Lessons Learned from Operation Anaconda

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Initial Conditions and Their Importance for Further Decisions
Structural Characteristics
Ineffective Cooperation
General Plan: Timely Readjustments
Flaws and Their Elimination
Conclusion
References

Introduction

The causes of successes and failures of the operation Anaconda in Afghanistan can be revealed by considering the most critical conditions. They include several aspects which were essential for the outcomes and equally affected the failures and the ultimate victory of the plan. Thus, the examination of the preparation, the structure of the forces, patterns of cooperation, strategies based on intelligence reports, and accompanying challenges and the methods for addressing them can be sufficient for this purpose (Kugler, 2007). The mentioned characteristics of military activity in the country can be useful for establishing the connection between initial intentions and further modifications. Hence, the operation Anaconda is an explicit example of interventions determined as flexible initiatives, and it contributes to the creation of a framework for similar programs.

Initial Conditions and Their Importance for Further Decisions

The main condition explaining the initial failures of the US army in Afghanistan was the lack of awareness concerning the actual circumstances of the projected battles and inaccurate results of intelligence. They should be viewed as the principal flaw to eliminate at the early stages of such interventions in the future. This stance is supported by Kugler (2007), who emphasizes the inadequate development of strategic positions, logistic support, and the ineffective combination of efforts with allied Afghan forces as the necessary provisions. They mean that the absence of these measures in the beginning leads to greater problems, and this idea should be laid in the basis of multinational operations. In other words, no positive outcome is possible if these needs are neglected. In addition, this challenge implies the violation of principles stated in the Army Doctrine Publication 2-0 (ADP 2-0) (2019), according to which the quality of the information received through technical channels should be prioritized. Thus, the erroneous assumptions are unacceptable, whereas they are complemented by potential problems in the structure of personnel, making decisions based on these data.

Structural Characteristics

The inability to benefit from the available facts when preparing armed forces of several countries for the battles is another circumstance which clarifies the relation between the discussed intelligence challenges and structural characteristics of units. This lesson learned by the participants of the operation Anaconda in Afghanistan should be laid in the basis of other plans under the same circumstances. This opinion is underpinned by the previous analysis conducted by Kugler (2007), who wrote that the activity was performed in the absence of unity since the leader General Frank was subordinate to two entities. Since the original problems were attributed to this factor, it is reasonable to suggest that the accuracy of the information should be accompanied by its targeted implementation in the context of authority. This idea also positively correlates with the fact that the improvements, more specifically, when this flaw was compensated for by involving a tactical commander, MG Franklin Hagenbeck, increased the precision of target determination (Kugler, 2007). Therefore, this part of the framework for future operations is as important as the above solution concerning data quality.

Ineffective Cooperation

The discussed factors, ineffective personnel structure and erroneous information, were crucial at first, but in the continuation of the operation Anaconda, the inappropriate patterns of cooperation came into play. This aspect is particularly important for designing military activity abroad as it is linked to many other circumstances of the matter. Hence, for instance, the Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 (ADP 6-0) (2019) states that efficient coordination of efforts is possible only when the tasks performed by different units are aligned with respect for a degraded environment. This setting is determined by the complications in accessing critical resources, and the experiences of armed forces during the examined conflict confirm this necessity. According to Kugler (2007), the Afgan and the US armies failed to proceed when their actions were not organized. From this point of view, the logical conclusion is the need for including the cooperation between units into the framework based on the explicit authority and substantial intelligence results.

General Plan: Timely Readjustments

The elimination of obstacles on the way to victory can be achieved through incorporating the above considerations into a comprehensive strategy while paying particular attention to the timely actions for readjusting plans. These initiatives should target the weakest points while being comprehensive in nature in order for the commanders to see a clear picture of progress, especially after the shifts are performed. In the case of the operation Anaconda, these decisions were made for assisting less efficient entities, minimizing risks attributed to them by carefully monitoring their activity, rescheduling attacks, and modifying their timings (Kugler, 2007). Nevertheless, such solutions greatly depend on the environment and other conditions and, therefore, cannot be deemed universal.

It means that developing flexibility is the key to success on the battlefield, and this provision is applicable to any operation, especially those conducted abroad. This suggestion is also supported by Joint Publication 3-16 (JP 3-16) (2019) as, according to this document, proper transitions between elaborated stages are crucial for a positive outcome. In other words, the dynamics of similar military events are reflected by the appropriateness of measures in terms of scheduling, time, and assistance, whereas efficiency is correlated with adaptability.

Flaws and Their Elimination

The final aspect, which stems from the previous section on flexibility, is the way the military experts eliminate the detected flaws while incorporating new approaches in the already developed tactics. In this case, the suitable adaptations are subject to the use of specific methods intended for solving the most critical issues. The challenges of the operation Anaconda prove that the ways to address them are numerous, and they might include the combination of air and ground forces and the particular focus on coordinating their readjusted efforts (Kugler, 2007). Since the requirements in this situation are not uniform as in the adopted measures discussed above, one cannot claim the possibility of suggested rigid models. In turn, the emphasis on the overall direction of work, which is increased support in the case of unexpected circumstances, can be favorable for the outcomes. In this way, the experience of US forces in Afghanistan at the time showed that eliminating problems on the way was a better approach than relying on original plans.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the examination of the operation Anaconda in Afghanistan showed that its lessons could be used as guidance for commanders in similar initiatives. First, the intelligence results should be accurate and interpreted appropriately for implementing them in planning attacks with precision. Second, the actions of units should be controlled by a single commander in order to accept the accountability for their results and bring clarity to others regarding general expectations. Third, cooperation should be organized with respect to the environment and capabilities of forces. Fourth, timely adjustments should be performed, and the accompanying risks should be regularly monitored to provide compensation. Thus, these provisions, when formulated as a uniform framework, can serve as sufficient guidance for operations abroad in the future.

References

Army Doctrine Publication 2-0 (ADP 2-0). (2019). Intelligence. Web.

Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 (ADP 6-0). (2019). Mission command: Command and control of army forces. Web.

Joint Publication 3-16 (JP 3-16). (2019). Multinational operations. Web.

Kugler, R. L. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A case study of adaptation in battle [PDF Document].

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