Art Of War: Analysing US Military Strategy Based on Intelligence Strategies of Sun Tzu

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Sun Tzu’ Intelligence Strategy in 21 Century Conflicts

Abstract:

Clausewitz’s theory of war has been fully verified after Napoleon’s practice, and has become a world-famous, relatively comprehensive interpretation of war. His analysis of the nature of war and the key to victory has been used in practice. Clausewitz’s theory puts the key to the victory of the war on military strength and military power. He does not believe that the role of intelligence use in winning the war cannot be ignored. Unlike Clausewitz, the Sun Tzu’s view of war focuses on the three key elements of winning a war: intelligence, deception, and manipulation. The CIA of the United States, the MI5 of the United Kingdom, and the intelligence department of Russia all play an important role in today’s international society. It is obvious that the views of Sun Tzu still have a place in today’s society even if they are from thousands of years ago.

The use of Sun Tzu’s intelligence strategy:

In Sun Tzu’s book Art of War, he not only systematically expounded the use and collecting of intelligence, the use of espionage, etc., but also systematically defined the procedure of strategically using intelligence to make decisions. The practice of strategic use of intelligence is divided into five steps: “yong jian”, that is, the intelligence collecting process; “liao di”, that is, to speculate on the enemy’s situation; “jing zhi yi wu shi, jiao zhi yi ji” that is to analyze and judge the situation of both parties, analyze the advantages and disadvantages of each considering strategy; “counting for profit” that is, the finalization of the decision-making; “yi li zhi quan” that is, the implementation and reflection process of war. (Yi Zhou & Feifei Yin, 2018) Throughout the past and the present, this five-step rule has been used in major and minor wars. In today’s international society, this five-step rule is still outdated and instructive. In these five-step rules, we can easily find the important position of intelligence work.

In Sun Tzu’s theory, intelligence is divided into two parts: macro abstract information and decision-making intelligence with certain limitations. At the same time, strategic decision-making has also been divided into two parts: “jing yu miao suan” (be sophisticated in seeing the bigger picture) and “shen yu jue ce”(be careful at decision-making). Through more macro-level intelligence, top-level policy makers develop a macro-strategy, which is “miao suan”, a process that allows the state to win to the greatest extent, rather than being limited to specific individual wars. At the same time, decision-making intelligence often comes from field work and the particular situation at the time, and is used by generals and war commanders to make more on site practical decisions, thus winning specific individual wars (Yi Zhou & Feifei Yin, 2018). Sun Tzu believes that “miao suan” is more important, and to achieve this goal, more in-depth intelligence work and espionage activities are needed to comprehensively grasp the information of the hostile countries, so as to reach the Sun Tzu’s one of the most important points of view is “knowing ourselves and knowing each other” (Yi Zhou & Feifei Yin, 2018). Sun Tzu is well aware of the importance of collecting intelligence and analyzing foreign policy and war. Only by understanding the other side can all be more fully prepared and a reasonable operational plan can be formulated.

According to US intelligence analysts, the Iraq war has backfired on fighting against terrorist organisations and has become an important recruitment tool for Islamic extremists. During the war, the US military has been repeatedly frustrated because it did not effectively carry out and manage intelligence work (Mark Mazzetti, 2006). According to Sun Tzu, intelligence and espionage require human intelligence, so the intuitive factors and confidentiality are particularly important, and such subtle intelligence work requires long-term collection and preparation work (Sun Tzu). But the Bush administration launched the Iraq war very fast, intelligence work was difficult to carry out, and there was no enough effective and accurate information. At the same time, the intelligence department was severely corrupted by politics, causing the intelligence department to lose its intuition. The information provided by the CIA about decision-making on weapons of mass destruction was incorrect. Due to insufficient effective intelligence, top-level decision makers fabricated some information to ensure war can be initiated (Karen DeYoung, 2006). This naturally became one of the reasons why the Iraq war was difficult to win (Mark Mazzetti, 2006). The United States has more sophisticated weapons resources. According to Clausewitz’s theory, it should be the one that can win quickly. But the reason why the Iraq war lasted for several years and the record is not optimistic is precisely because when the war started. The intelligence work in Iraq was insufficient, the information was not enough, and it is impossible to formulate an effective war plan. This is the failure of the “miao suan” process. During the war, many American soldiers became prisoners of war (P.O.W) and were killed by IEDs and ambushes. It was because of the lack of specific intelligence gathering work, that is, the failure of the “decision-making” link (Sebastian J. Bae). It can be seen that in the defeat of the Iraq war, the failure of intelligence work has become a fatal factor, which also proves that Sun Tzu’s view of the extreme importance of intelligence and spies to carry out war.

Compared with Clausewitz’s emphasis on war, the Sun Tzu’s war view is more inclined to use pre-war information, deception, manipulation and other means to win without fighting, or try to avoid actual military engagement (Yi Zhou & Feifei Yin, 2018) “ju shi shi wan, ri fei qian jin” (There are 100,000 soldiers, and the daily expenses are huge). He believes that the actual force engagement is costly. The key to winning should not be limited to the victory of armed conflict. Such way of winning can bring greater benefits to the victorious country. It is far more cost-effective to occupy a relatively war-free city than to occupy a city that needs to be rebuilt after the strike of force. During the Iraq war, large-scale battles between the two sides were supported by positive conflicts, blasting, ambushes and air strikes. After the war, the Iraqi cities were often ruined. The reconstruction work was extremely difficult and requiring a lot of capital investment to carry out. The same thing happened in Afghanistan. In the process of combating ISIS, positive conflicts and air strikes were also used. The important cross-fire conflicts in important cities such as Mosul and Ramadi were all engaged with those extreme means of force. After the liberation of Ramadi, the whole city also became a ruin. Sabah Karhout, Member of Anbar The Council told NYT: Ramadi is a city of ghosts, and the cost of urban reconstruction is not optimistic (Sebastian J. Bae). If in the process of cracking down on ISIS, the US military can attach the importance of intelligence gathering, it can accurately strike terrorist bases, not only can greatly reduce the frontal engagement of fire, but also reduce the ambushes caught by the American soldiers and the casualties caused by IEDs. At the same time, it can more effectively maintain the appearance of the city itself and reduce the post-war reconstruction work.

Sun Tzu’s emphasis on the confidentiality of intelligence work is also extremely important. The exposure of intelligence work is undoubtedly the failure of intelligence work and will endanger the military (Sebastian J. Bae). In 2015, a Pentagon press official disclosed to the media that there will be an strike action in Mosul in April of the same year and Mosul will be taken back from ISIS control. Due to disclosure of information, the plan was indefinitely Postponed until 2017, Mosul was finally liberated. At the same time, the existence of the FR24 app has greatly exposed the actions of the United States and its allies’ air forces. Any aircraft that takes off can be found in this program app. ISIS has already evacuated before the air strikes. The reaction was evacuated. It can be considered as that the enemy has carried out certain intelligence work, and the information of the US military has been analyzed and new decision-making arrangements have been made. At the same time, it also means that the United States and its allies have failed on their jobs in the confidentiality of intelligence. The information that should be kept secret can be obtained by anyone on the Internet, which directly leads to a waste of war resources and a prolonged conflict. The essence of ISIS can still be considered as a rebel insurgency, and the important element of the revolutionary war is time. It is difficult for the insurgents to sacrifice time elements to win (Kiras, J). And the ISIS army has the characteristics of guerrillas, Mao Zedong once said As mentioned in the book The Guerrilla War, “time is the key factor in the victory of guerrilla warfare. It is necessary to lengthen the front line and drag the enemy” (Mao Zedong, 1937). The relatively weak military strength of the ISIS insurgents has been able to balance the US military for so many years. It is precisely because of the dereliction of duty and negligence of the US and its allies’ forces in the intelligence secrecy work that many missed opportunities have been missed. And as Kiras, J mentioned in the Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency book, the best way to combat the rebels is: Defeat them in space and time, defeat insurgents as quickly as possible. And ISIS prolonged the battle line again because of the mistakes of the US military’s secrecy work, making the war more difficult to win.

“Win without war”, the spirit of Sun Tzu’s view of war

Sun Tzu’s “bu zhan er sheng” (win without fighting) view, “xian qi suo ai, gong qi bi suo jiu” (attack the most important part which they must try to save), that is, attack the enemy key units, first, the place that enemy will definitely want to try to remedy the situation in this process is very easy to chaos, thus killing the enemy. “Winning without war” also requires “clear and precise intelligence requirements”, which means that intelligence work needs to be time-sensitive (Yu Wang & Li Jun Wan, 2016). In some cases, the successful destruction of enemy’s key facilities, such as the arsenal, base camp, etc., can directly lead to the enemy’s defeat and direct win. Through the development of the early intelligence work, the enemy’s important facilities will be accurately grasped, and the initiative will be taken to control the war.

As far as ISIS is concerned, the battlefield is in the ISIS control area. It is relatively difficult for the United States and its allies’ forces to engage in the battle. However, after the US military successfully attacked the Omar oil field, the situation changed and ISIS was forced to give up the initiative. At the same time, a large number of combat readiness resources and funding sources were abandoned, which caused a huge blow to its combat effectiveness. From the example of Omar Oil Field, we can easily find that the control-taken of the oil field is planned in advance, so that we can achieve “raid”. Intelligence needs to be reported before the enemy compromises it, and at the same time, it must leave sufficient preparation time for the decision-making and combat units of the country. The Obama administration’s killing of bin Laden is a battle for the full development of pre-action intelligence work and the secrecy of work. From obtaining information about the bin Laden residence information by the CIA, quickly reporting and responding to the president, making analysis and decision-making, organizing the actual combat drills, to the final killing, the senior decision-makers of the war room were the only people who had the clearance and all the action plans were kept secret. Full preparation and prior conditions were obtained. This time, the decapitation attack not only killed bin Laden, but also devastated terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda. The killing of leaders and spiritual leaders undoubtedly caused a heavy blow to them. To a certain extent, it was an important achievement in the battle throughout terrorism that it was a victory without a large-scale military engagement of fire. As the Sun Tzu described, plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt’ through intelligence, spy work, act unexpectedly, and won.

This strategic arrangement applies to the Cyber War of today’s era, and network information facilities are too important for every country. The acquisition of intelligence through military reconnaissance, network and other means has greatly reduced spy (field agent) intelligence activities. The performance of contemporary warfare has turned to informational warfare, so if a country’s information facilities were hit, the country’s ability of military action would also have been hit hard. The existence of Cyber Warfare and its extremely important position is further evidence. Intelligence work still plays an important role in the war of the present era.

The restrictions of Sun Tzu’s Intelligence Strategy

Sun Tzu’s Art Of War from thousands of years ago naturally has a view that it no longer applies to today’s war environment. For the intelligence gathering work, Sun Tzu believed and emphasized that intelligence work needs to be done with more quantity, and the source of intelligence should be wide, so as to ensure the accuracy of intelligence. This view is actually not applicable to the needs of today’s war. The collection of contemporary intelligence comes from scientific means such as aerial reconnaissance and satellite aerial photography. The possibility of fraud and deception is low. The amount of data is no longer able to help identify the accuracy. The source of intelligence is often the state specialized agency, the possibility of collecting the false information is low, so this view is no longer applicable to today’s international community. For example, the Cuban Missile Crisis happened decades ago has even obtained accurate information through the photos of the reconnaissance plane. With the continuous development of science and technology and the progress of investigation methods, the accuracy of intelligence have been greatly improved.

Conclusion:

In the concept of Sun Tzu’s view of war, the intelligence work has an important position. Even today, thousands of years later, all countries in the international community have already attached importance to the development of intelligence work. At the same time, the development of the international community of today’s society also has important significant guidance the conflict of force is not the only way to war.

“Yi yue dao, er yue tian, san yue di, is yue jiang, we yue fa”. Here is Sun Tzu’s concept of decision-making. It is not difficult to see that Sun Tzu advocates that the decision-making process is important in considering all factors, that is, the “comprehensive national strength” that we now promoted. The wars of the 21st century tend to be localized and regionalized. The important countries (major powers) are more contested by comprehensive national strength. The Sun Tzu’s concept of warfare not only has significant guidance for war, but also has far-reaching influence on the conflict and competition of the international community today.

Reference and Citations:

Tzu, S. (2019). ART OF WAR. Beijing, Bloomsbury, China.

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