Public accountability is one of the noble concepts immensely supported by scholars in the discipline of public administration. In the political discourses coupled with policy documents, the term finds an imperative usage since it portrays an image of trustworthiness and transparency (Forrer, et al., 2010).
These two aspects are crucial since citizens who are also the clients of a state become satisfied that a system of administration is able to meet their anticipations in the public sector without exposing their resources to risks of fraud. In this extent, accountability emerges as one of the key values in the public administration. The aim of this study is to discuss the issues involved in making public organizations accountable.
A consideration is also given to discuss the people whom public officials are accountable to, and the most effective means of ensuring a balance between the demands for accountability and the need to have high-performing organizations.
Issues involved in making Public Organizations Accountable
Accountability involves making organizations transparent and responsible in their dealing in the effort to enhance their trustworthiness. For them to realize the goal, they need to address a number of issues concerning accountability. One of such issue is the development of the capacity to deal with emerging matters that may impede their efforts to attain their dream of being accountable.
For instance, the advent of globalization presents many challenges to corporations and institutions of public administration, seeking that to be accountable in many nations. Kearns (2003) supports the argument by further adding, “Globalization plays the role of shaping the current trends in the global economic markets and the increasing interactions among nations and people from different parts of the world” (p.76).
Emergence of new interactions driven by the dawn of globalization introduces challenges to institutions of public administration in that they handle emerging new roles and expand their functionality sphere. The more expansive an institution or any system requiring checks is, the harder it becomes to handle all the individual facets of an organization, which may provide loopholes for acts of fraud.
Emerging new issues such as those prompted by globalization also present challenges to accountability efforts of an organization due to “the need to understand the dynamics of global value chains, creating trade facilitation structures, developing partnerships, and the establishment of value chains and networks” (Kearns, 2003, p.81).
Existence of such new challenges means that public administration officials have to constantly change their tactics for enhancing accountability since traditional approaches or styles for public administration cease to be effective in handling all the contemporary situations that may prove to be a challenge to the efforts of becoming accountable.
From the above discussion, it is essential that an organization that seeks to be accountable in a globalized market to consider looking for new approaches of enhancing transparency as opposed to the traditional approaches for enhancing intelligibility in the public administration. In fact, this factor is yet another crucial issue involved in making public organizations accountable.
The history of public administration reveals that the main approach for enhancing accountability is through exercising of control and close monitoring of persons who are mandated to execute certain affairs that are of public interest. This task entails “bureaucratic discretion through compliance with some tightly drawn rules and regulations” (Forrer et al., 2010, p.477).
Alteration of such an approach is critical in the modern world that is driven by hefty interactions so that, rather than using a direct-control paradigm, an organization has to consider implementation of strategies for enhancing accountability. The strategy must be driven by the concerns of delegations as a methodology for breaking down the bureaucratic approaches to public accountability.
The relevance of this issue for an organization that wants to be accountable rests on the platform that, although delegation is an effective way for enhancing accountability, it has its limitations. A challenge facing an organization that is determined to be accountable is the establishing of balance and determination of the extents and permissible thresholds of accountability in the organization.
Thirdly, an organization needs to deal proactively with the issue of balancing levels of accountability anticipated from various stakeholders. In support of this argument, Forrer et al. (2010) reckon, “public managers report not only to a multitude of elected officials, but also to a plethora of interest groups, clientele, media, and other actors” (p.478).
This argument means that public administrators serve many conflicting interests of different stakeholders, both formal and informal, through the deployment of appropriate mechanisms for enhancing accountability.
The balancing mechanism that an organization that seeks to become accountable must deploy includes hierarchical accountability, public accountability, while not negating deploying of mechanisms for enhancing accountability to impersonal standards.
Organizations that embrace the relevance of accountability as a way of development of trust among various stakeholders must appreciate that one of the important issues they must put into perspective is that they must conform precisely to a myriad of legitimized but also competing anticipations for accountability.
To whom are Public Officials Accountable?
Public officials have to be accountable to various people. Essentially, accountability is a “means through which public agencies and their workers answer to the citizens directly and indirectly for the use of their power, authority, and resources” (Kearns, 2003, p.9).
From this definition, it is paramount to note that, in the first degree, public officials are accountable to the citizens who are also served by other persons and interest groups to whom public officials must also be accountable. Such other persons include city councils, administrators such as presidents, states’ legislatures, media, and professional associations, among others.
With the rise of and advocating for governance approaches that portray the exercise of democracy as the chief mechanism of ensuring equal presentations of all citizens’ concerns and interests in the tools of administration, concerns have been alarming on the mechanisms that can ensure that governments are held accountable effectively.
Consequently, with regard to Kearns (2003), internal means of enhancing accountability, including “official rules, codes of conduct, administrative hierarchy, performance evaluation, organizational culture, and professional ethics” (p.65) have dominated the discussions of public accountability. Some of these mechanisms of enhancing accountability have been pinned in the constitutions of many democratic nations.
All systems of power comprise executives, judicial, and legislative divisions of government. These divisions have the responsibility to keep public administrators on the check to limit their discretion to ensure they are achieving their noble mandates placed on them by citizens.
For instance, in the US the progressive era marked the establishments of “independent government regulatory agencies, public commissions, and corporation to oversee government bodies through the executive branch” (Forrer et al., 2010, p.478).
From the context of the roles of congress, public officials have a duty to ensure that they meet the requirements placed on them in terms of meeting the demands for accountability as stipulated by organizations for agency oversight and committees for budget appropriations, among others.
Since citizens cannot directly regulate the operations of public officials, such organs exercise control and monitoring of the activities of public officials on behalf of the citizens to ensure that they are accountable to any repercussions of the policies formulated and implemented by the public officials.
Public officials are accountable to legislatures. Legislatures have roles to play to investigate the operations of various public officials and demand to provisions of information on certain aspects that they may believe have comprised the national ethics and codes of practice in public offices, including accountability. Organizations such as GAO can also be employed by legislatures and congress to scrutinize public agency programs.
Consequently, public officials must be accountable to them. Since the goal of accountability is to ensure transparency to all interest groups and stakeholders in the operations of public administrators as argued before, public officials are also accountable to media, professional communities, and client groups.
Client groups are interested in the implications of public policies. Such groups have specific anticipated outcomes from public officials. Should the public officials fail to meet these anticipations effectively or do things at exorbitant and inflated costs, the officials have to be held accountable for the failure or embezzlements of funds.
Conclusion: Balancing the Demands for Accountability and the Need to have High-performing Organizations
Accountability implies that public officials have to evaluate every policy or decision they take to ensure that it does not expose the interest of various stakeholders and interest groups at risk upon its implementation. This argument means that decisions and policies that have high potentials of yielding optimal results but possessing high-risk vulnerabilities may not be implemented.
Measuring performance from the paradigm of the magnitude of returns, for instance, in terms of social benefit, failure to implement projects having high risks of failure, but having high levels of returns means that the performance of a public institution is impaired.
Public officials must balance demand for accountability and the need to have high-performing organizations.
For instance, considering the experience of hurricane Katrina, it is arguable that the government ought to have invested heftily on strategies and equipment for dealing with aftermaths and or for detection of both the likelihoods and the magnitudes of natural catastrophes in the bid to enhance effective disaster awareness through its established institutions for disaster management.
Such a measure would make disaster management institutions highly performing if the investments turn out commensurate to the anticipated levels of response to human and logistical challenges posed by hurricane Katrina.
However, in the effort to ensure that such organizations become highly performing, the question that emerges is whether indeed public officials charged with running such institutions would be willing to venture into risky decisions that would compromise their levels of accountability in the public domain.
Koliba, Zia, and Mills (2011) support this line of thought by noting that it is important to develop both theoretical and empirical constructs “to identify and assess how and whether failures of accountability lead to failures in performance” (p.210).
Directly congruent with this proposal, it is of paramount importance that public officials be made to account for success rather than just failures. Such a strategy can help to balance demands for accountability and the need for high performing organizations.
Obtaining a balance between accountability and the need for high-performing organizations is a challenge that public officials need to proactively address, especially bearing in mind that the citizens whom they owe the ultimate responsibility while making their decisions do not directly elect them.
Consequently, public officials may consider complying with political accountability roles since, according to Bovens (1998), “public officials are not rigidly constrained in their performance by narrow legal or procedural settings” (p.31).
This case means that the capacity to form and operate public institutions driven by the motive for high performance may be compromised by the need to meet programmed guidelines issued by the appointing authority in hierarchical systems of administration.
This argument is more imperative upon considering Bovens’ (1998) assertion that political accountability “tends to use outcomes as the main parameter for evaluation of performance rather than compliance with administrative rules and procedures” (p.31).
As a repercussion, it is probable that public officials may fail to balance accountability with the need to create highly performing public institutions due to the need to satisfy the anticipations of the elected authority as opposed to direct anticipations of the electorate.
Although in democratic and corruption-free nations, the elected persons may present the interest of the electorate. Hence, the anticipations of the elected and the appointing authority from the public officials have to measure up to the anticipation of the electorate. In the corruption-prone nations, the electorate interests are not presented by the elected persons.
If public administrators appointed by the corrupt-elected persons have to be politically accountable, it means that a balance between accountability and the need to put in place a highly performing organization cannot be established.
Reference List
Bovens, M. (1998). The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex Organizations. Public Administration, 77(3), 455-474.
Forrer, J., Kee, J., Newcomer, K., & Boyer, E. (2010). Public- Private Partnerships and the public accountability question. Public administration review, 1(1), 475- 484.
Kearns, P. (2003). Accountability in a Seamless Economy, in G. Peters and J. Pierre (eds.), Handbook of Public Administration. London: Sage Publications.
Koliba, C., & Zia, A., & Mills, R. (2011). Accountability in governance networks: an assessment of public, private and nonprofit emergency management practices following hurricane Katrina. Public Administration Review, 1(1), 210-20.
Citizens’ participation in the budgetary and financial processes is aimed at ensuring good governance, provision of public goods and general accountability1. There are three fundamental reasons behind the attempts to increase citizens’ participation in the matters of governance and policy-making.
First, civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) are increasingly calling for the participation of the stakeholders in political matters and policy-making decisions. Citizens are clamouring for access to information and the right to participate in local and national matters.
In addition, the current democratic processes demand for open governance, transparency in policy decisions and open budgetary processes2.
Second, reformist lawmakers and government officials, seeking to approve the authenticity and capability of the civil society in solving social-political and economic challenges, are increasingly supporting citizens’ participation. This is driven by both political and policy incentives.
Direct subject support can give extra authenticity to help reformist governments modify budgetary needs3. Besides, coordinate investment guarantees a steady stream of data between the state agencies, natives and common society, hence lessens the cost of exchanging data.4.
Reformist governments also advance participatory venues in light of the fact that this helps them to assemble a political base that may be actuated amid constituent procedures5.
Last but not least, direct participation can help the policymakers monitor strategy execution at the local level, consequently improving the probability that government’s strategy changes are actualized accurately.
By involving citizens in the budgetary processes both at the local and national level, the government can enhance its capacity due to extra mechanism to improve accountability6.
Third, global organizations, for instance, the IMF and World Bank have been advocating for increased participation of citizens in policy decisions and budgetary processes. The main reason for this is to enhance the government’s capacity, which is progressively perceived to be essential in achieving long term goals and objectives.
Direct citizen participation enhances state capacity by improving the quality of inputs at the same time letting citizens to play the role of a watchdog. Worldwide associations also support direct native investment as a method of engaging the common man and creating a compact social capital.
The global organizations believe that citizens and civil societies can hold the government accountable for the use of public resources, hence ensuring that donor funds are used for the intended purpose7.
An ongoing concept that cuts across these organizations is that they are looking for ways of designing institutions that can bring the citizens together in order to take part in solving key policy issues and governance challenges.
Institutional planners have made an expansive scope of rules and strategies that address an array of societal and policy issues. In each case, they are trying everything possible to ensure that the government and citizens work together for a common good8.
The citizen’s participation is highly regarded not because there are benefits linked to their full participation in the local and national matters, but it is supported because their increased participation can enhance the nature of governance and the general welfare of the people.
For that reason, direct engagement of citizens is the best way of solving key policy issues and governance challenges9.
Enhancing the quality of engagement is progressively entangled with attempts to advance straightforwardness in the working of governments and private sector. Transparency call for public officials to give prompt and relevant information that can be utilized by citizens and civil society10.
In any case, transparency endeavours need to be connected to participation on the ground since the release of information is simply the initial step11. Direct participation is crucial since it guarantees a high level of transparency.
In addition, it ensures that the criteria of choosing pertinent data and the schedule of its release are not left to the discretion of public officers. More extensively, collaboration is imperative so that the accessible data can be used to make elective arrangements and strategies.
After all, lack of access to vital information in the context of disinterested or detached citizens and civil society will not bring about progressed government approaches and policy solutions12.
Natives and common society represent the interest side of policy deliberation. Hence, they give elective answers to approach issues. The other side is represented by policies initiated by the government and international donors aimed at solving policy challenges.
The demand and supply sides are models that were adapted to fit into the field of socioeconomic development. Therefore, in the wider scope of this essay, transparency will be conceptualized as what the regime needs to provide or avail to improve accountability.
On the other hand, participation will be conceptualized as the activities that the citizens and civil society need to take part in so as to improve accountability13.
Improved accountability calls for greater collaboration between state agencies, government officials, civil society and the general public. State authorities must be ready to permit their activities to be investigated by non-governmental organizations and civil society.
Correspondingly, citizens and civil society must be prepared to dedicate their time and vitality to meticulously inspect the exercises of state.14. Accountability can be established when state departments and agencies are ready to be investigated to win public trust or gain a political mileage.
In addition, governments may be ready to support transparency in those ranges where they accept that accountability would be politically beneficial, which implies that the public and civil society should put more pressure on the government to avail all the necessary information15.
This essay will have two fundamental objectives. The first objective is to introduce a framework that can help to understand how citizens and civil society can participate in the budgetary process and other financial initiatives.
The explanation behind presenting this framework is that it will explore diverse courses through which citizens and civil societies are integrated into key government decisions. The second objective is to apply it on the two countries to show how and why they have embraced diverse establishments and strategies.
The second objective will attempt to establish the reasons and objectives behind the initiatives.
Citizen Participation
Citizens participate in a mixed bag of institutions. In law based administrations, citizens vote to choose delegates at neighbourhood, territorial, and national levels. Citizens might likewise vote in unique decisions, for example, submissions, plebiscites or reviews.
In addition, citizens may influence elected leaders by operating within certain establishments or engaging in activities such as campaigns, arranging appeal drives, and coming up with certain policy propositions. Therefore, participation is a progressing action in which residents work together to advance their interests16.
As a matter of fact, there are numerous ways through which citizens can influence formal arrangements. They can make use of the institutions, court procedures and public protests to place their case on government officials.
Petulant legislative issues have a tendency to be utilized more regularly by citizens who need access to open establishments or lack political representatives17.
There are four principal aspects of the citizen participation process, namely: voice, scrutiny, voting and rescission. Besides the mentioned participatory venues, citizens can also utilize other venues such as, opinion through the ballot, controversial politics, campaigns and neighbourhood initiatives18.
However, our emphasis will be on the ways through which citizens take part in budgetary accountability. This is represented by the four principal aspects of citizens’ participation.
Voice refers to the capacity of citizens to communicate their thoughts, inclinations, and sentiments within and outside the institutions sanctioned by the government. At the highest level, citizens and civil societies can use this facet of participation to extend the scope of issues that are being tended to by the existing institutions.
The issue can touch on specific policy problem. Public debates are some of the venues that can be used by citizens to express their voice. The formal gatherings permit citizens and civil societies to fortify their arrangements, as well as be incorporated in the prescribed networks19.
On the other hand, scrutiny is the capacity of citizens to audit archives and data given by government institutions and agencies. These archives may incorporate policy proposals, contract negotiations, income accumulation, progressive execution of open work tasks, and project conclusion20.
Citizens are required to have fundamental skills necessary for analysing and reporting the data provided by the government. When the citizens have the necessary skills to dissect government policies, their voice may be more focused and agenda-driven.
The scrutiny procedure enables citizens to link up with the government and its partners on specific issues touching on government recommendations21.
In some cases, citizens are given liberty to vote for government policy proposals. The votes can either be binding or consultative. A binding vote can either rebuff or approve policy proposals and, therefore, is the most powerful form of vote. A binding vote provides execution powers.
On the contrary, a consultative vote is simply an opinion over the general proposed policy. It does not warrant a direct action. However, it can have a considerable impact on policy decisions, especially when the voting process is sanctioned by the government.
Both binding and consultative vote calls for an establishment that can help in building residents’ voice and verifying techniques. Citizens and civil societies can be able to practice more robust, and informed voting only when the aforementioned condition is met22.
Citizens and civil society can have the power to rescind government proposals, annual reports and audit reports. This power is a kind of vote, yet is different on the grounds that citizens and civil society are not voting in favour of particular strategy recommendations, but are dismissing government projects and operations.
This is like the presidential veto, where the head of state can rebuff enactment of particular laws or policies. This kind of power clearly expands on voice and scrutiny. Citizens and civil society can make more use of this power to comprehend government policy proposals or activities.
Veto power and voice can be useful in generating support both within and outside the public domain23.
In entirety, the four aspects of participation offer a means to evaluate how public institutions engage citizens and civil societies in the budgetary and fiscal processes. Citizens and civil societies have different powers in these institutions. Sometimes, citizens have the power to articulate their views and concerns, which is a vital development.
In other cases, citizens are more involved in the implementation and monitoring process, which is likewise an imperative development. The four aspects of participation are the best examples of how the government, citizens and civil society interact or engage each other in matters of public interest24.
The Civil Society
The civil society is normally comprised of ordinary citizens, community heads, institutions that represent the people, professionals from different fields, socio-political movements, and non-administrative associations among others. These groups are very different from government officials.
They have diverse forms of authority, which is associated with their expertise and moral basis of their claims25. A standout amongst the most widely recognized political inquiries in participatory foundations is “who are the genuine representatives of civil society?”.
There is no simple answer to this question due to the diverse nature of civil society. Governments planning to create new institutions for engaging citizens need to place this question at the beginning of every dialogue as they create new establishments.
As the administration tries to fabricate new establishments, it must address the following issues that have been with us since time immemorial: Should choices be in light of the tenet of the lion’s share? In what manner can the enthusiasm of the minorities, be dealt with? Should engagement be in light of individual or gathering premise?
What are the essential skills required in order to participate in the decision-making process? When should the participating institutions concede to the opinions of experts or leaders? Do citizens have the power to sanction or reject government initiatives? Assuming this is the case, do these powers have a limit?
Common citizens are most likely to be included in decisions made at local or sub-national level due to their broad knowledge of local affairs, but limited skills. They can help public officials make informed decisions when allocating local resources.
Some of the initiatives sanctioned by the government to expand citizen participation include annual budget conference and communal projects. The mobilization can be done by community heads26.
At the national level, more emphasis is placed on individuals with legal or technical expertise. As a result, these individuals are always involved directly in the budget implementation and monitoring process. They can participate in the budgetary process in two ways.
First, they can take part in the local discussions, but their proposals and interests are transferred to the national summit. Second, they can articulate their ideas and interests in extremely wide terms, enabling them to be supportive of the general arrangement.
Nevertheless, there can be a huge difference in the sort of voice exercised by citizens, from voting on the choice of particular items to general items that are of priority.
The civil society and organizations representing the will and interests of the people normally take part directly in national-level policies and budget talks. Individual citizens are less likely to take part in national-level debates, but can take part in countrywide processes27.
Case Studies
Many regimes now engage nationals in policy decisions. To understand how governments engage their citizens in policy decisions, we will carry out a case study of two countries. In this case, the two nations are Brazil and Philippines.
The selection of the two cases has turned out to be very fruitful since the two nations are currently using a wide range of programs to enhance transparency, involvement and accountability.
It is important to note that Brazil and Philippines are on the excellent path of reform, and this will help in comprehending the conceivable outcomes and parameters of progress.
There are a number of significant similarities among the two nations that will be of great help in explaining why the two governments are increasing citizen participation and encouraging transparency. Each of them had a tyrant administration from 1960s to 1980s.
They swung to law based governance in the late 1980s and have remained so until now. Moreover, the two nations have seen the resurrection of non-state actors, proclamation of the new constitution and advancement of devolution.
Brazil: Citizen Participation in the Budgetary Accountability
Major reforms in Brazil started with President Cradoso who expanded Brazil’s capacity to promote transparency and accountability through mass participation. He began by building institutions, privatising state-owned companies and demanding a thorough clean up in the public sector.
He also introduced the fiscal responsibility law, which provided a framework of spending government resources and mechanism for guaranteeing budgetary transparency28.
In the past three decades, the country has expanded a number of participatory venues, which allows citizens to take part in an array of policymaking decisions. There are four fundamental institutions that permit citizens to take part in the budgetary process.
These institutions include Public Policy Management Councils (PPMCs), Public Policy Conferences (PPC), Pluriannual Budget Planning (PBP), and Participatory Budgeting (PB). PPMC, PPC and PBP are embraced from the local to national level. However, PB is only adopted at the municipal level29.
Participatory budgeting is a year-long process that brings together municipal official and citizens to decide over capital spending on the current and future projects. PB has been adopted by numerous municipalities and participants are mainly volunteers.
The table below demonstrates PB programs between 1989 and 2012 in municipalities with over 50 thousand inhabitants. Over 50 percent of the PB cases were managed by workers unions, which highlight the role of politics in the adoption of PB. As a matter of fact, PB has attracted very many youths into political positions30.
As already been mentioned, PPMCs are established at all levels of the government. Currently, the country has approximately 70000 councils at the district level. Generally, the council’s top seats are shared equally between the state and non-state actors.
The council has the power to sanction or reject the budgetary process through a vote and, therefore, it has the veto power. Truth be told, PPMCs is being utilized as a condition by the administration for disbursing national resources. 31. The table below shows the explosion of PPMCS in the last decades.
The increase in the number of councils is mainly attributed to the federal government that had made it mandatory for all public institutions and organizations to have a management council. However, some public institutions and organizations adopted it voluntarily32.
Pluriannual Budget Planning (PBP) is a national level budgetary planning process introduced by President Lula da Silva. This was after a number of reports showed that the country had heavily invested in sub-national level programs and was lacking in national-level programs.
Pluriannual Budget Planning, which is conducted yearly, was premised on the PPMCs’ model. The ministry of planning is tasked with the responsibility of providing all the pertinent data. It comprises of representatives from different sectors, including the civil society, private sector and state officials.
The participants are directly involved in the budgetary process. However, there is no information accessible to recommend that the arrangements are actualized by the government33.
Public Policy Conferences (PPC) also known as the national policy conferences attract millions of participants. In the last 75 conferences, it has attracted more than 8 million participants. These conferences have given millions of Brazilians a platform to participate in the policymaking decisions.
These conferences focus on a wide range of subjects, including transparency and social control, federal budgetary processes, human rights and many more. Nevertheless, the country’s expansive federal states make it very hard to establish the level of transparency and accountability in the public sector.
However, the country‘s emphasis is to incorporate as many citizens in the budgetary accountability and transparency programs34.
Philippines: Citizen Participation in the Budgetary Accountability
Philippine is one of the countries with the greatest devotion in advancing citizen participation and transparency. The current president’s campaign platform was to stop corruption and destitution. By associating corruption to all the problems facing the country, he drew attention to all the fundamental subjects of governance.
Therefore, the core agenda of the current regime is tackling corruption, especially in the public sector. Importantly, the core elements of enhancing the quality of governance include direct engagement and giving more power to the citizens.
Besides eliminating corruption in the public sector, the country’s reform agenda include establishments of new institutions that will generate new prospects to alter the pattern of public expenditure and ensure transparency and accountability35.
Due to lack of high level state capacity and pervasive civil society as witnessed in Brazil, the Philippines used a diverse participatory strategy. They are less likely to adopt citizen-based strategies used in Brazil due to the disintegration of its social fabric and low capacity of its citizens.
As a result, they are mixing citizen-based strategies, usually at the sub-national level, with extensive engagement of civil societies36.
The deliberate efforts of the Philippines government to increase citizens’ participation in the budgetary process and ensure accountability in the public sector include National Fund for Participatory Governance, Base-Up Budgeting, Budget Partnership Accord, Complete Disclosure Strategy, and Citizen Engagement Review37.
Base-Up Budgeting was borrowed from Latin America. It involves engaging rural community movements and individual citizens in determining funds to be allocated at the local level. This leads to the creation of a local poverty reduction team to implement and monitor funded projects.
The team comprises of the communal chiefs, state representatives and common organizations. Base-Up approach targets poor communities. As of 2013, more than 1100 poor municipal communities had adopted the approach with the government allocating in excess of $190 million for the projects38.
Budget Partnership Accord brings together agencies and the civil society in the preparation of the budget. This allows the government and the civil society to work closely in identifying priority projects.
The civil society is also involved in the implementation process. Base-Up Budgeting and Budget Partnership Accord have been commended by the international community as the best methods of empowering citizens39.
National Fund is a stipend given by the Treasury to non-state actors to bolster cooperation of subjects and the administration in national matters. As a result, the civil society acts as intermediate finance managers40.
On the other hand, Complete Disclosure Strategy is a reward system exemplifying all facets of accountability and transparency at the local government units. It requires full disclosure of information to the public.
In order to advance this, the administration has dispatched an online entry where all the administrative data can be accessed by the citizens. 41. To wrap things up, the Citizen Engagement Review is an institutional body that unites intrigued nationals and state authorities.
This body enhances access to government information necessary for the implementation and evaluation of the budget process42.
Comparing and evaluating the two cases
The programs aimed at increasing citizens’ participation in governance and accountability in the Philippines have created two changes. First, more citizens are joining state-approved institutions to play some part in governance and decision making.
Second, the government has increased the number participatory institutions to promote citizen’s participation in the local and national affairs, particularly in the budgeting and fiscal processes.
However, in comparison to Brazil, Philippine is still lagging behind with respect to structural foundations that support citizens’ participation and accountability. This means the country is more likely to make significant policy changes in the near future.
The disparity is attributed to the fact that the Brazil’s reform process started like three decades ago, whereas the Philippines process has only lasted a decade. In addition, Philippines lack high level state capacity and pervasive civil society.
Lastly, the country is less reliant on experts owing to the fact that the government’s main agenda is citizen empowerment. As a result, it employs mixed strategies that incorporate citizens at the sub-national level and civil societies at the highest level.
Conclusion
From the analysis of the two countries, it is apparent that four facets affect citizen’s participation in the budgetary process. The first factor is the political will of the existing regime. The second factor is the organization of the civil society. The third factor is the state’s capacity. The last factor is the path of policy reforms.
Citizens and the civil society can either support or challenge government decisions. As a result, citizens and civil society can work together with the government, but also hold it to account for public resources. The citizen participation process is based on four principal aspects, namely: voice, scrutiny, voting and rescission.
The Brazilian process incorporates all the four aspects. However, the Philippines do not have the veto power. Nevertheless, whatever the methodology utilized, the fundamental target is to expand resident support and enhance straightforwardness and responsibility.
The participatory initiatives in Brazil and Philippines are mainly driven by politics and reform agenda. Even though non-state actors have played a role in pushing the two governments to expand citizen participation, there is no evidence to suggest that they have been pushed by international organizations.
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Footnotes
1 J. E. Alt & D. Lassen, ‘Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries’, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 50, no. 3, 2006, p. 531.
2 B. Gianpaolo, P. Heller & M. Silva, Bootstrapping Democracy: Transforming Local Governance and Civil Society in Brazil, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2011, p. 5.
3 R. Carltz, Improving Transparency and Accountability in the Budget Process: An Assessment of Recent Initiatives, University of California, Los Angeles, 2013, p. 28.
4 Carltz, p. 32.
5 Alt & Lassen, p. 541.
6 P. de Renzio & H. Masud, ‘Measuring and Promoting Budget Transparency: The Open Budget Index as a Research and Advocacy Tool’, Governance, vol. 24, no. 3, 2011, p. 609.
7 P. de Renzio & D. Angemi, ‘Comrades or Culprits? Donor Engagement and Budget Transparency in Aid-Dependent Countries’, Public Administration and Development, vol. 32, no. 2, 2012, pp.170.
8 IMF, Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, International Monetary Fund, Washington, 2007, p. 13.
9 B. Wampler, Participation, Transparency and Accountability, Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency, 2013, p. 98.
10 L. Avritzer, Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002, p.11.
11 Ibid.
12 Carltz, p. 35.
13 Ibid.
14C. Ferraz & F. Finan, Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.123, no. 2, 2008, p. 707.
15 W. Hunter, ‘The Normalization of an Anomaly: The Workers’ Party in Brazil’, World Politics, vol. 59, 2007, p.453.
16 A.P. Montero & J.S. David, Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Press, 2004, p.7.
17 B. Wampler, Participation, Transparency and Accountability, Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency, 2013, p. 102.
18 S. McNulty, Voice and Vote: Decentralization and Participation in Post-Fujimori Peru, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2011, p.6.
19 McNulty, p. 8.
20 Ibid.
21 McNulty, p. 9.
22 Ibid.
23 B.Wampler, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and Accountability, State University Press, Pennsylvania, 2007, p. 28.
24 Wampler, p.30.
25 Gianpaolo, Heller & Silva, p. 7.
26 Ibid.
27 Gianpaolo, Heller & Silva, p. 10.
28 B. Wampler, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and Accountability, State University Press, Pennsylvania, 2007, p. 19.
29 Wampler, p. 20.
30 Wampler, p. 21.
31 Gianpaolo, Heller & Silva, p. 65.
32 Gianpaolo, Heller & Silva, p. 67.
33 Wampler, p. 106.
34 Wampler, p. 107.
35 F. Magno, Country Report: The Philippines, Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency, 2013, p. 3.
36 Magno, p. 4.
37 Wampler, p. 113.
38 Wampler, p. 114.
39 Magno, p. 4.
40 Wampler, p. 115.
41 A. Fung, Mary & David, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 7.
Humanitarian actions depend on the evidence-base greatly because required policies and responses cannot be developed effectively and ethically without solid ground (International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, 2016). Both the amount of knowledge and its quality are critical because “the international humanitarian community’s ability to collect, analyse, disseminate and act on key information is fundamental to effective response” (Clarke & Darcy, 2014, p. 5). In addition to that, such approach ensures professionals’ impartiality and delivery of the best interventions. Finally, the evidence is needed to ensure involved parties that resources were utilised efficiently and benefited vulnerable populations.
However, the evidence-base in international disasters and humanitarian crises fails to be as strong as expected. The accountability and effectiveness of humanitarian actions are poorly considered, which affects interventions and makes them less effective. Humanitarians fail to discuss evidence generation as a continuous process and often have problems with the consistent use of research methodologies. They do not pay enough attention to the direct interaction with vulnerable populations, which prevents them from meeting people’s needs (Wong, 2011). As a result, the effectiveness of humanitarian actions is affected adversely so that expected outcomes are not reached.
There is also a problem in the framework of accountability because stakeholders do not receive sufficient evidence that reveals how resources were utilised and what results were observed (ALNAP, 2015). Realising the existence of this issue, this paper will discuss the current state of the evidence-base for the accountability and effectiveness of humanitarian actions. It will pay attention to those problems that are often faced in the framework of Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) (Polastro, 2014). Finally, some recommendations will be made on how to resolve them. Thus, strategies that should be used by humanitarians in order to increase the strength of the evidence-base will be described.
Accountability
Failure to create and utilise evidence effectively often leads to the lack of accountability. In general, the stakeholders of the humanitarian actions that include donor organisations, affected parties and civil society are willing to receive information which can prove how the resources allocated for assistance were used. They need to have access to the data that reveals how money was allocated and also to find out what outcomes were reached. In order to meet their expectations, professionals who deal with humanitarian assistance should present the information about their operations on a routines basis. Thus, they should not only prove that the needs they focus on are real but also reveal that the responses they made were the most effective and efficient ones. It is critical to ensure stakeholders that all choices and decisions were thoroughly considered and well-grounded. Professionals started to pay their attention to these issues in the 1990s, so that a wide range of technical initiatives has been already successfully implemented, and the quality of information as well as assessment mechanisms improved (Basher, 2015). Still, the base of evidence for those approaches that work successfully lacks accountability even today.
Technology is believed to provide a lot of improvement possibilities, but it also presupposes challenges. For example, data protection can turn into an obstacle. The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership that deals with the accountability of individuals who require humanitarian assistance should bear in mind that geo-tagging affects people’s privacy while digital recording also entails complications connected with the necessity to deal with large amounts of data. In addition to that, this organisation reveals one more issue and notices that beneficiary engagement is “extremely rare in an evaluation, even if the current trend is to push for beneficiary involvement at this stage” (Alexander, Darcy, & Kiani, 2013, p. 29).
Agencies that provide humanitarian aid often operate in those contexts that are politicised and insecure, which means that the allocation of assistance is not impartial but affected by the political goals. Taking this fact into consideration, it is significant for them to prove stakeholders that the resources were used as promised, which is not maintained currently. The difference between the quality and quantity of required and provided aid is also rarely provided, which proves the existence of accountability deficit (Featherstone, 2013).
Roddy, Strange, & Taithe, (2015) discussed humanitarian aid accountability in Great Britain at the end of the 19th century – beginning of the 20th century. They emphasised that even at that time crucial self-regulation in this sphere were maintained with the help of the press. Still, Arroyo (2014) refers to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake to prove that today there is a gap in this process. Professional underlines that International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) fail to provide affected populations with the information about humanitarian operations. Even though these organisations implemented some mechanisms recommended by the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, Haitians had very limited ability to receive an expected response.
The research revealed that “while in principle agencies have the best interests of affected populations as their aim, fragmentation and power asymmetries within the humanitarian sector create conditions wherein agencies define the limits of what they are responsible for and, consequently, what they can be held accountable for” (Arroyo, 2014, p. 110). Thus, humanitarians’ recognition of the responsibility is critical because it is the main element that ensures efficient implementation of initiatives and accountability enhancement. What is more critical, Tan and Schreeb (2015) claim that there is no internationally accepted definition of accountability that could be used by professionals as the basis.
Effectiveness
The most critical thing that is discussed in the framework of humanitarian assistance is its effectiveness because the very purpose of this aid is crucial as it deals with the lives of the affected populations. The effectiveness of the humanitarian aid can be considered when measuring the way provided assistance fulfilled the needs of the population and met agencies’ targets. In this way, it is important for donors to monitor who receives their money and how they are spent (Clarke & Darcy, 2014).
For the evidence to be effective, it should be of high quality. This characteristic can be ensured if such dimensions are taken into consideration as:
Accuracy: the evidence should correspond with the real events. It should reflect the situation with no changes and include true to life measurements;
Representativeness: professionals should do their best to ensure the connection between the representative of a group and the group itself so that the condition of one person can reflect the larger population;
Attribution: the analysis should reveal connection between conditions or events so that the results of an action can be discussed;
Generalizability: evidence should ensure the possibility to respond to different situations on its basis;
Clarity: all information regarding the source of the evidence, the reason and the time when it was collected should be available (ALNAP, 2016).
From the nursing perspective, the problems in the evidence-base can be solved when referring to the logic models offered and successfully utilised by the World Health Organization (WHO) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Using the basic program logic model as an example and a starting point, humanitarians can have an opportunity to improve their evidence and outcomes reached (see Fig. 1).
Figure 1. Basic Program Logic Model (CDC, 2010, p. 6)
Birnbaum, O’Rourke, Loretti, and Daily (2014) believe that following an appropriate model, professionals can have an opportunity to deal with the principal branch of disaster research. They connect successful intervention with the effective evidence and believe that having high-quality data humanitarians can “(1) decrease the human, environmental, and economic losses; (2) decrease morbidity; (3) decrease pain and suffering; and (4) enhance the recovery of the affected population” (Birnbaum et al., 2014, p. 1). The guideline provided by Kulling, Birnbaum, Murray, and Rockenschaub (2010) should also be utilised.
Of course, humanitarian aid turns out to be rather effective in the majority of cases. It influences an adverse situation significantly, providing the recipients with the opportunity to improve the quality of life for affected populations. If such outcomes were not reached, there would be no sense in the continuation of these procedures. However, some challenges are still faced by humanitarians and other stakeholders. Humanitarians can hardly assess the success of their actions because they face problems with reaching affected populations. Increasing the number of attacks does not allow professionals to increase the relevance of aid and its effectiveness (Featherstone, 2013).
Trying to attract humanitarians’ attention to the problems connected with the poor evidence-base, Lam, Torres, Zoleveke, and Ondrusek (2016) presented a report about the response to Category 5 Tropical Cyclone (TC) Winston that hit Fiji. Professionals noticed that the communication between involved organisations sometimes led to confusions and misunderstanding, which means that there was no opportunity to obtain high-quality evidence. Even though the aid was delivered immediately and assisted the population, problems with the usage of assessment tools were reported. There were numerous new elements that were unknown to the agencies because they had no effective evidence-base that could be used to obtain required information and share knowledge obtained in practice. The human resource also occurred be a problem. Personnel turnover prevented involved parties from receiving required information and lead to operational issues (Lam et al., 2016).
In this way, reports provided by ALNAP do not only reveal successful operations and best practices that allowed humanitarians to provide required care but also identify spheres that require immediate improvement. Smith and Flatt (2011) believe that effective evidence can ensure appropriate allocation of financial aid and non-profit assistance. But professionals are not able to work efficiently because they lack evidence. Parties involved in these processes fail to cooperate effectively. They have no network that can be used to share knowledge and search for important data. The existing evidence-base is poor, and it does not include the information obtained directly from the affected populations, which means that professionals are not able to check whether their goals are well-aligned with the recipients’ needs. Thus, evidence that is available lacks quality and strength, which is a great drawback that proves that there is a necessity to implement new strategies to enhance the situation.
Strategies that Could Help to Raise the Strength of the Evidence-Base
For humanitarian aid to be properly planned and allocated, it is critical for professionals who deal with programming to have good evidence as the basis. That is why organisations within the humanitarian system do their best to improve and strengthen the evidence-base. It would be advantageous if this sectors robust methodology, efficiency, collaboration, continuity, and concentrate on inclusion and ownership.
A lot of information that is used as evidence when discussing humanitarian issues is obtained from research studies conducted with the help of qualitative methods. Unfortunately, the selected methodology is often poorly understood and applied, which means that agencies need to improve this area and became more rigour. In addition to that, limitations can be overcome if a mixed method is used to develop evidence because it was generated to fill the gaps of the separate ones. To ensure the strength of evidence, humanitarian actors should be encouraged to describe their methodology in the research paper. In this framework, it is also significant to make organisations cooperate.
They should share knowledge and experiences of the usage of qualitative and quantitative methodologies (Chan & Burkle, 2013). For such a purpose, special networks or inter-organisational groups can be used. ALNAP or ACAPS, for example, can synthesise the best practices in the sphere and provide training materials created on their basis. It will be beneficial if bodies for quality assessment are established. They can check whether reviews meet all need requirements and are trustworthy. Thus, humanitarian organisations should pay more attention to research methodology. They need to encourage and promote strategic partnership and training so that the gaps in this area can be filled. The standard of evidence creation should be enhanced so that it becomes stronger.
Taking into consideration the fact that the process of evidence gathering is resource-consuming, it is significant to prove that time and money are used efficiently (Scott, 2014). Donors and humanitarian organisations need to consider whether the benefits obtained from the results exceed overall expenditure. It will be better if they are both direct and long-term because more substantial improvement can be made in this way (Blanchet & Martin, 2011).
The effectiveness of the evidence and its quality can be affected greatly by the collaboration between the organisations that operate in the humanitarian system (Akl et al., 2015). It will be better if they pay more attention to the verification procedures and implement efficient cross-checking and quality control. What is more, it is significant to implement initiatives that can ensure their readiness to undertake responsibility. Donors should cooperate to identify the best ways to fill the evidence gaps that exist within the humanitarian system. They can use inter-agency networks and platforms to reach one another without any complications. In addition to that, they should develop international standardised frameworks for assessment and evaluation (ALNAP, 2012; Curmi, 2013). The collection of evidence should be maintained when budgets are considered, and the usage of system bodies (such as ACAPS and ALNAP) maximised.
One more sphere for the improvement of the evidence-base deals with continuity. The thing is that evidence generation is usually treated as a short event but not a long lasting process. As a result, it is obtained episodically and its effects over time are not discussed appropriately (DARA, 2013). This drawback also occurs because of the high personnel turnover rates that are observed in many spheres today. Such gaps can be filled if humanitarians utilise assessment and monitoring systems that strengthen one another.
As a rule, those individuals who deal with humanitarian actions pay little attention to the way data is collected and generated. Being affected by a crisis, they are more targeted at the immediate reaction. That is why, they rarely ask questions about the issue and obtain the information not from the participants of the event but from the international organisations, so they tend to meet their needs but not those of the particular populations. During assessments, they find out what aid is needed with no prioritising. In a similar way, the results of the assessment tend to be not very critical.
Trying to find out whether some even is a crisis or not, humanitarians do not really use the answers of the involved people as the basis and refer to the organisational views. Thus, it is critical to ensure that humanitarian organisations pay more attention to the reasons why they collect data and who it is for. They need to consider the usage of civil society organisations and involvement of the affected population in the process of data gathering. Humanitarian actors should reveal local knowledge and its connection with the recommendations clearly (Clarke & Darcy, 2014). It is critical to approach informed consent and inform participants on how the information they provided was used and what decisions were made in regard to it.
In this way, it is also significant to make sure that important evidence is used during humanitarian decision-making because the lack of attention paid to the needs assessment, for example, can lead to adverse effects made on the individuals affected by disasters. So professionals who create evidence should consider the accessibility of the information, timeliness, circulation through media and clear steps of decision-making procedure that can ensure that evidence can be successfully implemented for some incentives (Bradt, 2009).
Conclusion
To provide humanitarian assistance, professionals need to gather appropriate evidence because, being based on it, actions are more likely to be effective and accountable. They need to pay much attention to the evidence-base greatly because with its help they can ensure positive outcomes and appropriate actions. Humanitarians need to consider the amount of evidence and its quality because it should be enough to use for an efficient decision-making regarding a large population. Professionals should be impartial for them to be able to allocate aid appropriately. Using the information from the evidence-base, they can benefit vulnerable populations. Still, existing gaps prevent humanitarian agencies from utilising strong evidence.
The accountability and effectiveness of humanitarian actions are not good enough. Humanitarians still do not have a clear understanding of the concept of accountability with leads to the fact that it is often poorly maintained. Professionals are not able to gather enough data to prove their actions and measure positive changes. The effectiveness of humanitarian assistance also suffers. A lack of appropriate evidence means that humanitarians are not able to find out what exactly is required by the affected population. As a result, their actions fail to meet the expectations of the recipients. Moreover, then a lack of the information about the outcomes prevents them from obtaining an opportunity to improve the situation.
Unfortunately, the implementation of the efficient evidence-base is not well-considered yet, and the debate about it is in the initial phase. Still, some attempts to bridge the existing gap are made. In addition to them, it can be strengthened when professionals receive guideline regarding the usage of methodology. Agencies should cooperate and provide required training programs to improve their evidence-base.
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Accountability is a dominant concept in the democratic political discourses. It reflects trustworthiness and transparency in public administration. However, depending on the dimension from which one looks at it, accountability may mean different things (Behn, 2001, p. 3: Pollitt, 2003, p. 89: Considine, 2002, p. 22).
In the most fundamental sense, accountability bridges the dynamic relationships between citizens and systems of public administration entrusted by the citizens to act in a manner that will benefit all citizens in overall.
In democratic regimes, there exists a universal requirement for holding political leadership and administration accountable for their actions.
Political accountability is problematic since politicians presume that their obligations to the citizens would be executed in a manner that profiles master-servant relationships.
In such a relationship, matters are not answerable to the servants nor should the servants question their masters (Scott, 2000, p.41: Schmitter, 2004, p.53).
This phenomenon is common in the authoritarian systems of public administration. It infers that accountability is a concept that is only applicable to democratic systems where the administrators must respect the will of the people they serve.
People possess a myriad of mechanisms of interacting with their administration. They may be clients of a myriad of agencies. In such a situation, they seek services and benefits from various agencies serving administrative roles.
People may also interact with the administration through legal systems, which serve the principle function of providing restrictions that bind all citizens coupled with those who represent them in the government.
In such relationships, citizens constantly seek their interests to be safe guarded through accountability structures that ensure equal and paramount representation in the government by the people whom citizens appoint to make decisions on their behalf (Bovaird & Loffler, 2009).
The focus of public administration on adoption of mechanisms for ensuring that government is accountable to the client underlines the change of public administration systems from being bureaucratic.
The focus of this paper is to conduct an analysis on the changes coupled with differences in approaches of public accountability.
The paper is divided into two main sections. The first section of description considers theoretical perspectives of public accountability.
In the second section, which is the analysis part, a consideration of traditional public administration followed by new public management and then network governance is made. These approaches are then analyzed in the context of approaches of public accountability.
Description: Theoretical perspectives
For systems of governance to be acceptable by people, they need to be accountable. In the embracement of democracy, accountability is incredibly significant (Horner, Lekhi & Blaug, 2006, p. 42).
Accountable systems of governance are paramount since interaction of citizens and the government is dependent on the extent to which citizens can hold those in entrusted with power accountable (Hughes, 2003, p.240).
With regard to Martin (2006, p. 72), giving citizens an opportunity to scrutinize government is crucial since citizens bestow power to the administrators and politicians to govern on their behalf.
It is then important that citizens should be able to determine whether the power they have given the administrators is utilized in the appropriate way to ensure that the entire society benefits.
In this context, Hughes (2003) argues that accountability is significant since it marks the hallmarks of a democratic system of governance (p.241). Inadequate or even lack of accountability has the implication of making bureaucratic administration systems corrupt and omnipotent (Martin, 2006, p. 93).
Lack of accountability erodes the tenets of the responsibility that a government has towards its people.
Introducing the concept of responsibility to the discussions of accountability implies that people acting in the place of others have a legal obligation.
Besides, they have a moral responsibility to act in a manner that does not violate the trust bestowed to them and report to clients on how they have performed in the tasks dedicated to them (Rhodes, 1997). Interrelating responsibility and accountability this way attracts scholarly criticism.
For instance, Hughes (2003, p. 241) and Considine (2002, p. 22) maintain that responsibility is different from accountability in that, in the hierarchy of execution of responsibility at governmental and organizational levels, it acts in the opposite direction.
According to the author, this case happens where some subordinates are responsible for acts of other subordinates forming part of the work group.
It is unfair to hold one person responsible for an act of another person. For instance, a manger cannot bear criminal responsibility for undue act of an employee in his or her line of command. In this extent, responsibility does not define precisely the extents of liability, which should be held by specific persons in government. Hence, responsibility is different from accountability in that, when individuals are considered accountable, they would have some kind of punishment subscribed to them in case of unsuccessful performance (Behn 2001, p.4). In case of administrators in the government, one form of punishment would involve removal from office either through dismissal by the appointing authority or by being voted out in case of an elective office in democratic systems. In this sense, accountability in public affairs is associated with aspects of justice, reliability, and loyalty (Bovens 2005, p.182).
In public administration studies, accountability constitutes a large discipline. Scholars in the field have attempted to subdivide it into a number of facets. For example, Romzek (1998) divides it into four categories: legal accountability, hierarchical, professional, and political accountability (p.197).
A legal and hierarchical accountability reflects the traditional perspective of public administration approaches. Professional and political accountability fosters higher degrees of autonomy. Hence, they are integral to new public management theory.
According to Bovens (2005, p. 183), there are other types of accountability, which include administrative accountability, collective accountability, organizational accountability, individual accountability, and corporate accountability.
Behn (2001) classifies all these types of accountability into three typologies: performance, fairness, and finances accountability (p.6). Accountability for fairness makes rulers refrain from misusing their power unjustly to disadvantage some people.
In case of financial accountability, Bevir and Rhodes (2003) argue that government officials are entrusted with money belonging to taxpayers and that, if they fail to be accountable, they deserve a punishment (p.45).
Performance accountability is realized by setting targets with well-defined parameters for managers and leaders to attain.
The emphasis of accountability in public administration studies is paramount because accountability has significant functions within corporations and even in government.
The principle functions of accountability include fostering effectiveness, fairness, efficiency, integrity, and democratic governance (Arnull & Wincott, 2001, p. 18).
Integrity is the substrate for prevention of corruption coupled with other undue conducts of public officials. Effectiveness and efficiency enhance performance. When all the functions of the accountability are integrated, a legitimate and reliable system of governance is acquired (Ferlie, Hartley & Martin, 2003, p. 12).
Analysis: Progression of public accountability from traditional approaches in public governance to network governance
Traditional public administration and accountability
In the traditional public administration approaches, accountability is manifested in two main forms: bureaucratic and political accountability (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994, p. 9). In the bureaucratic accountability, citizens cannot directly hold civil servants accountable.
Hence, their accountability is only possible through voting in appropriate political systems that are capable of putting in place appropriate legal systems that can subject civil servants to trial in case they violate accountability codes of conduct.
In the context of traditional public administration, legal and hierarchical frameworks are deployed to enhance accountability.
In this sense, Romzek notes, “hierarchical relationships rely on supervisory and organizational directives including rules and standards operation procedures to which employees are answerable for their performance” (1998, p.197).
In this context, accountability is defined by various directives, which lay down the things that civil servants deserve to do and those that they should not do.
Enhancing accountability from a legal basis implies that certain externally set anticipations and or standards are established and met. The performance of the civil servants must conform to the established criteria.
Attempting to understand accountability from the contexts of the traditional approaches to public administration is quite easier. However, several problems emerge.
Fisher (2004, p. 510) exemplifies one of these challenges when he argues that, accountability in the context of traditional approaches to public administration is not multidimensional since the model holds politician accountable while neglecting administrators since they are not associated with policy formulation.
If anything goes wrong in the implementation of public policy, politicians should be held accountable since the administrators are only serving their bureaucratic role of implementation.
Mulgan (2003, p. 4) supports this line of argument by lamenting that cultural differences come into play at the juncture in which political leaders encounter the top administration arm in the hierarchical structure of public governance associated with traditional approaches in public policy making processes.
This challenge is akin to the focus of the traditional public administration on accountability based more on errors as opposed to achievements. Hence, the main attention is dedicated to the mistakes that would escape the scrutiny of the bureaucrats.
Acheberg and Baston (1997) illustrate accountability approaches from the context of traditional public administration through an experiment for two groups of people to give scholarships to various students (p.345).
The researcher was interested in the determination of the manner in which the groups allocated limited resources.
One group knew that its way of allocation of scholarships would be exposed to testing while the other group did not have such information.
The results on the experiment indicated that the group that knew its mechanism of allocation of resources would be tested for accountability allocated resources in an ineffective manner.
From this experiment, it can be inferred that perception of the need to be held accountable leads to low levels of efficiency thus reinforcing the argument that traditional public administration seeks to pursue accountability from the perfectives of legal and financial contexts as opposed to procedures and efficient utilization of resources.
Accountability in the new public management approaches
From the paradigms of new public management, citizens are viewed from the perspective of beings customers.
Looking at accountability from the dimension of the degree to which people making the decision on behalf of the citizens satisfy the citizens, new public management stands out as a model that is more effective in comparison to traditional public administration (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994, p. 12).
Adoption of this model implies that the responsibility to the citizens shifts from politicians to the managers. The aftermath of this step is the alteration of the relations that exist between elected persons and citizens in matters of allocation and management of public resources (Mulgan, 2003, p. 18).
Arguably, since new public management pursues the goal of improving relationships with various citizens (customers of the state), decision to maintain accountability is driven by the need to establish stable connections with people.
Comparatively, the traditional public administration approaches in enhancing accountability resulted in inefficiencies since it dwelled principally on seeking to control the manner in which bureaucrats spent resources as opposed to the outcomes realized from the utilization of resources.
Dunleavy and Hood (1994, p. 13) reinforce this argument by asserting that governments guided by traditional approaches of public administration hardly realized optimal results.
In the new public management, this challenge can be solved via making transfers of experiences to the private sector driven by the need to accord flexibility to mechanisms of public resource allocation in the effort to attain and satisfy the needs of citizens both optimally and maximally.
In this end, accountability is measured as the degree to which the needs of the citizens have been achieved as opposed to the effectiveness or efficiency of the procedures used to satisfy the needs of the clients.
This argument means that performance is an important parameter for measuring accountability under the new public management approaches.
New public management combines contracting with privatization to enhance the efficiency of delivery of public goods (Martin, 2006, p. 100). The focus is to shift functions of the public sector to the private sector so that, in the due course of seeking more profits, customer satisfaction is increased.
This means that the private sector would initiate steps to maintain its accountability since failure to do so would result in low profits.
Apart from shifting the accountability in the allocation of public resources to the private sector, new public management results in effective and efficient resources utilization in the attempt to yield optimal returns.
Bovens (2005, p. 182) commends such an approach by insisting that shifting the responsibility of allocation of public goods to the private sector provides the best mode of allocating and distributing public services.
Accountability in network governance
Over the last two decades, accountability with respect to network governance has undergone sophisticated changes grounded on the fundamentals of cooperation.
Network governance contrasts the other two models in that it predominantly dwells on the creation of public value coupled with putting in place the means of ensuring that the relationship between the government and the citizens is maintained at the closest levels.
The overall impact of network governance is the shifting of public accountability to horizontal accountability (Behn, 2001, p. 6). Bevir and Trentmann (2007) explain that this shift is fuelled by the need to enhance direct accountability to various customers (citizens), agencies, media, and even members of the civil society (p.78).
This shift is perhaps vital by considering the rapid creation of various citizen charters, citizen panels and myriads of focus groups all aimed at enhancing public accountability in the recent past in various nations.
In particular, in the UK, a citizen panel comprised 6000 people to represent all citizens was formed and mandated to consult citizens on matters of the quality of the services delivered to them by the public sector (Curtin, 2004, p. 104: Bergman & Damgaard, 2000, p. 15).
Many other measures are also being adopted by different nations to compel the governments to be accountable to the citizens. They include publication of inspection reports, benchmarking reports, and assessment reports among other things over the internet. All attempts are aimed at encouraging horizontal accountability.
The discussion above brings into the lime light a striking difference between the three topologies of public governance in enhancing public accountability.
Under the traditional public administration, governments are neither principally interested nor focused on the outputs of the processes of allocation and distribution of public goods. Rather, more emphasis is paid on curtailing redundant mistakes.
In case of new public management, concerns of accountability are market-driven (Kettle, 1998, p. 81).
For network governance, rational matching of private with public sectors coupled with advocating for cooperation for the two sectors is the central concern believed to enhance the effectiveness and efficacy in achievements of results.
Important to note is that network governance also compares with the other two approaches of accountability in that, under traditional public governance and new public management, civil servants are charged with the noble responsibility of ensuring that partnerships are created to foster cooperation between private and public sector.
In such cases, administrators have narrow roles in enhancing interaction between various stakeholders who are vital in ensuring accountability.
In the network governance era, transparency coupled with frankness and openness in the process of decision-making is influenced by interaction and cooperation of various stakeholders or contributors in the sphere of public accountability.
Conclusion
In public administration studies, accountability is considered as an element that helps to foster openness and trustworthiness coupled with transparency in both formulation and implementation of public policies. Public policies are formulated to enhance the allocation and distribution of public goods and services.
Members of the Public hold the government accountable for the delivery of public goods and services.
Driven by this concern, the paper focused on conducting an analysis on the changes and differences in approaches of public accountability from three dimensions: traditional public administration approaches to accountability, new public management, and network governance.
It was argued in the paper that accountability is pivotal in societies. It is a determinant of the existing relationship between citizens and the government.
Based on this argument, the paper maintained that democratic governance could not prevail in an environment dominated by administration systems that are not accountable for their actions.
The study demonstrated the significance of public accountability with respect to types coupled with functions of various forms of accountability. From traditional public administration through new public management to the network governance, several changes have taken place with respect to accountability.
New public management is considered an optimal mechanism of allocation and distribution of public goods and services compared to the traditional public administration. In the due process, public accountability is incredibly improved.
Under the paradigms of new public management, the relationship between bureaucrat and customers (citizens) is also improved. A shift in the measurement of accountability changes from being based on resources to the performance in terms of results.
With the adoption of network governance, which concerns itself with the creation of public value, cooperation of private and public sector is enhanced thus giving rise to even more enhanced accountability in allocation and distribution of the scarcest public resources.
Reference List
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Articles such as Considine (2002) and Kluvers & Tippett (2011) detail the importance of accountability in governance and how it is an integral aspect in establishing proper public management and policy networks. It is quite interesting to note though that traditional public management as well as new public management have different views and criticisms on how accountability should be applied in the field of governance.
For example, in traditional public management accountability is thought of as a type of formal and hierarchical framework from which managers within their respective departments comply with a set format of rules, regulations and standards of conduct.
However, as described by Wood (2004) in his examination of accountability in traditional public management, this type of accountability often results in “slow systems” wherein in their desire to comply with set standards of accountability managers actually fail to implement discretionary measures to “get the job done” so to speak which results in an unwieldy system of governance (Wood, 2004: 1-30).
Researchers such as Considine (2002) who examined accountability in public management even point out that “…too much of it can clog up the works, diverting resources and opening organizations to perverse pressures” (Considine, 2002: 21-40). It is based on these different accounts of what accountability consists of that it is necessary to determine how accountability is applied differently in different methods of public management.
The purpose of this essay to is to analyze the various changes that occur in public accountability. This ranges from examining traditional public administration, to going over network governance and finally to briefly elaborating on new public management.
This essay is divided into four main sections: an initial section that will examine the theoretical aspects of public accountability, after which it will delve into the 3 models of public administration in which the differences in the three models in terms of accountability will be explained and lastly this paper will attempt to demonstrate public accountability in network governance.
This paper will help to reveal how too much accountability in traditional public management and policy networks can “clog the works” as stated by Considine (2002) and to what extent should accountability be applied to avoid stagnation due to fear and hesitance or to prevent abuse as a direct result of too much freedom.
What are the theoretical aspects of public accountability?
It is interesting to note that the concept of accountability is considered an important aspect of any government entity. The reason behind this is quite simple; it acts as an integral facilitator of the relationship between the government and ordinary citizens since it holds public officials accountable for their actions (Alford & Hughes, 2008).
Studies such as those by Martin & Halachmi (2012) explain that public accountability should be considered a hallmark of effective governance since without it, it is likely that government bureaucracy could fall into a state where it becomes omnipotent and innately corrupt (Martin & Halachmi, 2012: 189-23).
According to studies such as those by Kluvers & Tippett (2011), the concept of accountability should not be interchanged with that of responsibility (Kluvers & Tippett, 2011: 3-9). Responsibility is considered the manner in which a manager or department head is responsible for the actions of their employees to a certain degree.
This does not mean that they are liable for all errors committed; rather, they are responsible for actions committed which are done in the line of duty. In the case of accountability this takes the form of being accountable for the success or failure of particular programs based on their performance (Koliba et al., 2011: 210-220).
A manager cannot simply offset the blame towards his/her subordinates; rather, regardless of errors committed that manager/official was still liable for the aftereffects of the program and should face the consequences of such actions (Koliba et al., 2011: 210-220).
A working culture is defined as the set of organization traits and practices that employees follow within a given business environment. As such their actions, practices and goals are all determined by the working culture by which they adhere their actions to. What must be understood is that different working cultures promote various types of behaviors within their employees one of them is the idea that they are accountable for their actions (Pennington, 2009: 146-150).
As stated by Samaratunge, Alam & Teicher (2008), public accountability it is meant to invoke a sense of reliability, loyalty, justice and trust between the public and the official in charge (Samaratunge, Alam & Teicher, 2008: 101-126). By being accountable for one’s actions, this ensures the public that those in charge of the “public good” are doing so based on the awareness that their actions will be judged with the official being liable for the end result, whether good or bad.
In order to understand more about this concept, it is necessary to understand how accountability is divided in the present Samaratunge, Alam & Teicher (2008). Through the study of Chan & Rosenbloom (2010), accountability is divided into 4 distinct types, namely:
hierarchical
legal
political
professional
In the case of political and professional accountability, it is important to note that these grant a greater degree of autonomy wherein public officials are allowed more “leeway” in terms of discretionary measures that can be utilized in order to pursue particular tasks (Chan & Rosenbloom, 2010: 21-33).
This is particularly important to take into consideration since studies such as Kluvers & Tippett (2011) explain that when it came to public management overly strict accountability checks on governments often led to a degree of hesitance in developing new policies and public management strategies which resulted in a complacent or even stagnant form of governance (Kluvers & Tippett, 2011: 519-527).
In such cases, officials were often too hesitant or fearful in performing particular duties or establishing particular reforms due to the burden of accountability. This was noted when it came to hierarchical and legal accountability wherein there were more “checks” when it came to performing particular actions which resulted in an active discouragement of discretionary measures in public management.
In the case of new public management such limitations were apparently addressed by freeing officials within the government to a certain extent to allow them the freedom to better manage policies, strategies and employees to make their system of public management more effective (Alford & Hughes, 2008:148.
One iteration of this came in the form of privatization of functions that were originally within the domain of government departments (Kluvers & Tippett, 2012: 519-527). Other forms of accountability as expressed by Burns & Zhou (2010) include organizational accountability, individual accountability, collective accountability and corporate accountability (Burns & Zhou, 2010: 7-34).
Basically, what these forms of accountability emphasized when it came to public management was that as a result of various government officials and employees being entrusted with tax payer money in order to provide particular services, they in turn have the obligation to utilize these funds in a proper manner and in effect be accountable for doing so.
It is based on this that when officials and employees violate the sanctity of this trust that they should be punished to the fullest extent of the law. Another aspect of accountability that should be taken into consideration is the concept of an organization’s accountability to perform. As stated by Demirag & Khadaroo (2011) government institutions are accountable to the general public in being able to provision the benefits and services that they are being paid to accomplish (Demirag & Khadaroo, 2011: 271-296).
This creates the needs to establish particular objectives, goals, metrics and bench-marks that are needed in order to ensure that governments are well aware of the necessity of reaching these particular goals in order to stay true to their accountability to the general public (Demirag & Khadaroo, 2011: 271-296 ).
Clear evidence of a violation of government accountability to performance was noted in the case of the political culture within the U.S. involving the tempestuous relationship between Republicans and Democrats. During the decision to raise the debt ceiling (2011 – 2012), it was the adversarial political culture between the two parties that stalled the necessary decision to raise the debt ceiling to such an extent that Standard and Poor actually downgraded the investment grade status of the U.S. as a result.
By the beginning of 2012 public perception regarding the continued effectiveness of the U.S. government significantly waned given that the sheer lack of accountability to perform that was displayed.
Examining Accountability in Traditional Public Administration
As explained earlier, accountability in traditional public administration is seen through the lens of political and democratic accountability. In such cases government officials and employees are held accountable to the general population by way of the popular vote. This means that those in the civil service are accountable to the country’s citizens by way of the politicians that they serve.
It should be noted though that there are distinct problems with the TPA model involving accountability (Heinrich, 2002: 712-725). First and foremost, while politicians are held accountable by the general public for the failure of particular projects or policies, the administrators of such projects are at times not held liable for failure despite their intimate role in the project’s/policy’s inception and execution.
Another problem with the TPA model of accountability comes in the form of its emphasis on capturing mistakes rather than showing achievements. In such cases, politicians and administrators often to follow the past of least resistance in enacting certain projects or policies.
In this regard the hesitance seen among the members reveals the unwillingness to commit mistakes since it is often the mistakes rather than the achievements that are the primary focus of the TPA accountability model. This results in the same problems described by Considine (2002) who examined accountability in public management wherein he stated that “…too much accountability can clog up the works, diverting resources and opening organizations to perverse pressures” (Considine, 2002: 21-40).
The TPA model involving accountability helps to reduce the amount of mistakes made through greater supervision of actions due to the liability of politicians towards the actions of their subordinates, the fact remains that this results in a slower form of public management.
In the examination of Humphrey & Miller (2012) on accountability practices, Humphrey and Miller attempted to determine the impact of accountability on public management, they were able to reveal that less accountability resulted in a more efficient system of governance since this allowed officials to pursue results rather than specifically focus on the procedures involving the financial and legal aspects of public management (Humphrey & Miller, 2012: 295-327).
Examining Accountability in New Public Management
Based on the work of Wimbush (2011) which examine the new public management model of accountability, citizens are viewed as customers with public officials being the managers ensuring that these “customers” are satisfied with the services that they are being given (Wimbush, 2011: 211-218).
In the case of the NPM model of accountability, managers (i.e. public officials) shifted the focus more towards improving the relationship between the government and the citizenry as compared to the previous model which focused more on developing a more hierarchical process of accountability (Ospina, Grau & Zaltsman, 2004: 229-251).
In this case the bureaucracy of accountability was shifted towards the side of the citizens wherein they, as consumers of the services of the government, are better positioned to be evaluators of public agencies. The main different between the NPM model and the TPA model of accountability is that the latter is actually considered inefficiently due to the way in which it focuses on the control of expenditure rather than the actual outcome of a policy or project.
As explained by Zapico-Goñi (2007) such a form of governance rarely achieved sufficient results given the level of stagnation brought about by hesitance to operate beyond indicated guidelines as a direct result of accountability (Zapico-Goñi, 2007: 421-438). One of the most notable differences between the accountability models is the fact that the NPM model focuses on performance accountability wherein the measurement of performance involving the implementation of policies and the use of resources is the focus rather than accountability for mistakes made found in the TPA model.
It is actually due to this focus on performance rather than the avoidance of mistakes that makes the NPM model superior to a certain extent as compared to the TPA model since it encourages action rather than complacency. Studies such as those by Hildebrand & McDavid (2011) have even stated that through the NPM model, public management improved significantly as a result of a greater government predilection towards creating and establishing new projects and policies meant to assist the general public (Hildebrand & McDavid, 2011: 41-72).
The last difference between the two models comes in the form of a shift towards allocating accountability towards the private sector when it is utilized in government projects and public services (Narayanan et al., 2007: 37-65).
However, despite the apparent effectiveness of accountability due to the shift to new public management, there are still issues that need to be addressed such as whether the current form of accountability within new public management is actually more effective than traditional public management or if the freedoms found in the new system cause more problems than they actually solve.
This is not to say that accountability should be removed from the formula of governance, far from it, accountability to one’s superiors and ultimately to the general public is an essential aspect for governance for without it the likelihood for abuse or mismanagement exists.
Accountability in Network Governance
In the network governance model, accountability becomes more horizontal rather than vertical wherein the utilization of various public agencies to help the government better understand the needs of the people resulted in the creation of “public value” wherein the government attempted to develop an effective and active relationship with the local citizenry (Brodkin, 2008: 317-336).
As a result, the NG model combines the cooperation and combination of the public and private sectors in order to achieve the results the government desires. A better way of seeing the impact of accountability in the network governance model is to look at it from the point of view of its decentralized nature.
With various sectors and component agencies constituting this particular model, there is no centralized structure that “dictates” actions wherein each agency or sector is able to act based on what they perceive to be the most appropriate form of action at the time.
This is considerably different to the hierarchical model seen in traditional public management wherein its top down structure ensured that those at the top found themselves accountable and liable for the actions of those at the bottom thereby resulted in an increased level of supervision and limitation on individual initiatives.
The end result is that the network governance model of accountability, just like the new public management model of accountability, allows government officials to better respond to the needs of the general public without letting the intricacies of accountability mixed with bureaucracy impede their actions.
Conclusion
Based on the various facts and arguments that have been presented in this paper so far, I have come to the conclusion that there is an insufficient degree of independent checks and balances system in the current accountability frameworks of governance that have been talked about.
The basis behind a check and balances process is to ensure that one facet of an organization does not become “supreme” in that based on a system of regulation one branch of a particular organization can regulate the other.
The concept of accountability is actually the basis of this particular process since without a system of regulation where one branch limits the other the possibility of actions without regard to possible accountability is a definite danger that could happen.
In the case of a successful organization a proper checks and balances process will be composed of several departments being limited in their action by other department with each aspect of the process having a certain degree of accountability. For example in the case of the healthcare industry doctors are held in check by healthcare providers by ensuring that only necessary tests are done to the patient in order to minimize the possibility of extra expenditure.
It is true that government officials should be held accountable to their actions, however, the fact remains that with the earlier example of the U.S. and its debt ceiling shown, in the current system, despite the fact that it has been greatly improved since its previous iteration is is still lacking in sufficient checks and balances to ensure that public management is done based on a solid belief in accountability for actions that are done or not accomplished at all.
Reference List
Alford, J., & Hughes, O. (2008). Public value pragmatism as the next phase of public management. The American Review of Public Administration, 38(2), 130-148.
Brodkin, E. Z. (2008). Accountability in Street-Level Organizations. International Journal Of Public Administration, 31(3), 317-336
Burns, J. P., & Zhou, Z. (2010). Performance Management in the Government of the People’s Republic of China: Accountability and Control in the Implementation of Public Policy. OECD Journal On Budgeting, 2010(2), 7-34.
Chan, H. S., & Rosenbloom, D. H. (2010). Four Challenges to Accountability in Contemporary Public Administration: Lessons From the United States and China. Administration & Society, 4211S-33S.
Considine, M. (2002). The end of the line. International Journal of Policy, 15(1), 21-40.
Demirag, I., & Khadaroo, I. (2011). Accountability and value for money: a theoretical framework for the relationship in public-private partnerships. Journal Of Management & Governance, 15(2), 271-296.
Heinrich, C. J. (2002). Outcomes-Based Performance Management in the Public Sector: Implications for Government Accountability and Effectiveness. Public Administration Review, 62(6), 712-725.
Hildebrand, R., & McDavid, J. C. (2011). Joining public accountability and performance management: A case study of Lethbridge, Alberta. Canadian Public Administration, 54(1), 41-72.
Humphrey, C., & Miller, P. (2012). Rethinking impact and redefining responsibility the parameters and coordinates of accounting and public management reforms. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 25(2), 295-327.
Kluvers, R., & Tippett, J. (2011). The Views of Councillors and Managers on Accountability in Local Government: An Empirical Study in Australia. International Journal Of Management, 28(2), 519-527.
Kluvers, R., & Tippett, J. (2012). The NPM: The Trojan Horse in Accountability. International Journal Of Business & Management, 7(3), 3-9
Koliba, C. J., Mills, R. M., & Zia, A. (2011). Accountability in Governance Networks: An Assessment of Public, Private, and Nonprofit Emergency Management Practices Following Hurricane Katrina. Public Administration Review, 71(2), 210-220.
Martin, M. H., & Halachmi, A. (2012). Public-private partnerships in global health: addressing issues of public accountability, risk management and governance. Public Administration Quarterly, 36(2), 189-23
Narayanan, V., Schocht, H. P., & Harrison, G. L. (2007). The interplay between accountability and management control patterns in public sector outsourcing. International Journal Of Business Studies, 15(2), 37-65.
Ospina, S., Grau, N., & Zaltsman, A. (2004). Performance evaluation, public management improvement and democratic accountability. Public Management Review, 6(2), 229-251
Pennington, R. G. (2009). Yes, but how? Nine tips for building a culture focused on results, relationships, and accountability. Industrial & Commercial Training, 41(3), 146-150.
Samaratunge, R., Alam, Q., & Teicher, J. (2008). Public sector reforms and accountability: The case of south and Southeast Asia. Public Management Review, 10(1), 101-126
Wimbush, E. (2011). Implementing an outcomes approach to public management and accountability in the UK-are we learning the lessons?. Public Money & Management, 31(3), 211-218
Wood, R. S. (2004). The New Public Dilemma: Supervision vs. Empowerment on the Front Lines of Government. Conference Papers — Midwestern Political Science Association, 1-30.
Zapico-Goñi, E. (2007). Matching Public Management, Accountability and Evaluation in Uncertain Contexts. Evaluation, 13(4), 421-438
Public officers assume the sole responsibility to serve the interest of the public upon assumption of office. However, they violate this by using their offices to influence the issuance of tenders, violating social values of personal integrity, misappropriating funds meant for the public.
Case Facts
Public officers usually face serious legal penalties if they are found to be violating these ethical codes. In some instances, it may lead to permanent forfeiture of the public offices that they hold. Section 1090 of the Government Code particularly prohibits employees from getting involved in contracts that they can use their offices to influence (Romm, 2001). In the case involving Robert Citron, there is little doubt that he used his office to acquire government tenders. Moreover, he was certainly driven by a personal financial interest in his decision to borrow $14 billion and invest it in complex derivatives contracts with Merrill Lynch & Company. Thus he violated the social value of putting the interests of the public before his interests (Williams, 2006). In addition, he violated organizational value that prohibits abuse of office to unduly influence business. That’s probably why he pleaded guilty of misappropriating funds, although his oath of office read the contrary. However, it must be noted that this public officer was faced with competing interests. He was either to seize the moment to make some personal financial gains or remain true to his oath of office in protecting the interests of the people. It was a hard choice making, especially considering that ethical culture had been considerably eroded at the moment. According to the literature, this practice became quite popular in California after the enactment of Proposition 13 (Diane, 2008).
Ethics & Accountability
The concept of accountability in public ethics and governance is a matter that should be taken very seriously. This is because an individual is holding a public office and that they have sworn to uphold the ethical standards of public offices, there should be a system that ensures that they remain accountable to these commitments. This is the fundamental responsibility that public officers have to the public that the law gives them a responsibility to protect (Mulgan, 2000).
Prevention
Although this mainly applies to officers in government offices, ethical standards should ideally apply to a non-profit organization and corporate sector as much as they apply to the public sector. However, this is hardly ever realized in the corporate and non-profit organizations as they don’t get the direct pressure of the public demanding accountability (Roberts, 1982). Usually, the public acts directly on the government that they have put in office to protect them against the private companies instead of trying to act on the institutions. This is the principle of the oath of office that they take (Dubois; Fattore, 2009).
Environment
The political class also has a responsibility to ensure accountability and office ethics. The idea here is that there are adequate laws that if properly implemented would provide water-tight protection to the public interest (Grant; Keohane, 2005). In case the laws no longer serve the public, the political class has the sole responsibility to change them to make them more responsive to the interests of the people. However, this ideal political environment is hardly achieved, especially in this era when political offices are staffed with psychopaths who have no heart for the common citizens (Ezzamel, 1997).
Conclusion
Public officers have a responsibility to protect the interests of the public. However, this is never ideally realized as regulating bodies occasionally relax in their watchdog roles, allowing erosion of ethical culture. However, the political environment has the mandate to restore sanity whenever ethics seem to be failing.
References
Diane Stone, (2008) ‘Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities and their Networks,’ Journal of Policy Sciences.
Dubois, Hans F. W.; Fattore, Giovanni (2009). International Journal of Public Administration. 32. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. pp. 704–727.
Ezzamel, Mahmoud (1997). “Accounting, Control and Accountability: Preliminary Evidence from Ancient Egypt”. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 8 (6): 563–601.
Grant, Ruth W.; Keohane, Robert O. (2005). “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics”. American Political Science Review 99 (1): 29–43
Mulgan, Richard (2000). “‘Accountability’: An Ever-Expanding Concept?”. Public Administration 78 (3): 555
Roberts, Jennnifer T. (1982). Accountability in Athenian Government. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Romm, Norma RA (2001). Accountability in Social Research. New York: Springer
Williams, Christopher (2006) Leadership accountability in a globalizing world. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
The current head of the state is Tuimaleali’ifano Va’aletoa Sualauvi II. Under his rule, the country has achieved successful results in the development of different spheres and has gained an appraisal of neighbors and partners. However, there are several politically important issues that the country is currently struggling to resolve. Firstly, since Samoa is a member of the United Nations Organization, it has to adjust its developmental standards to the requirements of the organization. Secondly, the state demonstrates challenges in the provision of free media within the framework of democratic rights. Also, one of the priorities in the political life of Samoa is the attraction of local communities and governments to the state governance system to ensure progress in all aspects of the country’s life (Meleisea et al. 8).
Economic Issues
The main spheres which enrich the Samoan economy are agriculture and fishing which, due to the climate, are the most productive. However, the harvest greatly depends on the cyclones which sometimes damage the households and impedes economic growth. The government utilizes reforming policies to introduce beneficial changes to the state economy. One of the main directions within this framework is financial reform which aims at giving more rights to the private sector, regulating the public sector, and reconstructing the tax base (Iati 153). A significant development in the tourism sphere is observed due to the attraction of foreign visitors to see the landscapes and scenery of the islands. Also, there are some attempts to incept light manufacturing to ensure production stability regardless of weather conditions which are so decisive for agriculture. The steps toward tourism and production development allow for attracting foreign investors. It all contributes to the growth of the Samoan economy.
Social Issues
The political and economic challenges that the country goes through, have their impact on the social life of the Samoan society. One of the main social problems is the growing gap between the rich population and poor citizens. The income rates vary greatly imposing inequality and forcing people to find ways to provide their families with needed things by all means. Due to these factors, street vendors appear with a growing speed which also imposes a social problem of a national level. Such a state of affairs threatens the safety of the citizens due to a possible increase in crime rates. Also, the disparities in income levels impose limited access of poor population to education. In addition, as the research conducted by Meleisea et al. shows, there is a need to address women’s rights to participate in decision-making processes at the governmental level (8). The state powers make attempts to reform the economy and politics of the country to resolve these crucial issues in the life of Samoan society. In conclusion, Samoa as a relatively young independent state has gained a certain level of political, economic, and social development. It was achieved by means of effective cooperation with neighbors and partners, as well as active participation in major international organizations. However, such issues as poverty, crime, limited opportunities for economic growth, and others become an obstacle and need to be resolved in the nearest future.
Works Cited
Iati, Iati. “Civil Society and Political Accountability in Samoa.” Pacific dynamics: Hournal of Interdisciplinary Research, vol. 1, no. 1, 2017, pp. 153-177.
Meleisea, Leasiolagi Malama, et al. Political Representation and Women’s Empowerment in Samoa. Vol. 2, National University of Samoa, 2015.
Governance and accountability is a critical concept to the development of states. Accountability in governance is a vital practice. It encourages effectiveness in discharge of duties and equitable allocation of resources. Accountability in different institutions has a close link with the way power is distributed in organizations. The loci of power in institutions are useful parameters for assessing the level of accountability in the organizations.
Decentralization of power is highly encouraged in most liberal democracies across the world. Decentralization of power is manifested in a number of managerial practices in institutions like the delegation of the organization’s duties and responsibilities (Brinkerhoff et al. 2009).
This paper looks into the aspects of centralization and decentralization of power in different institutions and how these two aspects of governance encourage accountability. In this paper, it is argued that institutions’ accountability is better attained through dispersion of power and the delegation of the organization’s responsibilities rather than through centralization of power and control.
Accountable governance in liberal democracies
Having mentioned liberal democracies, it is imperative to explain how the distribution of power encourages accountability in such nations. One vital characteristic of liberal democracies in the today’s world is the high decentralization of power.
Power and ability to make decisions in such countries do not lie in the hands of some individuals. Liberal states’ decisions are made through consultations between different arms of the government. This means that different arms of the government discuss, consult with each other and deliberate on the issues before the final decision is reached (Ezzamel et al. 2007).
Decisions reached through consultation and deliberations are better weighed than those that are made unilaterally. Different bodies which deliberate on the issues and come up with certain suggestions are also involved in the implementation of such decisions (Brinkerhoff et al. 2009). Therefore, there is a low possibility of manipulating decisions in the middle phases of implementation.
This encourages checks, ensuring that there is a balance in the implementation process. It is easy to detect anomalies in the implementation of the decisions because of the many observers monitoring the process.
Up to this point, it is imperative to say that liberal democracies encourage institutions’ accountability. Powers are decentralized from the top governance, leaving institutions with no other option, but to implement such structures (Mulgan,2003).
Having talked about liberal democracies, it is vital to mention autocratic governance. Autocratic governance is the least desired form government in the modern society. Autocracy means the centralization of power.
A few individuals are vested with decision making power, leaving other people as mere enforcers of the decisions reached. Channels of deliberating on issues are closed making most people rubber-stamp these decisions. The quality of decisions is put in jeopardy. Therefore, the level of accountability is often low in regimes which do not embrace democracy (Trechsel,2010).
Governance and accountability in decentralized institutions
Research shows that most people in the world are against the centralized system of governance. There are several reasons for the resentment. One of the strongest reasons is that centralized governance kills institutional accountability through the encouragement of unilateral decision making (Ezzamel et al. 2007). In centralized governance, there is one locus of power.
Institutional functions are coordinated from a single point. In some instances, all the powers to make key decisions are left under the control of one individual. The result of this is that one person takes advantage of the power to make certain decisions, which might not be favourable to the whole country/institution (Kaler,2002).
A deep look into the modern practices of institutional management shows that most organizations embrace decentralized structure of management.
Delegation of authority and responsibility can be traced in a wider range of institutions. This is one form of decentralizing power and encouraging sharing of organizational power and responsibilities. This practice is replicated at almost all levels of governance in countries that embrace democracy. Notable examples can be traced in the United States, Western Europe, and Australia (Curtin, Mair& Papadopoulos, 2010).
These are the benchmark regions in as far as institution’s accountability is concerned. The question that should be asked is how the decentralization of power and delegation of responsibilities contributes to a higher accountability. Another issue that should be discussed at this point is how the centralization of power and responsibilities kills institutional accountability.
These questions can be sufficiently answered by taking a deeper look into institution’s administration from two perspectives – centralized and decentralized governance (Schillemanns, 2008).
Decentralized institutional governance: its role in bringing about accountability
Steets (2010) observed that institutional accountability was often measured by the level at which institutions planed and assigned resources effectively in order to get the desired results. Accountability means that employees in an institution embrace ethics in their work (Shearer, 2002). The application of decentralized principles in organizations entails the redistribution of authority in institutions’ management.
In such institutions, power is shared among different people. Therefore, decisions are not made by a single authority. Each department is given powers to come up with their own suggestions that may be efficient. Each section of an organization has a head who leads it in coming up with decisions and implementing them using the available resources. Perhaps, one point should be noted here.
Decentralized authority does not mean that there is no centre of power. Numerous centres of power exist within an organization. However, each centre of power is given autonomy in a number of duties.
This is where the aspect of responsibility starts. Leaders of departments work closely with the organization’s members. Institutional workers keep close checks on each other and on the overall duties that are assigned to them (Kaler,2002).
Organizational tasks are not left in the hands of a few individuals but distributed among other segments of the organization. Leaving the task of decision making to fewer people has numerous consequences on institutions’ administration. One of the effects is that centralization of authority and responsibility causes flooding. Flooding encourages haphazardness in the discharge of institutional duties.
In such situations, it is easy for an institution to attain improved performance. In delegation, institutional responsibilities are assigned to people across the institution in such a way that no person is left with a wide load of work. This exercise depends on the abilities and skills of the institution’s workers. Therefore, it is easy to narrow on a person whenever anomalies occur in the institution.
However, anomalies rarely occur because every individual is involved in the institution’s production. Institutions are seen in terms of their ability to serve the society and not in terms of power and dominance (Hood,2010). Power is a minor element in situations where there is a higher delegation of duties and responsibilities. In other words, power is replaced by responsibility.
People work hard to accomplish their tasks as they are responsible for any task assigned to them. Most organizations in liberal democracies thrive in the global economy due to high levels of performance. The highest level of performance comes from the fact that there is a high level of organizational responsibility due to delegation of duties and responsibilities (Steets, 2010).
According to Behn (2001), a number of people argue that accountability can still be attained in institutions that have centralized operations. Their argument is that centralization promotes bureaucracy, which in turn encourages accountability in institutions. While there is some weight in the argument, the biggest portion of the argument is refuted.
This comes from the numerous study outcomes. Those results show that bureaucracy does not encourage accountability. Most functions in bureaucratic institutions are centralized. Delegation of responsibility is a rare practice in such institutions.
Conclusion
Institutional accountability is closely associated with decentralized systems of governance. This system of governance is synonymous with liberal democracies. Liberal democracies encourage the decentralization of power and delegation of administrative responsibility. Most institutions in liberal democracies embrace the democratic principles of management.
These principles include delegation of institutional power and responsibilities. This system governance is synonymous with autocratic regimes. In such regimes, institutions’ accountability is quite low due to the failure to enhance delegation of authorities.
Institution’s power is also highly centralized. From this discussion, it is imperative to say that there is a close relation between decentralization of institutions’ power and attainment of institutions’ accountability.
Reference List
Behn, R D 2001, Rethinking democratic accountability, Brookings Inst. Press, Washington, D.C.
Brinkerhoff, D W, Johnson, R W, Hill, R, Merrill, S, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute & Army War College (U.S.) 2009, Guide to rebuilding governance in stability operations: A role for the military, Army War College, U.S.
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The focus of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the implications of privatising public utilities with regard to accountability issues. In addition to the provision of supporting evidence, the paper assesses how privatisation of public utilities affects accountability. Privatisation of public utilities has two main effects on accountability. Efforts to privatise public utilities lead to demotivation on the part of the government.
The responsibility of the government is to investigate and respond to the demands of the public. When public utilities are privatised, the private sector takes up the role of providing the various services needed by members of the public. In addition to the government, efforts to privatise public utilities demotivate the entire public. The public sector lacks the resources and the mandate to mobilise resources and rouse for quality services.
The private sector ends up holding the public at ransom, inflating the costs charged on the government and, in extension, the public. In the process of legislating, some politicians may be biased and favour the issue of privatising public utilities. In most cases, they are the ones who benefit as most of the private companies that end up taking up the role of providing public services belong to them.
By privatising public utilities, the government reduces the role of members of the public in ensuring that the services provided are of high quality. The development has various effects as far as accountability is concerned. At the end of the day, the consumers pay more for the same services.
Introduction
Privatisation initiatives are mechanisms and components that fall under the broader liberalisation strategies and policies adopted by governments around the world. The main objective of privatisation initiatives is the formulation and implementation of policies aimed at restructuring the economy.
The major aim of such restructurings is to control the economy, especially if it has become inefficient and inebriated with corruption and other economic problems. The driving force behind the government’s decision to undertake such a policy is, in most cases, its ‘heavy’ involvement in the public sector. Resource privatisation, as a policy, is not an ancient phenomenon.
It is one of the most recent and most revolutionary innovations in economic policies. While this idea seems restricted to majority of the developed nations, a significant number of developing countries in the world find the initiative more applicable to their economies compared to other policies. All over the world, nations and governments regard the idea as a financial desire and a growth strategy.
However, while the idea continues to gain more ground and acceptability in most nations, some policy makers look at it from an accountability perspective. Most of the issues raised by these policy makers with regard to the honesty of the idea revolve around accountability issues.
They are also concerned with the credibility of the move, as well as the level of involvement among the three parties or stakeholders, namely the government, the private sector, and consumers of public utility goods and services.
Papadopoulos & Curtin (2012) state that the formulation and implementation of privatisation policies involves both complete and partial disposal of public utilities, as well as such assets as state-owned land. It also involves the privatisation of industries and businesses that were, for a long time, under the control of the government.
According to economists and other professionals, such as philosophers and political scientists, there are several theories explaining privatisation in ancient and contemporary economies.
According to Anjum (2012) and Hindmoor & Bell (2009), privatisation occurs when the government makes the decision to reduce its involvement in the management of some public resources. Through such an initiative, the government releases some of the resources and assets to the private sector.
In some of the arrangements entered into with the various stakeholders, the private sector is mandated to control part of, or the entire, resource base. The aim is to enhance the provision of services and goods to the end users like consumers and other citizens in the country.
According to Funnell (2001) and Savas (1987), privatisation, basically, involves an arrangement where competitiveness and efficiency are improved as far as the provision of public services and goods is concerned. Going by its early definition, the privatisation policy required the wholesale transfer of public assets and functions from the government to the private sector.
In contemporary society, it involves contracting a private investor to help the government in the provision of goods and services to the general public. On their part, Ellman (2006) and Hart (2003) define the concept as an arrangement where the government agrees to transfer its assets and services to investors in the private sector.
In a nutshell, the fundamental nature of privatising public utilities is to increase the participation of the general public (read private investors) in the production and delivery of goods and services in the society.
In one of their articles, Young & MacDonald (2000) question the rationality of the government in formulating and implementing privatisation policies. The scholars put the government to task given that, in most cases, it has at its disposal all the resources and mechanisms needed to satisfy the needs of the citizens. There are a number of theories explaining the pressures that force the government to take such initiatives.
According to Public Services Research Unit [PSIRU] (2006), there are four major reasons why the government may privatise most of the public utilities under its control. The four are populist, commercial, pragmatic, and ideological reasons.
According to the populist theory, there is always a felt and real need for the society (through the government) to give the citizens high quality goods and services using the available resources. Individuals in the society feel they have the right to access high quality services, such as health, water, and sanitation among others.
Privatisation initiatives help to empower such individuals and ensure that they have access (and control) over resources in the society. For example, when citizens buy shares (through initial public offers) in a power generating company that was under the control of the government, they end up controlling power generating resources in the country.
The second factor that pushes governments to privatisation involves commercial pressures. Analysts and supporters of privatisation initiatives argue that such policies help in setting up more businesses in an economy (Manubhai1998). Scholars, who support the commercial theory (Hess, Adams 2000; Ellman 2006,) argue that the state should give up its control over some resources. The reason for this is the size of the government.
The entity takes up a significant part of the economy. As a result, the provision of goods and services should be left in the hands of private firms. Private firms, given their commercial orientation, stand a better chance, compared to the government, to effectively utilise resources in improving the quality of life for the citizens.
According to pragmatist theorists, the aim of privatisation is to help improve the functionality of the government. An argument derived from this supposition asserts that privatisation policies lead to cost-effectiveness in the utilisation of public resources.
Uhr (2005) illustrates that the ideology behind the privatisation of resources by the government is related to the aim of helping in streamlining its operations and introducing a tendentious and effective public sector.
According to pragmatists, privatisation helps the government to continue growing and expanding to effectively make the needs of the citizens available to them. Most of the decisions made by the government are political in nature. As a result, such decisions are less trustworthy compared to those made in a free market economy.
Most of the arguments in support of privatisation initiatives maintain that societal dynamics force the government to rely on the private sector to help in meeting the needs of the citizens.
Specifically, the government relies on the private sector to provide the citizens with goods and services associated with public utilities. Based on this argument, Tiernan (2007) holds that the government may choose to contract the help of private investors in the local, regional, or international market.
Anjum (2012) asserts privatisation is associated with various benefits. For example, the leadership structure adopted in the private sector ensures that individuals are highly rewarded for their contribution in the development of the organisation, leading to high levels of motivation.
As such, increasing the number of firms in the private sector (through privatisation) increases the number of motivated individuals in the society as more people are employed in these private firms. However, the private sector is annoyed by job insecurities and such other issues.
In spite of this, the performance of private firms is significantly higher compared to that of the government. On the contrary, the public sector is associated with job security, but the employees lack incentives to improve their performance.
Ellman (2006) and Sarfraz (1998) are of the view that public utility, as a concept, is not clear defined. It includes, but not limited to, such items and assets as telephone services, road transport, rail transport, water services, insurance services, banking services, sewerage disposal, health care, education, electricity, postal services among others.
Under privatisation, the government mandates the private sector to take up some of its roles. The roles include providing the public with various goods and services. In one of the strategies used in privatisation of public utilities, the government may hire private investors and mandate them to handle the resources.
In such a case, the government gives up control to the private sector. Alternatively, the government may contract the services of the private investor, but retain the financial and political responsibilities to the citizens as far as control of the resources is concerned. In another arrangement, the state may grant the private sector the responsibility of enhancing performance in service delivery.
In either case, the function of the government revolves around regulating the operations of the service provider. Another strategy involves contracting the services of other stakeholders, for example the employers. Through such an arrangement, the government shifts its welfare burden to the service provider. The government may offer incentives or subsidies to both the citizens and the service providers in any of the three mechanisms.
In spite of its supporters’ spirited fight, a number of criticisms are pointed against the privatisation of public utilities. The individuals opposed to the idea of privatisation, both in developed and developing countries, regard such initiatives as a plot to sell off public utilities to private brokers.
In addition, the employees in most of these countries are against privatisation. In his article, Funnell (2001) illustrates that privatising public utilities may lead to loss of jobs and increased bureaucracy because of lack of accountability from the government.
There are various implications of privatisation of public utilities in relation to accountability. Hess & Adams (2000) identify one of the implications as the lack of effective mechanisms to impose penalties.
The others are price fluctuations, lack of guidelines to inform compensations and redress of complaints, as well as transparency issues. Other scholars are concerned with public participation, equitable access to public utilities, and the rise of monopolies.
According to Taylor & Balance (2005), it is important for the public to get involved in the decision making process. Before the government makes the decision to implement a project, it is important to enhance public involvement through their representatives. The policies advanced by the government in such cases enhance transparency in the management of state resources.
The consumers are directly involved as they participate in the management of the resources. Ellman (2006) is of the view that a lot of emphasis is placed on accountability and transparency as far as privatisation of public utilities is concerned. Two of the major concerns, according to the author, revolve around policies relating to public services and decision making process.
Active public involvement in the decision making process is one of the prerequisites of privatisation, which helps to improve service delivery through competition. As a result, the major concern in the process of formulating privatisation policies is whether or not the public is fully involved in the initiative.
Kanesalingam (1991) suggests that the government, through the public policies, should involve the citizens in the delivery of goods and services related to public utilities. It is the citizens who are aware of the services that will satisfy their needs. It is important to ensure participation of the public through informed debates.
The debates are very important as they are forums through which the public gets the opportunity to make their opinion known. It is only through the support of the government that the public can be represented in such debates.
Another major concern with regard to privatisation of public utilities is the frequent changes in the prices of goods and services provided by private investors. Evidence from the Australian Government (2006) shows that most private investors in both developed and developing nations tend to increase the prices of their goods and services.
One of the justifications provided is that investors in the private sector have to contend with the costs associated with monitoring and evaluation. Given that the major objective of the investors is to make profits, they pass the costs to the consumers to cushion their profit margins.
Apart from the issue of public involvement to ensure transparency, Hart (2003) and Manubhai (1998) notes that there are other factors that needs to be taken into consideration when privatising public utilities. They include, among others, basic responsibilities, social policy, equity, and universal access to public utilities.
Most of the problems that arise from privatisation affect the disadvantaged members of the community, such as the poor and the marginalized groups. The individuals who do not use the utilities may also be affected by the privatisation initiatives. It is observed that the sectors regarded as unprofitable in the economy are largely ignored by private investors and service providers who are profit oriented.
The same goes for geographical locations that are regarded as uneconomical. The reason why private investors ignore these regions is because of the perception that they are remote and less economically viable. As a result, they end up cutting down or even shutting down utilities in these areas, denying citizens access to services.
There are various real life examples used to illustrate the relationship between accountability and privatisation of public utilities. In 2009, the US government made efforts to liberalise and privatise its airline sector. The management of some airlines was left in the hands of private investors.
Because of remoteness and unprofitability of some routes, a number of airlines withdrew their services. The people leaving in these regions were highly inconvenienced. Another example is the privatisation of ActewAGL and United Water in 1995 by the Australian government (Australian Government 2006).
As a private company, United Water was mandated to initiate cost saving measures and increase the volume of water sold. However, there are various accountability issues that continue to bedevil this sector. The issues revolve around increase in water prices and standardized measures to address the quality of the commodity, as well as discharge of wastewater.
In conclusion, it is important to point out that the government should be fully responsible for certain public utilities like gas, water, electricity and other universal services. The government should ensure that there is continued supply of these critical services to the citizens.
References
1 Anjum, T 2012, Privatisation of public utilities: a consumer perspective, Consumer Rights Commission of Pakistan, Kabul.
2 Australian Government 2006, Department of Prime Minister: discussion paper on the role of the private sector in the supply of water and wastewater services, London House of Publishing, London.
3 Ellman, W 2006, Does privatising public service provision reduce accountability?, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain.
4 Funnell, W 2001, Government by fiat: the retreat from responsibility, UNSW Press, Sydney.
5 Hart, O 2003, ‘Incomplete contracts and public ownership: remarks, and an application to public-private partnerships’, Economic Journal, vol. 113, pp. 69-76.
6 Hess, D & Adams, M 2000, ‘Alternatives to competitive tendering and privatisation: a case study from the Australian health industry’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 59 no. 1, pp. 49-59.
7 Hindmoor, A & Bell, S 2009, Rethinking governance: the centrality of the state in modern society, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne.
8 Kanesalingam, V 1991, Introduction to privatisation: trends and experiences in South Asia, Macmillan, New Delhi.
9 Manubhai, S 1998, ‘Public services and the new role of the states and the government’, Liberal Times, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 9-12.
10 Papadopoulos, H & Curtin, D 2012, Accountability and European governance, McGraw-Hill, London.
11 Public Services Research Unit 2006, Pipe dreams: the failure of the private sector to invest in water services in developing countries, World Development Movement, London.
12 Sarfraz, K 1998, ‘Regulatory issues in Pakistan telecommunication’, The Pakistan Development Review, vol. 4, pp. 873-882.
13 Savas, S 1987, Privatisation: the key to better government, Chatham House Publishers: Chatham.
14 Taylor, A & Balance, T 2005, Competition and economic regulation in water: the future of the European Water industry, IWA Publishing, London.
15 Tiernan, A 2007, Power without responsibility, UNSW Press, Sydney.
16 Uhr, J 2005, Terms of trust: arguments over ethics in Australia, UNSW Press, Sydney.
17 Young M & MacDonald, D 2000, ‘Land and water, interstate water trading: a two year review’, Journal of Government Responsibility, vol. 3, pp. 122-134.
The Circles of Support and Accountability (COSA) model of reintegration inducts sexual offenders into mainstream thresholds of societal engagement. The initiative targets individuals who have undergone imprisonment for sex-related offences (Wilson, 2009). In most cases, it rehabilitates sex offenders into society through activities that restore their lost glory. Most sex offenders encounter difficulty as they strive to reintegrate and fit into society. Such challenges emanate from stigma that society ascribes to such patterns of behaviour. Participation is usually voluntary and does not suffice as a mandatory judicial requirement with regard to social offenders (Wilson, 2009).
There has been extensive discourse regarding the overall essence and rationale for such programmes in social contexts. Proponents of such initiatives argue that they support restoration of justice and fairness in societal contexts. Prior to its initiation and propagation in Canada, there was national outcry regarding the plight of sexual offenders who had to reintegrate into society (Wilson, 2009). Criminologists cited numerous instances where sex offenders relapsed into crime after completing their term in prison. Such realities prompted establishment of a programme that sought to bridge disparities that manifested with regard to issues surrounding sex offences and restoration of justice in Canada (Wilson, 2009).
Core members must exhibit willingness to revise existential parameters in order to establish new patterns of behaviour. Their voluntary involvement gives credence to the premise that anchors restoration of justice and reintegration into society. Society often views sex offenders with apprehension because of previous patterns of behaviour within social contexts (Wilson, 2009). In most cases, society fails to accept offenders into social agency. This reality leads them into self-destructive habits that ultimately drive them back into the turbulent world of crime. Most sex offenders encounter rejection and segregation due to negative perceptions regarding their past patterns of behaviour (Wilson, 2009).
COSA reflects the recurrent desire for society to integrate and incorporate offenders into mainstream societal engagements. During its inception, critics relayed sceptical nuances to discredit efforts that geared towards incorporation and rehabilitation of sex offenders. They argued that such efforts would not bear fruits because such offenders are usually beyond repair and rehabilitation (Wilson, 2009). They sought to discourage proponents by casting doubts regarding pertinent areas such as funding, oversight, and regulation. However, it is important to note that this programme continues to record success due to numerous internal mechanisms that enhance activities and operations within various ranks that define its existence (Wilson, 2009).
Essence and rationale for the programme
As earlier mentioned, COSA relays assistance and guidance to sex offenders upon completion of terms in prison. In most cases, it targets habitual offenders who hold higher risk of recidivism (Wilson, 2009). However, it is important to note that such involvement is voluntary and does not suffice as judicial or statutory prerequisite for release or reintegration into society. Once an individual joins the programme, they immediately receive assistance towards actualization and propagation of ideals that facilitates their reformation (Wilson, 2009).
Participants are core members of the initiative because they enjoy tutelage from three to five members of their community. They mentor and offer support in order to reintegrate and inculcate offenders into societal undertakings. In order to qualify as mentors, individuals are required to uphold dignity and good conduct. Such community volunteers dedicate efforts and resources towards rehabilitating and offering support to sex offenders. This is possible through constant meetings and conventions that facilitate sharing and delivery of information (Wilson, 2009).
COSA meetings usually deliberate on diverse issues that determine integration of offenders into mainstream society. They facilitate realization of daily needs that suffice in social contexts. For instance, they arrange for access to amenities such as healthcare and insurance facilities (Glasgow, 2008). They also offer assistance in crucial areas such as official emolument, provision of shelter, social services, and other components that cater for daily human livelihood in society. During meetings, programme coordinators determine personalized areas that require attention in order to facilitate realization and actualization through favourable avenues (Glasgow, 2008).
It is important to note that most meetings revolve around issues that impact on the welfare and propagation of core members within social contexts. Peripheral members and constituents of such meetings act as support frameworks that ultimately facilitate integration and acceptance into society. Meetings usually develop social strategies that devise proactive measures with regard to challenges affecting core members. In this particular instance, core members suffice as the most important aspect of the programme because they bolster the overall rationale and essence of the programme (Glasgow, 2008).
Most sex offenders experience numerous challenges that jeopardize their overall existence in society. This reality necessitates deliberate action towards ameliorating existential parameters in social contexts. Delivery of strategic solutions requires positivity and ability to realize areas that warrant action with regard to the propagation of sex offenders after completion of their terms in correctional facilities (Glasgow, 2008).
Devoid of such efforts, it would be difficult for authorities to account for the lives of offenders after they exit prison. Due to the successful nature of this programme, authorities should devise rational systems that guarantee its actualization and sustenance. For instance, legislators should allocate more funds in order to support operations within and without the programme. In absence of proper funding, it would be difficult for project coordinators to pursue avenues that strengthen and bolster operations within its area of operation (Glasgow, 2008).
It is important for experts to demystify various thought processes that characterize different behaviour in society. Young people face numerous challenges that ultimately drive them into destructive patterns of behaviour and conduct in society (Glasgow, 2008). COSA evaluates such attitudes and perceptions in order to determine appropriate action that could aid in diffusing and pre-empting such patterns of behaviour. It is important to note that this programme halts offending cycles that undermine reintegration into various societal ranks (Glasgow, 2008). It also invokes active participation by offenders in order to get first hand facts that ultimately lead to successful realization of basic ideals and aspirations that characterize the operations of the programme. During meetings, members recognize areas that record success and appreciate those that warrant various forms of improvement (Glasgow, 2008).
They sanction core members to offer valid explanations that justify the overall desire for integration and involvement in societal activities. They constantly assess progress and willingness to revise previous patterns of behaviour and engagement in social contexts. It is necessary for programme leaders to hone a culture of transparency and accountability in order to facilitate realization of core ideals and aspirations that characterize similar initiatives with regard to society and its associative entities (Glasgow, 2008).
The history of COSA model of reintegration
This model of reintegration commenced its Canadian operations in 1994. Its initialization and propagation sufficed through efforts spearheaded by pastor Harry Nigh, through his association with a man who had habitually fell into cycles of sexual offences (Dobrow, 2004). Harry sought to understand and demystify parametrical thresholds that determined such habitual cycles of sexual offence. He further sought to understand the role of society in eradicating such destructive cycles of abuse. According to Harry, it was evident that most habitual sex offenders had difficulty finding appropriate levels of acceptance within social contexts (Dobrow, 2004).
For instance, they had difficulty accessing basic amenities and services such as healthcare, food, water, and shelter. He thought that such circumstances could have been responsible for high rates of recidivism with regard to habitual sex offenders. Harry mobilized stakeholders in his ministry in order to devise structural frameworks that could support rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders into mainstream societal engagements (Dobrow, 2004). They formulated a support group that sought to engage sex offenders and facilitate livelihood and existence in society after completing terms in prison. In order to sustain operations, they applied for funding from church and state agencies. The Mennonite Central Committee of Ontario availed funds towards realization and formulation of the support group (Dobrow, 2004). The committee realized need for such noble undertakings in order to guarantee sustainability with regard to reintegration of sexual offenders. The pastor and his support group received additional funding from Correctional Service Canada (CSC) (Dobrow, 2004).
Such support enabled drafting of mechanisms and structures that ultimately led to establishment of a nationwide programme that offered support to sex offenders within society. The programme continues to record vigorous expansion into other countries such as the United Kingdom. The United States also supports COSA programmes in its various jurisdictional entities (Dobrow, 2004). France, Netherlands, and New Zealand have plans to create and actualize such programmes within their jurisdictions. Through the COSA model, there has been hope for thousands of sex offenders who find it difficult to reinvent and fit into mainstream societal engagements (Dobrow, 2004).
The model offers an opportunity for sex offenders to revise existential parameters in order to attain new patterns of behaviour in society. This enables them to associate with individuals who inspire and motivate them to change and create fresh impetus for moral conduct within society. Through its activities, COSA offers opportunity for sex offenders to engage in societal activities and operations without fear of apprehension or retribution (Dobrow, 2004). It sensitizes community members on need for positive attitudes towards offenders who seek to reintegrate into society after completing jail terms. According to experts, most sex offenders experience mental and emotional instability. Such realities affect their ability to conform and align to societal ideals and aspirations (Dobrow, 2004).
They encounter numerous challenges as they pursue normal operations within society. This happens due to stigma and segregation that suffices with regard to their predicament and position in society. Support groups are very important because they offer medical and counselling services that guarantee successful integration into society (Dobrow, 2004). Society should learn to support and encourage sex offenders to develop new skills and learn various coping strategies that enhance and facilitate their integration into society. Many sex offenders retreat into crime because of the hostility they face after exiting correctional facilities. This makes it difficult for them to realize and master full potential in areas that define existence in social contexts (Dobrow, 2004).
Validation of COSA model of reintegration
Since inception of COSA model of reintegration, there has been discourse with regard to its essence and rationale. Government and community agencies continue to quantify benefits that arise from such support programmes within social contexts (Lee, 2006). They strive to understand how involvement in such entities leads to low levels of recidivism among high-risk sex offenders. It is evident that offenders who involve themselves in activities within such groups have lower chances for unpleasant behaviour within social contexts. One reason for such reality emanates from the benefits and satisfaction they receive from support groups (Lee, 2006).
For instance, they benefit from material provisions that alleviate recurrent physical needs. Besides material provisions, offenders receive psychosocial support that allows them to integrate and fit into society (Lee, 2006). In most cases, sex offenders suffer emotional and psychological distress that jeopardizes their willingness to change and revise existential parameters. Most high-risk sex offenders encounter emotional and psychological challenges that undermine overall efforts towards reintegration and harmonious coexistence within social contexts. Support groups are integral in offering direction with regard to reintegration into community life (Lee, 2006).
In recent past, there have been studies that sought to establish the validity of models of integration within social contexts. One such study preoccupied with frequency with regard to recidivism among high-risk sex offenders in Canada (Lee, 2006). It drew comparison between COSA members and other high-risk offenders who did not subscribe to any form of support group within their communities. They sought to establish recurrent connections between social support and reintegration. Previous studies had shown correlation between social support and low rates of recidivism. This particular study devised structural regimes that facilitated probe into parametrical thresholds that govern reintegration into society (Lee, 2006).
It propagated comparison between members of COSA model and those who did not benefit from such services. It comprised 60 sex offenders who were actively involved in reintegration efforts through COSA support group. The study considered realities that govern participation and sustenance within such groups. It investigated nature and scope of services that suffice with regard to such groups. In order to establish accurate findings and outcomes, researchers interacted with offenders through groups or contact persons (Lee, 2006). They conducted interviews and other engagements with a view to establish overall relevance and implication of support on high-risk sex offenders in society. The study applied pertinent parameters such as length of period spent in jail, levels of risk, involvement in communal activities, and individual desire for change and reintegration into society (Lee, 2006).
This research exercise lasted four years. During that period, experts interrogated various aspects of sex offenders and their coping strategies with regard to changes in existence within different social settings. Results that sufficed in this exercise showed that offenders who subscribed to any form of support groups had little chance for recidivism due to values and influence they receive from support networks (Lee, 2006). Results showed low rates of reoffending and willingness to engage in criminal activities. Members of COSA exhibited high levels of optimism and desire for change with regard to existence and propagation in social contexts (Lee, 2006). They portrayed desire for closure regarding previous cycles of crime. There was evidence of reduced rates of sex recidivism among offenders who participated in COSA activities. Besides sex recidivism, there was evidence of reduction in other forms of offences that characterized previous cycles of criminal engagements. The study was integral in offering fresh impetus towards validation of models of reintegration within social contexts (Lee, 2006).
The second research undertaking put emphasis on realities that characterize existence of sexual offenders within Canadian society. It sought to understand how various factors enhance development and propagation with regard to recurrent cycles of sexual offences within social contexts. This study correlated with previous ones regarding orientation and focus on fluctuations in rates of recidivism among offenders (Lee, 2006). It focused on basic tenets that sufficed with regard to the pilot project in Ontario, Canada. The methodology of this study was similar to the first study that had centred on similar concerns and attitudes. Its major preoccupation was devising comparisons between COSA offenders and those who were not associated with any form of support through community and social entities (Lee, 2006).
In order to guarantee accuracy and precision, the second study did not enlist core members of the inaugural project. This sought to create disparities and points of convergence with regard to research outcomes. This particular study revealed outcomes that gave credence to earlier sentiments on the essence and rationale for models of reintegration. Outcomes revealed low rates of sex recidivism as opposed to other forms of offences. This showed that models of reintegration had a role to play in enhancing harmonious coexistence and incorporation into social contexts (Lee, 2006).
Relevance of the COSA model of reintegration
COSA model of reintegration is an important facet within systems that seek to guarantee restoration of justice in society. Most models of reintegration fail to actualize pertinent ideals due to constraints that afflict their operative networks. Such models do not fulfil their mandate with regard to rehabilitation and restoration of offenders into society (Wilson, 2007). However, the Circles of Support and Accountability model offers offenders an opportunity to revise their patterns of behaviour in order to ensure and guarantee reintegration into society. This model continues to elicit discourse among observers who seek to understand and demystify its operations. Their efforts gear towards demystifying internal structural frameworks that support sustenance and propagation of its services within diverse contexts (Wilson, 2007).
Most people appreciate difficulties and challenges that manifest within organizations and groups that rehabilitate habitual offenders. Indeed, COSA model is unique and special because it harbours internal mechanisms that facilitate reintegration and sustenance in social contexts. The model is efficient because it deals with individuals who desire change and integration (Wilson, 2007). Its voluntary membership programme ensures that members are dedicated and willing to change recurrent patterns of behaviour. The model uses people who have proper reputation in society. Such individuals suffice as mentors and role models. They guide sex offenders and create impetus for change and re-evaluation, especially on areas that characterize previous patterns of abuse and disregard for legal provisions that guide human behaviour in social contexts (Wilson, 2007).
It is important for such models to enlist services that add value to overall ideals and aspirations within their settings. Sex offenders require proper tutelage to guarantee and support reintegration and existence within society. Their social disposition does not satisfy inherent societal values because they lack respect for humanity and rule of law. Therefore, it is important for such models to inculcate and hone values that underlie human existence in society. Devoid of such efforts, models of reintegration cannot satisfy expectations that guide sustenance and propagation in social contexts (Wilson, 2007).
As earlier mentioned, COSA model of reintegration is successful and relevant in its area of operation within society. Its success emanates from proper management and support within diverse contexts. The model has support from government and correctional authorities. Government agencies appreciate its role in restoring justice in society (Wilson, 2007). Its core functions and modalities revolve around rehabilitation and restoration of habitual sex offenders. Most of these offenders feel aggrieved by treatment that they receive from society due to previous patterns of abuse and disregard for the law. Therefore, it is important for models of reintegration to consider such realities and offer reprieve to individuals. This can only happen through concerted efforts that gear towards creation and propagation of structural and institutional frameworks that support such undertakings (Wilson, 2007).
Such structures should offer opportunity for offenders to pursue constructive activities that enhance revision and pursuit of conventional behaviours that suffice in society. This model is successful because its structural framework is inclusive and participative. Under this model, sex offenders participate voluntarily without any form of coercion (Wilson, 2007). Indeed, freedom is an important condiment with regard to sustaining relations with offenders who have spent long periods in prison. Any feeling of oppression or undue repression could lead to withdrawal and other forms of adverse reactions. Success of this model of reintegration emanates from its ability to recognize basic realities that characterize sex offenders in diverse contexts. This enables it to reintegrate offenders and ultimately record low rates of recidivism (Wilson, 2007).
Due to successful propagation of COSA programmes within Canada, other countries have begun efforts to replicate its essence within their respective jurisdictions. For instance, most jurisdictions within the United States have similar programmes that seek to guarantee rehabilitation and reintegration of high-risk offenders into society. Such jurisdictions find it necessary because they have a lot to learn from the Canadian model of reintegration (Wilson, 2007). This is an important area of interest because it supports replication and propagation of similar programmes within the region and beyond. Other countries must replicate the COSA model because it exhibits high rates of success with regard to rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Through such efforts, they will benefit and guarantee progress in restoration of justice in respective jurisdictions (Wilson, 2007).
It is important to recognize that the COSA model revolves around creation of institutional and structural frameworks that enhance rehabilitation and reintegration of sex offenders into mainstream society. The model continues to yield positive outcomes because there are low rates of sex recidivism and other related forms of criminal activities. This is possible through concerted efforts towards creation and propagation of appropriate mechanisms that support such undertakings (Wilson, 2007).
Effective march 31 2013, the Canadian federal government plans to reduce funding that goes towards the COSA programme. The government cites various reasons that characterize evaluation and revision of parameters with regard to such programmes (Peck, 2013). It is unwise of the federal government to reduce funding for this initiative because it could undermine efforts that gear towards rehabilitation of habitual sex offenders. This could also affect the plight of sex offenders who are currently active within the initiative (Peck, 2013).
In fact, the government should channel more funds into correctional facilities in order to ensure and guarantee delivery of appropriate services that support rehabilitation and reintegration of habitual sex offenders into mainstream operations within society (Peck, 2013). Reduction of funding could undermine current efforts that seek to bolster operations with regard to sustenance and propagation of models of reintegration and rehabilitation. It is important for the government to support such initiatives because they contribute to success with regard to restoration of justice in society (Peck, 2013).
Conclusion
There has been extensive discourse regarding overall essence and rationale for such programmes in social contexts. Proponents of such initiatives argue that they support restoration of justice and fairness in societal contexts (Peck, 2013). Prior to its initiation and propagation in Canada, there was national outcry regarding plight of sexual offenders who had to reintegrate into society. COSA model offers opportunity for such offenders to regain proper participation with regard to societal undertakings. The federal government should encourage propagation of such programmes in order to guarantee systems that support reintegration and fusion into social contexts (Peck, 2013).
References
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Glasgow, R. (2008). Types of Evidence Most Needed to Advance Behavioural Change Among Sex Offenders. Ann. Behav.Med., 35(8), 19–25. Web.
Lee, D. (2006). A Multicenter Retrospective Pilot Study of Attitudes Associated with High Risk Sexual Offenders. Archives of Criminal Justice, 27(3), 12-19. Web.
Peck, J. (2013). The Impact of Reintegration on High-risk Sexual Offenders in Canada. Journal of Criminal Justice, 12(6), 81-106. Web.
Wilson, R. (2007). Evaluating the Effectiveness of Professionally Facilitated Volunteerism in the Community Based Management of High Risk Sexual Offenders: A Comparison of Recidivism Rates. Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 46(7), 327-337. Web.
Wilson, R. (2009). Circles of Support & Accountability: A Canadian National Replication of Outcome Findings. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research & Treatment, 21(12), 412-430. Web.