Countries’ Relationship with Nuclear Weapons

NB: We do not resell your papers. Upon ordering, we do an original paper exclusively for you.

NB: All your data is kept safe from the public.

Table of Contents

Introduction
Summary, Examples, Critique
Comparison
Conclusion
Works Cited

Introduction

Articles “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb” and “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use” explore possible models which can be used to determine the foundation for the creation, storage, and use of nuclear weapons. The first article, written by Sagan, investigates three approaches to discussing nuclear proliferation and proves that each of these models could be used to point out particular reasons for countries’ decision making. On the other hand, the second article by Tannenwald focuses on one model and argues for its superiority in explaining the reasons for not using nuclear weapons. Both authors present a strong case for using the norms model for analyzing countries’ nuclear armaments, although Tannenwald’s arguments fail to account for other models while Sagan’s thesis incorporates a more collaborative approach.

Summary, Examples, Critique

In his article, Sagan introduces three models of reasoning that help determine why countries make certain decisions related to nuclear weapons. These approaches include the security model based on the realist view, the domestic politics model, and the norms model (Sagan 56). The first approach argues that countries decide to create nuclear weapons because of their national security concerns (Sagan 57). Here, the model claims that continuous proliferation occurs due to nations wanting to have a strategic advantage over their rivals. The author gives such examples as the US’ first incident of rapid development based on the concern of losing its technological advantage and the USSR’s decision to create nuclear weapons to restore the balance of power (Sagan 58). The second model is founded on a belief that a country’s domestic reasons are more significant in promoting weapons’ development (Sagan 63). Finally, the last model argues that the world’s idea of nuclear weapons influences countries’ decisions to either produce more bombs or engage in disarmament treaties (Sagan 73).

The author argues that while the security model is often regarded to be the most viable due to its wide range of suitable examples, its depth of analysis is insufficient to review every situation. For this purpose, other models should be utilized. Moreover, the norms model, often overlooked for its focus on “nuclear symbolism,” is highlighted as a valuable method of analyzing nuclear decision-making as it offers a point of view that is different from the realist-based arguments (Sagan 73). The author’s examples are numerous as he supplies each type of model with multiple cases. The analysis of models does not attempt to deter readers from using them but encourages future research to consider a more prominent focus on the norms. The article does not appear to possess any substantial flaws as it presents a solid case for showing all models as incomplete on their own but useful in collaboration. However, the author does not produce any definite conclusions which may be considered the article’s weakness.

The article by Tannenwald takes a different approach, focusing on the norms model to analyze some conflicts of the US and explain the concept of taboos present in the discussion of nuclear weapons’ use. Here, the realist view is regarded as an incomplete and often incorrect basis for analysis because it fails to explain the lack of nuclear weapons’ usage after 1945 (Tannenwald 433). The author states that the normative element should be considered in the discussion of non-use of nuclear weapons. This model implies that the world’s views of nuclear weapons changed over the years and shifted from treating them as usual armaments to the last possible option (Tannenwald 437). Tannenwald notes that a nuclear taboo established in the world after some historical events prohibits counties from engaging nuclear weapons in conflicts and frames this type of weaponry as immoral.

In this case, the power of a taboo can influence countries because norms and regulations exist in every culture and nation and are hard to challenge (Tannenwald 440). The article investigates multiple armed conflicts that involved the US, including the bombing of Japan the Korean War, and others. Across these events, the role of nuclear weapons changes from being a way of stopping conflicts and preventing losses to an idea that is not even considered. The author provides a plethora of examples to support the concept of taboos and prove that materialism cannot explain the change in nuclear weapons’ development rates. However, she fails to regard other theories, which may weaken her argument and make it one-dimensional.

Comparison

Both articles construct a case for using the norms model to analyze countries’ nuclear weapon development processes. However, the first research takes into consideration the benefits of other approaches and agrees that none of the models are perfect to use separately from each other. The article by Tannenwald, on the other hand, emphasizes the usefulness of the normative basis and fails to acknowledge its limitations, revealing the flaw of the second research. Moreover, both reports present many examples to support their arguments. Sagan examines countries’ relationship during and after conflicts, and Tannenwald investigates the US’ decisions in conflicts. The arguments for using norms and taboos seem reliable although the nature of both ideas in highly theoretical and hard to prove.

Conclusion

The described articles by Sagan and Tannenwald investigate the importance of norms and taboos in countries’ relationship with nuclear weapons. Both researchers construct a strong case for using this model for analysis and present many examples to support their position. However, Sagan fails to provide the audience with an affirmative and reliable conclusion, while Tannenwald dismisses the importance of other approaches neglecting them in favor of one model.

Works Cited

Sagan, Scott D. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb.” International Security, vol. 21, no. 3, 1997, pp. 54-86.

Tannenwald, Nina. “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use.” International Organization, vol. 53, no. 3, 1999, pp. 433-468.

Click Here To Order Now!

Countries’ Relationship with Nuclear Weapons

Do you need this or any other assignment done for you from scratch?

We have qualified writers to help you.

We assure you a quality paper that is 100% free from plagiarism and AI.

You can choose either format of your choice ( Apa, Mla, Havard, Chicago, or any other)