Control Station Design and Supporting Systems’ Risks

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Table of Contents

Incident and Primary Causal Factor(s)
Summary of Causes
Lessons Learnt from predator B and NTSB
References

Incident and Primary Causal Factor(s)

Predator B crashed in 2006 about 10 miles from Arizona. However, there were no injuries to people reported when the UA crashed. It was confirmed that predator B was not registered and operating under night visual situations. Inside the predator, a flight instrument was activated, which assists in flights (NTSB, 2022). The systems controlling flights had powered down, forcing the pilots to use a downloaded system based on the flight status, and the pilots had to recycle power on both the PPOs.

Summary of Causes

Primary Cause(s)

When the power shut, there was a technicality in capturing the status data about the flight. Based on the basic aviation requirements, there would be two pilots in the PPO seats wherever the UA system is controlled (Fasano et al., 2016). There was no checking done while making the UA switches, according to the pilots. The main causal factor of this accident has therefore contributed to various discussions on the suitability of the flights before taking offs.

Secondary Cause(s)

The leading causes of the crash in predator B were a result of lack of control at the ground control station. These controls aid in improvising flight operations played through RF communications (Marques, 2014). The ground control stations (GCS) exist in various levels and forms depending on what requirements best fit the UA systems. The control systems facilitate communication in the flight by linking the machine and the computers held on the pilot seats (He et al., 2017). In the pilot seat, there has been the implementation of HSI technology which aids in the establishment of proper control for the pilot and plane operators.

Tertiary Cause(s)

There was a lack of coordination and management of intelligence data through the systems implemented in the flight. These, therefore, did not contribute to the production of intelligence pictures. These intelligence pictures assist the pilots in locating the direction of the plane while in the air (Hobbs & Lyall, 2016). In addition, there was a lack of command during the take-off stage, leading to distractions in operations and the flight’s landing.

UAS System and Human Element(s) Related to Causes

The mission payload operators (MPO) who manage the data collection were unavailable at the ground control station leading to the poor visual establishment of the pilot and the technicians. The UA system lost its signals due to human error from the technical team and the pilots. Due to ineffective systems, flight operations can have errors (Marques, 2014). When there is an excess workload generation from the human system interface in the UA, the vital data necessary for flying the plane would not be produced.

Lessons Learnt from predator B and NTSB

System Architecture

The leading factors that contributed to the crash of flight in predator B were technical and human system applications in the system architecture. Some of these factors are human errors, while others are system-generated. For instance, there is a periodic reduction in the sensory systems of the pilots due to the absence of auditory and proprioceptive sensations (Hobbs & Lyall, 2016). In cases of availability of the standby cameras in the UA systems, the pilots would be able to improve their sights.

Control Station Layout, Design, Function Allocation, and Information Display

The control and communication challenges due to the lack of radio signals established in the plane also contribute to most accidents. When the pilots cannot link the communication for both the internal and external environment of the plane, there would be disruption of voice communications, affecting coordination between the pilots (Gundlach, 2011). When the controls are unavailable, there would be difficulty enforcing the cockpit’s sterile procedures when the control station is locked in an inaccessible environment.

System Ground Elements

From the predator B incident, future developers should quickly implement all the essential features that provide information to the pilots and the crew. The systems elements developed in UAS should allow the planes to take off and land wherever mechanical problems are developed quickly. In addition, the aircraft should be designed to include the basic requirements regarding the ground elements to enable the UAS pilots to receive alerts on communication when there have been lost signals from the air panels.

Control Station Procedures

The primary control station procedures should be checked regularly when developing the UAS systems in most crafts and their operators. These control procedures enhance communication and information sharing since they describe the inputs necessary for the machines to receive guidance from the human operators (NTSB, 2021). These communications are made possible without specifying the essential inputs that flight pilots depend on during emergencies. The UAS pilots and the plane designs should therefore have controls to shut off the engines in the flights quickly.

Pilot and Crew Training

Training the crew and pilots makes it necessary to adopt critical plans for regulating the aftermath of plane crashes and associated risks. The pilots and crew should be trained on the essential measures undertaken in cases of emergencies. In addition, the UAS operations should be identified and necessary steps to mitigate the associated risks. Various flight maintenance programs and design requirements should be undertaken to minimize the risks of poor functioning UAS.

References

Fasano, G., Accado, D., Moccia, A., & Moroney, D. (2016). Sense and avoid unmanned aircraft systems. Journal of Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 31(11), 82-110.

Gundlach, J. (2011). Designing unmanned aircraft systems: A comprehensive approach. Conceptual Design and Flight Sciences.

He, R., Wei, R., & Zhang, Q. (2017). UAV autonomous collision avoidance approach. Automatika Journal, 58(2), 195-204.

Hobbs, A., & Lyall, B. (2016). Human factors guidelines for unmanned aircraft systems. Journal of Ergonomics and Design.

Marques, M. (2014). STANAG 4586 –Standard UAV control system (UCS) interfaces or NATO UAV Interoperability. Journal of Scientific & Theoretical organization.

NTSB (2021). NTSB Identification. NTSB. Web.

NTSB (2022). Safety Recommendation. NTSB. Web.

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