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Military Culture, Doctrine, Theory and Organization
The influence of the theories of air warfare on the development of technology and innovation during the Interwar Period is evident as both Mitchell and Douhet had rather similar views on the role of air warfare in the wars that were to come. The difference between Mitchell and Douhet was in the cause that made them support air warfare. Mitchell was an active advocate of the autonomous air force in the US Army and emphasized the importance of its independence from the Army because he believed that Air Service would not be able to conduct independent missions if it was controlled by the Army (Clodfelter 45). At the same time, Douhet was affected by the inefficiency of the Italian army in World War I, which eventually caused him to write numerous essays and books about air warfare that also included a critique of domestic forces, just as Mitchell’s works did. In Douhet’s opinion, the air force was the only power that could change the war itself as it was operating in a different dimension, i.e., the air (Meilinger 9).
Unlike Mitchell, who believed that air control could be achieved by air combat, Douhet argued that the best defense, in this case, would be an attack (Warner 489). The important notion that both used was also in the influence of air warfare on people’s will since it could destroy the vital centers of cities, “those elements of society, government, military, and industrial structure essential to the functioning of the state” (Meilinger 11). The perception of air warfare as a tool or innovation that could destroy the enemy’s morale would also resonate later when the awareness of wars as battles not between armies but nations would be more and more accepted at the beginning of the 20th century (Hall 12). These perceptions would eventually result in the new strategy called strategic bombardment, which would not be used until 1939, but was predicted by theorists, such as Mitchell and Douhet. The aim of strategic bombardment would be precisely described by the two theorists, i.e., to destroy the enemies’ morale and ability to wage war at all (Hall 11).
Despite the active support of air warfare by these theorists and their knowledge of military processes, the air force was perceived as a powerful tool of the conduct of warfare only prior to World War II for several reasons. First, early air aircrafts had very poor lifting power and were relatively unreliable (Hall 13). Second, aircraft were seen as a technology necessary for intelligence gathering but no direct attacks. Despite Mitchell’s arguing that bombers were more effective in battle than battleships because each of them could sink a battleship and needed less investment to be constructed, the Army had little interest in aircraft until the mid-1930s. Douhet also predicted carpet bombing by emphasizing the importance of en masse air attacks, which would cause collapse if conducted rapidly. The aim of such attacks was the destruction of the collective will of a country (Meilinger 15). Although Douhet’s perceptions of air warfare were somewhat based on simplistic calculations, the changes in the use of air warfare and its growing support nevertheless began, both in Europe and the USA. Mussolini’s interest in air warfare and discussed the autonomy of the Air Corps in the USA were the first signs of the transforming power of air service.
Individual Innovators and National Policy
Mitchell can be seen as one of the individual innovators because his active support of an independent air force and public outcries, although at first perceived with slight scorn, would become a support for the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) that provided intense nine-month air-power focused curriculum to the Air Corps’ mid-level officers (Clodfelter 52). The curriculum focused not only on independent air operations but also on bombers as weapons that would ensure victory. The School’s instructors contributed significantly to the understanding of the role of the air force in wars by evaluating its impact on the national will and lecturing about the industrial web theory and the air force ability to destroy this web. The development of bombers began with the Air Corps’ realization that all-metal monoplanes such as the Boeing B-9 and Martin B-10 that were faster than the Air Corps’ fighter aircraft P-26. But both of these aircraft only had two engines, which limited their ability to carry heavy bomb loads (Clodfelter 70).
Thus, the Air Corps’ submitted a request to aircraft manufacturers for a design of an aircraft that would be able to fly 2.000 miles carrying a ton of bombs and maintaining a speed of 250 mph. The request was submitted by Air Corps Chief Major General Benjamin Foulois (Clodfelter 70). However, the Army’s opposition toward the use of the XB-17 (and later the B-17) resulted in the prohibition of the procurement of four-engine bombers by Major General Stanley D. Embick. An active advocate of the autonomous air force was Brigadier General Frank Andrews, who noticed that the airpower was “an entirely different mode of warfare” (Clodfelter 77). Andrews used flying demonstrations to gain support for the B-17, convey political messages, and indicate the Navy’s doubtful viability since the B-17 could navigate and bomb targets even in poor weather conditions. Andrews’ active lobbying of bombers was opposed by Secretary Woodring who did not support the use of the B-17 and preferred to have light, medium, and attack bombers. Such resistance was also caused by the unfavorable economic conditions (the Great Depression), during which the Army and the Navy could not risk losing financial support if independent air force would be proven to be more effective than any of them.
After Brigadier General George C. Marshall was appointed as Chief of the General Staff’s War Plan Division and Hap Arnold as Chief of the Air Corps, strategic bombing gained additional support, although the B-17 was mostly advocated for by Andrews and Arnold who was a close friend of Mitchell. The most important source of influence was, however, Roosevelt because his growing concern with Germany and Adolf Hitler’s rearming of the country resulted in Roosevelt’s view of Germany (and later Japan) as direct threats to the USA. Seeing that fascist aggression was facilitated by the air force, Roosevelt stated that the USA needed an Army Air Corps consisting of 24.000 airplanes and a total capacity to produce 20.000 a year (Clodfelter 84).
Roosevelt addressed the Congress asking for $500 million on defense spending, and although this suggestion was opposed by some, eventually the weak state of the American military became evident. Only in 1940, as Germany continued to conduct the blitzkrieg in Europe, Roosevelt realized the state the USA was in and ordered the production of 500 heavy bombers per month. The grim reality of the expanding European war and the lack of air force that could counter the German Luftwaffe resulted in the growing independence of the Army Air Corps and the emergence of the Air War Plans Division (AWPD). The gradually growing support for the use of bombers and strategic bombardment in the USA and Europe would eventually result in their active use, leading to such military operations as the British bombing offensive and the raids against Germany in January-June 1943 (Clodfelter 120; Jacobs 91). Thus, the changed perception of bombers and air force would alter the course of World War II.
Works Cited
Clodfelter, Mark. Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations of American Air Power, 1917-1945. University of Nebraska Press, 2011.
Hall, R. Cargill. Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment. Air Force History and Museum Program, 1998.
Jacobs, William. “The British strategic air offensive against Germany in World War II.” Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment, edited by R. Cargill Hall, Air Force History and Museum Program, 1998, pp. 91-167.
Meilinger, Phillip S. “Giulio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory.” The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, edited by Phillip S. Meilinger, Air University, 1997, pp. 1-41.
Warner, Edward. “Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare.” Makers of Modern Strategy. Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, edited by Edward Mead Earle, Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 484-503.
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