The Ongoing Ukrainian Conflict: Historical Context and International Response

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Table of Contents

Introduction
The Historical Context: The Beginning of the Conflict
Agitators and Establishment of Their Ideologies
Strategies and Tactics of Ukraine
Strategies and Tactics of Russia
Discussion of the Strategies’ Effectiveness
The Process View and the Competitive Conflict Escalation Cycle
International Response
Conclusion
References

Introduction

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine drove the world’s attention since the annexation of Crimea by Russia. The increased emphasis on this war was placed when Russian troops invaded Donbas, officially starting the ground war. This conflict threatens regional and global peace and order; thus, many Western leaders became indirectly involved in this situation (Koval et al., 2022). Since the beginning of this clash between the two neighboring countries on February 24, 2022, hundreds of civilians have lost their lives (“A total of 219 children have died in Ukraine,” 2022). For example, 219 children were reported to die due to this war in Ukraine, which has been formally lasting for the past two months (“A total of 219 children have died in Ukraine,” 2022). Most minors were killed in the Donetsk region, followed by Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chornobyl, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Lugansk, and Zaporiya (“A total of 219 children have died in Ukraine,” 2022). Apart from reviewing this conflict as the collision between the leaders of Ukraine and Russia, it is essential to understand the citizens’ response. The propaganda conducted by the two opponents seems to be efficient but has fundamentally different reasoning.

The Historical Context: The Beginning of the Conflict

The origin of this conflict can be rooted back in the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, and even Bandera’s opposition to the Soviet Union. In fact, Stepan Bandera was the leader of the nationalist anti-Soviet group that strived to gain independence, and hence he collaborated with the Nazis during World War II (Strycharz, 2022). This historical context was used by the Russian government to represent the 2013 Euromaidan as a fascist movement (Strycharz, 2022). The protests in Maidan, which is the Western part of Ukraine, were directed against President Yanukovych, leading to the fleet of the latter from Kyiv (Koval et al., 2022). However, riots continued, turning more violent and dangerous for the civilians and becoming the major source of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

Initially, Russia held a neutral position when the local Ukrainian revolution started. In fact, this position was repeated multiple times by the officials for the press (Strycharz, 2022). However, when Putin received official appeals from Yanukovych and Aksyonov, the Crimean prime minister, for military help to normalize political situations in the country, he announced that these requests would not be ignored (Strycharz, 2022). The president of Russia claimed that he would not leave such requests unattended even if he initially supported the noninterference approach proposed by foreign minister Sergei Lavrov (Strycharz, 2022). The subsequent events resulted in the invasion of Russian military troops to Crimea and the 2014s referendum, where most people voted for seceding from Ukraine (Strycharz, 2022). The newly formed country was declared illegitimate by the Ukrainian government and the United Nations, and hence it soon was accepted to become the autonomous republic of the Russian Federation.

The conflicts between Western-oriented parties and pro-Russian groups have been ongoing since the protests that resulted in overturning the government that president Yanukovych ruled. It seemed that the issue was de-escalated after the annexation of Crimea, but a new separatist movement started in the Donbas region soon after Crimea was recognized as part of Russia (Dietrich, 2020). In fact, pro-Russian movements in Donetsk and Lugansk, collectively called Donbas, were known to request military help from President Putin at the beginning of this year. It resulted in the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 (“A total of 219 children have died in Ukraine,” 2022). Although Putin seemed to hope to finish this war quickly, the resistance to Russian troops by the Ukrainian army and citizens is still ongoing (Klare, 2022). Since neither of the sides wants to accept the terms of the opposing party, it is challenging to predict the outcomes of this conflict and when approximately it will start to de-escalate.

The two opposing sides did not view this situation the same. The initial perception of this conflict by people in Russia was positive because they believed that these actions were directed to protect the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine (Strycharz, 2022). On the other hand, pro-Maidan Ukrainians viewed it as terrorist acts of the Donbas population and aggression from Russia (Strycharz, 2022). The current situation became complex, especially for Russian citizens, because this operation initiated by their leaders turned to the extremes.

Agitators and Establishment of Their Ideologies

Ukrainian and Russian governments continue agitation among the general population to prove their actions are justifiable. For example, the Ukrainian military intelligence believes that “Russian efforts to subdue the population by manipulating the media, spreading propaganda, and installing puppet, pro-Kremlin, leaders have so far failed” (Shinkman, 2022, para. 3). Most Ukrainians have developed anti-Russian moods since the beginning of the ground war in the Donbas region. Although horrifying pictures and videos are spread across the Internet, many Russians still support Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine (Dickinson, 2022). There were protests against the president’s actions, but these movements did not become massive (Dickinson, 2022). International experts claim that Russians are good at bypassing censorship and restrictions; thus, they could potentially discern truth from facts (Dickinson, 2022). However, according to Dickinson (2022), people in Russia are more concerned about popular brands leaving their market than about the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. It appears that Kremlin established its ideology in people’s minds over the last eight years by controlling the media, making people unwilling to seek the answers.

Although the civilians either support or are indifferent to this war, Russian soldiers seem to oppose it. According to Shinkman (2022), the morale among Russian military forces is low, and many of them refuse to participate in this war. For example, Ukrainian sources claim that 200 Russian marines declined to fight against their neighbors (Shinkman, 2022). Furthermore, it was reported that during the two months of the ongoing conflict, Russia lost more than 10,000 troopers (Shinkman, 2022). Although President Putin’s ratings seemed to increase among the general public, the servants, who are primary executors of this operation, are against his decision to demilitarize Ukraine.

Strategies and Tactics of Ukraine

Even though Ukraine appears to be the victim of Putin’s aggression, the Kyiv government utilizes specific tactics to maintain people’s inner moral strength and attract more global community support. It appears that the Ukrainian government had been preparing its military forces for this invasion since 2014; hence, the Russian blitzkrieg was unsuccessful (Mittal, 2022). Furthermore, Kyiv started cooperating with NATO a long time ago, ensuring the alliance’s financial, humanitarian, and military support (Mittal, 2022). The country that was expected to capitulate within three days of the invasion showed fierce resistance to Russian forces (Mittal, 2022). Moreover, Ukrainian soldiers and leaders maintained discipline and cooperation that allowed them to withstand the initial Russian attacks, preventing General Gerasimov’s plan of quick capitulation (Kasapoglu, 2022). President Zelensky showed tenacity and resilience under pressure from President Putin (Kasapoglu, 2022). The former is active on social media and sends inspiratory messages to the people of Ukraine (Kasapoglu, 2022). Overall, this win became possible since Ukrainians developed anti-Russian moods over the years of the conflict and were prepared to protect their lands violently.

Although Ukraine has not won the war yet, its tactics promise to prevent Russia from taking control over its major cities. The Ukrainian army’s main strategies were taking control of the air, attacking Russian columns from all sides, and resisting to surrender (O’Brien, 2022). Indeed, it is primarily due to the air forces of Ukraine that Russia cannot patrol and take control of its airspace (O’Brien, 2022). Furthermore, Ukrainians transformed their cities into roadblocks and fortresses, complicating the advancement of Russian military troops (O’Brien, 2022). Overall, the tactics used by the Ukrainian government appeared to be effective during the two months of this conflict.

Strategies and Tactics of Russia

The original vision of the Russian government about the situation in Ukraine was neutral, and it had no plans for invading this country or interfering in the ongoing civil war. Still, the propaganda in social media and the press represented this issue as a potential threat to Russian-speaking people living in Ukraine (Strycharz, 2022). Russians were constantly primed with the messages that the Euromaidan movement had a nationalist character and was even compared to fascists (Strycharz, 2022). Therefore, the annexation of Crimea and continuous military support to the separatist movement in the Donbas region were, if not supported but definitely not criticized by the general population in Russia. In fact, the same strategy is used by the leaders of the country now to control and manipulate the mass media and people’s opinions about this situation (Dickinson, 2022). Notably, Russian propaganda seems to be carefully and intelligently planned because it is broadcasted through various channels in high volumes.

The primary strategy that the federal government of Russia chose in terms of propaganda is proper labeling. Indeed, they called the invasion of Ukraine the “special operation” directed toward freeing Russian-speaking people from the genocide by the Ukrainian fascists (Segal, 2022). As the surveys show, many people in Russia believe this information and support it (Dickinson, 2022). Moreover, news that appears about bombings of Ukrainian civilians is automatically described as fake or deep fake by the Russian media. People in modern days are equipped with the power of fact-checking websites and access to various sources. Still, it is particularly challenging for Russians to distinguish true and false data because they have been primed to think in a specific way for a long time. Whether Putin planned to attack Ukraine since the Orange revolution or Euromaidan is unclear. However, it is evident that the propaganda against the West, which is claimed to have anti-Russian moods, is a remnant of the Soviet era. Since people who grew up with this ideology are alive and brought up a new generation, it was inevitable for the “special operation” brainwashing to be readily accepted.

Discussion of the Strategies’ Effectiveness

Both Ukrainian and Russian governments utilize not only military forces against each other but also news and media. Their tactics seem to work effectively for the population because Ukrainians are inspired to fight Russian aggressors. At the same time, Putin’s ratings became higher since the beginning of the “special operation.” Even though the number of people in Russia who are against this war has risen, it is insufficient to start massive protests. The significant difference between Russian and Ukrainian propaganda is that the latter has moral reasoning behind its hatred of invaders. On the other hand, the former is no longer seen as a liberator even by its own soldiers, let alone the global community.

The Process View and the Competitive Conflict Escalation Cycle

If their strategies and actions are reviewed from the perspective of the process view and the competitive conflict escalation cycle, this situation can be perceived as any stagewise event with input and result. The conflict escalation cycle consists of such elements as sources of issue, emotional response to the problem, conflict manifestation, and outcomes. As the name suggests, the process view means that there are specific inputs, activities, and outputs in any situation. In the case of the Ukrainian crisis, the sources and inputs of the problem were the Orange revolution, Euromaidan, and propaganda, which contributed to the negative emotional response in Russia. Crimean annexation, the war in the Donbas region, and the ongoing conflict can be considered conflict manifestations and processes. However, the outcomes of this clash between the two nations are not known yet. Nevertheless, as the first two months of this military conflict showed, Ukraine was fully prepared for the harsh rebuff, and hence Russian initial military tactics were demonstrated to be ineffective. It appears that only media propaganda remains relatively efficient in maintaining the false image of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

International Response

The world was shocked but not completely surprised about Putin’s decision to bring military forces to the Donbas region, which indicated an official start of the ground war between Russia and Ukraine. Although the latter is not a member of NATO, and Article 5 does not apply to Ukraine, the alliance expressed its readiness to provide financial and military support to protect its lands (Hubbard, 2022). The abovementioned Article 5 is the principle that NATO uses when one of its members is in danger of foreign invasion (Hubbard, 2022). In that case, all other countries belonging to the alliance are obligated to provide military or humanitarian support to their counterpart in need. NATO promised to send aid to Ukraine, but they decided not to be directly involved in this war to prevent further escalation of the conflict to the larger dimensions (Hubbard, 2022). However, if NATO’s members are attacked by militant forces or in cyberspace, it may invoke an international crisis feared by many, World War III.

Conclusion

The Ukrainian crisis that shocked the global community has been officially ongoing for the past two months now after Russian troops invaded its borders. However, the conflict escalated eight years ago with Euromaidan and Crimean annexation. Apart from using military tactics, both countries utilize propaganda to maintain high morale among the population and soldiers. Indeed, Ukrainian strategies work effectively, giving people emotional strength to protect their land. In contrast, Russian military servants seem to lose faith in Putin’s ideology, even if most citizens still support him. Unfortunately, the inputs and processes of any war do not predict the outputs; thus, it is impossible to make predictions about its outcomes.

References

A total of 219 children have died in Ukraine after the start of the Russian invasion. (2022). News Bank. Web.

Dickinson, P. (2022). Not just Putin: Most Russians support the war in Ukraine. Atlantic Council. Web.

Dietrich, M. (2020). A critical political cosmopolitanism for conflict de-escalation: The Crimean example. Europe-Asia Studies, 72(2), 238–262. Web.

Hubbard, K. (2022). Explainer: What is article 5, and how does it shape NATO’s Ukraine response? U.S. News & World. Web.

Kasapoglu, C. (2022). A winning strategy in Ukraine. Hudson. Web.

Klare, M. T. (2022). Stop the fighting in Ukraine. Nation, 314(7), 3–4.

Koval, N., Kulyk, V., Riabchuk, M., Zarembo, K., & Fakhurdinova, M. (2022). Morphological analysis of narratives of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in western academia and think-tank community. Problems of Post-Communism, 1-13. Web.

Mittal, V. (2022). How the Ukrainian military strategy stalled the Russian offensive. Forbes. Web.

O’Brien, P. P. (2022). Why Ukraine is winning. The Atlantic. Web.

Segal, E. (2022). Be smarter about disinformation by paying attention to Russian communication tactics. Forbes. Web.

Shinkman, P. D. (2022). The war in Ukraine is poised to become much more violent. U.S. News & World Report. Web.

Strycharz, D. (2022). Dominant narratives, external shocks, and the Russian annexation of Crimea. Problems of Post-Communism, 69(2), 133–144. Web.

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