Enforcement Powers of the UN Security Council

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Conceptual Analysis
Article 39
Article 41 and 42
UN Security Council Resolution 678
Conclusion
References

Introduction

The UN Security Council has the sole mandate of maintaining international peace and security throughout the world. So far, it has managed to do so with the maintenance of law and order in countries like Afghanistan, Cambodia, Namibia, and the likes. Its track record has been highlighted by the maintenance of peace and policing of truces to end some of the bloodiest world conflicts; however, other credits have been attributed to the councils commitment to helping nations build their economies after wars and in bringing perpetrators to book. Some of its successes on this front are like bringing Libya to account for its bombings in Pan Am 103, and the acknowledgment of Colonial Rhodesian leaders of their war crimes during an endless oppressive regime they let thrive under their watch.

However, recent developments, especially in the gulf have cast a lot of doubt on the councils ability to maintain world peace and security. One notable development was the failure of the council to prevent the recent Iraq invasion by the US in 2002, under former President Bushs government. In addition, the council was unable to stop wars in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, thereby giving room for critics to castigate the council as ineffective and full of fiascoes. In this context, the UN Security Council has been threatened by the power of willing nations to carry out their military actions in foreign lands before getting the go-ahead from the council. Nonetheless, the UN Security Council is the only body that can confer the legitimacy of the use of military force, even though some nations may not be in agreement with its decision. In other words, the council is recognized globally for the authorization of armed forces in international conflicts.

However, the council as a body has often experienced challenges in trying to enforce its decisions in major world conflicts, as can be seen from Iraqs invasion into Kuwait in the 90s. Some of the hurdles experienced arise out of legal challenges and the interpretation of its mandate in stopping world conflicts. Some of its powers in enforcing military actions are stipulated in article 39 of the UN charter; but, before the body can exercise its authority, it has to determine certain elements like the threat to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, by one of the states engaged in war. Furthermore, the councils actions are stipulated in articles 41 and 42 of the UN charter as either forcible or non-forcible actions.

This study seeks to determine the scope and powers of the UN about authorizing armed force by the UN charter which determines its powers in effecting military action on rogue states. However, this is going to be done with special reference to the Iraq Kuwait invasion in 1991 and the councils resolution (678) that led to the withdrawal of Iraq troops from Kuwait. This study will further analyze the form and content of this resolution during the war and its implications in the enforcement of future council actions in international conflicts.

Conceptual Analysis

A few years preceding the Iraq Kuwait invasion, the UN Security Council had found a new spirit of cooperation among member states, prompting many proponents of the Councils actions to openly boast of the Councils capability to finally end the scourge of war among nations. The councils five permanent seating members had finally decided to be regularly consult with each other during the process of resolving world conflicts, by maintaining a cordial working relationship under the system of rotating chairmanship in the councils leadership; however, the Iraq -Kuwait conflict cast a lot of doubt to the councils ability in dealing with conflicts, especially after the council exhibited a lack of preparedness to deal with Saddam Husseins aggressive military tact in Kuwait

Over the past years, preceding Iraqs invasion of Kuwait, Saddams government had been accusing Kuwait of stealing oil from its borders; in addition, the country claimed that the pro-western country was its 19th province. Unfortunately, as Saddam amassed his troops at the Kuwait border, the UN Security Council did little to dissuade the dictator from making his threats real. Moreover, Saddam Hussein may have drawn wrong conclusions to the perceived indifference western governments had on his earlier attack on Iran; in some quarters, it was reported that some Western regimes may have supported his invasion into Iran but the regime suffered defeat in the war anyway. Months before Saddam attacked Kuwait, its reported that Western governments never gave him a clear go-ahead to attack the country, but they also did little to stop him from doing so. These developments included a much-publicized meeting between Saddam and the American ambassador of the time; but in all this time, the UN Security Council was never firm on its position on the impending conflict.

A few months later, Saddam made his threats real and chased the ruling al Sabah clan out of Kuwait through military action, even though Kuwait had a relatively smaller army and was less empowered as compared to Iraqs. In some quarters, it is noted that Iraq may have as well held on to Kuwait for a long time if the US never found the resolve to oust him out of power; at this time, the UN security council looked up to the US to give it direction in solving the impulse. Nonetheless, Saddam Husseins actions against Kuwait took the Security Council by surprise because in months preceding the invasion, the UNs capitals perceived Saddams amassing of tankers at the Kuwait border, a bluff, and they also never thought he was going to make his threats real. His subsequent invasion into the country thereafter put the newly found cooperative spirit of the councils member states to test. The biggest shortcoming of the council in the entire conflict was that it was well aware of the situation but was nonetheless, not overly concerned about the matter. From the councils proceedings after the war, there was both a good and bad side to the conflict; the good news was that the council had clear reports on the issues underlying the conflict and their subsequent eventualities, but the bad news was that there was no plan to deal with the conflict at all.

Article 39

Under article 39 of the UN charter, the council needs to determine the threat to peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression before authorizing armed force in international conflicts; after which, it is to determine the course of action to be followed by article 41 and 42 of the charter. Article 39 is what governed the councils action in the Iran Kuwait conflict since it is found in chapter VII which outlines the recommendations the council is to undertake with regards to recommending military or nonmilitary action in any conflict. This article dictates the actions to be followed by military staff members in determining the actions to be taken by the council, in case they wanted to use military force, which is often at the disposal of the UN.

An analysis of article 39, therefore, becomes quite important in the Iran Kuwait situation because it authorizes the use of force to stop Iraq from further causing havoc in Kuwait. However, the action by the council is only effective on UN member states because, under article 39, the council can intervene in preventing wars between member states, since the article bars one state from attacking another. Articles 39, 41, and 42 were extensively used to moderate the soaring relationships between Iraq and Kuwait because, under article 39, the UN Security Council could use force to quell violence if it was established that acts of aggression or a breach of the peace were noted from either of the two nations. Acts of aggression of breaches of peace all have different implications under article 39.

When analyzed in the Iraq Kuwait context, breach of peace implies that one of the parties had to destabilize the peace that was existent before the conflict by carrying out some form of disorderly conduct in another nation. A common manifestation of a breach of the peace is the trespass into another countrys territory to carry out acts of violence. Saddams actions perfectly befitted the breach of the peace because his invasion into Kuwait was unlawful, and under article 39, his use of military force to destabilize the sitting government authorized the councils actions to use force to stabilize Kuwait again.

Saddams actions caused a lot of public unrest in Kuwait because of the destabilization of peace and the consequent expulsion of the ruling clan out of the country. His actions when analyzed under article 39 implied that Saddam should have possibly faced detention or deportation as outlined in articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, which outlines the course of action to be followed by the council after the establishment of a breach of peace in a conflict.

Under UN regulations, the threat of peace is quite difficult to determine and so the council does not have a blanket definition of the act of a threat to peace. Instead, the council determines on a case-by-case basis whether the threat to peace can be established in a conflict. The implications of a threat to peace and an act of aggression are the same and all of them call for the use of force in stabilizing conflict areas. Acts of aggression can also be equated to Saddams actions in Kuwait because the invasion by military means and the ousting of the sitting regime was a clear act of aggression by Iraq. The situation was further worsened from the observation that Kuwait had a much smaller and weaker army when compared to Iraq, thereby pitting Iraq as an aggressive country, especially considering Iraq wanted to take over the country as one of its provinces. Under article 39 therefore, Iraq depicted acts of aggression, breached the peace, and was an equal threat to peace in the region. This warranted the use of force, or otherwise, depending on the course of action to be taken under articles 41 and 42.

Nonetheless, under article 41 of the UN charter, the use of armed forces is not completely guaranteed of the council unless it is established in the words of Higgins that armed forces are to be used only if the economic and spare the prayer rail, sea, air, postal, and others, are partially or completely ineffective.

As the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait ceased, Iraq constantly referred to the seventh chapter of the UN charter in formulating its policies on Kuwait; however, provision 688 was an exception to this chapter because to a significant degree, the resolution emphasized the protection of human rights and political freedoms which were also to liberate them from any forms of oppression to be perpetrated by any government. Nonetheless, there were some segments to the resolution which were nonbinding to Kuwait but all the resolutions against Iraq were binding, with the most important resolution being resolution 678. With reference to this resolution, Carl affirms resolution 678 was

adopted on 3 / April / 1991 and is making all of Abu, which contained the present resolution to the 34 rule and put all of Iraq at the threat of the seventh item supplied in the service of the American Zionist. Since Iraq was also under American tutelage under the umbrella of the United Nations, when U.S. forces entered Iraq in April 2003, according to the UN 1483 resolution (after amendment), the same forces launched a multi-national resolution 1546

Article 41 and 42

Under articles 41 and 42, the UN charter encompasses the use of force as the last resort in preventing the occurrence of war at any given point of conflict between two nations. The charter has not only been used in the Iraq Kuwait conflict but also the preventions of Civil war in Congo. The article gives power to the Security Council to use a requisite measure of force in apprehending, detaining, or deporting individuals who are identified to perpetrate violence or conflict. Article 41, therefore, gives the council the power to arrest, detain or deport individuals without contravening international regulations, but in some respect, such a scope is contrary to military measures which have been outlined in article 42 of the UN charter.

The constitutional basis for article 41 excludes the use of force in quelling conflicts so that the UN Security Council puts more emphasis on its decisions. However, there is a loophole to this restriction under article 39 which approves the use of force to prevent conflicts whenever a breach of peace, a threat to peace, or an act of aggression is established (since these three conditions give the go-ahead to the council to use force which may not necessarily be an armed force. However, the lack of use of arms in stabilizing conflicts may not necessarily mean that such action is non-military.

UN Security Council Resolution 678

The UN security council resolution 678 was adopted after several resolutions including 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 667 were ignored by Saddam; thereby prompting Iraq to constantly defy previous resolutions by the UN security council; however, after the council realized Iraqs nonconformance to peace agreements, it gave the oil-rich nation a strict deadline to implement resolution 660, failure to which member states were to use force in marinating peace in the region. Under resolution 678, the above ultimatum was the primary condition under the resolution, but in the same context, the resolution gave member states authority to cooperate with the government of Kuwait in establishing peace in the region, if Iraq failed to fail to meet the deadline of withdrawing its troops from Kuwait. Under the resolution, member states were persuaded to comply with the second condition of the resolution which was to assist Kuwait in establishing peace in its country. However, the council was to be informed of all the member states actions when assisting Kuwait to realize peace within its borders; such that, a diversion of the overall mission of establishing peace was not witnessed.

Resolution 678 however did not act as a sole ultimatum in its sense because it reinforced previous resolutions, and subsequent ones, in addition to guaranteeing legal recognition of whatever support member states were to give Kuwait in establishing peace within its borders. To some degree the 678 resolution was also an act of goodwill by the UN Security Council in avoiding military force to expel Iraq from Kuwait because the agreement gave Iraq an ultimatum in which it was supposed to withdraw its troops from Kuwait; failure to which military actions were to be undertaken against it. Iraq, therefore, had the option of avoiding conflict with member states by withdrawing its forces from Kuwait.

The 678 resolution however had other implications in international politics because it reaffirmed the authority of the UN Security Council in declaring wars with other nations. The French and German governments affirmed the opinion that the war against Iraq was justified after the UN resolution. To some extent, this sets the precedent for future use of force in world conflicts as is affirmed by Lobel and Ratner, when they assert that Despite the language and history of Resolution 687, U.S. and UK officials have asserted since 1991 that the Resolution 678 authorization to use force remains in effect, and on several occasions, they have deployed forces against Iraq. In this context, Lobel and Ratner note that the 678 resolution has given immense powers to member nations to attack Iraq in case it goes contrary to any of the resolutions guidelines, even today.

In other respects, the councils resolution can be seen as a contravention to the rights of nations to defend themselves against external attacks, and this implies that Iraq is still allowed to fight the UN under international laws right to self-defense. According to Higgins, this situation is likely to cause more conflict because she notes that &because of each states sovereignty over its territory under international law, the alleged internationally illegal action of a discriminatory expropriation would never justify another nation physically invading the host state&.

In some respect, since all the goals of the 678 resolution were not realized, the right to attack Iraq in 2002 may have been justified because under resolution 678, member states were allowed to use whatever means to establish peace in the region, and since Saddam was a key factor to the destabilization of peace in the Middle East, the US may still have been justified to attack Iraq in 2002 and oust Saddam. It remains very interesting to note that peace in the Middle East is still long from being realized and the UN resolution 678 may implicitly still legalize subsequent actions by member states in establishing peace in the region.

Conclusion

The UN Security Council is the sole body recognized globally to legalize the use of armed force in international conflicts. The Iraq Kuwait conflict provides a good example of this provision because the council allowed member states to use whatever means to ensure previous resolutions were observed by Iraq and peace was established in the region. The councils powers are outlined in articles 39, 41, and 42 of the UN charter. Article 39 guarantees the councils action to use military force, or not if it establishes that acts of aggression, a threat to peace, or breaches of the peace are carried out by a given nation. In the Iraq Kuwait conflict, Iraq exhibited a direct contravention of the guidelines in article 39 which gave the UN Security Council a go-ahead to authorize member states to use force in ensuring peace was established in the region.

After it was established under article 39 that the authorization of force was legal, the council had to choose a course of action either under article 41 or 42 of the UN charter, which either advocated for military force or otherwise. However, since Iraq failed to comply with previous resolutions to establish peace in Kuwait, the council found it necessary to enforce article 42 which authorized the use of force by member states on Iraq. These steps outline the UN Security Councils authorization of armed force in world conflicts in addition to legalizing the councils actions (about the Iraq Kuwait conflict).

References

De Wet, E. The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council. Hart, Oxford and Portland, 2004.Web.

Higgins, R. Problems and Process: International Law and how we Use it. Web.

Hodge, C. US Presidents and Foreign Policy. New York, ABC-CLIO, 2007. Web.

Lobel, J. & Ratner, M. Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorization to Use Force, Ceasefires and the Iraq Inspection Regime, 1999. Web.

Malone, D. The UN Security Council: From Cold War to the 21^st Century. Lynne Reinner, London, 2004. Web.

Martenczuk, B. Justice, Liberty, Security: New Challenges for EU External Relations. Asp / Vubpress / Upa, London, 2009. Web.

Schweigman, D. The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Security Charter. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2001. Web.

Strauss, S. The Complete Idiots Guide to World Conflicts. Penguin, New York, 2002. Web.

United States Congress. Congressional Record, V. 149, Pt. 10, Government Printing Office. Washington, 2010. Web.

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