Case Study of Malik Taylor Who Was Tried and Convicted of First-degree Robbery

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Case Study of Malik Taylor Who Was Tried and Convicted of First-degree Robbery

Nature and Stage of the Proceedings

Malik Taylor was tried and convicted of first-degree robbery in the Delaware Superior Court. The defense filed a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence; the motion was denied. The defense now appeals arguing (1) that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal, as there was insufficient evidence to link the defendant to the robbery, and (2) that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal, as there was insufficient evidence that the defendant displayed what appeared to be a weapon or represented by words or conduct that he possessed a weapon.

Summary of Argument

Robbery in the second degree; class E felony:

(a) A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when, in the course of committing theft, the person uses or threatens the immediate use of force upon another person with intent to: (1) Prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property or to the retention thereof immediately after the taking; or (2) compel the owner of the property or another person to deliver up the property or to engage in other conduct which aids in the commission of the theft.
(b) In addition to its ordinary meaning, the phrase “in the course of committing theft” includes any act which occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission of the theft. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 831.

To convict a defendant of robbery in the first degree, the jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that an accused commits the crime of robbery in the second degree and during the commission of that crime displays what appears to be a deadly weapon. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 832(a)(2). To be convicted of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, the jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant commits a felony while in possession of a deadly weapon. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1447(a).

The State of Delaware will argue (1) that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal to Malik Taylor; there was sufficient evidence to link the appellant to the robbery beyond a reasonable doubt because of the jury’s verdict and (2) that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal for the reason that there was sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt the appellant displayed what appeared to be a weapon or represented by words or conduct that he possessed a weapon during the course of the robbery to Mr. Evgeni.

Issue #1: The jury agreed on a guilty verdict for, Malik Taylor, of first-degree robbery based on the evidence presented to the Delaware Superior Court.

a. The jury is the sole trier of fact under Delaware law to convict Malik Taylor based on the testimony and evidence presented to the trial court.

Wanamaker v. State, 1995 Del. 659 A.2d 229 (Apr. 3, 1995): A police officer testified that she had been working as an undercover agent targeting a specific apartment building. The officer identified defendant as the man who had sold her marijuana. Defendant testified and denied committing the crime. He claimed it was, mistaken identity, relying on an alibi. The court held that the jury was the sole trier of fact, responsible for determining witness credibility, and resolving conflicts in the testimony. Thus, it was solely in the discretion of the jury to accept one witness’ testimony and disapprove the testimony of other witnesses. The court held that sufficient evidence existed in support of the defendant’s conviction.

Under Delaware law, the jury is the sole trier of fact, responsible for determining witness credibility and resolving conflicts in the testimony. The court granted the State’s motion and affirmed the defendant’s convictions and his sentence. In the present case, the main legal issue on appeal is whether Malik Taylor was actually in fact the individual who committed the robbery to Mr. Evgeni. Based on the testimony and the evidence presented to the trial court, the jury came to the verdict, as sole trier of fact, that Malik Taylor had in fact committed the crime of first-degree robbery. The State of Delaware will argue because it is precedence in Delaware that, it is ultimately up to the jury as to whether Mr. Taylor was the perpetrator and the jury in the Delaware Superior Court has already agreed that it was in fact, Mr. Taylor. In this case, it is up to the appellate judge of the Delaware Supreme Court to decide whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Malik Taylor and remand the case back to the trial court if it is not.

Issue #2: There is sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant, Malik Taylor, displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon during the commission of the robbery.

a. Taylor gestured what appeared to be a deadly weapon in his jacket pocket pointed at Evgeni.

Deshields v. State, 706 A.2d 502 (Del. 1998): On April 21, 1995, Laura Jackson was working at a store. At 3:30 a.m., a man entered, made a purchase, and left and returned a few minutes later. He told Jackson to go behind the counter and give him the money in the register. When she hesitated, he reached underneath his tee-shirt and belt with his right hand. He then pointed something heavy and bulky at her from under his shirt. Jackson thought he had a gun. Jackson followed his orders and gave him fifty dollars cash. The robber motioned for Jackson to enter a back room near the end of the counter. He gestured for Jackson to stay there until he was gone. The robber left the store. Jackson called the police. Defendant was convicted after jury trial of first-degree robbery and appealed.

Deshields was charged with robbery in the first-degree, alleging that on April 21, 1995, in the course of, committing theft, use the threat of force upon Laura Jackson with intent to overcome resistance to the taking of property and in the course of the commission of that crime displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon. Defendant did place his hand under his shirt in a manner to make it appear that he possessed a gun, in violation of Title 11, Section [832(a)(2)] of the Delaware Code. According to the State, the circumstances of the second robbery in May illustrated that Deshields tried to convince Jackson he had a weapon by reaching underneath his shirt with his right hand, just as he had done during the first robbery in April.

The Superior Court ruled that the May robbery was admissible to show absence of mistake or an intent on Deshields’ part to convince Jackson, by gesturing, that he had a weapon. This case is directly similar to the present case because of the element of first-degree robbery where the appellant in the commission of a second-degree robbery, “displays what appears to be a deadly weapon.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 832(a)(2). Malik Taylor, in the course of the robbery, gestured to Mr. Evgeni as if he had a weapon to use the threat of serious harm or death to intimidate Mr. Evgeni and force him to open the door to the area with the cash register for Taylor to have access to the money. This gesture towards what could be interpreted as a deadly weapon to Mr. Evgeni was sufficient to convict Malik Taylor of the crime of first-degree robbery. This is directly similar to the actions made by the appellant, Deshields, toward Ms. Jackson when he had reached underneath his shirt with his right hand, intending to threat Jackson to give her the idea that he had a deadly weapon without showing if he actually did have one. This was sufficient to convict the appellant of first-degree robbery in the state of Delaware and affirmed after appeal.

b. Mr. Evgeni reasonably believed Mr. Taylor had or appeared to have a deadly weapon.

Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821 (Del. 1994): Linda Mikolaitis was working at the Tri-State Mall Thriftway on September 7, 1991. At 8:00 p.m., a man inserted a gun through the booth’s window and said ‘this is a hold-up give me your big bills.’ Mikolaitis had never seen a gun before and assumed the man was holding a toy gun, making a joke. However, due to the man’s demeanor and, the gun ‘didn’t look plastic, it looked metal and it had to be real.’, she changed her mind. Mikolaitis handed a large amount of cash from the store safe to the robber. Two other Thriftway employees witnessed the robbery. Michelle Ulmer entered the booth while Mikolaitis was emptying the safe. The robber told her to be quiet and pointed what she believed to be a ‘small silver gun’ at her. She observed the gun from close range. The two women, Ms. Mikolaitis and Ms. Ulmer, later identified Desmond as the robber.

The Supreme Court of Delaware held that possession of a deadly weapon during commission of felony did not constitute double jeopardy, and testimony describing gun used was sufficient to prove that defendant possessed deadly weapon; the trial court judgment was affirmed. The appellant, Desmond, claims that the eyewitness testimony was circumstantial evidence, therefore insufficient “credible evidence” to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually possessed a deadly weapon. Thus, the Supreme Court of Delaware should overturn his PDWDCF conviction as a matter of law. “To sustain a conviction for PDWDCF, the State need not recover the weapon involved, nor must the weapon have been fired during the course of the felony. The relevant question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williams v. State, Del.Supr., 539 A.2d 164, 168, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 969, 109 S.Ct. 500, 102 L.Ed.2d 536 (1988). The record reflects that most of the witnesses viewed the weapon at close range and for extended periods of time. The substantial similarity of their detailed descriptions of the weapon lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that what Desmond appeared to possess was, in fact, a deadly weapon.

This is directly related to the present case in the issue of whether Malik Taylor had or appeared to have a deadly weapon when he had committed the robbery from Mr. Evgeni. It does not matter if he actually in fact, had the weapon or not, as long as there is sufficient evidence that Mr. Evgeni reasonably believed Taylor had a weapon and a rational trier of fact found that Taylor appeared to possess a deadly weapon during the robbery of Mr. Evgeni’s store. Even though there is no direct evidence as to whether a deadly weapon was actually shown or not based on the surveillance footage and testimony by Evgeni, the circumstantial evidence presented to the Delaware Superior Court and Mr. Evgeni’s testimony was adequate, as in the case with Desmond, to convict Malik Taylor of first-degree robbery. The State of Delaware will argue that Evgeni reasonably believed that Taylor had a weapon from his actions and this was sufficient to fulfill the element of “appearing to have a deadly weapon” for first-degree robbery in Delaware.

c. Taylor appeared with his conduct to manifest a deadly weapon without showing it to Evgeni.

State v. Muhammad, 2004 Del. Super. 435 (Del., 2004): Defendant, Parris Muhammad, was convicted by a jury on April 11, 2002, of robbery in the first degree, wearing a disguise during a felony, and tampering with physical evidence. These convictions were upheld on appeal. The first issue is, whether there was “sufficient” evidence that Muhammad displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon. In Walton v. State, 821 A.2d 871 (Del. 2003), the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed a first-degree robbery conviction, holding that a person who handed the bank teller a note saying he had a bomb while holding one hand in his pocket, did not “display what appears to be a deadly weapon” for purposes of the criminal statute. The Walton Majority held that there must be conduct, in addition to the verbal threat, “that could be viewed objectively as ‘displaying what appears to be a deadly weapon.” Muhammad’s crime is distinguishable. In addition to his verbal threat, Muhammad fiddled with something under his shirt. Applying Walton, the Court found that Muhammad’s actions provided an objective manifestation of the weapon he claimed to have and threatened to use against the teller. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support Muhammad’s conviction of first-degree robbery.

In the present case, Taylor objectively manifested that he had a weapon by gesturing in his jacket pocket pointing at Mr. Evgeni while also simultaneously trying to hit Mr. Evgeni to gain entry into the booth with the cash register. Taylor’s conduct in this scene of events is an objective manifestation of his claim to have a deadly weapon to use the threat of harm or death to force Mr. Evgeni to open the door and cash register for Taylor.

d. Objective manifestation is not necessary to support the guilty verdict for first-degree robbery.

State v. Smith, 2004 Del. Super. 208 (Del. 2004): Defendant, Smith, claimed that the evidence did not establish that he displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon, as required for a robbery first-degree conviction, of the amended version of Del. Code Ann. tit. 118 § 832(a)(2) requiring that a victim subjectively believe that a defendant had a weapon and that a defendant’s threat was accompanied by an objective manifestation of a weapon. Thus, the fact that defendant manifested the presence of a deadly weapon in such a way that his victim perceived, through his senses, the existence of a deadly weapon, even if defendant did not actually possess a weapon, was sufficient to support the guilty verdict because objective manifestation was not necessary. Defendant’s motion for postconviction relief was denied.

The Court held: that a weapon was ‘displayed’ to a victim if the weapon was exhibited to the victim’s mind through any of the victim’s senses. The ‘displays’ requirement could be predicated only on the victim’s belief that a defendant possessed a deadly weapon, and some objective manifestation of a weapon, even if the weapon was unseen. The objective manifestation was in the form of a defendant alleging to have a weapon while concealing his or her hand under a piece of clothing. This is a powerful argument for the State of Delaware to support the denial of the appeal from Malik Taylor because it satisfies the additional element needed for first-degree robbery, “displaying a deadly weapon” without having the burden of proof to show that Taylor objectively manifested the deadly weapon to Mr. Evgeni. Taylor’s conduct alone is sufficient to satisfy the necessary element for first-degree robbery because Evgeni perceived through his senses the existence of a deadly weapon from Mr. Taylor, thus dictating his actions of allowing Mr. Taylor to enter the booth with the cash register.

Statement of Facts

Excerpt of testimony of Tihomir Evgeni

District Attorney (DA): Could you please state your name and occupation for the record?
Evgeni: My name is Tihomir Evgeni. I own and operate the Gas-n-Go on Spruce and 10th Street.
DA: Could you describe the events of May 15, 2018?

Evgeni: I was working the early morning shift. It was about 4:00 AM. I was ringing up customers and also trying to stock shelves, so I propped open the door of the cashier’s booth with a piece of cardboard. I was straightening up the counter and when I looked up, I noticed a masked man enter the store. I tried to close the booth door, but the man grabbed it from the outside. As the man was trying to open the door, I saw his hand in his jacket pocket and it looked like something inside the pocket was pointing toward me. I immediately thought it must be a gun. After I knew that he had a gun in his pocket, I just let the door open. The man entered the booth and I opened the cash register. He grabbed about three hundred dollars and left.

DA: Did you see his face?
Evgeni: No. He was wearing a ski mask that was light blue. He had on a bulky brown jacket and Levi’s. I didn’t really notice his shoes.
DA: Can you describe him?
Evgeni: I’m 5’8 and he was a little bit taller than me—maybe 5’9 or 5’10? He was African-American and seemed pretty thin—I couldn’t tell for sure because of the jacket.
DA: Did you see ever see the gun?
Evgeni: No. During the times that I was able to see the robber’s hands, he wasn’t holding a gun. However, he pretty much kept one hand in his pocket the entire time. And like I said, when he put his hand in his pocket, it seemed like he had a gun aimed at me. But when he started to enter the booth, he took his hand out of his jacket pocket and tried to hit me.
DA: What made you think that he planned to hit you?
Evgeni: He kind of waved his arms around and gestured as if he wanted to hit me, so I moved away and tried to cover myself so that he couldn’t hurt me.
DA: Did he say anything?
Evgeni: No. He was silent the whole time.
DA: What happened next?
Evgeni: He left the store and a few minutes later the police pulled up. About 30 minutes later, the police called me and said they had the suspect in custody. They asked me to go to the station to identify him.
DA: What happened at the station?
Evgeni: There was a line-up of about 5 African-American men.
DA: Were you able to identify the robber?
Evgeni: I really couldn’t tell for sure. Like I said, he was wearing a bulky jacket and a ski mask the whole time, so I never really got a good look at his face.
Public Defender (PD): I would like to show you the video surveillance recording that covers the events of May 15, 2018. Afterwards, I will ask you some questions.

Footage plays.

PD: Is it correct that when you were questioned by police you stated that the man did not remove his hand from his pocket the entire time he was in the store?
Evgeni: Yes.
PD: And just now you testified that when the man’s hand was in his pocket, you believed that he had a gun aimed at you?
Evgeni: Yes
PD: In the video we just viewed, is the man’s hand in his pocket?
Evgeni: No.
PD: Does the man ever reach into his pocket?
Evgeni: I know he did. He must have done it during the part of the video where you can’t see his hands. I could tell he had a gun on me.

Excerpt of testimony of Virginia Hanson

My name is Virginia Hanson, and I am a police officer with the Wilmington Police Department. I was driving on Spruce Street, approximately 20 feet from the gas station when a pedestrian flagged me down and told me that the station was being robbed. As I pulled into the station, I saw a masked man leaving the store. I observed the man for about three seconds, briefly making eye contact with him before he took off running. I followed in my car for about thirty seconds, until the man jumped over a gate and ran into the backyard of a house. After an unsuccessful foot pursuit that was about 10 minutes long, I put out a description of the man over the police radio. He appeared to be an African-American male, approximately five-seven, five-eight in height, approximately 190 to 200 pounds, wearing a brownish-beige, waist-length jacket, blue jeans, and a light-colored ski mask.

Excerpt of testimony of Daniel Krasprzak

My name is Daniel Krasprzak, and I am a police officer with the Wilmington Police Department. My partner and I were patrolling together when we heard the description that Officer Hanson put out, we then drove over to canvass the Spruce Street area. At about 4:35 a.m., I noticed a black man, approximately 5’5” to 5’7” tall, walking down the street about four blocks from the gas station. He was wearing a black and red hoodie with blue jeans, and gray and black sneakers. The hoodie had a logo on it. I stepped out of the police car and asked the man to stop and show his hands. I noticed that he was breathing heavily, and he had a tear in his right pant leg over the knee. I leaned down to the car to tell my partner that this could be the robbery suspect, and the man started running. I chased him on foot and my partner followed in the cruiser. I caught him after about two blocks, and we took him into custody.

The Surveillance Footage

The camera recording the interior of the cashier’s booth showed Evgeni facing away from the camera and using the cash register to assist customers through the booth window. A piece of cardboard, the corner of a box, and an item identified as a table wheel can be seen on the floor immediately outside of the booth door. About 30 seconds into the video, a masked man walks across the front of the store, past the booth window, and out of frame. Evgeni makes a sudden move toward the booth door and attempts to pull it shut, and the man grabs the doorframe, from the outside, with both hands. The man then pulls the door open, and Evgeni releases the handle; the man shoulders his way through the door, waves his right hand, and Evgeni walks backward. At this point, approximately 47 seconds into the video, a small, black, rectangular object is visible on the floor slightly outside of the doorframe. The man points to the register. When Evgeni does not move, the man approaches him and again points toward the register. Evgeni opens the register and then moves back into the lower-left corner of the frame, assuming a protective posture. The man empties cash register, and at one minute and nine seconds into the tape, leaves the booth and exits the store.

Another camera provided a view of the outside of the cashier’s booth and the aisle leading to the booth door. From this viewpoint, several boxes and packages are seen stacked in the aisle and a piece of cardboard is wedged under the open door. The masked man walks through the customer area into the aisle leading to the booth door and Evgeni begins to pull the door closed; the man lunges toward the door and grabs the doorframe. After several seconds, the man opens the door and stands in the doorframe.