Scottish Parliament Project Management Issues

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Reasons for project delay and cost increment
Role of project management
Strategies that ought to could have been taken to save on cost and delay
Conclusion
Reference

Introduction

Construction of the current Scottish Parliament Building started in June 1999 and the first debate in the house took place on September 7^th, 2004. Although it was initially planned to be in use in 2001, it did so in the year 2004.

This was a delay of more than three years than it was initially planned with the final cost of £414m being many times higher than the original estimated cost of £10m to 40£. Due to this escalation in cost and the delay that followed, a public inquiry team headed by Peter Fraser, former Lord Advocate was established back in 2003 to investigate construction. This was a result of the constructive criticism that came all over from the politicians, the Scottish public, and the media. In September 2004, the inquiry team concluded and criticized the construction management on the way it implemented major design changes that resulted in cost increment and delay, Auditor-General Report, (2000).

Reasons for project delay and cost increment

The initial estimates of constructing the building were between £10m to 40£ in 1997 but by 2004, the final cost of the project was estimated to be £430m, this being ten times higher than the original cost. There were several reasons given in respect to this; Auditor-General Report, (2000).

In 1997, the original cost projection of £10m to £40m was for housing members of the Scottish parliament without taking into account the design and location of the new building.
On 1998, July 6^th, Miralles design is chosen and the figure was updated to £50 -£55 m. This did not include site acquisition costs or VAT.
A provisional cost estimate of about £109m was issued by then Minister Donald Dewar on June 17, 1999, which took into account site costs, consultancy fees, VAT, demolition, risk, archaeology, and contingencies.
On April 5^th, 2000, a new projection of £195m is issued out.
An official new report was issued out in November of 2001 of an estimated figure of £241m. The increased cost was to take into account the escalated cost due to design changes and increases in space. Construction problems due to the attempt to finish the project by May of 2003 was another reason given out that resulted in cost increment at this point. Sir David Steel who was then the presiding Officer informed the Scottish parliament Finance committee that re-scheduling of work was resulting to cost increment.
In December of 2002, a new estimate of £300m is given. First, due to increased security needs, the escalated cost goes up to £295m by October of 2002. This new security need required that a bombproof external fabric be incorporated into the building. The delays that occurred at this time raised the cost farther by December of 2002n to £300m.
George Reid, the new presiding officer on account of increased consultancy fees gave out a new monthly report on the schedule and estimated cost of £373.9m. Due to construction problems on the interior of the building, the new cost was estimated to be £400m by September of 2003.
By February of 2004, there was another cost increment. Again it was associated with construction problems and it was estimated to be £430m.
The building was opened in October of 2004 and the final cost of £414.4m which was less by 16.1m from the previous estimate was issued out to the Scottish Parliament Corporate Body.

There were a lot of controversies in this construction that resulted in cost escalation and delay. First, the unique Scottish Parliament architecture was complicated by cost increment and design changes. Other controversies included: the decision to have a new building, site selection, incorporation of the non-Scottish architect as well as having Bovis as construction manager who had earlier on been excluded. At the time when the cost was increasing, the cross-party Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body (SPCB), took over the control of the building project from the Scottish Office. Even with all the controversies and heightened media attention on the Holyrood project, a vote to continue with the project worn in a debate held by the Scottish Parliament, Bain, S. (2004).

In August 1999, a further 4,000 square meters (43, 000 sq ft) was proposed by the architect. Due to this increased floor space, the cost had increased to £115m by September of 1999. An independent report submitted by architect John Spencely commissioned by SPCB indicated that there was a possibility of saving up to 20% from the ongoing project and thus shifting to another site or abandoning the project entirely would result in £30m additional cost. Poor communication between construction officials and SPCB was one of the reasons cited by Spencely that was causing increased cost. On account of Spencely report, a debate by MSPs to continue or abolish project on the Holyrood site worn with the majority on April 5^th, 2000, Balfour, A & McCrone, G. (2005).

The death of Miralles in July 2000 and the presence of a multi-headed client that consisted of the SPCB, architectural advisor, and the presiding officer further complicated the project. This resulted in the client taking over from the Scottish Executive formerly known as the Scottish office, the running of the project. This led to design changes on account of security that saw cost increase. Later on this new proposal to incorporate more security was rejected as it was seen to be the major factor that was increasing cost, Balfour, A & McCrone, G. (2005).

Quality was preferred to cost as completion was to cost although no significant acceleration was ever achieved. Only when it was late to make a significant change that the architect’s complex design and the inevitable cost was appreciated.

Role of project management

The project management team consisted of the clerk and Chief Executive of the Parliament who was also the Principal Accountable Officer and the project team led by the project director. The responsibilities of managing and ensuring successful delivery of the project lie entirely with the project management. In place of the Scottish Parliament, the Holyrood Progress Group was mandated to guide as well as advise the project management team. The progress Group however was not to be held responsible for the delivery of the Holyrood project Taylor, Brian. (2002).

The decision to have the construction management take over as the main force behind the project was one of the reasons that caused a 20-month delay. In most public sector building projects, construction management is unsuitable. In the case of Holyrood, this wasn’t necessarily a wrong choice. Its main role is usually to transfer risk to those who can better manage it. The risk stays with the client under construction management since the design is usually uncertain and incomplete when construction begins, Burke, R. (2003). Thus the client is mandated to manage design developments as well as get a team of construction professionals.

Unfortunately, construction management was not fully implemented in the Holyrood project. The construction management team lacked the expertise as well as the experience required in the early stages of the project. Thus the challenges and the risks were not appreciated fully by the project management and the client.

There was also the challenge of constructing an unusual complex building against tight deadlines on a site that was densely developed. It could also be appreciated that there was no slippage room from the original time plan that was highly compressed and challenging to follow. Out of these factors thus, some of the trade contractors and architects could not have some of their critical duties delivered on time, Tanner R. J. (2001).

The project management failed to effectively control the project design development as the project was characterized by major design changes all through. Thus the management failed to appreciate the project’s complex design early enough. Unfortunately, most of these design developments took place during the period of construction and due to emphasis on high quality and time pressures, it was difficult than normal to monitor the process of the design development.

The main cause of slippage was the release of design information at a later date than the one agreed on the construction managers’ program. Design elements that were provided by the trade contractors and required the approval of the design team further delayed the project. Tight completion dates set by the client resulted in some of the work being unproductive and out of sequence thus adding to the delays. The repeated slippage was supposed to be a signal to the project manager to monitor performance. This they could have achieved by measuring project achievements against contractual obligations and then enforce obligations strictly.

Although there were enormous problems associated with the project, the project management failed to address the main causes of these problems. The client’s program was involved because of the contacts that had a high degree of uncertainty. It was thus difficult for the client to resist claims for extra time-related added costs from contractors, Auditor-General Report, (2000).

Strategies that ought to could have been taken to save on cost and delay

There are different strategies that can be incorporated to avert this kind of delay and cost escalation in the future;

For most of the building projects in the public sector, the construction management approach is not appropriate and should thus have been avoided.
The contracting method should have been selected with care after understanding the risks involved and how they will be averted.
The project should have been scrutinized at different stages through the gateway review process.
To encourage good performance, there ought to be performance incentives to the contractors.
Control and leadership of the project should have been centralized.
Performance assessment should have taken place throughout the project.
Adequate time of planning ought to be allocated before the project was started, Barrie, D. S. & Paulson, B. C. (1992).

Good management that should be incorporated in the future should have some of these desirable characteristics. Should have a clear understanding of the key stages of the construction and the risks involved with the construction work to come up with ways in which to reduce or avert them. The management should also be able to select competent people as well as organizations that have the required skills to complete the construction.

Project monitoring should go along with the review of the budget and the key project milestones. This should be done using timely and reliable information to ensure that appropriate remedial action is taken on time whenever necessary. There should be effective coordination and communication between all those who are involved in the supply chain. The right personality of the managers is a key requirement if they have to create as well as lead a team, Burke, R. (2003).

In case there is competition for a designer, contractor, or consultant, several recommendations could be made:

Pre-qualification questionnaires should be evaluated in an orderly manner.
There should be consistency in the making of visits to the candidates’ offices.
From start to conclusion, there should be a fully transparent completion record.

A rigorous and full evaluation of architects should have been carried out when international architects were involved to ensure that practices and working cultures were compatible. In the place where construction management as a means of procurement route is used and the client and finally the taxpayer is the risk bearer, a hard long reflection should be carried out by the local government officials and civil servants on all the advantages as well as the disadvantages of using such route. A full report of the evaluated risks should be set before the political leadership, Taylor, Brian. (2002a).

Since the United Kingdom including Scotland is a member of the European Union, it’s obligated to observe all procurement rules. Since not everyone in the inquiry had adequate knowledge of the rules, it’s important in the future that no one should be put in a public project if he/she doesn’t appreciate EU procurement rules. In cases where independent professional advisers are retained, their views should be put both before the Civil Service officials, other disagreeing parties as well before the Ministers. As the government is clear with the private sector projects, so it should be public projects where civil servants are involved, Taylor, Brian. (2002b).

Due to security concerns of public buildings, their safety and security should be a primary integral part of the initial assessment of the proposed design and not a later thought that keeps on changing. The presiding officers should even stand oral questioning in the case where such major bleaches on safety and security are encountered as this is seen as a loophole for cost escalation.

Conclusion

Scottish Parliament building project faced enormous challenges. Weaknesses in financial control and cost reporting were contributed by the lack of an approved budget. Since the client was left with most of the construction risks due to the construction management procurement method, it was important to manage contractors’ performance and to have a distinct leadership plan. It is unfortunate that several parties were involved in the leadership and giving out directions of the project which further complicated its control. The fact that there was no centralized point of control was a weakness in the system that lifts the blame of delay from the individuals who did their best in this complex challenging project, Brown K. M. and Mann A. J. (2005).

The tension between time, quality, and the cost was seen all through the project. When time criterion was set too tightly, the flow of the design failed to meet expectations. Thus when time parameters are tightly set and construction cannot move with the program, then a cost penalty is encountered as in the case of this project. The design flow could not keep pace with the program set forth by the client. This was the responsibility of the architect due to the indifferent communication and coordination between Barcelona and Edinburgh. After Mr. Brigg gave out his report in 2002, it was important for the client to understand that more time is required for high-quality design work and thus with the complex designs, the program was unrealistic, Brown K. M. and Tanner R. J. (2004).

The architects ought not to could have signed up for programs that they could not honor. This could have given more time for accurate programming that would ensure that that the anticipated design is achieved on time. The unique complexity and quality of the building were both the most important factor of the building. If this was appreciated early enough, then it would have been clear that the completion date and the program were highly likely to be affected and thus a significant extra cost would have been anticipated on time and discussed upon.

Although security considerations were done quite early enough, cost implications had been underestimated by all including the client. An estimated £100m extra cost is attributed to security. Security could be seen as a safe scapegoat to unnecessarily raise the cost. Production of design variations as well as late delivery of information during construction caused all the slippage. The project management should have done more to address these problems. With proper management, the same high quality could have been achieved.

Control and leadership of the project were not well established. Holyrood lacked a single point of control and leadership. Another shortcoming of the project is that management of individual aspects such as cost, time, and quality were not properly allocated among the various parties. The running of the project became further difficult since the different leading project parties never fully agreed on a one-cost plan. The project management, construction manager, and the design team ought to could have agreed on a cost plan to have sound management of the project.

There are thus lessons to learn from the Holyrood project that may be applied to other significant public building projects. The main lesson is that the contracting method should be chosen with a lot of care having appreciated the benefits and the risks of each procurement option. The contracting firms should be able to transfer risk to those who are best positioned to manage it.

‘Gateway reviews’ introduced by the Office of Government Commerce for procurement of major public projects should be utilized in the future. It has the advantage of allowing thorough scrutiny of the project needs by a qualified team before the award of contracts. Irrespective of the method chosen, ample time should be allocated for planning before construction begins. Good planning will see that the construction sequence is right to avoid extra costs and delays. It would also entail managing and assessing project risks as well as assessing the different parties’ contribution to avoid inefficiency and wastage of resources, Auditor-General Report, (2000).

Reference

Auditor General Report. 2000. “The new Scottish Parliament building, an examination of the management of the Holyrood project for Scotland.

Barrie, D. S. & Paulson, B. C. 1992. Professional Construction Management, Third edition, Singapore, McGraw-Hill International Editions.

Burke, R. 2003. Project Management: Planning and Control Techniques, Fourth edition, London, Wiley & Sons.

Bain, S.2004. “Holyrood – The Inside Story”, Edinburgh University Press, ISBN 0-7486-2065-6.

Balfour, A & McCrone, G. 2005. “Creating a Scottish Parliament”, StudioLR, ISBN 0-9550016-0-9.

Taylor, Brian. 2002. “The Scottish Parliament: The Road to Devolution”, Edinburgh University Press, ISBN 0-7486-1759-0.

Taylor, Brian. 2002. “Scotland’s Parliament, Triumph and Disaster”, Edinburgh University Press, ISBN 0-7486-1778-7.

Brown K. M. and Mann A. J. 2005. The History of the Scottish Parliament volume 2: Parliament and Politics in Scotland 1567-1707.

Brown K. M. and Tanner R. J. 2004. The History of the Scottish Parliament volume 1: Parliament and Politics in Scotland. 1235-1560.

Tanner R. J. 2001. The Late Medieval Scottish Parliament: Politics and the Three Estates, 1424-1488.

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