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Introduction
The article by Gailmard and Jenkins (2007) analyzes the role of negative agenda control in the Senate and House of Representatives. The most significant contribution made by the authors is the thorough investigation of negative agenda control in the Senate, as opposed to the majority of studies that investigate the House. Gailmard and Jenkins (2007) remark that since research on the power of political parties usually focuses on the House of Representatives, there is a subjective notion of the character and institutional foundation of party power. The study by Finocchiaro and Rohde (2008) is one of the examples of such investigations. While many authors focus on partisan agenda control in the House, they overlook the state of affairs in the Senate.
Main body
Gailmard and Jenkins (2007) offer a substantial evaluation of power and control in the Senate and House by comparing the problems in both chambers. In particular, the authors note that the Senate’s ability to avoid unwanted issues in its agenda is rather limited. Thus they suggest that the Senate and House have quite disparate levels of negative agenda regulation (Gailmard & Jenkins, 2007). In light of this argument, these scholars make a crucial contribution toward eliminating unexamined issues about negative agenda control.
The article employs a substantial amount of evidence and analyzes positive and negative agenda control in the Senate and House. Its findings indicate that the Senate majority party can compete with the House in terms of its ability to deal with disagreements from minority party members. Thus, Gailmard and Jenkins (2007) conclude that the power of the Senate majority party is quite forward-looking, and they demonstrate their vision through deep analysis.
While the study performed by Gailmard and Jenkins (2007) makes a crucial input to the analysis of agenda control in Congress, there is one serious drawback to the structure of their study. The variable used by the authors to measure the dependent variable is not the most valid measurement possible. Gailmard and Jenkins (2007) focus their study on the analysis of party roll rates, but using this measure alone is not considered the most productive approach. This view is supported by the study performed by Stiglitz and Weingast (2010). Whereas party roll rates have proved to be an important factor in the process of analyzing negative agenda power, it is necessary to “look beyond roll rates” and investigate the issue from a different perspective (Stiglitz & Weingast, 2010, p. 164). An alternative solution is the estimation of cutpoints.
Stiglitz and Weingast (2010) suggest two reasons why it is crucial to look beyond roll rates. The first argument is that the theory of pivotal politics does not offer explicit and straightforward prognoses concerning partisan roll rates. Such predictions are much more precise concerning cutpoints. Thus the comparison of the theories becomes more problematic in the context of concentrated roll rates (Stiglitz & Weingast, 2010). The second reason to look beyond roll rates is that their pattern is compatible with a nonpartisan theory (Stiglitz & Weingast, 2010). Thus their approach lacks the possibility of analyzing the issue from a partisan theory.
Conclusion
In general, the major limitation of the study performed by Gailmard and Jenkins (2007) is that they concentrate on roll rates. If they had paid more attention to cutpoints, they could have reached more valid results. Also, there would have been an opportunity to view the problem in the context of a partisan theory.
References
Finocchiaro, C. J., & Rohde, D. W. (2008). War for the floor: Partisan theory and agenda control in the U.S. House of Representatives. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 33(1), 35-61.
Gailmard, S., & Jenkins, J. A. (2007). Negative agenda control in the Senate and House: Fingerprints of majority party power. The Journal of Politics, 69(3), 689-700.
Stiglitz, E. H., & Weingast, B. R. (2010). Agenda control in Congress: Evidence from cutpoint estimates and ideal point uncertainty. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 35(2), 157-185.
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