Category: 9/11

After 9/11, Leffller noted that the American administration under President Bush came up with radical measures to respond to the state of security in the country. The government’s response generated a heated debate with supporters of Bush claiming that the action would bring change in the way country’s security is handled.

In their view, the proponents of observed praised the government by describing them as bold, creative, imaginative since they would minimize terrorist threats. The opponents termed the government’s move as adventurous, proactive, and imprudent in the sense that they would not have facilitated the realization of interests.

The author took a neutral stand by claiming that the changes introduced were not an end, but instead a means towards improvement of state security. The policies designed after 9/11 was a continuation of the American foreign policy that had been put in place several years ago.

He noted that understanding of the current measures in handling country’s security calls on an individual to analyze the changes in the state foreign policy. The current foreign policy has the potential to improve the performance of the state globally while on the other hand, it might affect state interests in case implementation is not done appropriately.

While the state has been focused on bringing about change with the major aim of improving the standards of living, revolutions are not included since they simply alter the fundamental principles. In his analysis, the country’s behavior in response to the 9/11 attack constitute a recalibration of the complex interactions and interrelations as far as threats, interests, values, and power are concerned.

Depending on what the country is interested in, the foreign policy is expected to change and interactions among various aspects is a determining factor as well. If the state is under threats from terrorists, rogue states, and belligerent actor, the issue of values would generate a heated debate. The government is likely to incite members of the public to support its policies by claiming that the country’s values and ideas are in danger.

This means that the state has always formulated a foreign policy that serves its interests at the time and incorporation of the public is critical for purpose of funding. In his view, the 9/11 security policies were not revolutionary in any way since the president was guided by the government’s 2002 strategy statement.

Opponents suggest that the National Security Strategy statement, which was designed after the attack, aims at preempting threats, unilateral formulation of policy, and gaining military hegemony globally. The author opposes the idea that the government was concerned with gaining military strength when it formulated the policies after the attack since the strategies were not any different from the traditional foreign policies.

After the First World War, the author confirms that the US reformulated its economic and foreign policies to reflect the new realities in the global system. The state was decided to empower its people economically by allowing them political and economic freedom, resolving conflicts with other actors peacefully, and respecting human dignity.

In other words, the US foreign policy has always been focused on promoting freedom in the international system. The US president was reaffirming his commitment to the country’s values since he aspired to defend liberty and justice, as the two principles were right and true to all people in the country.

In the document designed after the attack, the president called on all states to support his mission since it would defeat global terrorism, encourage cooperation in diffusing regional conflicts, and prevent enemies from causing destruction. The scholar went a notch higher to compare the Bush policies with other decisions made several years ago, especially when the state interests were at stake.

He gives readers an opportunity to think about the open door notes of 1899 and 1900, Wilson’s fourteen points on democracy, the Atlantic charter, and Truman’s doctrines. Recently, he reminds readers of the Clinton’s efforts to ensure a peaceful global environment that support democracy and human development. Clinton was focused on facilitating peace, preventing aggression, managing, defusing, and preventing any form of conflict.

On the domestic front, Clinton was concerned with enhancing exportation, opening up markets, helping American traders globally, fostering development, and promoting sustainability. During the Clinton administration, the United States was faced with the challenge of dealing with human tracking, narcotics, terrorism, crime, and development.

The administration drafted a blue print on how to deal with the issues based on the country’s foreign policy framework developed several years ago. Similarly, the Bush administration relied on the same policy framework to design strategies to respond to the 9/11 attacks.

Was the Bush administration right to design new strategies to deal with terrorism

The US government has always been guided by a certain foreign policy framework that aims at ensuring state interests are realized. Before the World Wars, the state was guided by non-interventionist policy and it stated that the government had to keep off from external intervention.

After the attack on the Pearl Harbor, the foreign policy changed significantly and the state was expected to intervene whenever it was felt that national interests were at risk.

Following the bombing of the US, the government had the mandate of ensuring that people are safe and the only way to deal with the terrorists who were a major threat to the realization of American dream. Therefore, drafting of policies to respond strongly to security threats was the best thing that the Bush administration did.

Were the changes introduced after the 9/11 attack revolutionary in any way

President Bush had various options, including consulting the United Nations and waiting for a multinational action, but this would take time since it would need members of the Security Council to agree on the best way forward. This would have given terrorists, rogue states time to restructure their policies and defeating them would not have been easy.

Therefore, the government had to do swing into action right away to deal with the menace. Many leaders relied on the prerogative powers bestowed to them constitutionally to safeguard the interests of the state.

President Wilson noticed that the world was in need of democracy to facilitate healing and peace. He drafted the fourteen points that acted as the guiding principles towards peaceful resolution of conflicts. Similarly, President Bush had to draft policies that would guarantee its citizens peace and tranquility.

Were the President’s decisions unilateral, preemptive, or hegemonic

Depending on the way an individual views the terms, any answer would be accepted, but the author claims that they were not in the sense that they aimed at helping all actors in the international system.

Abstract

This assignment looks at the effect of the September 11 bombing of the US concerning Israel and Palestine relations. Of concern is that the discussion comes out with facts that Israel has developed policies that favor them with the backing of the US. The US has used Israel as an offshore military base to advance its military influence on the Middle East. Palestine will continue depending on Israel until a two-state settlement is reached in an unpredictable time frame.

Israel’s Relationship With Palestine

Israel’s relationship with Palestine has been frosty since 1967 after the conflict. The policies have been enacted to foster Israel’s control over the Palestinian economy where the major problem for the leaders have been to distinguish between the integration of Palestine into the Israeli economy or separation into two separate economic and political entities. In 1967 the borders after a preliminary recommendation from the committee set up by Prime Minister Eshkol were eliminated as new one were established. The external borders were closed as and the Green Line has abolished in which economic transactions crossed the Green Line. This however happened with visible and hidden restrictions.

Israel implemented the trade protocol with conditions in which the external trade was dictated by them in which custom union was established. The movement of manufactured goods and agricultural goods was controlled to limit competition from territories. The Palestinian public sector that dealt with taxation, service provision, and investment infrastructure among others was closed in 1967 up to 1993 when the limited opening was allowed. Macroeconomic

policies aimed at helping Palestinians were never implemented, local currency never existed banking system was closed until the 1980s.

The GDP of the Palestine region especially the West Bank and Gaza was less developed than that of Israel. For example in 1976 the GDP in West Bank was 3.5 % of Israel and in Gaza, it was 1%. the living conditions between Palestine and Israel continues up to the present as seen in the table below;

The initial recommendations of Israel policy included;

1. a) holding territories by conducting suitable economic activities
2. b) holding territories with emphasis on resolving the problem of refugees in the Gaza strip
3. c) delivering the economic borders between administered territories and Israel
4. d) Palestinian labor force not permitted into Israel economy while allowing free movement of goods and services.
5. e) Provision of employment through housing in the Gaza strip.
6. f) Eliminating trade border but preserving labor order

But within 2 years after the adoption of the recommendations, the labor border disappeared and the trade border was demarcated with limitations that protect Israeli farmers.

Due to this policies implementation, two groups emerged each supporting different opinions about economic integration and separation, Moshe Dayan, the then prime minister supported economic integration which could reduce economic hardship while the other group wanted economic separation would allow the flow of goods and services thereby reducing economic deprivation of the territories.

The economic policy of Israel from the 1960s played a key role in shape in which development of the Palestinian economy for the last four decades. This was evident in the pattern of employment of Palestinians. Their salaries were lower than Israeli workers and the economy grew at a slow pace due to Israeli politics. After the 1987 Intifada, closer ties between Israel and Palestine developed in trade and employment. The Gulf War led to the expected implementation of a peace policy in which the Arab countries that supported the US invasion wanted a permanent peace solution. However, Israel reassessed the situation which led to a change in economic policy.

In 1991 Israel agreed to let local initiatives that would compete with Israeli manufactures. These also led to Israel-PLO arrangements of political and economic dimensions in which they wanted to implement the Oslo Accord that requires an agreed approach. The imposed economic regime of Israel ended and the Paris protocol made significant modifications to the 1960s policies. Here the trade barriers and trade regime were implemented.

After the Paris protocol, new restrictions were imposed and free movement of goods and labor within Israel and territories was restricted. Political and security concerns were established and enforced by Israel. It created the Palestine interim self-governing authority (PISGA) that later transformed into Palestine authority. The Palestine authority was responsible for civil and security issues. But due to frequent closures and replacement of Palestine workers with foreign workers, there were changes in relations between the two and made Palestine crumble its economy.

Palestine continued to depend on Israel who transferred about 60% of revenue collected to Palestine authority but was stopped when there was the bombing of Israel in 1997. On this note in it is apparent that the demarcation of Palestine from Israel in terms of political, legal, and economic borders continues to affect Israel politics up to the present. In July 2000 the talks on the Palestine-Israel peace pact failed to achieve an amicable solution and hence resulted in the Second Intifada. These had a catastrophic impact on the economy of Israel and Palestine. Israel’s economy dropped by 8% while living standards in Palestine dropped by 35% in West Bank alone and the poverty rate rose to 40%.

It also comes up that since the September 11 bombing of the US Israel’s policies have not changed since 1994. The Hamas group has risen and defeated the US-Israel-backed Fatah leadership. These have posed challenges to Israel’s economic life. This is because Hamas doesn’t recognize Israel as a legitimate political entity, it does not agree with Israel on land demarcation as well as on sharing of the territory. On the other hand Israel doe not recognize the rights of Palestine in principle and deeds.

Chomsky in her review of the effects of September 11 on the US she says that the election of Hamas reinforced the security concern of the US and Israel who opposed it and made sure Hamas did not rule. They financed, trained, and armed Fatah so that they can overthrow Hamas. They stepped up violence in Gaza, withheld funds, and cut water flow to Gaza. They also rejected the call of Hamas for a long-term ceasefire and allow for negotiations. Israel went ahead and annexed, dismembered, and imprisoned Palestinians in the west bank and tightened their grip in Gaza.

US and Israel put demanded Hamas to agree on the implementation of the Road Map of Quartet or otherwise they will not come out from the captivity they were in. these included them to recognize Israel, renounce violence, and accept past agreements. This according to Chomsky is hypocrisy because the US and Israel do not accept the past agreement. For instance, Israel did not agree to cease violence or incitement against Palestine. Thus the Road Map was suppressed and Israel and the US continued to implement their plans in West Bank with the support of Fatah who will be rewarded with the release of 600 million dollars it had frozen.

The US-appointed Ex-Prime Minister Tony Blair as special envoy to Middle East conflict. This has been noted by critics of bush administration as a smear campaign since they hold key decision-making roles and Blair is only to look at problems arising from the institutional building.

However, in January 2001, there was confidence in the settlement of peace accord in Taba Egypt but was called off by Ehud Barak at the last minute dashing hopes for a two-state settlement shortly.

Similarly, the invasion of Israel backed by the US to Lebanon is equated to the 1982 invasion of Palestine in which it was used to provoke Palestine not to agree on diplomatic settlement.

US and Israel have demanded Hams to accept the 2002 Arab League in Beirut proposing for the normalization of Israel according to international consensus. The proposal has been received by PLO, the supreme leader of Iran and Hezbollah. Although this is seen to achieve some peaceful negotiation, the US and Israel find beneficial impact in ensuring they have a visible threat to Iran by eliminating Hezbollah and Lebanon.

The extent to which the US is using Israel shows that Israel is an offshoot of the US military base and that the effects seen in the regional politics are catastrophic even to the interests they claim to uphold. In July 2006 they justified their aggression of Lebanon when they captured two Israeli soldiers. These led to the death of tens of Lebanese civilians. The irony is that these western countries do not see their capture, kidnapping, and killing of civilians as wrong.

Falk and Kriegler in their article on the Iraq war after September 11, explain that this is a battlefield that reinforces their previous war invasion such as the Gulf War(1991), Kosovo(1999), and Afghanistan (2001). The impact of this war is a deviation from what the Israelites are have been oppressing the Palestinian for decades. This is evident given the fact that Americans are involved in the Indo-Pakistan conflict which may cause one of the major wars of nuclear powers and bring international lawlessness. The US foreign policy is destructive and since they set rules and other states follow it will lead to a fight against US influence and interests across the globe.

Conclusion

This paper discusses the effect of the September 11 bombing of the US concerning the Israel Palestine association plus the regional countries. We find that the Israel policies have been established in their favor backed by US foreign policy. This has contributed to the economic marginalization of regional countries in the Middle East such as Palestine, Iraq, and Lebanon. Other countries are in a state of cautiousness since the conflict can spill over them like Iran. Palestine continues to depend upon Israel until a solution is found.

References

Arnon, Arie. “Israel policy to Palestine.” Middle East Journal 62, no. 4 (2007): 573.

Chomsky, Naom. US-Israel invasion. (2006), Web.

Chomsky, Naom. Guillotining Gaza. (2007), Web.

Falk, Richard and David Kriegler. After Iraq war. (2003), Web.

The September 11 2001 attack is a major political event that I can remember though it was a terrorist activity. The attack can be termed political because it was a transformative incident. As far as I am concerned, the attack happened when I was 17 years and this therefore left a very big impression on my life. From my childhood, I have never had or experienced any other political event or issue that left a big impression in my life like the September 11 2001 attack.

This event had an impression on my life because it ultimately brought a new approach to war on terrorism. As a matter of fact, the aftermath of these attacks led to various political motivations that enabled me to know more about the political side of terrorism. There was a lot of political pressure on various groups by the American government in its bold initiative to fight terrorism.

I can confidently say that this event shaped my views towards government and politics that revolve around terrorism. This is because the world started seeing terrorism from a different point of view based on the effects of this event. After this attack, the US government launched an attack on Afghanistan but there was no opposition because many countries supported it. The war on terrorism had never taken such a direction but this event changed everything.

As a matter of fact, this event is still fresh in most American citizens’ mind which explains why it is a one of the major political events that has ever happened in the country. Initially, the war on terrorism could not be undertaken or pursued without any evidence or occurrence but this meant that the country had to change its approach to the politics of war on terrorism.

I have always known that anti-terrorism is a response to a terrorist activity but I had never seen this in action as such activities were not done in public or with the engagement of the public. These therefore changed my understanding of how such issues work because every American and even politicians were involved in this debate. The attacks led to a lot of political effects and activities that have never been seen before. This was based on the need to ensure that the world is united against the war on terror. Countries came up with a lot of legislation to ensure that the war on terrorism is on track. Just the fact that countries were placed on high alert after the attack shows that they had to come up with good security measures that entailed a lot of legislation.

This event definitely left me idealistic because our general experience is based on mental activity. Idealism revolves around relating to a given activity and this is the experience that I got from the attack. The war on terrorism has attracted a lot of political debate with some countries saying that they are being targeted in the name of fighting terrorism. It should be known that the attack and politics were closely intertwined in a broad way because it affected the brand of Republicans.

All this withstanding, Republicans held a 36 point lead over Democrats when asked which party was best positioned to fight terrorism. This means that the attack raised concerns on which was the best party that could be trusted to fight terrorism. In this case, this event enabled me to understand various aspects about the country’s security system.

Political socialization agents’ play an important role in our lives as far as understanding various aspects of politics are concerned. As a matter of fact, it should be known that political socialization agents influence our opinion in a great way. My family has never been much into politics although I had developed some interest in various aspects of politics. Because of this gap where my father and mother were not obsessed with politics, the media kept me informed on various political issues.

In this case, the media as a political socialization agent has been shaping my opinion as time goes by. First of all, through the TV, I could listen to various aspects of our politics thereby understanding what was going on. I have grown up getting information from the media about our politics which has been the basis of my opinion.

Human beings have been known to be social meaning that we always relate with people around us. As much as I have been engaging in political discussions and debates with my friends, all our opinions have always come from the media. Most notably, the internet has been instrumental in shaping my political opinion as I have grown up because of diversity. In this case, the internet has a lot of information that is always updated as the political scene and happenings change.

This means that I have always been updated on what is going on around me as far as politics is concerned. In addition, newspapers have been good political socialization agents based on the analysis that has been done by various commentators. The media has a lot of freedom meaning that they are always open as far as their reporting is concerned. This therefore has always been my trusted source of information as far as politics is concerned.

Politics has been changing as time goes by and this can be complicated by certain events. The war on terrorism revolves around politics and these are some of the aspects that I have come to understand after the September attack. It is undeniable that the war on terrorism took a different direction after the attack and this definitely left a political impression in my life. The world has never been united like this on the war on terrorism which can be explained from security measures and legislations that were put in place to counter any other attack. America’s security as a nation was threatened with the September attack and the politics that followed after these make it a very important event in the country’s history. I will definitely remember the attack as an issue that shaped my opinion about terrorism.

Every one had his/her own opinion as far as terrorism is concerned and this is based on individual understanding. There are people who have had a first hand experience with terrorism meaning that they are in a better position to explain what they know. In this case, there might be misconceptions about terrorism but I was able to understand this through the attack. It does not entirely mean that the war on terrorism will always be approached on a political front but there are various approaches like diplomacy that can also be used from what I have seen after the attack. As far as shaping my opinion is concerned, the government is supposed to be on the forefront to ensure that the security of its citizens is guaranteed. I will always recount this event based on the experience that it has given me on various political and government issues.

Introduction

Following the glaring terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the homeland security became a key national concern. Law enforcement bodies and their respective roles changed at the federal, state, and local levels. The United States’ Congress responded to the attacks by enacting the U.S.

Patriot Act, which sought to restructure the federal, state, and local bureaucracies coupled with disseminating powers to law enforcement bodies across various agency departments (Davis 2010, 44). Even though most of the traditional security policies changed drastically, law enforcement personnel is yet to understand how to adapt to these new roles and powers towards curbing terrorism.

In many respects, many people may perceive the Homeland Security as a recent policy area developed to react to the terrorist attacks of September 11. However, it is not a new idea since the U.S. government has been dealing with domestic invasions for a long time.

In addition, much attention since the World War I has been given to safeguarding the home front from internal and external enemies. However, the concept of the homeland security shaped as an internal policy after the September 11 incident.

Research question

Several national intelligence issues continue to pose threat to the future of the Department of the Homeland Security (DHS) including strict bureaucratic structures, inadequate finances, lack of coordination, reluctance to share intelligence information, fragmentation as opposed to integration, and lack of accountability (Jenkins, Liepman, and Willis 2014, 19).

In addressing these issues, this article will be answering the question on the challenges that the DHS will continue to face in the future. These areas will continue to pose challenges because the decision makers seem to be contented with the existing bureaucratic organization.

Second, the same bureaucratic leadership is tasked with the allocation of finances meaning that considerable time will be wasted while trying to distribute funds to the security bodies. Furthermore, due to the bureaucratic systems, information sharing is highly restricted to a few people, thus leading to mistrust and further fragmentation of intelligence bodies (Goldstein 2013, 11).

Purpose statement

The most prominent future intelligence challenges encountering the DHS are much attributable to the September 11 attacks. Most notably, the immediate response issued by the George Bush administration was an enforcement of strict bureaucratic systems across the national intelligence community.

This approach did not solve the problem, but it created differences since many workers were demoralized due to working under highly bureaucratized structures. This system has been reflected in the current Obama administration not only in the security systems, but also in other departments that influence the performance of the security agencies.

Currently, the process of recruitment, training, and firing of workers is strictly bureaucratized. For instance, the incumbent Secret Service Permanent Chief, Joseph Clancy, has often expressed his regrets over the complex system deterring him to take swift actions to security agents and other officers who engage in mischievous and unacceptable behaviors (Rogers 2014, 337).

Following the intensive consultations in decision-making, achieving timely interventions has been in vain. In addition, lack of adequate finance has led to poor service delivery and yet the government looks reluctant to utilize soft power to mitigate this issue.

Literature Review

Even before the September 11 attacks, intelligence analysts had explored the risks and threats of terrorism in a bid to fill the gaps that persisted within the US security system (Hymans 2006, 457). The experts repeatedly identified the lack of cooperation and poor coordination as the eminent concern amongst the several bodies linked to the Homeland Security.

Prior to these attacks, the law enforcement system was majorly divided and bureaucratized. For example, the CIA addressed foreign threats while the FBI handled internal threats. This fragmentation encouraged division and different versions of intelligence operations. In most cases, the National Security Agencies (NSA) dealt with similar problems, thus overlapping each other.

Before the attacks, the US government lacked a clear framework for pulling its intelligence expertise together to offer protection against terrorism. Apparently, insufficient information sharing by key federal entities remains the primary indicator in the security gaps in the US.

Most of the post-attack responses made it common knowledge that the U.S.s security efforts suffered poor coordination. This aspect led to the formation of the DHS to foster coordination among all security entities with a mission of preventing future attacks together with enhancing preparedness and response (Kamien 2006, 31).

In a bid to mitigate the foreseen challenges facing the DHS and the American fraternity as a whole, this review will address various issues that are seen as weak ends destabilizing the homeland security framework. For instance, the bureaucratic system is still acting as a barrier to implement the recommended changes.

The main national intelligence challenge facing the DHS is poor coordination and this aspect brings forth the possibility that attacks will continue to happen if not controlled. Coordination does not only involve the intelligence entities, but it also extends to the Congress, which passes budgetary allocations coupled with enacting key security laws.

The current workforce in the DHS is inadequately equipped in terms of resources, empowerment, and training. For example, after the September 19 2014 White House incident in which a man managed to jump over the White House fence, Cummiskey, a former DHS agent, argued that the security flaw was purely attributable to the lack of funds (Shear and Schmidt 2014).

Further investigations backed this claim by showing that several agents on duty had no appropriate skills to handle the situation. In addition, the majority had no idea on how White House Communication radio operated under such circumstances. This assertion holds due to the lack of enough financial resources, which should not be a reason to expose prominent leaders such as the president to any sort of security threats.

Despite the evident commitment and progress demonstrated amongst government agencies, this review notes that there has been lacking professional exchange of intelligence information amongst security agencies. Furthermore, military and law enforcement training is yet to upgrade to the standards of the 21^st Century technology that can assist in promoting the US security level (Rychnovska 2014, 27).

It is about 14 years down the line since the September 11 attacks, but the US government continues to delve into research and forums to develop strategies to enhance the homeland security. It has become increasingly evident that the U.S. security entities are suffering due to the lack of interconnectedness.

In light of this impasse, President Obama, in a directive to evaluate the DHS and its efforts towards counterterrorism, retaliated that the DHS is inseparable from other security agents and they should be functionally thought as a unit rather than separate entities (LaPira 2014, 230).

Contrary, the federal state still faces conceptual and functional differences. This aspect has weakened integration, efficiency, and cohesive approaches that promote the national security since the bureaucratic system inhibits the formulation of ways that reflect this reality.

In a bid to address the underlying mission of the homeland security, it is good to understand that the burgeoning campaign against terrorism is a multifaceted endeavor. The federal machinery has to deploy every tool at its disposal to wage this fight; for instance, international training, law enforcement, finance, diplomacy, as well as the new tools that are being invented.

In this regard, it is noteworthy to review the works of Joseph Nye, viz. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Soft power is a concept developed as an alternative to use of force, coercion, or monetary compensation to persuade others to adhere to what one wants (Nye 2004, 74).

Nye (2004) had keenly observed how the American society was struggling with hard power, yet enemies were in a position to not only hit, but also hit hard regardless of the alleged preparedness of the US security agencies. Nye’s conviction of power as possessing the ability to lure others to get to the preferred destination is currently given a chance albeit in part by various security entities across the world (Nye 2004, 98).

The US Congress has shown reluctance in allocating more money to cater for security matters. In the last decade, in spite of the security concerns, the budget allocation to ensure a more secure homeland has always fallen short. Consequently, planning and implementation have overlooked key security factors that gradually continue to affect the homeland security negatively.

The US government can adopt soft power and save chunks of taxpayers money used on hard power like the military. Soft power and hard power should be used alongside each other, but the former should be granted much attention in terms of implementation and financing.

It is evident that soft power is hugely overlooked, and this aspect contributes partly to the current fall in the US power influence over the past five decades. The old image of the US as the representative of democracy and a symbol for others to emulate has declined dramatically. The use of hard power by the US has doubled the fear rather than instilling optimism.

The US security entities have developed an old versioned tendency of using tactics employed in past wars to address current concerns. While there are positives to be drawn from history, facing the 21^st Century terrorism requires a paradigm shift. Since the case is new, security agents should adapt quickly to new measures and act in new ways.

So far, the existing partnerships encouraged by President Obama’s administration are yet to materialize, as there is still overlapping of critical roles by different intelligence partners. The CIA’s chronic failure prior to the September 11 attacks to inform partner agencies about the names of the alleged terrorists in the country enabled them to stay and orchestrate the attacks.

Therefore, information- sharing continues to suffer from significant flaws. In order to learn from past events, it is necessary to change the bureaucracy that encourages information hoarding and empower experts to take full responsibility for their roles with less closed systems.

This hindrance can be overcame by developing a paradigm shift whereby experts have the power to react to an urgent situation at best of their knowledge instead of waiting for commands from the top, which are time wasting and uninformed in most cases (Puyvelde 2013, 142).

Despite the many advantages of soft power, it has some shortcomings. Americans are scientifically oriented, and thus they resist soft power because they find the design behind it difficult to trace and research. As a society, the US is used to quick answers and it seeks immediate satisfaction. Unfortunately, soft power is a long diplomatic investment with no assured outcomes.

This aspect explains why the US government prefers hard power even though it is expensive. In addition, soft power is not purely owned by the government like the case with hard power. Many public and private entities engage in soft power, thus making it hard to collect information together.

After evaluating the social learning theory, one is in a position to identify that not all cultures are receptive of other nations’ strategies and ideas (Lieven and Hulsman 2006, 61). In this regard, these theorists challenge soft power as not many cultures find the US values and ideologies admirable to follow. Therefore, there is a possibility that soft power can backfire especially when in control of the wrong people.

Cultural exchanges have developed to serve as measures to control national security. Through cultural exchanges, different people are in a position to gain better understanding of others. Similarly, other individuals get the opportunity to acquire greater understanding of the US mainstream culture.

For instance, some scholars attribute the fall of the Soviet Union to social exchanges gained after visiting the US the international relations theory advocates for multilateral relations between the state and non-state actors. Developing mutual understandings is one way through which the DHS can achieve its mission of ensuring security at both domestic and international levels.

This theory further suggests that mutual relations are difficult since every state has its own ambitions and if they fail to reciprocate with those of the other state, then cooperation is not possible.

So far, the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) appraisal of the federal government and its security agencies indicates that there has been positive progress yet not enough to guarantee sustainability.

For example, in a report done on September 2013, GAO reported on the activities that DHS had taken in regard to the use of resources outside the US. The GAO established that the DHS had not identified strategic plans like target zones to combat crime and secure the US borders. The DHS also lacked mechanisms to capture resource deployment neither did it have a reliable cost data to make informed resource-allocation decisions.

This aspect implies that the DHS is failing significantly in planning since it does not consider data monitoring and analysis on expenditure abroad. Without this data, it is hard to disseminate funds on future programs.

In addition, this aspect manifests poor intelligence planning and data collection gaps, hence poor analysis. In a bid to avoid this issue, the DHS must inform its resource deployment outside the US as well as encourage screening.

Theoretical analysis

Following a review of the past literature, this theoretical approach seeks to test the hypothesis that poor gathering and utilization of intelligence data will continue to hinder the performance of the DHS in the future.

Looking at the state of affairs in the US intelligence community, it is largely generalizable that the US law enforcement and intelligence bodies depict the overarching problems of coordination and sharing of intelligence information based on baseless assumptions.

Although the US Congress and the Obama administration have shown efforts to eradicate some of the misunderstandings that hinder coordination, there is still no confidence in sharing of critical intelligence information.

Nevertheless, the social learning theory offers an appropriate approach to learn the changing social context of the American Society as well as its potential enemies concerning the significance linked to the national intelligence community. This theory claims that learning is a cognitive process that prevails in a social environment through provided directives or observation.

In this case, according to the GAO, the US security services have shown the desire to learn through observation of past attacks, but that desire has been jeopardized by the slow rate of behavior change and adaptation to new trends in the management of security affairs.

Some of the stringent measures adopted by the US Congress and the George Bush administration following the September 11 attacks have failed to impede security threats. Critiques posit that the bureaucratic measures have led to a string of security gaps even in the White House. To critics like Hummel, tight bureaucratic measures foster a circular sluggishness in decision-making.

The policymakers have been reluctant to initiate a paradigm shift in security affairs. On the contrary, they keep on twisting old strategies to solve emergent problems. For instance, the DHS and the Secret Service require strong and flexible leadership, which is open to criticism and ready to share security information with relevant bodies.

Working under strict bureaucracies is discouraging for workers and if it proves hard to avoid the protocols, then it is also difficult to enhance performance and coordination.

Bureaucratic values discourage teamwork and decrease trust among security machinery, thus meaning that information sharing is minimal if any. This approach has proved inadequate particularly after the September 19, 2014 invasion of the White House by a stranger who managed to jump over the fence without being noticed.

Models that influence leadership

In a bid to understand the research on human intelligence, it is crucial to explore the triarchic theory of intelligence. In this theory, Sternberg defines human intelligence as mental activity focused on a specified goal and shaping of real world events influencing one’s life (Sparks and Sulmasy 2006, 34). This assertion implies that intelligence entails how effective a person can handle changes occurring throughout life.

His model entailed three components including problem solving, performance, and knowledge acquisition. The combination of all the three components completes tasks that entail selective choice of information from irrelevant sources or unforeseen events. In addition, these components assist in putting together the several pieces of information collected and analyzed to establish any possible cues.

Different people have disparate abilities to learn new information depending on training. The DHS has expertise with the potential to utilize these three components fully and come up with useful intelligence information. The challenge comes in when experts seek to change the norms to suit the situation.

The bureaucratic machine fails to acknowledge change from outside since all decisions come from the top. Even though the DHS is willing to adapt to new environments that contend with real world situations, the pace is too slow and it might keep on playing catch-ups with its enemies.

The policy regime theory holds that in the policy world, major attacks are rare and in most cases, unpredictable, but they have huge effects. Unexpected external disruptions often influence routine policy goals and government activities. Policy theorists refer to these events as ‘shocker moments’ that force some drastic shifts in government concerns to issues that had for a long time been overlooked.

The September 11 attack is an example of these trigger events. Such moment causes dramatic focus by government machinery, but the attention quickly fades away soon after. The issue may not be completely forgotten as it was the case before the attack, but it fails to keep the heightened concentration that was employed amid the attack.

The government seems to assume that the adversaries disappear entirely, and thus get reluctant once again (Thachuk 2007, 71). Contrary to these views by the policy regime theorists, this paper affirms that government security agencies such as the DHS have enough intelligence to foresee attacks and neutralize them before they hit the targets.

The fact that large-scale attacks are rare should provide enough time for the intelligence community to organize and identify all security loopholes that may be exploited by terrorist groups. In addition, the work of the DHS is to ensure security, and thus there should be heightened attention continuously irrespective of whether there is a looming attack or not.

The government demand-oriented theories for interest representation argue that the government itself engages in activities that encourage groups to foster political action merely by orchestrating concerns that those groups will benefit. In other words, the government demand theory advocates the idea that groups as well as individuals react to policy agendas determined by only the government institutions.

This theory fails to consider the efforts of non-governmental agencies. This aspect is reflected in the lack of cooperation as experienced by the US security agencies. This view is different from the Truman’s classic pluralist disturbance theory, which claimed that different groups, both governmental and non-governmental, should come together in response to some foreseen threats in the society.

This aspect implies that problems outside and inside the government motivate like-minded people to respond cohesively to try to find a permanent solution.

This model influences the leaders’ behavior as the government shows attention to factors that might affect a group like the DHS, and thus it is more likely that the DHS will work towards government objectives (Stana 2003, 84). When leaders in the DHS get financial support from the government, they feel obligated to perform effectively.

Future threats to the homeland security

Military researchers and defense technologists are recently exploring possible challenges that face not only the US, but also the entire global security. This review gives a forecast of four potential traditional and non-traditional security challenges that may catch the US unawares in the near future. This assertion holds because the pace of research is slow and it may not match that of the terrorists.

First, there is the possibility that biological weapons will be used in large scale in a terrorist attack. In 2009, the White House came up with a National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats with an assumption that such weapons might be used for major attacks (Robinson, Xinsheng, Stoutenborough, and Vedlitz 2013, 715).

With these insights, the US government has acted too slowly to identify ways to ensure that it can prevent deadly viruses from being used as weapons of mass destruction.

Due to the lack of coordination and bureaucratic structures, it is hard to attain timely insight on possible attacks as well as taking swift measures in case one is detected. Since this phenomenon is new, researchers need to anticipate widely by closing all potential gaps that might be useful to terrorists.

The second issue is the eminent threat of cyber-attacks. Cyber warfare is a traditional security threat to global peace that has persisted for years. Terrorist networks are using the same technologies that propel developments to sabotage the critical structures, which are necessary for public safety (Thachuk 2007, 99).

The US intelligence community has embarked on cyber security activities to ensure timely fixes, but it is now evident that the sophistication of attacks is outdoing the available security measures.

Therefore, solutions should surpass the traditional approach, which requires more funds to upgrade the system and catch up with the enemy. This assertion holds because in the near future, attacks on computer systems are about to cross the line from mere theft and disruption to serious terrorist attacks. These attacks will be controlled remotely and devastating damages will occur if such circumstances happen.

These postulations are within the realm of the possible given what has been witnessed when hackers overwhelm networks. The National Security Agency and the Cyber Command have a wide array of expertise, but they lack the commitment to share classified information.

The private sector in most cases is not ready to reveal attacks for the fear of losing clients or facing lawsuits. The lack of enough network security personnel remains a concern in the private sector as well as the government (Sun 2008, 170). Therefore, it is time to create incentives and issue bonuses as a way of retaining and motivating experts.

The third aspect is the existence of the transnational crime. The US intelligence community views transnational terror as a key global security challenge (Nakaya 2005, 93). These groups lead to instability and blackmail to governmental organizations through corruption. These groups are very well organized without strict bureaucratic systems.

They generate funds through engaging in illicit activities such as human and drug trafficking. Much of the US efforts to counter terrorism have been concentrated in the Middle East, thus forgetting that al-Qaida sympathizers are located everywhere (Murray 2003, 66). The last aspect is the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

For at least the past five decades, the US has spent huge sums of money and time trying to find, monitor, and impede all means through which they are developed. Non-state actors such as terrorist groups are hiding nuclear weapons deep in the ground.

Finding and destroying these weapons has remained an increasingly complicated endeavor. Thus, the US government will need weapons that can unravel these mysteries. Due to lack of adequate finance and poor coordination, it will be hard for the US to destroy nuclear weapons in the possession of terrorist groups any time soon (Mullins 2010, 102).

Findings

Based on the reviewed articles, there are clear signals that the frequency and intensity of attacks on the US and its allies will escalate. Since terrorism is a strategy that can be used by any enemy, the DHS must be ready to react to foreseeable and unforeseeable threats coming from expected as well as unfamiliar origins.

As technology evolves and becomes readily available to a larger population of actors, potential attackers are motivated to use terrorism. This aspect has been attributable to the gaps left in the innovation of these technologies. For instance, computer manufacturers should redesign their products in a way that it is hard to manipulate its functioning to suit the terrorists’ desires.

The movement of people across borders has also increased the ease of movement by terrorists. The Internet has served as a key platform for terrorist activities ranging from recruitment and training to planning and attacking.

Of huge concern is the spread of religious radicalization, which is taking root in the Muslim society due to different reasons. These tensions have become widespread via the Internet even to countries like the US, which have a better understanding of the Muslim populations (Maxwell 2004, 94).

Increased funding is now needed than ever to advance training and purchase sophisticated facilities because threats continue to evolve. The DHS must be in a stable financial state to cater for learning programs and ensure good pay for security agents to ensure that they are motivated to perform well (Marion and Cronin 2009, 22).

The enemies are proactive, innovative, adequately funded, always learning, and adapting to the dynamics of a globalizing world. The DHS must be in a position to surpass the adversary tactics and reflect the evolving threat environment. The DHS has so far issued analysis of possible future occurrences, but it is yet to demonstrate its capabilities to counter those threats.

Furthermore, effective collection and utilization of intelligence data will only be achieved if the DHS is allocated enough money to cater for its extensive activities (Walker 2007, 74). The increase in funding should also target all avenues of international cooperation to bolster the existing and create new alliances to create and sustain international networks that embrace information sharing.

The Sternberg’s intelligence theory helps in answering the research question as it shows what the DHS lacks and the consequences it has to face for its ignorance. For instance, Sternberg talks of divergent thinking, which is brought by activities like task switching and domineering management. The DHS must learn specific skills to help in coping with the ever-changing environment.

Strategies to impede future threats

The primary strategy is impudent leadership. Combining tools of soft power with selected hard power can transform the National Security apparatus greatly. Leadership is a common tool that the US has embraced for decades. The question is how this leadership has influenced matters of national security.

From previous reviews, it is evident that the American leadership both at home and abroad has suffered poor coordination, thus leaving gaps for terrorists to exploit. Adopting the soft power model brings forth leadership styles that mobilize people with an objective and the leader helps the people in attaining those shared targets.

It is time for the US leadership system to abandon the hierarchical leadership pyramid and shift to what Nye (2004, 106) refers to as leading from the center of a circle. The current leadership model in the DHS is a rigid one because information flow is often slow from top to the bottom or from bottom to the top. In addition, information is subject to distortion amid intended or unintended additions and omissions.

The second model is more flexible because leaders at the center of the circle find it easy to coordinate large groups via persuasion and influence. Leaders are in a position to link straight to the subordinates, and thus their influence is felt on a wide scope.

In a fast globalizing world, the US should ensure that it encourages leadership from the center since it is the way to impertinent leadership. The former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, echoed these sentiments by reaffirming the need to embrace civilian power in line with military power as essential pillars in enhancing global security.

The role of international training and cultural exchanges by the DHS can be a starting point in a bid to make a huge effect on both national and global security by utilizing soft tools as opposed to hard power. Given that the homeland security has a direct link to the global community, embracing intercultural literacy is paramount. Leadership in the homeland security has to understand the dynamics of culture.

This aspect can enable them to act as pioneers of transformational leadership that motivates individuals from various diverse origins to fight global criminal cartels and ensure national security. These changes can only be possible if improvements are done on communication both within the DHS and within other agencies.

Evidently, the homeland security has failed to speak a common language on various occasions, and thus increasing communication is necessary. Communication should not only focus on the security agencies, but also engage the public since security is everyone’s responsibility. The DHS should collaborate with learning institutions, media, and religious bodies to sensitize the public on terrorism.

As the US adopts a new paradigm, civil rights and individual freedoms must be observed. Even though some risks have to be taken, this move will ensure that the process does not interfere with human dignity. The DHS in partnership with the media should embark on instilling trust in the public by keeping the society well informed with accurate and timely information (Caponi and Belmont 2015, 17).

Conclusion

After the September 11 attacks, homeland security has gained national interests with key projects focused toward promoting the safety of the US citizens. This review has established that the US Homeland Security faces many conceptual, structural, organizational, and functional problems that are posing threats to security.

A review of several cases shows that even the White House has become vulnerable to attacks due to poor coordination and training of security agents. These dysfunctions have been directly linked to the lack of enough funding and rigid leadership that discourages innovation as well as employee motivation. Cultural diversity has also been identified as a possible problem impeding interagency cooperation.

Consequently, this paper has predicted various challenges that ought to face the DHS including cyber attacks, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and transnational crimes. The DHS in partnership with other bodies of the intelligence community has a chance to prevent these attacks from happening.

As indicated earlier, the application of soft power is a major way forward since it does away with bureaucratic systems, whilst keeping the critical values of that system. However, through proper coordination and information sharing amongst security agencies, the US will stand a better position to promote homeland security.

Reference List

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Regulatory barriers that led to the 9/11 terror attack

The problems with the intelligence agencies

The intelligent agencies struggled throughout the years prior to 9/11 on the collection of intelligence data and the analysis of the transformations of transnational terrorist activities. The intelligence agencies suffered from a number of intelligence priority areas, limited budgets, bureaucratic and outmoded structures as well as tight regulatory frameworks. The mentioned factors led to an insufficient collection of intelligent data on terrorism as well as an inadequate response to the new challenges of terrorist activities.

Even though there were overwhelming indications of terrorist threats and activities within the US, no security agencies tried any initiative to prevent or disrupt the terrorist activities (George and Bruce 102). The CIA that attempted to collect intelligent information on terrorism and counter the terror activities outside US was limited in terms of their capabilities.

Lack of information sharing between the law enforcement and intelligence agencies

Lack of information sharing between the law enforcement and intelligence agencies was cited as the major obstacle that led to lack of detection and eventual occurrence of the terror attacks. According to intelligence sources, the September 11, 2001, attack was largely attributed to the failure of the US intelligence agencies to provide adequate information to the security and law enforcement agencies due to poor coordination between the agencies (Shlapentokh and Woods 120). The barriers that existed between the agencies did not allow free discussion of security issues and sharing of the information.

According to security policy makers, appropriate coordination and sharing of information between the agencies could have led to a coherent comprehension of the emergent plan. However, descent opinions argued that the plot could have been detected without any expert intelligence and sharing of information. Nevertheless, the fact that most of the intelligence data had not been shared could have contributed to the failure of the security agencies to prevent the attack. Studies indicated that prior to September 11, 2001 intelligent agencies were not in a position to sufficiently share pertinent counterterrorism information (George and Bruce 107). The breakdown in communications between the security agencies was due to several factors including variations in their missions, legal authorities and cultures.

The multifaceted arrangement of constitutional philosophies, laws, guiding principles and practices led to the blockade of information from one security agency to the other. Lack of information sharing had a long-standing history between the security agencies though legislative amendments undertaken to be part of the solution to the problem. One of the legislations is the National Security Act that forbids the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from law enforcement powers.

Moreover, the act does not allow the CIA, which is central in the detection of terrorism from having internal security functions. Further, the legislations regulated the extent in which such intelligence agencies could conduct their investigations within the country. The lapses in the investigations and law enforcement capabilities contributed significantly on the concealment of terrorists who by year two thousand had already travelled into the American soil. Moreover, the legislations such as the Foreign Intelligent Surveillance Act (FISA) controlled the level of foreign intelligence electronic surveillance investigations (George and Bruce 118).

On the other hand, the electronic surveillance on internal criminal investigations was still controlled by the Omnibus Crime Control Act (Title III) of 1968. Such were the legislations that incapacitated the intelligence services as well as the control of information sharing on terrorist activities.

The Title III Act prohibited the interception of any electronic communications only such exchanges falling within the domain of the act. In fact, electronic surveillance under FISA is one of the jurisdictions or domains of the Title III act. The electronic communications that was used by the terrorists did not fall within the domain and therefore was ignored and even if it was detected to be security threat, the FISA Act further curtailed the sharing of such information with other law enforcement agencies (Shlapentokh and Woods 119).

Under the FISA, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) was the only agency with both investigative and law enforcement powers. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) was conceived to be the international intelligence agency as well as the law enforcement agency. FBI was also the only agency that had prosecutorial powers beyond the US.

The Title III Act also permitted that the foreign intelligence should not involve in probable or definite contravention of the American legal regulations. In other words, intelligence could be obtained within the US regarding a plot involving parties outside US that would not affect the operations proscribed by US laws. Moreover, such intelligence might be of great importance to the policy makers but the intelligence agencies are not entitled to acquire such information under Title III Act. Such provisions provided gaps and overlap on the intelligence information provision and the laws enforcement. In addition, the implementation of FISA greatly influenced the relationship that existed between the law enforcement and the intelligence agencies.

According to FISA, the purpose of electronic surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information. Further, FISA allowed giving out information regarding criminal operations incidentally obtained during the physical search or the electronic surveillance to the law enforcement agencies (Blitzer 111). However, such dissemination of information was constantly challenged and majority of state courts held judgments that was against sharing of information.

Moreover, the judgments held that the functions of FISA are limited to the gathering of foreign intelligence information. In most cases, FISA information sharing was challenged as being against the Fourth Amendment on domestic criminal information. The federal courts of appeal held in most cases that FISA’s primary purpose was to collect foreign intelligence information through electronic surveillance or physical search, which was inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment requirements for criminal cases.

The regulations of FISA and court orders curtailed the information sharing among the intelligence agencies. The criminal and justice policy more progressively predicted that holding on primary purpose of FISA effectively envisaged the challenges of the Fourth Amendment. The criminal investigators had to get FISA court orders to obtain intelligence information regarding criminal activities (Shlapentokh and Woods 118).

The concerns by the criminal investigations department and criminal justice policy makers were that the courts would consistently suppress information obtained through FISA investigations. The argument was that the criminal investigators primarily used FISA to collect domestic criminal evidence instead of gathering foreign intelligence. Practically, aptitude data collected by the intelligence agencies including the FBI investigations on counterterrorism and counterintelligence was separated from information shared by other security agencies and prosecution. The fear was that FISA could be reversed.

The gaps and lapses due to legislations and regulatory framework led to the failure of information sharing exposing weaknesses in the US intelligence. Moreover, the regulatory framework led to lack of appropriate policies and management frameworks on probable acts of terror and counterterrorism measures (Blitzer 122). The impact of the conflicting legal regulations led to lack of information concerning imminent attack. Most of the prior intelligence information was either ignored or not taken seriously. In the circumstances that the intelligent agencies had information that some terrorists were within the country, the intelligence agencies had to prove it beyond reasonable doubt and not be seen as flouting the laws in case sharing such information was necessary.

Lack of counterterrorism policy

Lack of information particularly failure to share information among the intelligence and security agencies led to the need of counterterrorism strategic measures. The security policy measures were deficient of information on probable threats to come up with immediate measures to counter terrorism activities. In other words, terrorism was not the major security concern during the time.

The policy challenges were purely blamed on the conflicting legal and regulatory frameworks that existed. The intelligence officials and security policy makers disregarded the terror warnings or regarded full invasion of US by terrorists as practically impossible at that particular time. Moreover, the security policies that existed at the time did not adequately address the terror threats or were based on haphazard intelligence information collected by various agencies under tight regulatory frameworks (Blitzer 105).

Reduced capabilities

The legal and policy frameworks that existed before the 9/11attcaks were majorly crafted to deal with terrorist activities outside US (Shlapentokh and Woods 115). Moreover, such policies were based on the capabilities originating from the post cold war errors. Such capabilities proved inadequate amid advanced technological knowhow and the new capabilities used by terrorists. Further, the intelligence capabilities were reduced by failure of coordination on information sharing due to legal regulations and lack of clear policy frameworks. The existing capabilities proved insufficient and little actions were undertaken to reform such policies.

Among the security agencies, the CIA had limited capacity to enforce laws on top of conducting paramilitary operations. The CIA did very little to improve on such capabilities as well as its personnel to conduct preliminary investigations. In addition, the CIA did not improve on its capabilities in collecting intelligence data from human agents due to lack of legal frameworks. Further, the department of defense did not fully engage in countering terrorism. Even though terrorism was the most probable external threat facing US, the defense capabilities were not directed towards fighting terrorists.

Even though homeland security detected the alerts on the application of guided hijacked planes towards American targets, the homeland capabilities were directed towards the aircrafts coming from the outside of the US (Shlapentokh and Woods 119). Serious weaknesses in the intelligence competencies were on the domestic arena. FBI lacked the potential of linking the collective knowledge of the field agents to national priorities. Moreover, other domestic intelligence agencies deferred their intelligence information to FBI.

Generally, the security agencies were extremely weakened by the inadequate policy frameworks and tight legal regulations that controlled the sharing and use of information. There was lack of serious examination of possibilities of the suicide hijackings, which could have been critical in sealing the loopholes within the security system. Strategies to fix vulnerabilities including expanding no fly zones, advanced screening of passengers, deployment of federal air marshals, hardening aircrafts cockpit doors and alerting the crew on possible terror hijackings could have been undertaken with strong policies and legal frameworks on the part of security agencies (Blitzer 109).

The roles of Khalid Sheik Mohammed in 9/11 terror attack

Khalid Sheik Mohammed is one of the main suspected masterminds of the terrorist attacks around the globe. In the 9/11 terror attack, Khalid Sheik Mohammed was said to have been the architect of the deadly event. In fact, Khalid Sheik Mohammed played the roles of training, plotting and commissioning the attack. Moreover, the roles Khalid Sheik Mohammed played in the 9/11 terror attacks originated from his beliefs on Islamic ideals and the notions of the western countries particularly the United States. Khalid Sheik Mohammed was purely against the US foreign policy on Muslim countries particularly that favored Israel (Bolton 98).

However, Khalid Sheik Mohammed spent some of his early life in the United States as a student. During the American stay, Khalid Sheik Mohammed developed hatred for the American foreign policy, which later contributed to his terrorist activities.

Khalid Sheik Mohammed’s actual planning of terrorist activities against US began back in 1994. In the same year, Khalid Sheik Mohammed took part in a plot to destroy twelve US planes operating in East and Southeast Asia. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the United States intelligence agencies believed that the planning for the 9/11 attacks started during the time. The use of passenger planes was found to be among Khalid Sheik Mohammed’s plans besides crashing explosives into the CIA headquarters (Mcdermott 231). However, the planning to bomb twelve planes with nearly five thousand Americans in Southeast Asia aborted when it was detected by the intelligence services before the actual action.

After the failure of initial plans, Khalid Sheik Mohammed went back to the drawing board. With the help of experienced terrorists during the time, the planning began again in Philippines including the broader terrorist attack plans on the US planes commonly known as the Bojinka plans (Mcdermott 189). The Bojinka plans included buying one of the planes fully fitted with explosives and crash-landing the plane into the CIA headquarters.

The plan had a back up of hijacking another plane that was to be crashed over pentagon or any other important US interest buildings. The plans followed a series of tests that were conducted before on the US airlines that resulted in the death of several citizens of Southeast Asia countries. Following the terrorist activities in Philippines, Khalid Sheik Mohammed was indicted on terrorist charges in US and in 2001 just before the 9/11 Khalid Sheik Mohammed was listed as the most wanted terrorist by the FBI.

The close relationship between Khalid Sheik Mohammed and diehard terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and the Sudanese political activist Hassan Al-Turabi contributed to his continued hatred for the Americans and actions that led to the 9/11 terror attacks. Khalid Sheik Mohammed was said to have been closely associated with Osama bin Laden by the time he was being wanted and fled to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the full plan for the attack took place. With the help and assurance from Osama bin laden, Khalid Sheik Mohammed recruited, trained terror cells and executed the plans in 2001. The plan for 9/11 terror activities resembled that of Bojinka in Philippines where several planes were to be hijacked and crashed into the major targets of great interest to the US (Mcdermott 231).

Evidence indicated that Khalid Sheik Mohammed presented his 9/11 terror plans to Osama bin Laden back in 1996 at Tora Bora in a meeting arranged by Al Qaeda chief of operations Mohammed Atef. The plan that Khalid Sheik Mohammed presented to bin Laden included the quadruple hijackings of the US planes in 2001. In the meetings between Khalid Sheik Mohammed and bin Laden, Khalid Sheik Mohammed was particularly persuaded to become a fully-fledged member of Al Qaeda.

However, Khalid Sheik Mohammed refused constantly until late 1999 after the bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam that Khalid Sheik Mohammed accepted full commitment to terror activities of Al Qaeda (Mcdermott 211). The acceptance initiated the move to Kandahar upon invitation by bin Laden where Khalid Sheik Mohammed became the leader of the media committee of the Al Qaeda. In Kandahar, Khalid Sheik Mohammed cemented his plans for terrorist attack in US.

One of the plans that Khalid Sheik Mohammed presented to bin Laden included hijack of several planes and crash into several US targets. The plans were to be undertaken inside US by several well-trained terror cells. The plans evolved from the previously held strategies that were undertaken in Southeast Asia. However, the Al Qaeda leadership rejected some of the plans including crashing a plane in US bank tower.

The final plot was allowed by bin Laden and was drafted between 1998 and 1999 in a meeting held by Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Mohammed Atef and bin Laden. In that meeting, bin Laden agreed to finance the final plan and provide ground for execution. From that time, bin Laden led the final plans while Khalid Sheik Mohammed was involved in the recruitment and training of the terror cells that were to execute the plot. The trio contributed in the selection of the participants who had to be thoroughly screened and trained for the execution of the plan (Bolton 112). Mohammed Atta was chosen and trained to be the lead hijacker.

Khalid Sheik Mohammed also provided support for the entire operation including choosing the best targets, arranging for the travels of the hijackers as well as other logistical requirements such as their accommodation and movements. Atef controlled the movements of the terror cells that were to undertake the hijackings. The trio of bin Laden, Atef and Khalid Sheik Mohammed coordinated the 9/11 attack each effectively playing different roles.

Khalid Sheik Mohammed and bin Laden discussed the elaborate plans and chose World Trade Center as the most possible target representing the US economic interest (Chernick 198). Mohammed Atta led the team that hijacked the planes that were crashed in the World Trade Center. Osama Bin Laden and Khalid Sheik Mohammed were also convinced that the Pentagon represented US military while Capital was perceived as the source of policy that supported Israel. The Pentagon and the Capital also remained high targets within the plan. In the plan, the White House was also listed and the trio believed that it represented the US political prowess. According to the plan, the hijackers were to be trained in US as pilots of the purported planes and outside US as militants (Mcdermott 58).

According to the intelligent sources, the hijackers were trained in Afghanistan as militants and were made to believe that Americans as well as the West were against the Muslim faith, doctrines and practices. Moreover, intelligence sources indicated the hijackers were to be trained in US as pilots of various specified planes and acquainted with the necessary routes and flight schedules. According to the plan, the team of hijackers consisting of nineteen militants was to be rigorously trained as pilots as well as live in US without prior detection (Mcdermott 63).

The hijackers were to be briefed on the development of the plan after every four months by somebody only known to bin Laden and Khalid Sheik Mohammed. The funding was to be provided by bin Laden. Khalid Sheik Mohammed was responsible for logistics and operations including preparing the hijackers for the final date.

According to intelligence sources, Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Osama bin Laden were motivated and remained committed to punish US in a grand scale for its involvement in the support of Israeli affairs towards Middle East and anti Muslim sentiments. On the eve of the event, bin Laden wanted the date to be postponed. However, Khalid Sheik Mohammed insisted that everything was within the plan and the hijackers were ready. Moreover, bin Laden wanted the hijackers to down the planes with all the passengers on board rather than hitting the targets.

On the contrary, Khalid Sheik Mohammed insisted on his plans and argued that the operations would not be successful by only downing the planes. The hijackers had to hit the targets. Moreover, Khalid Sheik Mohammed persisted that the hijackers had to be fully trained as pilots and combatants. Additionally, the hijackers had to be large to hit the targets at the same time. Several intelligence sources indicated that Khalid Sheik Mohammed was directly involved in the 9/11 terror operations with the help of other Al Qaeda top leaders such as Ramzi bin Al-Shibh.

Even though Khalid Sheik Mohammed was accused of being the head of Al Qaeda military committee, it was never proved and in most instances, Khalid Sheik Mohammed denied being a member of the Al Qaeda military committee. However, in several occasions, Khalid Sheik Mohammed admitted involvement in the planning and operations of the 9/11 terrorists attack in the US soil.

Even though Khalid Sheik Mohammed was the chief architect of the 9/11 terror attack, five other top members of Al Qaeda members were fully aware of the details of operations of the attack. The top Al Qaeda members included Osama bin Laden, Ramzi bin Al-Shibh, Abu Turab Al-Urduni and Mohammed Atef. Other members included the Humbug cell that later became the pilots and hijackers. The motive behind the actions of Khalid Sheik Mohammed and other Al Qaeda members included the declaration of the holy war by Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden against the American citizens for alleged support of Israel.

The declaration of holy war against American citizens led Khalid Sheik Mohammed to organize for mass killing of the American civilians as well as the destruction of major American economic and political interests around the world (Chernick 201). However, the motives behind the terrorist attack included the American support for the attack of fellow Muslims in Somalia, support for atrocities against Muslims in Chechnya, support for Muslim oppression in Kashmir, presence of US bases in Middle East, support for Israeli atrocities against Muslims as well as sanctions against Iraq.

Using the above motives, Khalid Sheik Mohammed found it reasonable to organize and carry out operations that ensured the demise of American citizens. In the 9/11 terror attacks, Khalid Sheik Mohammed played a critical role as the chief architect and led the operations including training of the hijackers as well as logistical support to the hijackers. With the help of other Al-Qaida members, Khalid Sheik Mohammed ensured that his plans were undertaken to success.

Ways used by Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta as a deception to avert intelligence discovery and prevention of the attack

The application of deception and denial

While the tactics used by terrorists to avoid detection from security agencies may vary, common tactics have often been employed (Sageman 159). In fact, terrorists use different tactics at every given opportunity because of vulnerability to security agencies. Advanced modern communication technology plays a critical role in the deception tactics used by terrorists (Jessee 368). Essentially, denial and deception has been major tactics that have been employed by terrorist groups particularly the Al Qaeda. Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta used the tactics throughout the operations leading to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to avoid detection by the Americans as well as other international security agencies (Sageman 159).

The reasons why Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta majorly applied the tactics were that denial and deception had been institutionalized in all aspects of Al Qaeda structure and organization (Jessee 369). Being members of the terror network, Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta had been trained and mastered the techniques of deception and denial. Moreover, most of the international as well as domestic securities agencies hold the perception that terrorists are incapable of employing the tactics as part of their grand strategy (Eldridge 132). Having the knowledge, Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta applied the procedures to evade detection and arrest in planning the operations leading to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks.

Throughout the planning and operations of the Al Qaeda, Khalid Sheik Mohammed employed disinformation through the publication of manipulated footage in order to falsify the American security agencies as well as the allied agencies of the identities of other people not directly connected to the terror activities (Jessee 370). In most cases, the terrorists used information of the countries’ citizens as having direct link to the terrorist groups.

Often, the terrorists implicated names of security personnel or journalists to be leaking intelligence information to the terror groups. The tactics were applied by Khalid Sheik Mohammed to divert attention of the security agencies from the plans, activities and operations (Sageman 160). The application of false publications and information ensured the survival of Mohammed Atta and other terror cells in Hamburg and US. Essentially, Khalid Sheik Mohammed applied false information at strategic and operational levels in order to avoid detection as well as attain the strategic results.

In support of the grand strategy, denial and deception covered a wide range of activities including institutionalized training, travel, financing and communications. Khalid Sheik Mohammed applied all the tactical actions to achieve the desired goal (Eldridge 125). In fact, Khalid Sheik Mohammed ensured that all the information channels by which the intelligent agencies could learn the plans, strategies and operations were blocked.

The deceptive travel tactics included incapacitating intelligent airport agencies, passport fraud, visa fraud and choosing several means of travel (Eldridge 130). In terms of financing, the terrorists used nondescript transactions, non-banking transactions and non-disclosure of the sources of finance.

Communication was one of the most sensitive areas where the terrorists’ activities could be detected. Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta used many encrypted codes that could not be identified easily by the intelligence agencies and if detected took time before such codes were understood (Eldridge 128). Moreover, Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta used extremely limited communications throughout their operations. The command of the activities were communicated in prior particularly during the training sessions (Sageman 159).

Institutionalized training

Terrorists are thoroughly instructed on the disguise tactics during training sessions. Khalid Sheik Mohammed admitted in several occasions on how he was trained on the art of disguise and the way the tactic aided in the avoidance of arrest and detention of security agencies particularly in Pakistan and Southeast Asia (Sageman 159). Moreover, Khalid Sheik Mohammed admitted how he thoroughly trained the hijackers including Mohammed Atta on the disguise tactics, rendezvous practices, concealed writing skills, cryptology and codes.

Moreover, Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta trained the hijackers on how to live the American lifestyle including how to order food in restaurants, type of clothing and other social actions that would allow them mingle with the population without suspicion (Jessee 381). The Al Qaeda training manual contained elaborate procedures and instructions on how the operatives could avoid detection while infiltrating an enemy area. The lessons included currency counterfeiting, forging documents, cell compartmentalization, living under cover and clandestine meeting and communications. Mohammed Atta and other hijackers were thoroughly trained on these deceptive tactics in Afghanistan before travelling to US (Sageman 158).

Deception and denials in travel

The Reports of 9/11 Commission indicated that Khalid Sheik Mohammed applied deceptions on the hijackers’ travels in order to be in the locations where they could easily accomplish the desired objectives (Sageman 158). Further, the 9/11 Commission Report indicated that travel issues played a critical role in the planning and operations of the attackers. Mohammed Atta and other operatives used fake visas and passports, used the US borders to their advantage and chose several air travels that provided the opportunity to hijack various planes at the same time (Jessee 381). In fact, the reports indicate that the travel techniques were inculcated during the instructions provided by Khalid Sheik Mohammed.

Instructions

Before the 9/11, Mohammed Atta and other operatives were thoroughly instructed on how to falsify the travel documents to avoid any suspicion. The falsification process was such a way that the documents could not be detected as being forged (Jessee 388). The instructions included passport modification techniques such as replacement of photos, deleting or adding travel statuses and manual representing skills as well as cleaning of visas.

The purposes for the instructions were to increase the hijackers’ capacity on documents forgery and to enable the operatives make adjustments while on the field (Eldridge 136). Khalid Sheik Mohammed trained Mohammed Atta and other operatives on how to use forged documents as well as the expected reactions and actions of the customs officials while entering foreign countries.

The institutional incapacitation

Prior to 9/11 the Al Qaeda operations arm ensured that airport as well as border customs were incapacitated in terms of detection of any fraudulent documents (Sageman 160). In fact, the falsification procedures were undertaken through a command system that was located in the host countries and specialized in the techniques of altering documents. In the case of Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta, travel-coordinating cells located in various airports within the US synchronized the travels of the hijackers (Jessee 382).

The facilitators ensured that Mohammed Atta and other operatives obtained fraudulent documents, arranged for real or fake visas, made reservations for the airlines, bought the airline tickets, arranged accommodations and the ground transportation and were responsible for all aspects of travel where expertise or contacts were required (Sageman 160). As such, the domestic intelligence encountered difficulties in detecting the operations of the terrorists. The activities of the facilitators also incapacitated the detection procedures of the airport customs officials.

The passport and visa fraud

Passports and visas were critical in the facilitation of the terrorists’ travels. In relation to the visas and passports fraud, the terrorists had skills in changing photos, deleting or adding fake status on visas and passports, bleaching stamps and substituting pages (Sageman 159). The techniques were highly utilized in the provision of cover during the travel of the hijackers. In fact, two passports that were found after 9/11 attacks were fraudulent.

Visa frauds are critical in disguising the travel destinations. The cachets on the travel destination on visas were changed to disguise the information on the travel destinations to avoid detection and follow-ups. In the 9/11 operations, Khalid Sheik Mohammed enabled two hijackers Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hamzi to utilize Yemeni passports for travel from Pakistan to Malaysia. Thereafter, the two hijackers used Saudi passports to travel to US. The undertaking was to prevent US customs officials from noticing Pakistani markings on the Yemeni documents that could raise any suspicion (Jessee 376). The indications are that almost all the hijackers used falsified visas and passports to enter into United States.

Cover tactics

Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta perceived the attacks in the World Trade Center and other targets within US as open warfare or insurgency against the American citizens (Sageman 158). As such, they took cover among the American population. Cover was one of the strategies that Khalid Sheik Mohammed used to shelter the insurgents who later became the nineteen suicide plane hijackers. The insurgents camouflaged among the American population without detection until they accomplished their mission (Sageman 161). Mohammed Atta used the cover tactics throughout his involvement in terror activities.

In Hamburg, Germany, Mohammed Atta took cover as a student and used false reasons behind failure to perform his roles as a student (Eldridge 123). Further, Mohammed Atta used false identities including different names to prevent detection by the security agents. In US, Mohammed Atta perfected the tactic, used false identities including names, passports as well as activities, and successfully evaded the detection of security agencies (Jessee 383).

The communities perceived Mohammed Atta as respectful person and in most cases was sympathetic towards his course. In fact, majority of people Mohammed Atta interacted with were indifferent towards his activities or acted under duress (Eldridge 125). The communities as well as the security agencies knew little about the terror activities of Mohammed Atta. Nevertheless, Mohammed Atta successfully used the tactic of cover to undertake the terrorism operations.

Works Cited

Blitzer, Robert M. Domestic Intelligence Challenges in the 21^st Century. Arlington, VA, Lexington Institute, 2002. Print.

Bolton, M. Kent. U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy making After 9/11: Present at the Re-creation. Lanham, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. Print.

Chernick, Howard. Resilient city: the economic impact of 9/11. New York, NY, Russell Sage Foundation, 2005. Print.

Eldridge, Thomas R. 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York, Norton, 2004. Print.

George, Roger Z. and James B. Bruce. Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2008. Print.

Jessee, Devin D. “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 18.1 (2006):367–388. Print.

Mcdermott, Terry. Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It. New York, NY, Harper Paperbacks, 2006. Print.

Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Print.

Shlapentokh, Vladimir and Joshua Woods. Feudal America: Elements of the Middle Ages in Contemporary Society. Pennsylvania, Penn State Press, 2012. Print.

Introduction

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Muslims have become victims of hate crimes because of the attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions that link them to terrorism. According to various academic research publications, counter terrorist groups and other Muslim groups including the Metropolitan police, there were about 962 Islamophobic offenses in London in early 2009 (Umbreit, Lewis, & Burns, 2003).

Prior research indicates that Americans perceive Muslims negatively because the media consistently associates Muslims with the violent activities of terrorism and other civil wars in the Middle East region (Lambert & Githens-Mazer, 2010). The consistent association of Muslims with violent acts and terrorism has led development of stereotypes among Americans, which portray Muslims as people who do not value human dignity and peace (Umbreit, Lewis, & Burns, 2003).

Thus, the media influences how Americans perceive Muslims and consequently commit hate crimes. Therefore, this research paper will discuss and analyze various beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that make individuals to support hate crimes directed at the Muslim community. Furthermore, the paper will discuss how the media shapes beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions about Muslims and terrorism, and thus causes Americans to conduct hate crimes against Muslims.

Problem or Objective

The main objective of this research paper is to assess and analyze some of the attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions that make Americans and other groups to associate the Muslim community with violence and terrorism. Moreover, the paper aims at analyzing how the media influence perceptions of Muslims among Americans by linking Muslims with acts of violence and terrorism, which normally emanate from the Middle East.

To come up with a comprehensive report, the paper will discuss and give some examples of hate crimes and terrorist activities that have happened in the Middle East and America after the September 11, 2001. In this view, the paper will analyze how Americans perceive Muslims in relation to terrorism and hate crimes. To elucidate the relationship between hate crimes and terrorism, the paper will use survey as research design.

The study will administer questionnaires to various Americans to provide information about their beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions in relation to Muslims and their association with terrorism and hate crimes. Various theories of hate crime and terrorism indicate that political violence and acts of terrorism are very common in the Middle East (Bonino, 2012). Hence, it is evident that terrorism and hate crimes are common in the Middle East.

Literature Review

According to British largest mainstream Muslim organization, there have been Islamophobic attacks and hate crime against the Muslim community, which have been increasing as evidenced by constant assaults on Muslims and vandalisms of mosques (Lambert & Githens-Mazer, 2010).

Although there has been an increase in the number of hate crimes and violence, it is clear from various previous researches that very few of these acts have been reported to the police (Lambert & Githens-Mazer, 2010). According to the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), the minority Muslim community is 42 times more likely to be a victim Terrorism Act than other minorities (McCorkell, 2011).

In April 2009, 762 Islamophobic offenses were reported to the Metropolitan Police in London when compared to the 333 offenses that were reported at 2010/2011 (McCorkell, 2011). Furthermore, reports from two police officers in the United Kingdom indicate that around 1,200 anti-Muslim crimes were reported in 2010, while only 546 anti-Semitic crimes were reported in the same year (Lambert & Githens-Mazer, 2010). Since the cases of hate crimes reported among Muslims are high, it indicates that they experience high rates of hate crimes.

The cases of hate crimes are not only common among adult people, but also common among children. According to Sandoval, Lysiak, & Scharpiro (2011), a fellow student beat a 13-year-old Muslim girl because she was wearing a headscarf, which he and his classmates believed to be a sign of terrorism.

According to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), about 1,700 cases of hate crimes against Muslims were reported in the year 2002 (Lambert & Githens-Mazer, 2010). The cases of hate crimes in American are higher than in the United States, which means that Americans perceive Muslims as terrorists, and thus direct hate crimes at them.

Ample evidence shows that the increase in cases of hate crimes against Muslims has been due to negative stereotypes of Muslims in the media, especially among the communities of Muslims in the Middle East (Craig-Henderson, & Brown-Sims, 2004).). In some social places such as schools, markets, buses, planes, and even political meetings, hate crimes and negative attitudes towards Muslims are usually very common (Bayoumi, 2011). This means that Muslims are not safe in social places because they are prone to hate crimes against them.

Although hate crimes against Muslims emanate from terrorist activities such as September 11, 2001, propaganda spread by the media has continued to paint Muslims negatively. According to the FBI report, in 2010 and 2011, hate crimes against Muslims increased up to 50% due to the anti-Muslim propaganda (Lambert & Githens-Mazer, 2010). This shows that there is less reporting of hate crimes by the public to the police.

Other studies estimate that the real number of Muslims who are victims of hate crimes range from 3,000 to 5,000 (Lambert & Githens-Mazer, 2010; Falcone, 2006). Although cases of hate crimes reported increase, Muslims still have some reservations as they claim that Christians perceive their struggles against hate crimes as a means of enhancing their dominance (Lambert & Githens-Mazer, 2010). In this view, the Muslim community usually fears reporting hate crime to the police because most of them are Christians.

The social media has a significant influence on beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions, which associate Muslims with terrorism. The negative publicity of Muslims has compelled Muslims to come out and defend their religion strongly in a bid to dissociate themselves from terrorism and acts of violence (Love, 2009).

One incident that illustrates the prevalence of hate crimes against Muslims is in the report of the Niagara Regional Police, where a 16-year-old girl was charged for assaulting a 17-year-old Muslim girl on her way from the Mosque (Carr, 2011).

The incident is not an isolated case because hate crimes are common in Canada. Owing to the prevalence of hate crimes in the United Kingdom, campaigns against hate crimes have aided in reducing their occurrence. The murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in Woolwich did pave the way for massive campaigns against hate crimes (Tasker, 2012). Hence, Muslims hope that the campaigns would help in reversing the trends of hate crimes against them.

Research Questions

1. What are the attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions that correlate with individual support for hate crimes directed at the Muslim community post September 11, 2001?
2. How does the media shape perceptions of Americans about Muslims and makes them to commit hate crimes?

Subject for Study

In this research paper, the subjects of study are students in schools and a few adults present in social gatherings. The study aims to collect beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that Americans has regarding hate crimes directed at Muslims in various schools and other social gatherings.

The victims of hate crimes are important in the study because they provide firsthand experience of hate crimes (Zahedi, 2011). In this view, the study will also target students who are victims of hate crimes. Students and members of general experience are important subjects of study because they have at least witnessed cases of hate crimes in social gatherings.

As the study deals with human subjects, the study will administer informed consent in compliance with ethical principles of research (Ahmad, 2004). Moreover, the study will guarantee confidentiality of the information obtained from participants. Given that hate crimes is a sensitive issue among people, the study will approach participants professionally with great caution lest some get angry and vent their frustrations on researchers.

Measurement

Since the study is a correlational study, it seeks to establish the existence of correlation between two different variables. One variable comprises of social factors that make Americans to support hate crimes against Muslims. These social factors are beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions, which tend to associate Muslims with terrorism and acts of violence. The second variable is the prevalence of hate crimes against Muslims.

From the literature review, it is evident that the Muslim community fears reporting hate crimes committed towards them, since the police rarely take them seriously (Kwan, 2008). Thus, the study will establish the prevalence of hate crimes among Muslims with the objective of correlating them with the social factors that contribute to their occurrence among Muslims.

Methodology

The study will use metaanalysis and survey as research designs. Metaanalysis will aid in the analysis of secondary data from various sources. In the collection secondary data, the FBI’s hate crime reports will provide valuable information and statistics relating to hate crime against Muslims.

Besides the FBI’s reports, Muslim websites will also provide data that depict the prevalence of hate crimes against Muslims. Additionally, the study will collect primary data using survey administered to the participants. The study expects participants to provide their beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions regarding the relationship between Muslims and terrorism. The questionnaire that the study will employ in conducting the survey has the following questions:

1. In your opinion, what do you think has led to the increase in cases of hate crimes and violent activities?
2. Have you been involved in any hate crime act in the last six months?
3. In your opinion, who should bear the blame for hate crime and terrorism?
4. How can you rate the level of terrorism and violent activities taking place in the Middle East?
5. How do the Americans conduct hate crimes against the Muslim community?
6. Do you think the Muslims are responsible for current activities of terrorists as the media claim?
7. What is your attitude and belief towards the Muslim community?

Analysis

The literature review indicates that there is a close association between Muslims and terrorism. Following the events of September 11, 2001, Americans started to associate Muslims with terrorism, which provided a platform for the media to spread beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that paints Muslims negatively (Choudhury, & Fenwick, 2011).

In this view, the study hypothesizes that Americans have a negative perspective about Muslims because the media constantly portrays violent acts of terrorism and civil wars within the Middle East, and thus making Americans to associate violence and terrorism with Muslims. Hence, the study will analyze data collected from the survey to establish if beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that Americans have about Muslims relate to the support of hate crimes.

It is expected that beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that perceive Muslims negatively in relation to terrorism contribute to the hate crimes. On contrast, presence of beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that perceive Muslims positively in relation to terrorism reduces the occurrence of hate crimes. Thus, the survey will provide beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions of Americans, and so give social factors that make them commit hate crimes against Muslims.

Moreover, the research will examine secondary sources with a view of obtaining statistics about the prevalence of hate crimes against Muslims in various parts of the world. The prevalence of hate crimes is important because it depicts the gravity of the crime and experiences that Muslims undergo.

Given that many cases of hate crimes are unreported due to negligence on the part of the authorities and criminal justice system, FBI’s statistics are essential for analysis of prevalence of hate crimes. Sandoval, Lysiak, and Scharpiro (2011) reports that the girl endured hate crimes for a long period because school officials ignored her when she reported. Hence, the analysis of secondary sources to establish the actual prevalence of hate crimes against Muslims is necessary in the study of hate crimes.

The study will also seek to associate the negative publicity of Muslims with hate crimes. In this view, the study with an attempt to correlate the presence of social factors such as beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions with the prevalence of hate crimes. The study assumes that the media shapes beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that associate Muslims with terrorism.

Essentially, what makes Americans to commit hate crimes against Muslims emanate from the beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that the media has imposed on them. Portrayal of the Muslims as potential terrorists has compelled them not to report cases of hate crimes that they experience.

The negative portrayal of Muslims has led them shy away from reporting any form of hate crimes committed against them because they fear the police would not listen to them (Phillips, & Moore, 2009). Moreover, the constant negative publicity of Muslims creates stereotypes that make them vulnerable to hate crimes in wherever they work or travel. Therefore, analysis of the roles that media play in influence beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions is essential.

Conclusion

From the research paper, it is clear that the negative attitudes and beliefs that the Americans have against the Muslims are to some extent supported by the way the media associate the Muslim community with violence and terrorism.

Additionally, from the paper, it is evident that despite the prevalence of hate crimes in the Muslim community, Muslims do not report them because they are afraid that the police would ignore. Therefore, the paper suggests that to reduce hate crimes directed at Muslims, the criminal justice system should focus on creating a peaceful relationship between the Muslims and the Americans.

Given that the media shapes the beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that associate Muslims and terrorism, it should use its power to demystify stereotypes that have made Americans to commit hate crimes against Muslims. In this view, if the media and Americans eliminate stereotypes that they have about Muslims and terrorism, hate crimes would not only disappear in America, but also across the world.

References

Ahmad, M. I. (2004). A Rage Shared By Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion. California Law Review, 92(5), 1259-1330.

Bayoumi, M. (2011). Between Acceptance and Rejection: Muslim Americans and the Legacies of September 11. OAH Magazine of History, 25(3), 15-19.

Bonino, S. (2012). Policing Strategies against Islamic Terrorism in the UK after 9/11: The Socio-Political Realities for British Muslims. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 32(1), 5-31.

Cainkar, L. (2006). The Social Construction of Difference and the Arab American Experience. Journal of American Ethnic History, 25(2/3), 244-278.

Carr, J. (2011). Regulating Islamophobia: The Need for Collecting Disaggregated Data on Racism in Ireland. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 31(4), 574-593.

Choudhury, T., & Fenwick, H. (2011). The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities. International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 25(3), 151-181.

Craig-Henderson, K., & Brown-Sims, M. (2004). An Investigation of African American College Students’ Beliefs about Anti-Middle Eastern Hate Crime and Victims in the Wake of September 11. Western Journal of Black Studies, 28(4), 511-517.

Falcone, J. (2006). Seeking Recognition: Patriotism, Power, and Politics in Sikh American Discourse in the Immediate Aftermath of 9/11. A Journal of Transnational Studies, 15(1), 89-119.

Kwan, M.P. (2008). From oral histories to visual narratives: re-presenting the post-September 11 experiences of the Muslim women in the USA. Social & Cultural Geography, 9(6), 653-669.

Lambert, R., & Githens-Mazer, J. (2010). Islamophobia and Anti-Muslims Hate Crime: U.K case studies. Web.

Love, E. (2009). Confronting Islamophobia in the United States: Framing civil rights activism among Middle Eastern Americans. Patterns of Prejudice, 43(3/4), 401-425.

McCorkell, A. (2011). Muslims Call for Action against hate Crimes. Web.

Phillips, J. M., & Moore, L. J. (2009). China: Economic, Political, and Social Issues. New York, USA: Nova Science Publishers.

Sandoval, E., Lysiak, M., & Scharpiro, R. (2011). Girl Attacked for Wearing a Veil Says 11-year-old Bullied, Beat her for months with Another Student. Web.

Tasker, Y. (2012). Television Crime Drama and Homeland Security: From Law & Order to “Terror TV.” Cinema Journal, 51(4), 44-65.

Umbreit, M. S., Lewis, T., & Burns, H. (2003). A community response to a 9/11 hate crime: Restorative justice through dialogue. Contemporary Justice Review, 6(4), 383-391.

Zahedi, A. (2011). Muslim American Women in the Post-11 September Era. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13(2), 183-203.

Challenges and conflicts in political interactions between states on a global level have always affected how relationships between the representatives of corresponding cultures develop. Due to the complexity of political relationships between the U.S. and several Muslim countries after the tragedy that took place on September 11, 2001, the attitudes toward Muslim Americans have been based on suspicion and prejudices among the rest of the American community (Foner 1172).

Although the source of negative feelings and prejudices toward the German Americans after WWI and Japanese Americans after WWII were quite different compared to the ones shown toward Muslim Americans nowadays, the extent and nature thereof are virtually the same, being based on ethnic and cultural stereotypes and fear. However, due to the increase in the intensity of prejudices and the emergence of the tools that allow for fearmongering among citizens, the extent of negativity that Muslim Americans experience in modern American society is much greater.

The experiences of Muslim Americans regarding social tension and even downright discrimination have been quite traumatic. While the general concept of fighting against terrorism was a rather natural and justified response to the tragedy of September 11, its toll on Muslim American citizens has been huge in terms of discrimination that they have witnessed. According to Flanagin’s account of the relationships between Muslim Americans and the rest of the U.S. population, the victimization of Muslim Americans is comparable to that one of German Americans after WWI, although it may not reach the extent of hatred for Japanese Americans after WWII (Foner 1173).

As Flanagin explains, “These assessments of hyphenated Americans—German, Irish, Catholic, etc.—were hysterical and maliciously bigoted, inspired by a noxious combination of fear and stupidity” (par. 17). Simultaneously, Flanagin states that the relationship toward Muslim Americans nowadays is similar to that one to German Americans in the 1940ies (par. 1).

Therefore, the attitudes toward Muslim Americans are currently very close to those that German Americans had to face after WWI, with the extent of suspicion and the perception of the specified demographic as an inherent threat being extraordinarily high. However, the rate at which Muslim people are marginalized in the American community might be a bit lower than the amount of discrimination and bias that Japanese Americans had to deal with after WWII.

The tragedy of 9/11 has left an indelible mark on American society, causing massive social trauma and derailing the relationships between Americans and the Muslim community. As a result, the Muslim American population in the U.S. has been facing significant contempt and has been deemed as a threat to public safety by a range of American citizens (Foner 1170). The extent of mistrust, fear, and hostility toward Muslim Americans among the rest of American citizens nowadays make their experiences quite comparable to those of German Americans after WWI and Japanese Americans after WWII (Foner 1175).

The observed tendency takes place due to the effects that social media have produced on spreading misinformation and allowing people with a misconstrued perception of Muslim Americans to create groups geared by the same emotions, primarily, fear toward the specified demographic (Flanagin). As a result, the extent of hostility that Muslim Americans have faced after the infamous terrorist act is even higher than it was for German Americans at the time of the corresponding political conflicts, although the amount of discrimination that Japanese Americans had to face after WWII might have been slightly higher.

Works Cited

Flanagin, Jake. “Today’s Muslim Americans are Yesterday’s German Americans.” Quartz. 2015. Web.

Foner, Eric. Give Me Liberty! 3rd ed., W. W. Norton & Company, 2016.

The events of September 11 changed the American nation and forced millions of people to understand the real threat of terrorism and Jihad for the international community. Political leaders and philosophers, military leaders, and sociologists have developed conspiracy theories of 9/11 trying to explain the attacks, the involvement of the government, and its response to the attacks. Despite the facts and figures proposed by the conspiracy theories, all of them lack clear evidence and official documents which could prove the hypotheses.

The majority of the conspiracy theories claim that the US government knew about the attacks but had ignored a threat. Critics explain that the US government had received numerous warnings and anonymous letters informing about terrorist attacks and the date of the attacks (Rothschild 67). Despite all attempts of the US government to protect its citizens against terrorist attacks, the government lost control over social security. Also, critics underline that President Bush and the state authorities did not inform the public about possible threats afraid of militarization of society and civil disobedience movements (Jasper 45).

Another layer of theories states that the events of September 2001 were initiated by the US military and the government which tried to gain the confidence of the American people and inspires racial envy and militarization (Hari 34). This is one of the most controversial theories because there are no official documents and facts which could prove this hypothesis. Also, some researchers claim that the American military had been interested in these attacks which helped them to prepare the ground for the Iraqi war. Before the attacks, the American military had stated: “the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor” (Rebuilding America’s Defenses 2000). It is possible to assume that the US government needed to gain the trust and faith of the American citizens but, on the other hand, the deaths of thousands of people only lowered its ‘image’ and showed inadequate security measures and social support it provided.

There is a point of view that the events of September 9/11 were a controlled demolition. Critics reject this conspiracy theory stating that: “demolition professionals always blow the bottom floors of a structure first, but the WTC tower collapses began at the upper levels, where the planes hit the buildings”. Also, seismographs in other areas of the city did not record any changes or seismic activity. Some journalists and researchers claim that that Flight 93 was shot down. Critics reject this theory because “the cockpit voice recorder of this flight [proves] that the passenger revolt caused the hijackers to deliberately crash the plane.”

There is a conspiracy theory which states that ‘Flight 93’ was just a missile fired by elements. On the other hand, the weak point is that the theorists do not take into account that the bodies of the passengers were found near Pentagon. The flight black box proved that the plane was hijacked and crashed by Muslim patriots. Also, some critics suppose that “insider trading in the stocks of United Airlines and American Airlines just before September 11 is evidence of advance knowledge of the plot” (The Top September 11 Conspiracy Theories 2006).

It is possible to reject all conspiracy theories because terrorist attacks had been widely used by Muslims and other interest groups since the 1970s. The undeniable fact is that Al-Qaida and bin Laden officially confirmed their involvement in these attacks. Bin Laden states: “We calculated in advance the number of casualties … who would be killed” (The Top September 11 Conspiracy Theories 2006). The main claims promulgated by al-Qaeda against the USA also included: unauthorized use of the Arabian national resources; an unlawful intrusion into political affairs of those countries, support of the abusive regimes; military bases in Arabian countries, etc. It is important to note that the openness of liberal-democratic societies is a factor in making them vulnerable to terrorist assault like the event of 9/11. All conspiracy theories lack evidence and factual data to support the arguments and hypotheses proposed by researchers. The main factor against all conspiracy theories is that before the attacks, the USA had stood in opposition to Arabic countries providing aggressive international politics, and these attacks became a response to its international politics and aggressive actions towards global terrorism. Dissatisfied with American policy in the Middle East terrorists started to destroy everyone they were as a threat to their national and religious existence.

Works Cited

Baker, G., Neo-Conspiracy Theories. The National Interest, 78, 2004, 34.

Hari, J. Conspiracy Theories: A Guide. New Statesman, 131, 2002: 34.

Jasper, W.F. 9-11 Conspiracy Fact & Fiction. The New American, 21, 2005: 45-46.

Rebuilding America’s Defenses. 2000. Web.

Rothschild, M. Enough Conspiracy Theories, Already. The Progressive, 2006: 67-68.

The Top September 11 Conspiracy Theories. 2006. Web.

The early morning of September 11, 2001, remains historic to many of the Americans who woke up to a terrorist attack in a country long believed to be the superpower. Nineteen hijackers from the middle east took control of four US commercial American airlines. Two of the airlines, flight 11 and flight 175 crashed on the North and south tower of the World Trade Center respectively in the early morning. The two other flights, flight 77 and flight 93 crashed into the Pentagon and near Shanksville, Pennsylvania respectively (Ronczkowski, p. 21).

The attack on the US by al-Qaeda has been related to a lot of conspiracy theories. It has been suggested that the attack could have been an inside job by some individuals within the United States. The individuals have been accused of having known of the attack beforehand but they chose to do nothing about it. They are also suspected of having assisted the terrorist in performing a planned demolition of the world trade center (Heymann, p. 13). The investigations that were published by the National Institute of standards and Technology dismissed these allegations and the community engineers supported the move by stating that the building was brought down by the impact of the jets. The theory of the jets collapsing the building can be more upheld since the jets were at very high speeds. The impact of the jets on the building also led to subsequent fires in the building. The resulting fires caused the melting of the steel holding and the building became very weak. As a result, the building collapsed as the steel reinforcements could not support it.

It is very important to note that the impact of the jets and the damage resulting from the fires did not have to necessarily bring the building down immediately for people to believe that the jets brought the building down (Heymann, p. 30). The fact that the building came down seven hours later did not mean that there must have been other forces that enabled to bring the building down such as thermal combustion. The investigation that was recently completed in August indicated that the fireproofs of the steel structures of the two towers were destroyed by the impact of the two Jets. An independent investigation by Purdue University indicated that if the fireproofs of the steel building had not been blown off the building would not have collapsed (Glanz, p. 10).

The fact that the US government did not attract the Al-Queda by booming them did not in any way indicate the just system of the American government was on the rocks. The US government led by President Bush did not have to follow the same suit as the attack on the Japanese in pearl harbor. Terrorist bombing results in the killing of multitudes of innocent people. If all the countries were to respond to terrorism by placing parallel bombings, then this would be a great threat to human rights and justice. The response of President Bush was very brave and was supported by many other nations (Higgs). President Bush declared war on terrorism and in my opinion; I consider this as a better and long-lasting solution than revenge.

Works Cited

1. James Glanz .City in the Sky: The Rise and Fall of the World Trade Center. Times Books, 2003, pp. 6-24
2. Michael R. Ronczkowski.Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime. CRC, 2003, pp. 20-42
3. Philip B. Heymann. Terrorism and America. The MIT Press, 1998, pp. 12-33
4. Robert Higgs.Another 9/11 – in a Long Series. Web.
5. The Editors of Popular Mechanics .Debunking 9/11 Myths: Why Conspiracy Theories Can’t Stand Up to the Facts. Hearst, 2006, pp. 18-36

In 2002, William Dudley wrote an article that focused on the September 11 attacks in the United States. He compared the attacks to those that occurred at Pearl Harbour, Japan, in 1941 in this article. The article that Dudley wrote was titled 9/11 Attacks on America. According to Dudley, both of these attacks led to the loss of the lives of many Americans. Approximately 3,000 people died as a result of the Pearl Harbour attacks (Dudley, 2002).

The real number of individuals who perished in the September 11 attacks is not known. However, people approximate that around 6,000 individuals perished (Dudley, 2002). Despite the number of deaths reported on these two incidences, the bottom line is that an attack was raised against the USA, which led to the death and injury of many American citizens. Due to this fact, these attacks are deemed to be terrorist attacks. Like many other Americans, William Dudley is against terrorist attacks and believes that the perpetrators of such crimes should face the full sentence of the law.

The writer has a negative attitude towards terrorism, judging from the tone of his writing. This is due to the nature of subjectivity that the writer has developed in his theme of discussion. As a result, the writer, like many other Americans, would go at any length to ensure that their state’s sovereignty is maintained.

From the discussions he issued in his paper, he said that there were massive recruitments of civilians into the army to ensure that their army was strong and ready to face the enemy (Dudley, 2002). The writer can influence the subjectivity of the reader. The manner in which he presented the topic, his word choice, and tone can make the reader also have a negative attitude towards terrorism.

References

Dudley, W. (2002). 9/11 Attacks on America. Web.