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Introduction
In reading about all the various theories of physicalism, also often called materialism, it presents a confusing array of philosophical stances, which all have one thing in common: the separation of the physical from the non-physical, or the division of brain and mind. There are many different types with different definitions and it is difficult to prove or refute any of them. Churchlands particular version, eliminative materialism, is considered a bit extreme, and so is easier to refute, because it does not allow observation to prove existence. The most commonly discussed problem with eliminative materialism is the problem known as the Qualia Problem , which discusses the existence of non-physical things in the mind or brain or both (as is suggested here), such as redness . One further discussion to which attention should be given is the circular nature of proof or disproof of any of these ideas.
Main body
In Mental Events and the Brain (1963), Paul Feyerabend posited that common-sense psychology might actually be false. He held that most versions of materialism undermined common-sense psychology. Feyerabend argued that common-sense mental ideas are non-physical, indicating that physicalism would eliminate all mental states understood by common-sense (1963, p. 295). In his 1981 article, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes , Paul Churchland presents several arguments in favor of dropping commonsense psychology that have shaped the modern debate about the status of ordinary notions like belief. (Ramsey 2008) The Churchlands, in fact, decried the state of folk or common sense psychology, because they said it was both stagnant and inadequate, because it does not allow us to explain many phenomena, such as: dreaming, certain types and attributes of mental illness, consciousness, memory and learning.
That a theory is not universal does not discount its value. For example, there is currently no unifying theory for quantum mechanics, but there are many valuable theories. Theories such as these in the past have eventually become accepted as scientific fact, even in the absence of a unification theory. One example is the existence of dark matter and of antimatter. Both of these things have been proven to exist by inference, since the existence of something which eliminates matter, either by cancelling it or absorbing it has been found by using huge particle accelerators to test this. These forces which eliminated particles have been named antimatter and dark matter, because they fit the original definition contained the original theories concerning the nature of matter, dark matter and antimatter. Therefore, they do exist.
The Qualia Problem as posited by Jackson (1996) names sensory perceptions, such as perceptions of colors, pain and other non-physical perceptions, which may or may not stem from physical causes, as qualia, and says that all of these are subjective in nature: ineffible, intrinsic, private and directly accessible to the conscious mind. (Silby 2009) What this means is that perceptions of the mind, such as pain and different colors and depth of colors are proof that mind exists in that it has effect upon the brain and body. All animals respond the same way to pain: they withdraw from the source. However, each individuals perception of pain is different. One person will drop a bowl of hot liquid, because they sense more pain and danger of burning flesh than another who will continue to hold a bowl of the same temperature liquid. Each individual mind perceives a different degree of pain and reacts accordingly. By the same token, an individual can learn not to drop the bowl, because they have learned that it really is not hot enough to burn them, or because the consequences of dropping the bowl are more severe than temporary discomfort. In fact, with sufficient motivation, such as danger in a battle setting, an individual can ignore obvious injury in order to accomplish his desired purpose.
It depends entirely upon motivation, which would not exist without mind, and does not exist theoretically outside a function of the brain in a purely materialist philosophy. Materialists expect that eventually the existence of mind will be disproven and it will be shown to be a mere function of the physical brain. However, since they use the concept of misjudgment to disprove the existence of qualia, it leads to using what they wish to eliminate to eliminate itself. The qualia problem is expected by materialists to resolve itself when it is proven that only the brain exists and the rest is purely a product of the brain. It is supposed that differences, such as the degree of redness perceived, will be resolved by measuring the differences among brains and among the functions of brains..
In fact, circular reasoning is often at fault in philosophical traps. It one wishes to prove that a deity made everything out of nothing, one must first eliminate the deity in order to have nothing. In fact, one must especially remove man from the same picture. So if nothing ever existed, which is doubtful, then nobody ever knew about it. The same type of circular reasoning is used to say that the mind does not really exist, because it cannot exist without the brain. However, there is no proof of that either. The living mind on this plane of existence cannot exist without the brain as far as we know, because without the living brain and body, the mind cannot express itself in any way that we can perceive.
Saying that mind cannot exist without being attached to a living brain, simply because we cannot perceive it or communicate with it unless it is attached to a living brain is like saying that mathematics and numbers do not exist, because they require the existence of an intelligence to invent and perceive them. Numbers were created by man to arbitrarily measure an arbitrary piece of existence. That we cannot pinpoint how much of existence, possibly because we are actually measuring apiece of infinity, they measure does not negate their existence. It simply means that they are only useful with the boundaries we human beings have arbitrarily set.
Much of the debate in philosophy centers around the language used to express ones theories and beliefs about philosophy, to explain philosophical problems and solutions. Often it is merely a debate over semantics and definitions. (Sturgeon, Scott, 2000) The earlier examples using quantum mechanics showed this when the existence of dark matter and antimatter were proven by naming something that has been identified with these names. However, it seems that we humans have a fondness for debating essentially unanswerable questions in this manner. Perhaps we are hoping to stumble over the magical answer if we dance around it and debate it long enough.
Perhaps it is language that is inadequate, and we need to find a more precise way of communicating. We could then share our impressions of redness and maybe even agree upon degrees of redness. Cognitive psychologists especially would like to solve the problem of identifying and sharing qualia, since this would open up whole new ways for understanding perception and individual existence. I cannot know what it is like to be someone else, because I have never done that. By the same measure, nobody else has ever been me. Cognition is possibly nearly as individual as qualia, since identifying functions and creating definitions which always work is a significant problem for psychologists.
Patricia Churchland (1986) has argued, that we cannot possibly identify where in the brain we may find anything in sentence-like structure that is used to express beliefs and other propositional attitudes or to describe what is defined as qualia, because we cannot find anything in the brain expressed in syntactic structures. Especially as concerns qualia, people claim not to think in syntactic structure, but to perceive these feelings directly and understand them in a non-0linguistic manner. A person does not pull away a hand from a flame as a result of reasoning, but as a result of involuntary muscle response to stimulations from the brain. This supports the materialist view. However, when asked to describe the feelings, people must use language, however inadequate it may be.
Materialists argue that any descriptions will be false, since they are not precise measurements. They posit that we will eventually be able to measure these responses from the brain in a precise manner and that will replace descriptions of feelings . This totally discounts the measurable effects of the same feelings . Stephen Stich (1983) argues that semantic taxonomies ignore causally salient aspects of cognitive states, involve a high degree of vagueness, and break down in the case of the mentally ill or the very young. This is especially true of beliefs and belief systems. Materialists use this to discount any semantic reasoning in favor of physical measurements, and claim that we will develop more and more refined measurements and eliminate the need for semantic descriptions. Since the brain stores information in a widely dispersed pattern distributed over many locations, and not in any syntactic manner, it is argued by materialists that language is unnecessary for measurement of qualia. They expect new measurements to show that qualia are merely a function of the brain and not of the non-existent mind.
In research it has been found over and over again that people have physiological responses to ideas and suggestions . Anticipation of pain or pleasure will excite the same physiological response as the actual pain or pleasure. This is why we can become so involved in movies that we have physiological responses as if we are actually experiencing the action in the movie. Any ideas, anticipation or suggestion must stem from mind, since it involves imagination and not reality. Therefore, when it actually has a causal relationship upon the body, and presumably the brain, it must, therefore, also exist.
Conclusion
This debate will go on indefinitely, possibly for centuries, supposing that the race and the planet last that long, because it is unlikely that we will discover any definitive proof within that time. Even should be discover much more refined methods for measuring brain activity and body responses, there will be no way to express the conclusions without using language, still a function of mind. To be able to attribute language to the brain will be an insurmountable task. By the same token, it will not be likely that any method of proving the physical existence of mind will be invented, because mind is not a physical thing. We are probably at the level of cave men in our ability to understand realties and proofs we seek in this area of study. As long as we are physical beings we may never be able to actually measure the existence of the non-physical. However, that does not prove that it does not exist. Many people accept proof by inference as enough in view of the unlikelihood of acquiring anything more. Materialists, however, will probably never accept the existence of anything they cannot precisely measure.
References
Churchland, P. M., Behaviorism, Materialism and Functionalism: pp. 309 321 Reason & Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems in Philosophy 13th International Student Edition.
Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes, Journal of Philosophy 78: 67-90.
Churchland, P.S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Feyerabend, P. (1963). Mental Events and the Brain, Journal of Philosophy 40: pp 295-6.
Jackson, The Qualia Problem: pp. 297 301. Reason & Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems in Philosophy 13th International
Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. (1990). In Defense of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Studies 59: pp 31-54.
Ramsey, William, Eliminative Materialism , The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Web.
Silby, Brent, 2009, The Problem of Qualia, Scribd. Web.
Stich, S. (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sturgeon, Scott, 2000, Matters of Mind, Consciousness, Reason and Nature, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, International Library of Philosophy, pp 42-70.
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