The Ansar Al-Din Terrorist Organizations Activities

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Abstract

Today, more than ever, it is essential to understand the origins and causes of terrorism worldwide. The purpose of the paper is to study the Ansar al-Din organization, its goals, origins, ideology, and funding. In addition, as part of this study, a potential terrorist attack on the infrastructure of the United States of America was simulated in order to find out how possible such a situation is. Analytical, systematic, historical, and deductive methods were used to conduct the study. According to the studys results, it can be concluded that the threat of a terrorist act in the modern world remains high since organizations like Ansar al-Din have open access to all possible types of weapons and can quietly cross state borders also recruit people on the ground. Moreover, by conducting a simulation, it was found that acts of terrorism are capable of causing enormous damage to the countrys infrastructure and its people.

Introduction

Terrorist groups, despite international efforts, still terrify the civilian population of the world. The terrorist threat violates fundamental human rights in a democratic society, such as the right to be free from fear, the right to be protected by life and life (Praba, 2020, p. 39). The group operates in conjunction with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb movement, which was previously included in the list of terrorist organizations. According to Bildirici & Gokmenoglu (2020), total deaths from terrorism throughout the world fell 27% from 2016 to 2017 (p. 3). Accordingly, if no action is taken, the threat will continue to grow, which becomes a danger to society.

Hypothetical Attack

Given the official ideology of the terrorist group and its direction, it can be considered possible to organize a terrorist attack in the United States of America. Even though terrorist activities are carried out mainly online, about 90% of terrorist activities online are conducted via social media platforms (Jain & Vaidya, 2021, p. 2), their threat in real life is still relevant. Many terrorist groups show a significant interest in active subversive activities in the United States since the United States is a country that has always directly opposed the terrorist threat in the world. Gao et al. (2019) state that terrorist attacks have great lethal and destructive power, which may directly cause casual huge ties and property losses, but bring great psychological pressure to civilians (p. 126). An attack by the Ansar al-Din could be genuine in the next few years, as their interests are significantly at odds with the Americans. Such an organization will likely not arrange a conventional terrorist attack in the middle of the city. Instead, Ansar al-Din can focus on state structures. It cannot be ruled out that the organization may have recruited agents within the States, making it easier for them. Given the problem of illegal trafficking in weapons, including explosives, it is also not difficult to get them.

A terrorist act can be committed on any infrastructure object to disable it and block the state apparatus for a short time. Priambada & Purwadi (2021) argue that the eradication of terrorism cannot be carried out partially and individually but requires the involvement of institutional components or the international community (p. 2878). For a terrorist attack, an organization may involve twenty to forty people. More will not be needed, and fewer people will be unable to carry out such a plan. One of the critical strategic places for a terrorist attack can be considered the Hoover Dam. The construction of Hoover Dam was conditioned by the exploration of the lower Colorado River and initiated by the Hydrology Branch of the U.S. Geological Survey (Rogers & Asce, 2020). If a disaster hits the Hoover Dam and somehow collapses, a catastrophic amount of water will pour out of Lake Mead. The reservoir provides water to many major cities such as Las Vegas, Henderson, North Las Vegas, and Boulder City, Nevada, as well as municipal, industrial, and irrigation water for downstream users. In addition, if the dam breaks, the bridges downstream will be destroyed. Electricity is out in the river valley, and it could take weeks to get back to full power. The dam also provides water to three states, which are about 22 million people, respectively. They can all be left without water for a long time, leading to a humanitarian catastrophe. Another consequence of the damage to the dam will be flooding, which will lead to many deaths. The dam is solid, and any natural disasters will not able to damage it. However, achieving severe damage or even collapse with explosive elements is possible.

Origins, Ideology, and Goals & Objectives

Modern society gradually began to forget about the threat of terrorist attacks, but the tension only increases yearly. According to Ousmane-Issaka (2019), the threat and impact of terrorism have increased significantly since September 11, 2001.

Origins

The history of the interaction between the norms of pure and traditional Islam shows that the imposition of Salafism significantly reduces social support from the local population and often leads to armed clashes. Carrying out operations in areas with a predominance of the Tuareg population requires taking into account local and national specifics, which also forces Salafi groups to appoint representatives of the Touareg to the post of regional amirs. As a result, the situation has developed so that the Ansarovites, allegedly declaring their refusal to cooperate with the radicals, do not intend to squeeze them out of the region.

Ideology

Ansar al-Din, defenders of the faith, was founded in late 2011. Their leader is Iyad ag-Ghali, who in February 2013 was already included in the list of terrorists of the State Department. The groups militants are ethnic Touareg professing the Salafi direction of Islam.

Goals & Objective

Being an experienced politician, Ghaly declares the strengthening of cooperation with regional Salafi groups in case of tactical necessity. At the same time, it is also focused on acting as a legal and political force. Thus, fearing international intervention in the crisis in northern Mali, on November 6, 2012, the Ansar al-Din movement announced its refusal to cooperate with the radicals from JEDZA and AQIM. According to Arieff (2018), AQIM calls for the overthrow of North and Central African governments to install Islamist regimes there. Moreover, on December 4, 2012, at negotiations with representatives of the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS), mediated by the President of Burkina Faso B. Campaore, the Ansarovites expressed their intention to counter extremism and trans-border organized crime, as well as to engage in dialogue with all parties interested in resolving the crisis in northern Mali. At the same time, AD noted that it did not intend to fight against its brothers from DZEDZA and AQIM. In order to expand its base of support, AD has abandoned its strict adherence to Salafist norms, often contrary to traditional Islam, which residents in northern Mali practice.

Leadership

The leader of the Ansar al-Din group, I. Ghaly, also known as Abu al-Fadl, in the early 80s. It is authentically known that In the early 1990s, he was one of the leaders of the Touareg movement (Issaev et al. 2021, p. 40). Together with his deputy Sheikh Osa and other supporters, he participated in the hostilities against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon, where M. Gaddafi sent them and dozens of Arabs and Touareg. After signing a peace agreement with the government of Mali, he began to work in the government of that country. For his services in reconciling the most radical Touareg nationalists, he was appointed Consul General of Mali in Saudi Arabia.

Funding

Since its founding, the organization has received funding from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Ansar al-Dine also generates income through smuggling operations. In addition, the organization receives money for the ransom of the hostages. Various agreements exist with other terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, to implement oil sales. In addition, funding comes from external donors who support the political goals of the organization.

Capabilities

In November 2011, he entered into a cooperation agreement with two major Salafi groups in the Sahel: AQIM and DZEDZA. According to Hicks, The Sahel (shore in Arabic) is a vast semi-desert zone to the south of the Sahara (p. 108). In January 2012, his group took control of the Aravan settlement and captured the Amshesh military base near Tesalita, replenishing its weapons and ammunition. Militants attacked a UN base in the city of Kidal in northern Mali on Friday morning. First, they drove up to the camp, blew up a car filled with explosives, and fired mortars and small arms at the base. At least three of the dead are Guinean citizens. About thirty more people were injured. Some scholars argue that in some instances, organizations Islamist terrorism is its unique form of religiously motivated terrorism (Van Nuys & Carter, 2021, p. 2). However, in a statement, Ansar al-Din, a group linked to the terrorist organization al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, called the attack on the peacekeepers a message to the crusaders and all those who support them. The UN Secretary-General called the attack on the base a war crime. While the parent al-Qaeda is in a difficult situation in the tribal zone near the Afghan-Pakistani border, groups that share the ideological principles of this organization have been able to significantly replenish their financial resources in the Sahel through multimillion-dollar ransoms for the release of captured foreigners.

I. Ghaly concentrated his strikes on the fortified points of the Malian army, leaving at the disposal of the militants of the NDZOA settlements in the north of the country. The coup détat in Mali, which took place on March 22, 2012, also contributed to the success of the implementation of I. Ghalys plans. Since the beginning of 2012, AQIM, MUDZA, and Ansar al-Din have captured most of the settlements in Azawad. At the same time, the Salafis used to achieve their goals through inter-tribal contradictions in the city of Kidal, where most of the inhabitants are from the Ifoghas clan, to which I. Ghaly belongs.

During the capture of the city of Timbuktu, Ansar al-Din acted as an intermediary in the negotiations between the NDLOA and militants of the armed formations of local Arab tribes. Due to this fact in Western Sahel, terrorist activity increased significantly in 2019, with over 4,000 deaths recorded (Demuynck & Coleman, 2020). Strengthening the positions of the Islamists is also facilitated by their flexible policy of appointing amirs in the settlements they have captured. As a rule, the administrations leaders are people from the tribe that represents the majority of the population of a particular area. The Islamists managed to enlist the support of residents. In areas under their control, they abolished taxes on essential goods and introduced fixed prices for food and free use of electricity and water. Along with this, the militants families receive monthly payments.

Conclusion

There has been a tendency for the Touareg units to leave the AQIM and DZEDZA. First of all, this is because of the experienced leader of Ansar al-Din, I. Ghaly is gradually moving away from the principles of Salafism and moving closer to the nationalist NDLOA. It is the flexibility in the implementation of ones political line, as well as the well-thought-out tactics of interaction with the clans inhabiting the north of Mali, that strengthens the position of Ansar ad-Din in the region. Along with this, the common economic interests of the Salafis, smugglers, and sheiks of the Touareg tribes only complicate the task of neutralizing the Ansarovites, who, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, have become part of the local society.

References

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Gao, Y., Wang, X., Chen, Q., Guo, Y., Yang, Q., Yang, K., & Fang, T. (2019). Suspects prediction towards terrorist attacks based on machine learning. In 2019 5th International Conference on Big Data and Information Analytics (BigDIA) (pp. 126-131). IEEE. Web.

Hicks, C. (n.d.) The Sahels ungoverned spaces and the ascent of AQIM, Al-Mourabitoun and MUJAO in Mali and Niger. Extremisms in Africa, 107-39.

Issaev, L., Fain, E., & Korotayev, A. (2021). Impact of the Arab spring on terrorist activity in the sahel. Social and Political Transformations in the Middle East and Northern Africa Region, 3(19). Web.

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Ousmane-Issaka, A. (2019). Impact of Terrorism on Niger from 2013 to 2019. US Army Command and General Staff College.

Praba, D. A. P. U. (2020). De-Radicalization and Guidance for Criminal Acts of Terrorism in Indonesia. Ganesha Law Review, 2(1), 37-43.

Priambada, B. S., & Purwadi, H. (2021). Involvement of Children in Legal Issues for Criminal Acts of Terrorism in Indonesia: Phenomenon and Inflicting Factors. PalArchs Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology, 18(08), 2875-2886.

Rogers, J. D., & Asce, F. (2020, May). How Boulder Canyon Dam Ended Up in Black Canyon as Hoover Dam. In World Environmental and Water Resources Congress 2020: Nevada and California Water History (pp. 66-80). Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers.

Van Nuys, M., & Carter, B. (2021). Framing violence: Rhetoric and goal structures of Shia and Salafi terrorist organizations. Politics, religion & ideology, 22(2), 1-22. Web.

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