Chechnya and Russia: A History of Conflict

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Table of Contents

Introduction
The main cause of this conflict
Signs of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups
The bombings in Moscow
A second threat
Summary
References

Introduction

The conflict between Chechnya and Russia has deep roots and goes back to the Middle Ages. Thus, the last twenty years have been marked by cruelty and violence in relations between two countries and two nations. In general, governments have frequently acquiesced in violent activities that have targeted certain groups in their societies because of their unpopularity with the general population. The record of governments attempting to deal with domestic violence has been highly mixed, and in some countries, such violence is virtually ignored. The fact that men often use violence as a means of control as part of an effort to terrorize their partners emphasizes government complicity when such activities are not punished (Arquilla et al 65). Unpopular minorities cultural, religious, racial or ethnic, or groups identified by sexual preference may be targeted for such domestic violence.

The main cause of this conflict

The main cause of this conflict is Russia’s refusal to accept the independence of the Chechen republic. Ostensibly Russia is an ally in the war on terrorism. Since 1998 it has consistently denounced terrorism as a threat to its interests and security, claimed to be fighting it in Chechnya, and tried to forge an anti-terrorism bloc in Central Asia, the second front of what Moscow regards as a two-front war where its vital interests are directly engaged (The Chechen Conflict 2006). Moscow portrays the Chechen threat as being directed at Russia’s integrity and as aiming to establish a Muslim terrorist theocracy in the North Caucasus if not elsewhere. Putin invoked a Russian version of the domino theory to justify the war. Russian leaders did not invent this Chechen goal but it surely was the aim of the outsiders who usurped effective control in Chechnya from Aslan Maskhadov’s government. They succeeded because Russia refused to construct a political solution after 1996 and because Maskhadov failed to establish control over an admittedly difficult situation. Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that during the wave of kidnappings, drug running, and general acts of terrorism that originated in Chechnya during 1996-99 Russian military, political, and police officials were deeply involved in various forms of highly profitable collaboration with the ‘terrorists’. For example, officers in the North Caucasus Military District, the army’s main fighting force in Chechnya, routinely, sold soldiers to the Chechens as slaves or to become drug couriers and addicts through August 1999. There is also considerable evidence of the corruption of the Federal Security Service (FSB) through its toleration of and occasional protection of Chechen criminals and rackets in Russia (The Chechen Conflict 2006; Damrel 10).

Signs of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups

Thus, despite regular invocations of the threat of a ‘terrorist international’ from Manila to Sarajevo that does exist, the threat to Russia is and was less than it publicly stated. “Since Russia’s foreign policy, like that of any other state, is a continuation of its internal politics, the war in Chechnya plays a significant role in determining the direction that Russia will go” (Khalilov 2002). And often Moscow colluded with the bearers of this threat. This does not mean that there was or is no threat. Since 1999 there have been numerous signs of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups’ interest in Russia beyond Chechnya. Certainly, Russian counterintelligence was warning throughout the 1990s of real threats to blow up or seize nuclear power plants. Likewise, there was much terrorism in Chechnya and Dagestan as part of the broader thrust for Chechen independence during 1997-99. This terrorism certainly aimed to detach Chechnya and Dagestan from Russia and set up a Muslim state, thereby justifying a severe military and police response (Lieven 2002). Nevertheless, as President Jacques Chirac of France reminded President Vladimir Putin in January 2002, there is much more to Chechnya than terrorism. “According to the Russian President, that the only issue of fundamental importance to Russia is security. If that is so, the conflict can be resolved by 1) eliminating alleged threats to Russia’s security, and by 2) transforming Chechnya into a genuinely peaceful and democratic state, acceptable to the international community” (Khalilov 2002).

The bombings in Moscow

Similarly, the charges that the Chechens launched the bombings in Moscow and Vologodonsk in September 1999 that decisively shaped public opinion have never been satisfactorily proved while the FSB was caught supposedly simulating such an explosion in Ryazan, and Berezovsky has publicly charged the FSB with those bombings. Those bombings and the war against the Chechens that began with their invasion of Dagestan in August 1999 along with Putin’s accession to office appear to have been an almost providential series of events for a government besieged on all sides, lacking domestic support, and obsessed with the fear that Russia might fall apart (Arquilla et al 23).

Therefore, critics grasp the reasons why the Russian army responded to Chechnya by resorting to total war. Certainly, in September 1999 the then Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeyev, proposed a limited invasion of Chechnya culminating at the Terek River in Northern Chechnya, a natural frontier. Instead, the government, led by Yeltsin and Putin, opted for a total invasion of Chechnya as proposed by Chief of Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin. Essentially this option of total war went beyond defense against a real, serious, and justifiable threat to Dagestan and Russia’s integrity to confront four other threats to the Yeltsin regime.. One clear threat was the domestic opposition that was expected to win the Duma elections in December 1999 and then launches investigations, arrests, and trials of members of the government and even Yeltsin’s family (and to impeach Yeltsin). Undoubtedly this would have put Yeltsin himself and the succession to him at risk and was thus an unacceptable risk for the party in power. The still-unexplained bombings in Moscow in September 1999 plus the initial military successes against the Chechens helped ensure a patriotic consensus around Putin and his victory in the Duma elections and the presidential elections in June 2000 (Lieven 2002).

A second threat

A second threat to the regime owed much to intra-military politics. Kvashnin and Sergeyev, by the end of 1999, were bitter antagonists with each one pushing rival threat assessments and thus prescriptions for defense spending. For Sergeyev, the threat was a high-tech conventional war, as in Kosovo or a war that would require the first use of Russian nuclear weapons since the conventional forces were unavailing against a Western thrust. However, the likelihood of this is low as long as Russia preserved and extended its nuclear deterrent. In this relatively low-risk environment, defense investment for procurement should go primarily to the nuclear arm, the Strategic Nuclear Forces with the residual going to the conventional forces until the economy revived and could support them (The Chechen Conflict 2006). The main steps to combat terrorism should include new policies and strategies against terror groups aimed to protect citizens of both countries against terrorist attacks. Russian military argues that the extent of Russia’s partnership with the West will be determined by the extent of support they give to it against what it claims to be terrorism in Chechnya. Moscow’s strategy of brutal military domination contrasts markedly with the ‘liberal imperialism’ of the Bush administration in the US. However, as Blank shows in the latter part of his study, Russia plays a key part in a wider alliance with China centered on the Shanghai 6 or Shanghai Forum. The revamping of this in 2001 in Uzbekistan reflected growing disillusion with the capacities of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (covering the former Soviet Union) to act as an effective regional security organization in Central Asia. Subsequent revelations demonstrate how this intra-military split and anger at the government affected the planning for the war and showed what the war in Chechnya is all about (The Chechen Conflict 2006). “Earlier in 2003, a new constitution had been passed in a referendum giving Chechnya more autonomy within the Russian Federation” (The Chechen Conflict 2006).

Summary

In general, while the same mechanisms that work with other terrorist weapons apply to a certain extent, interest groups with these weapons must be handled with more care, given the potential for mass casualties. The government may fail to prosecute the attackers even when they are caught. The result may be that the victims are terrorized and persons in similar situations begin to fear as well, in part because they know the government will not do anything to protect them. In some cases, there may be a lack of any political goal on the part of the government. The government could be ignoring the problem because the minorities are indeed unpopular and the attacks have been deflecting public attention from other problems in the society, but such inaction still constitutes complicity. Strong governments like American state power, on the other hand, avoid the problem of civil liberties interfering with efforts to repress violent dissident groups.

References

Arquilla, J., Hoffman, B., Lesser, I.O., Ronfeldt, D. Zanini, M. Countering the New Terrorism. Rand, 1999.

The Chechen Conflict (2006).

Khalilov, R. (2002). The Russian-Chechen Conflict. Web.

Damrel, D. The Religious Roots of Conflict. Religious Studies News, September 10 (1995): 10.

Lieven , A. 2002. Chechnya: History as Nightmare. Web.

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