highlight the opposing view. The author focuses on the development and, so-to-speak, successes of the organisation. Nevertheless, little information about losses within the organisation is given. It may seem that the book spreads panic rather than provides extensive facts on the matter.

Irrespective of the downsides of the book, it can be helpful for a wide audience. Researchers, students, policymakers, etc. can benefit from reading the book as it contains a lot of valuable information concerning the past and possible future of Al Qaeda. This book contains valuable insights into the structure of the organisation, which can help foresee the way it will develop.

In conclusion, it is necessary to note that After bin Laden: Al-Qaeda, the Next Generation is the book for those interested in the future geopolitical situation in the world. The author shares his concerns about the organisation, which can become a very serious power able to shape other countries’ policies. Atwan warns that Al Qaeda has evolved into a brand new organisation which exploits new ways to achieve its goals. It is clear that a new stage of Al Qaeda’s development has started and policymakers of different countries should take this into account.

Works Cited

Atwan, Abdel Bari. After bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the Next Generation. London: New Press, 2013. Print.

The articles under analysis are devoted to the examination of the terrorism problem in the context of Yemen. In spite of the fact that both authors study American participation in the fight with terror, they address the relevant problems from different perspectives. Hence, the paper at hand is mainly aimed at analyzing the author’s approaches and the arguments they provide.

In his Breaking the Yemen-Al Qaeda Connection, Mark Katz focuses on the problem of the cooperation that currently exists between Yemeni tribes and Al Qaeda. The author examines in detail the factors that underpin this cooperation as well as the ways it might be cut off. It is essential to note that the author has a rather realistic vision of the problem. Thus, he does not offer the most apparent variant that resides in the complete destruction of the Al Qaeda group.

Instead, he focuses on alternative solutions to the relevant problem. The relevant approach to the problem’s treatment distinguishes Katz from other authors who neglect the practical side of the question focusing on the abstract solutions that are highly problematic to apply to real-life circumstances.

It is necessary to note that from the perspectives of potential solutions, Katz’s prognosis is quite pessimistic. The author admits that there is a need for external intervention, however, he, meanwhile, points out that there are currently no forces that could carry it out effectively. He refers to the cases of the British and the Soviet Union’s unsuccessful attempts in order to show that foreign interventions are almost apt to fail. It is essential to point out that the reference to historic examples makes Katz’s rationale more consistent and valid.

A particular emphasis is put on the potential participation of the United States in the problem’s resolution. However, according to Katz, the only possible way of succeeding is likely to do harm to the country’s image in the international field (42). In other words, in case the USA tries to perform some financial pressure over the leaders of the Yemeni tribes so that the latter agree to break their connections with Al Qaeda, other countries might accuse the country of supporting terrorism.

Moreover, the author adds that this variant is a “short-term” solution that will only work as long as the USA or any other country continues providing financial support (Katz 43). It is critical that the author tries to analyze the suggested solutions not only from the perspective of their efficacy but in terms of their long-lasting effect as well.

Instead of enlisting alternative steps and methods, Katz prefers to address the problem complexly. Hence, the author suggests that the only possible way out resides in eliminating the cores of the Yemeni tribes “grievances” (Katz 43). In other words, he assumes that in case the problem of the repressive government in Yemen is resolved, the locals will have no more motives to continue supporting their collaboration with Al Qaeda. The focus on the roots of the problem instead of its consequences is the strength of Katz’s analysis.

Moreover, the author tries to predict the outcomes of their refusal to cooperate. Thus, Katz believes that the refusal to maintain contacts might provoke Al Qaeda to retaliate (43). Therefore, the author not just offers a solution but tries to work out a post-strategy considering the fact that as soon as the problem is resolved, the local tribes might need some external protection.

Whereas Kats mainly focus on the particular problem of the terrorists’ financial support and its possible solutions, Terril, in his Drones over Yemen: Weighing Military Benefits and Political Costs, examines the US contribution to the fight against terror and the efficiency of the American approach. The key problem under analysis is the implementation of US drones in Yemen. According to the author, the use of drones is highly complicated by the fact that it requires an official consent from the government of the country on the territory of which the drones will be used. Allowing the United States to perform military operations, the government essentially provokes critics in a certain part of society

Thence, Terrill refers to the example of the former president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who would not admit his cooperation with the USA, fearing the public disapproval (17). Terrill tries to address the problem from two standpoints: the American prospects and the Yemeni reaction.

While analyzing the achievements of the US drones in Yemen, the author points out the fact that there is currently little data and evidence that can be easily accessed – most of the relevant documents are considered to be secret (Terrill 18). From this perspective, the most evident strength of the author’s approach in addressing the problem is that he tries to make the best use of the available facts and provide a concise summary of the drones’ deserts – his report is utterly objective and deprived of any personalized vision or attitudes.

It is essential to point out that unlike the previous author, Terrill is mainly focused not on the mechanisms of the fight with terrorism, but on the implications that this fight is likely to have for the USA. As well as Katz, Terrill agrees upon the point that carrying out military operations on the Yemeni territory has a negative image on the country’s image (21). First, foremost, it is the disapproval on the part of the locals that the presence of the drones provokes.

Nevertheless, the author provides a series of arguments that justify this negative attitude. Hence, Terrill notes that as well as any other country, Yemen is highly concerned about its sovereignty and regards the presence of the foreign military forces as a direct threat to it. Moreover, he explains that the inconveniences that the locals have to bear because of the drones. Thus, according to the author, the Yemeni people are afraid of meeting in large groups for special occasions for fear of being mistaking for terrorists. Finally, the Terrill believes that there are some cultural implications that cause the social disapproval of the American intervention (21). Providing a rationale for any presented phenomenon is one of the key benefits of Terrill’s analysis.

In addition, the relevant approach to the analysis shows that the author has deep insight and a profound knowledge of the Yemeni environment which allows him addressing the problem from different perspectives and providing a rationale for the described phenomena. Another peculiar point about his analysis resides in the fact that he employs Yemeni vision while explaining the reasonability of the fears described above.

Whereas the concerns expressed by the locals refer to the US policy, it would be logic to assume that the author will try to elucidate the US response. In the meantime, his focus remains on the Yemeni vision, and he tries to present the problem as it is treated in Yemen. Hence, Terrill shows that it is mainly the residents that share the negative attitude towards American drones, whereas the local government is rather tolerant about it, even though it cannot express its vision openly for fear of being overtly criticized.

The examination of the two conclusions helps to point out the principle differences between the analyzed articles. Thus, Terrill’s examination is mainly devoted to the existing tools and methods of fighting with terror in Yemen. The author tries to provide a multifaceted analysis of the problem, elucidating the vision of both American and Yemeni government. Katz is, likewise, focused on the spread of terror in Yemeni; however, his analysis is concentrated on potential solutions rather on the existing approaches. Moreover, his vision of the American participation in the fight with terror on the Yemeni territory is different from the Terrill’s interpretation.

Katz tries to define the ways in which America might contribute to the common fight and figure out the outcomes this participation might have for the country. Terrill, in his turn, puts an emphasis on the foreign vision of the American military activity in Yemen, trying to eliminate the way the locals treat this problem.

Both authors provide a consistent rationale and relevant examples in order to support their arguments. In the meantime, the key targets of their analysis differ, which is why the articles have different design – whereas Katz tries to work out a strategy for potential activity, Terrill is concerned about examining the current American policy in terms of terrorism.

Works Cited

Katz, Mark. “Breaking the Yemen-Al Qaeda Connection.” Current History 102.660 (2003): 40-43. Print.

Terrill, Andrew. “Drones over Yemen: Weighing Military Benefits and Political Costs.” Parameters 42.4 (2013): 17-23. Print.

The following essay includes the comparing and contrasting evaluation of the two articles, ‘Turmoil within the Taliban: A Crisis of Growth?’ by Antonio Giustozzi and ‘Al Qaeda’s Twenty-Year Strategic Plan: The Current Phase of Global Terror’ by Martin Rudner. The main idea of the first article implies that the foremost affiliation of intra-Taliban pressure appears to be flanked by the Peshawar Shura and the Quetta Shura.

Moreover, as a consequence, there has been a noteworthy relocation of influence, authority, and control from Quetta to Peshawar throughout the latest years. In the diminutive period of time, an official splitting of the Taliban is believed to be responsible for a vigorous sentient area for the administration of the Kabul, whose power in probable discussions would be intensely boosted. Furthermore, the author implies that the disasters of development can merely be demarcated as such ex-post. They develop into a resilient and more amalgamated association; nevertheless, there are several severe predicaments, which possibly will produce the menace of administrative failure as well.

The second article contains the study that provides an examination of the Al Qaeda’s structural changing aspects, doctrinal principles, tactical purposes, operative main concerns, and strategic directions within the framework of its Twenty-Year Premeditated Proposal. This Premeditated Proposal consists of seven steps and is addressed with a specific emphasis on its contemporary stage in progress, which is step 5. It has been lasting for three years at the moment and consists of including the deployment of Muslim militaries for the Announcement of the Caliphate.

In this affection, specific consideration is devoted to the Al Qaeda assignation in confrontational jihadist movements throughout the Middle East and various Muslim provinces. Furthermore, the reading completes with a general valuation of worldwide intimidations and continuing dangers ascending from the contemporary stage of Al Qaeda’s Twenty-Year Premeditated Proposal.

‘Turmoil within the Taliban: A Crisis of Growth?’ by Antonio Giustozzi provides an assessment of the consequences of the Taliban split from the different point of view, including the government of Pakistan. The Taliban have actually been in distress due to an interior encounters ever since their re-appearance in the role of a rebellious association in fourteen years ago and have stay alive principally untouched, even enduring expanding their positions and outspreading their processes to different lands year by year.

In 2012, on the other hand, the interior encounters within the walls of the Taliban stretched to the new altitudes with an enormous amount of Taliban starting to be concerned about the long-standing costs in cases if this encounter is not one way or another gotten under their power. Mullah Omar fulfilled this part some time ago, superseding to resolve the encounter by the means of compelling the choices, which pacified every interior division. Moreover, for the duration of the same year, for the most part in the last six months, Mullah Omar was unsuccessful in this aspect, advancing the trustworthiness to the reports; in accordance with these rumors, he was deceased, out of action, or in the imprisonment.

Furthermore, the author provides a comparison between the Peshawar and Quetta Taliban and their tactics towards the split. Resistance in the framework of the Taliban happened in 2012 and was implemented at numerous stages. The primary point of the pressure appeared to be amongst the Peshawar Shura and the Quetta Shura. As a result of a foremost transmission of control and authority, this progression has been slowly but surely in progress for almost seven years, from Quetta to Peshawar.

At the present moment, Peshawar has gained the control over most of the monetary incomes and is trying to enforce an innovative scheme of facility and influence focused around Peshawar. Furthermore, a vast amount of people in the Quetta-based Taliban feel aggrieved towards this change of power and are not accepting that they are being ordered by Peshawar how they should be prearranged.

According to the author, the Peshawar-centered Taliban appear to be nearer to the Pakistani jihadist clusters, more than a few of which in reality sit are located in the Peshawar Shura, and its frontrunners and squads own a to a certain extent dissimilar outline in comparison to the Quetta Taliban. To be more precise, the Peshawar-centered Taliban are less ecclesiastical and more government- and the institution of higher education-cultured. Peshawar is making an effort of establishing a more well-organized organizational apparatus for the Taliban; they are planning on opening with soldierly facility and influence. This movement is coming across the confrontation located in Quetta, where the former Taliban systems continue to be irrepressible and are not persuaded to submit their privileges and rights without a battle.

In comparison to the ‘Turmoil within the Taliban: A Crisis of Growth?’ by Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Al Qaeda’s Twenty-Year Strategic Plan: The Current Phase of Global Terror’ by Martin Rudner provides an explanation for the principle of jihad (fight) that is predominant in the actions of Al Qaeda, its twenty-tear Tactical Strategy for establishing a worldwide Caliphate, the operative changing aspects of the “extremism sequence” by the means of which this objective is being followed, closing the arguments of the author with an evaluation of the existing intimidations and dangers related to the Al Qaeda–enthused worldwide jihadist radicalism.

According to the author, “Jihad is a religious obligation in Islam. What is described as the “Greater Jihad” pertains to a personal effort to better one’s own religious compliance. The “Lesser Jihad” represents a communal and individual obligation to defend and protect Islam, Muslims, and their geographic domains against hostile forces” (Rudner 957). The pledge to this religious obligation is made obvious and categorical in Quranic documented records of soldierly missions and fight in protection of the devotion and the truthful to the religion. That sphere of activity for jihad summons both self-justifying and aggressive fighting at the premeditated in addition to the strategic stages.

According to Mawlana Maududi, a “foremost twentieth-century Islamist thinker and founder of the Jamaat e-Islami Islamist revivalist party, Islamic jihad is both offensive and defensive at one and the same time” (Rudner 957). At a premeditated stage, jihad gathers together the protectors of Muslim welfares. An announcement of jihad provides a directive to go on board with practical, aggressive and belligerent actions with the intention of distribution of the Islamic devotion.

Throughout the article, the author establishes the definition of various terms regarding the subject matter, which is non-present in the ‘Turmoil within the Taliban: A Crisis of Growth?’ by Antonio Giustozzi. Furthermore, Martin Rudner provided an insight towards the current pressures and dangers as the conclusion of his research. Al Qaeda is at the moment a more miscellaneous and multifaceted danger than ever in the past. Its essential component, Al Qaeda al-Jihad, is the merely one fragment of an extensive assemblage of connected and linked jihadist clusters, even though having a distinguished part in the dynamic of present-day confrontational jihadism.

Al Qaeda influences this aggressive jihadist dynamic in order to abuse the innovative directing prospects in the framework of the speedily developing functioning surroundings. Its confirmed nimbleness, resourcefulness, and adaptableness towards allocating with the altering safety environs have been the key points in the suppleness of Al Qaeda. In accordance with the newest evaluation of menaces of worldwide extremism and party-political forcefulness, which is conducted every twelve months as recorded by AON Risk Solutions, the Middle East along with North and West Africa are prominent as the areas of the uppermost, and even cumulative, jeopardy.

Extremism is perceived as presenting the utmost menace to the nations that were mentioned above, with Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen appearing to be in the middle of the most brutally impacted (Rudner 971). The sustained danger of an extremist occurrence or party-political forcefulness throughout the world continues to be present and is not predictable to disperse anytime in a little while.

According to the author of the article, he is assured of the fact that Al Qaeda lasts to target the nations of the West openly for enduring occurrences, in accordance with the “Jihad Alone” processes advocated by its Inspire electronic journal, at the same time as the foremost shove of the fight moves to the Enlistment of Muslim Militaries for the Announcement of the Caliphate. Martin Rudner states that the caution has been spread, in conformism with the Islamic regulations of conflict.

Antonio Giustozzi, on the other hand, provides a rather brief insight in the future of the conflict; instead, he is describing the past and the present events. “Pakistan might see a split of the Taliban as not entirely opposed to its interests: it would provide the short-term benefit of delivering to the Americans what they want—that is, a step in the direction of high-profile Taliban figures reconciling with Kabul” (Giustozzi 4).

Pakistan appears to be in the terrible fiscal situation and is in need of the financial aid from the United States, so short-range assistances could give the impression of being appealing to Islamabad and Rawalpindi even in cases when the middle- and long-standing insinuations are to some extent undefined. The intelligence facilities of Pakistan, at any rate, assess the southern Taliban systems as unsuccessful armed forces who wasted a number of favorable prospects in order to attain soldierly attainments in advance to 2010, and who have from the time not been adequately operative in regaining their positions after the spread of the United States.

Moreover, they are aware that the hoary party-political governance of the Taliban is a fragment of the Quetta Taliban; it appears to be more and more mistrustful of Pakistani purposes. The question is whether the settlement with Kabul would have a permanent destructive impact to the Taliban in the southern territory, and to what extent profound and permanent it would appear to be. A secure spread of the Taliban’s armed and party-political power is intended for being significantly decreased. These actions would influence both their aptitude to convert a reimbursement on promising conditions and continue to battle for the complete conquest.

Works Cited

Giustozzi, Antonio. “Turmoil within the Taliban: A Crisis of Growth?” Central Asia Policy Brief 7.1 (2013): 1-5. Print.

Rudner, Martin. “Al Qaeda’s Twenty-Year Strategic Plan: The Current Phase of Global Terror.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36.1 (2013): 953–980. Print.

Introduction

Al-Qaeda is an Islamist organization responsible for several terrorist attacks on military and civilian targets, including the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 (Shahzad 2012). The organization is international, with a strong ideology, centralized decision-making, and a variety of persuasion and recruiting tools at their disposal. The proposed documentary will be composed of existing relevant footage and interviews with experts to cover the history of al-Qaeda, the analysis of the organization’s narratives, and its impact.

History

The history of al-Qaeda as a terrorist network started in Afghanistan during the Soviet War in that country (Mohamedou 2011). The organization then became international as it advanced its structure of decentralized execution and recruited new members from many countries. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for several terrorist attacks in such countries as the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia. The organization also participated in many military conflicts, including wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria. The death of one of its founders, leaders, and main ideologists, Osama bin Laden, killed by the CIA in 2011, significantly undermined the organization. According to Gerges (2011, p. 5), ‘very little’ remains of al-Qaeda today.

Narratives

The principal narrative that the organization uses is that ‘Islam is under attack’ (Holtmann 2013, p. 141). Related narratives promote the idea that external forces are to be blamed for the problems that Arab and Muslim societies face. Al-Qaeda calls upon its supporters to take up arms for the war with infidels. The narratives are violent and tied to religious concepts. It has been stressed repeatedly by researchers that the narratives that promote radicalization, extremism, violence, and terrorism are very challenging to oppose or combat. It is important to understand why reactions to such narratives are sometimes counterproductive, i.e., why they foster further radicalization and violence.

Impact

Al-Qaeda has had an impact on the modern world in various ways. The main outcome of the organization’s activities was the declaration of the global ‘war on terrorism’ (McCrisken 2011). The organization has operated in many countries, but nowadays, researchers are paying special attention to the Arabian Peninsula, particularly Saudi Arabia (Boucek 2011). It is argued that the efforts aimed at containing terrorism in the region have been successful, but failure to maintain these efforts may worsen the terrorist threat dramatically.

Another important aspect of al-Qaeda’s activities was operating through mass media, particularly the Internet, to propagate their ideology and find supporters in different parts of the world. This model of building a worldwide network with extremist views and violent rhetoric is still used today by Islamist terrorist groups. It makes the study of al-Qaeda’s impact relevant to addressing modern-day global issues associated with terrorism.

Conclusion

The proposed documentary will try to evaluate al-Qaeda’s role and significance in modern history. The relevance of the work is justified by examining the organization’s discourses and messages that have proved to be influential to this day for creating Islamist networks around the world. Most importantly, the mechanisms for constructing the organization’s narratives will be analyzed to evaluate the effectiveness of combating strategies.

Reference List

Boucek, C 2011, ‘Terrorism Out of Saudi Arabia’, Carnegie Endowment, p. 4.

Gerges, F A 2011, The rise and fall of Al-Qaeda, Oxford University Press, New York.

Holtmann, P 2013, ‘Countering al-Qaeda’s single narrative’, Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 141-146.

McCrisken, T 2011, ‘Ten years on: Obama’s war on terrorism in rhetoric and practice’, International Affairs, vol. 87, no. 4, pp. 781-801.

Mohamedou, M M O 2011, The rise and fall of Al Qaeda, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva.

Shahzad, S S 2012, Inside al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond bin Laden and 9/11, Pluto Press, London.

Introduction

Wright has a special way of explaining things. When reading this book, a reader need not have a background knowledge on terrorism, Wright crafts the book in such a way that it consists of a ten page list of the main characters, fifty pages of notes, a list of interviews held, a bibliography and a clear bibliography for those who would love research the topic more.

He also uses pictures of the main characters in the book, so that a reader can see the person being discussed.

The book can be divided into two major parts with the first part focusing on giving the reader a comprehensive background and beginnings of militant Islam and the terror group Al Qaeda. In the book’s first three chapters, the writer writes bibliographies of three important persons.

He writes about an Egyptian named Qutb who is seen as the father of militant Islam, he also writes about Zawahri who also is an Egyptian and a co founder of Al Qaeda. The last character in the three chapters he talks about is Bin Laden who is the central character of the book.

After reading the first three chapters a reader gets to learn about the internal politics of two most important countries in the history of Al Qaeda: Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Wright, 2006). The author tries to explain how the governments of both countries might have influenced the rise of radical Islam movement. This is helpful for the reader to understand why Al Qaeda is against everything represented by the West.

Through the book, a reader can visit the towns and cities where these men grew up. After writing the bibliographies, the author then looks at the bigger picture and writes two chapters on Saudi Arabia. In these two chapters the writer talks of a spy master, Turki, who is instrumental in the search of bin Laden.

The chapters also discusses the political and social structures of the Saudi Kingdom, the Soviet-Afghan war, the Afghanistan – Pakistan border jihadist movement and lastly how jihadism has spread around the world. Wright at this point builds a strong groundwork so that when he starts to discuss about the Al Qaeda attacks a reader can understand the context.

Wright then takes 200 hundred pages of the book to discuss the American Security and Intelligence agencies, The FBI and CIA. He tells of how the agencies reacted to the first cases of jihadists. This section of the book ends with a chapter dedicated on Osama’s life in Sudan (Bergen, 2010).

The second part of the book looks at the Al Qaeda’s activities in the rest of the world. He begins by writing about how, in 1995, the Al Qaeda raided and bombed a building in Saudi Arabia that was housing Americans in the town of Riyadh. The chapters in this second part of the book are not very detailed and the writer talks of various key players. It is also in this second part we learn of the gruesome murder of tourist by Zawalhri.

The author describes how Zawalhri stormed the Queen Hatchupset temple located in Egypt and killed all the tourists that were there. Wright then looks at the evolution of the terror group Al Qaeda on how they recruit, leadership, and their use of suicide bombers in carrying out their attacks.

He looks and blames the actions of the CIA who had no right to with hold crucial information from the sole mandated agency, the FBI, to carry surveillance on the people who later committed the attacks.

The last two chapters the author talks of the aftermath after the attacks. He explains in heart-wrenching details about the fear and desperation after the attacks. Wright in this book can be praised for his making it compelling and emotional.

Discussion

Al Qaeda is a terrorist group that has been behind many terrorist attacks. The book investigates some of their attacks especially the September 11 carried out in the United States. The author of the book, Lawrence Wright, is a famous writer and for his work, Al Qaeda the Road to 9/11 won him a Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction.

The book largely focuses on the persons involved in the attack. It covers things like, who they are, reasons that drove them to undertake the attack, and the people they associated with closely. The book begins with Sayyid Qutb who is an Egyptian religious intellect. Sayyid visited the U.S during the 1940’s, upon return to his homeland, he became an anti-West activist, and in the end, he became a martyr for his beliefs.

The book also portrays Ayman al-Zawahiri, it looks at his story from upbringing days in Egypt and pursues his life up to the time he participated and became the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the book states was later to merge with the Al Qaeda. The author in his book writes the story of head of Al Qaeda, Osama bins Laden.

He traces Osama’s childhood in Saudi Arabia where he was born and brought up in a rich family. The book continues to give a detailed account of how Osama participated in the war between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

It writes of his role as a financier to terrorist groups, his life in Sudan, his stay in Afghanistan upon his return and his association with the Taliban (Wright, 2006). The book also wraps on the 1998 radical attacks, which were carried out in East African countries as well as the terror campaign done on the USS Cole in the year 2000.

The author also writes of famous American who were involved, particularly Richard A. Clarke who at the time of 9/11 attack was the chief counter terrorism adviser sitting on the U.S National Security Council. The other personality featured in the book is John P. O’Neill who was the assistant Deputy Director of Investigation in the FBI.

Until his retire in August 2001, he was actively involved in the hunt for Osama bin Laden. After his retire from the FBI he headed the security of the World Trade Center where he was later to die in the 9/11 attacks (Bergen, 2010).

The book covers some of the problems faced in the fight against terrorism, especially the lack of cooperation between the American Security Agencies, the CIA, and the FBI, which are blamed for not preventing the attacks.

The Looming Tower is a story mostly based on the lives of the people involved in the 9/11 attacks rather than the attack. It focuses on the background and situations that led the perpetrators to plan and stage the attacks.

The title “the Looming Tower” is described as appearing in the Quran and according to the author Osama had uttered the words before the 9/11 attacks during a wedding he attended. The line is quoted from the fourth Sura of the Holy Quran and Osama is claimed to have said, “Wherever you are, death will find you, even in the looming tower.”

When Mohamed Atta and his accomplices hijacked a Boeing 767 and flew the plane into the World Trade Center, a tragic story ensued. This attack was so gruesome that years down the line people still cringe at the mention of the events that took place that day.

The events of 9/11 are in many ways a start of a tale or maybe the climax of a story that began years ago in different locations such as Cairo, mosques in Hamburg, streets of Jordan and the town of Greeley. This is a story of how few individuals from impoverished places planned and carried attacks on a world super power.

It is also a story of how some individuals desperately tried to convince the government security agencies of an imminent attack. Many years after the attack questions were still being asked about the why and how a super power like America could fail to prevent it (Filkins, 2006).

The Looming Tower is full of details of how the Al Qaeda had once abandoned plans to stage an attack on American soil owing to the lack of foot soldiers that could pass credibly as westernized Muslims.

Later the Al Qaeda found the credible persons to facilitate the attack in Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ziad al-Jarrah and Marwan al-Shehhi, who had been attended schools in the United States. Wright gives accounts of Islamic Militancy in his book and looks at it from the intellectual, religious, and economic situation of the places where the attackers came from.

Wright portrays a picture of Sayyid Qutb the man credited with the rise of modern day Islamist Fundamentalism. He shows Sayyid as a frail, middle-aged scholar who visited the United States and as a student in the university town of Greeley in the 1940’s (Bolton, 2008). Sayyid is overwhelmed at the unrestrained luxuries and godlessness of the American culture.

He was disgusted with the American women and how the women freely they expressed their sexuality. He writes, “A girl looks at you, appearing as if she were an enchanting nymph or an escaped mermaid, but as she approaches, you sense only the screaming instinct inside her, and you can smell her burning body, not the scent of perfume, but flesh, only flesh. Tasty flesh, truly, but flesh nonetheless.”

Later Sayyid upon returning his country he started to write elaborate reasons why the Muslims should rise and wage war against the West and its rotten culture. Years later, the book writes of how Atta openly expressed his disgust for women especially from the West.

The book is based on many interviews, which the author held with various persons. The interviews range from Osama’s best friend from school, Jamal Khalifa and Yosri Fouda a reporter working for Al Jazeera. He also writes of the interviews he had with Richard A.

Clarke who worked in the White House as a counter terrorism chief. In his accounts, the author gives the reader an intense view of the terrible events of 9/11. Though the events the author writes in his book have been told many times before, Mr. Wright tells the story with myriad new details.

He gives accounts and describes them in the context of politics and culture. He focuses on the lives and occupation of the key players involved in the attacks while succeeding in writing a historical story that possesses all the propinquity and poignant power of a novel (Wright, 2006).

The author writes that, “The charisma and vision of a few individuals shaped the nature of the contest between Islam and the West.” He further asserts, “While the tectonic plates of history were certainly shifting, promoting a period of conflict between those two cultures.

The emergence of Al Qaeda depended on a unique conjunction of personalities most notably Mr. Zawahri, who promoted the apocalyptic idea that only violence could change history, and Mr. bin Laden, whose global vision and leadership held together an organization that had been bankrupted and thrown into exile” (Wright, 2006).

The author suggests that the events of 9/11 were evitable. Unfortunately, through bad luck, indecisiveness of American officials and war between the CIA and FBI contributed to the success of the attack by Al Qaeda.

In contrast to other famous writers who have covered the events of September 1, Wright does not concentrate on the influence the Afghan-Soviet war had on Osama bin laden resolve to join the jihadis. Rather, he draws his stories from documents written in Arabic and carries interviews with jihad activists who offer chronicles of the many things that influence Al Qaeda and the long road against America Osama took.

The book gives a very detailed account of the Al Qaeda’s way of life, motivations, and doubts. It also goes further to give what each individual member wanted to achieve politically. The author captures certain events that are claimed to have influenced the Islamist Movement such as the execution of Sayyid Qutb by Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime in 1966.

In the eyes of the Islamist Movement Sayyid was a martyr and hero, this did not wane but increased their faith in the war against the West. Wright then goes on to describe how Osama, the heir of one the largest family fortune in Arabia, grows from a timid child into a religious adolescent. He says one of the most influential people in Laden’s life was a charismatic gym teacher.

This teacher was the one who introduced Osama to the Muslim Brothers Organization. Another person who influences Osama was Mr. Zawahri, who became acquainted with Osama in Peshawar in the early 1980’s. Mr. Zawahri was a doctor from Egypt and in the book; he is drawn as the evil mentor who transformed the political view of the Young Saudi.

The author argues that before Osama met Mr. Zawahri, he was “not much of a political thinker.” The author goes to take a quote from Essam Deraz who was the first biographer of Osama. He says that he once thought Osama had the potential of becoming “another Eisenhower,” who could turn his celebrity status he had got after fighting in the Afghan- Soviet war into a serene political life (Filkins, 2006).

This is can be seen was not the plan Mr. Zawahiri had for Osama. The writer notes that as a young man, Mr. Zawahri was tortured in the Egyptian prisons and this powered his resolve to fight the Westernized culture. He is credited as pioneering the use of suicide bombers was seen from the start very keen to use biological and chemical weapons (Bolton, 2008).

It took Osama a long time for him to create a plan of action after he left the Afghan-Soviet war. In the time, he was exiled from Saudi Arabia and leaving in Sudan the author says that Osama “was wavering the lure of peace being as strong as the battle cry of jihad. Agriculture captivated his imagination.” It is further reported he was contemplated of quitting Al Qaeda and going into farming.

The author tells of how after the first Gulf war the continued stay of the American troops in Saudi Arabia gnawed on Osama. He was also aggravated by the invasion of Somalia by American troops who were on a humanitarian relief mission.

The Al Qaeda in 1992 the book claims met and “turned from being the anti-communist Islamic army that bin Laden originally envisioned into a terrorist organization bent on attacking the United States” (Bolton, 2008).

The book traces not only the evolution of Al Qaeda first as a resistance group to the Soviet and Saddam Hussein and then a sworn enemy of the United States, but also gives the reader a clear picture of life at an Al Qaeda training camp.

The author’s description of Osama bin Laden concurs with that made by security experts such as former CIA official Michael Scheuer. He states that Osama was not opposed to the American culture rather he was angry at the American political and military actions it was carrying out in Muslim countries(Bergen, 2010).

The author observes that Osama occasionally allowed his young sons to play Nintendo and in the Al Qaeda training camps, recruits would be allowed to watch Hollywood thrillers. Their favorite movies, as the book says, were those done by Arnold Schwarzenegger and tried to gather tips on being American from them.

One of the many wives Osama had was known to love “brand-name cosmetics and lingerie, preferring American products.” He also had a wife who had graduated with a doctorate in child psychology (Filkins, 2006).

Wright is categorical in his book blaming former and present administrations for failing to prevent the 9/11. He writes of the failures in the CIA, FBI, and NSA refusal to share information with each other as the main reason the attackers were successful. If the agencies had cooperated, they might have foreseen the entering of two known terrorist in America.

He blames the Bush and Bill Clinton administration of laxity in tackling problem of terrorism in the world. He notes that when Bush entered office terrorism was a low priority to his administration. Like other authors on the issue of terrorism, he criticizes the actions that the Clinton administration took after the 1998 bombing in East Africa.

The administration of the day launched missiles at one of the Al Qaeda training camp located in Afghanistan and desperately failed to kill Osama. The writer notes helped turn Mr. Laden into a global celebrity and this allowed the terrorist to mythologize himself (Bergen, 2010).

Wright writes, “ Mr. bin Laden’s goal in striking the American embassies and bombing the American destroyer Cole in 2000, was to lure America into the same trap the Soviets had fallen into: Afghanistan.

His strategy was to continually attack until the U.S. forces invaded; then the mujahedeen would swarm upon them and bleed them until the entire American empire fell from its wounds. It had happened to Great Britain and to the Soviet Union. He was certain it would happen to America.

When neither the embassy bombings nor the Cole bombing was enough to provoke a massive retaliation, Mr. Bin Laden decided he would have to create an irresistible outrage.”

The outrage in this case happens to be the 9/11 attack. The author continues to write that Laden had gotten what he wanted and cites the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 attack of Iraq as his wins. In both this invasions, the American Army has seen deaths of more than 2500 soldiers, just the thing that Osama fervently wanted (Bolton, 2008).

In the book, the writer portrays what has caused the Islamic militancy. He says at the heart of Islamic militancy lays anger, hatred of modernization, and feeling of humiliation which terrorist group cite as reason for killing.

The author looks at failure of autocratic governments to offer their citizens reasons to face the future as the reasons why some of this terrorists turn to Islam, which offers dignity and hope more so in death. He says that these “theological amateur,” will turn to be religion extremist and join terror groups (Bergen, 2010). Atta and the hijackers felt this as the Filkins (2006) writes;

Their motivations varied, but they had in common a belief that Islam — pure and primitive, unmitigated by modernity and uncompromised by politics — would cure the wounds that socialism or Arab nationalism had failed to heal. They were angry but powerless in their own countries.

They did not see themselves as terrorists but as revolutionaries who, like all such men throughout history, had been pushed into action by the simple human need for justice. Some had experienced brutal repression; some were simply drawn to bloody chaos. From the beginning of Al Qaeda, there were reformers and there were nihilists.

The dynamic between them was irreconcilable and self-destructive, but events were moving so quickly that it was almost impossible to tell the philosophers from the sociopaths. They were glued together by the charismatic personality of Osama bin Laden, which contained strands, idealism, and nihilism, in a potent mix. (p.3)

The author gives a story of John O’Neill who was an FBI agent in the city of New York. He is claimed to have had proof of an imminent attack in America. John O’Neill and the team he headed were assigned to trace and find information about Al Qaeda operatives in America. O’Neill had the hunch that the Al Qaeda was preparing to stage an attack on the American soil.

He was an ardent investigator and when he saw the agency was not taking him seriously, he quit. After quitting, he said he could not work for a government bureaucracy that did not intend to move quickly to avert an attack as he did desperately trying to do. It is unfortunate that O’Neill was among the people who died during the 9/11 he had foreseen.

Other agents in the bureau had premonitions of the Al Qaeda being successful in making attack on America. The supervisor posted in the Minneapolis office was cautioned in the month of August for raising his fears of an attack happening.

He expressed fear that a known Islamic radical was attending a flight school could have been as well planning an attack. When being admonished he retorted, “I am trying to keep someone from taking a plane and crashing into the World Trade Center.” Astonishing you might say (Filkins, 2006).

The Author talks of how the CIA had information of high level Al Qaeda members had attended a meeting in Malaysia in the early months of 2000. He says they also knew of two of those who attended the meetings had entered America. This two would later play a role and implement the attack as was later uncovered.

The CIA had failed to avail this information the FBI, which is mandated to carry out internal surveillance of known and suspected terrorists. The struggle between the two agencies is highlighted in the book as the author writes of a meeting held prior to the attack. In the meeting CIA analysts are claimed to have dangled pictures of would be attackers at the faces of FBI agents.

When the CIA agents refused to give the information they had on the two, the FBI agents realized they were the same persons they were pursuing and the tension between the two agencies increased. Three months prior to the attack, both agencies held a meeting, which ended in both the FBI and CIA agents shouting at each other.

In the book, the author illustrates a scene where an FBI agent named Ali Soufan reacts after being shown the pictures of the terrorists. Ali Soufan was working on the Al Qaeda case and when on September 12 he was shown the names and pictures of the hijackers, he just rushed into the bathroom and threw up. These people the CIA had information about their activities but refused to share with the FBI (Bergen, 2010).

The writer has covered many things in his book, though it seems he left out some important things such as the hijackings. There is no chapter that the writer explicitly discusses the hijacking as he has on so many things. He takes the reader directly to the jiffy of the blazing towers.

This maybe he did thinking that many other authors had covered it and wanted to be different. The other thing about the book is the way the author draws up verbatim reconstruction of various conversations. He travels a lot in such of this information and writes of conversations that had taken place more than a decade before.

This brings the question of how true and detailed the conversations are because it is hard to believe people have such good memories. The book ends with Zawahri or someone else riding a horse on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This person disappears into the mountains and the book lacks a definitive end. This is a point the author tries to put that the story about the Al Qaeda is still not over (Filkins, 2006).

Conclusion and Recommendation

The book focuses on the lives of two men who have shaped the Al Qaeda. He tells of the Egyptian doctor al- Zawahiri and the life of Osama bin Laden. Wright skillfully dissects the relationship the two have. He gives on one hand the story of the ideologist al-Zawihiri, who is a skilled combatant and on the other hand, he tells the story of the determined and charming Osama bin Laden.

To be noted is that from their first interaction in the 1980s, the author follows how they join to form Al Qaeda and how al-Zawahiri mentors Osama. Wright gives accounts of how the attack affected the United States and the most depressing scene is that of Ali an FBI agent throwing up after realizing the CIA had knowledge of the people responsible.

The book as seen is a magnificent read and ay person looking to learn about the rise of the Al Qaeda should look for this book. The book gives detailed accounts of occurrence that happened before the 9/11 attack. It also looks into the lives of those people who are seen as instrumental in the rise and growth of the terror group.

Wright in his unique intelligent way delivers the occurrences and reasons of the attack on American soil with emotion. The strengths of this book in informing about the road to 9/11 lies in the deep research the writer carried out and the way he reconstructs conversations that had been taken more than a decade ago.

This is also the greatest weakness of the book owing to questions of how true these conversations are because people are not known to have search kind of memory.

References

Bergen. P., (2010). The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and Al-Qaeda. New York: Simon and Schuster

Bolton, M., (2008). U.S. national security and foreign policymaking after 9/11 present at the recreation. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Filkins, D. (2006). The Plot against America. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/06/books/review/06filkins.html

Wright, L., (2006). The looming tower: Al-Qaeda and the road to 9/11. New York: Vintage Books.

Filkins, D. (2006). Plot against America. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/06/books/review/06filkins.html?pagewanted=2