Arendt’s Concept of Evil in the Rwanda Example

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Table of Contents

Introduction and Background
Main Idea
Main Arguments
Objections and Limitations
Conclusion
Works Cited

Introduction and Background

Banality refers to the quality associated with a lack of originality, that is, triviality and ordinariness. The term was applied to the concept of evil by the philosopher Hannah Arendt in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem, and the author’s main idea is that the atrocities during the Holocaust were not the result of exceptional evil. The Nazi officials involved in these trials are primarily accused of carelessness and obedience to a higher authority, not of personal evil. It is necessary to discuss the relevance of these claims further. Thus, the purpose of this writing is to examine Arendt’s concept in terms of its application to the triumph of evil in human history since the 1950s. In the case of the Tootsie tribe genocide in Rwanda, the possibility of applying this perspective occurred: many of the claims can be confirmed, while the completeness of the idea itself is highly controvertible.

Main Idea

The main idea of the philosophical assertion of the banality of evil lies in the root causes of the origin of evil and people’s evil actions. Such causes are called the lack of critical thinking and the loss of autonomy from the authority in parallel with the loss or distortion of one’s own opinion (Arendt 31). The example of the Nazi movements involved in the Holocaust highlights the obedience, gullibility, and willingness to follow the leader. The officials involved in the genocide are not described as sadists but as psychologically balanced citizens who gave up their autonomy to the authorities. Thus, it can be argued that evil itself is not a quality that characterizes a person or society and is peculiar only to some; it is the result of circumstances that have led to legitimate negative results.

Furthermore, people who commit evil acts can often become victims of circumstances and do not always think about the consequences. According to this theory, evil in the conventional sense can arise in a variety of contexts, and only ignoring one’s own individuality and desire for self-improvement while following the guidance of management contributes to immoral actions (Arendt 32). In this case, the general direction of the idea is correct, but one cannot agree with it completely because it vigorously dehumanizes and segregates all of humankind. The case of the genocide of the Tootsie, which was instigated by hatred, racism, propaganda, and a lack of critical thinking, is taken for a more specific review. To fully assess the suitability of the concept of the banality of evil requires a more thorough analysis.

Main Arguments

In a general format, the example of genocide is the best confirmation of the basic idea that evil is trivial. The Rwandan Armed Forces and the Hutus participated in propaganda and distortion of public opinion, resulting in the murder of more than eight hundred thousand people in less than a hundred days (Straus 507). There has been historical hatred and conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes, but most people are incapable of killing their neighbors solely for racial reasons. Many of them, including military members, followed orders from civilian and army superiors, who were united and tightly interconnected. Thousand Hills Radio, as the main instrument of propaganda and the most effective dissemination of information in a poor developing country, became the main instrument representing the interests of Hutu decision-makers (Straus 506). The Tootsies were portrayed as a threat to national security, and many rumors spread about them seemed completely illogical, which did not stop the military and civilians from killing civilians.

Rwanda case correlates perfectly with the claims and logic of the triviality of evil theory, demonstrating compliance and excessive trust in authority with the poor level of education, levity, and superstition prevalent among the people. The Rwandan government has created a system of obedience that motivates even ordinary citizens to participate in massacres without considering the morality or consequences of such acts (Straus 506). In this context, ordinary people can be seen as agents of evil power and propaganda, filled with anger and processed ideologically. In addition, the absence of any legal responsibility for crimes can modify thinking and reveal the most negative qualities in some people. Thus, some nuances must be considered before asserting the correctness of one’s chosen philosophy.

Objections and Limitations

In evaluating the concept of the triviality of evil, one is immediately struck by the responsibility that the philosopher attempts to absolve people of their actions. As a product of obedience and compliance with government instructions, the atrocities committed are not human beings’ full guilt and responsibility if the concept is fully accepted (Lawtoo 480). However, even this point raises several questions at once and cannot be fully proven.

Firstly, each person always has a choice of action and freedom of thought, along with his or her own notions of good and evil, morality, and ethics. This point would be greatly complicated by the crime of the authorities of the time in Rwanda and the peculiarities of propaganda. Anyone who expressed doubts or even tried to defend the Tutsis was equated with the enemy and could suffer (Straus 520). For this reason, many who could have confronted the results of the propaganda were afraid to speak their minds in concern for their own lives and the lives of their families. Hard statistics cannot confirm it due to the specifics of events, but at all stages of human development, there are people who have critical thinking and assess situations more fully.

Secondly, generally accepted attitudes of ethics and morality cannot easily be violated in a society where they are upheld. Many of those involved in the massacre demonstrated susceptibility to psychological phenomena such as an awareness of impunity, inert groupthink, and dehumanization of opponents. This was achieved by propaganda accusing the Tootsie tribe of all sins and attributing terrible rituals to them while calling them creatures unworthy of living (Owen 4). There was as much evil in the vast masses of such information, specially corrected and directed at the peculiarities of tribal interaction, as in the genocide that followed. The pressure on superstition and the historical differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi were additional methods of pitting some people against others.

Finally, one cannot ignore the main disadvantages and limitations of the idea of the banality of evil. The assumption of no responsibility blurs the search for the guilty and draws a line between ordinary citizens and the authorities, which is irrational. Regardless of their political or social status, each individual is a member and unit of society. There is then no way to argue whether people in power are the sources and spreaders of evil and whether their beliefs or social pressure guides them (Strand 409). The banality of evil, in the simplicity of its explanation, dilutes blame and suggests ordinary citizens’ lack of opinion, ethics, and intelligence. It is another type of violation of human rights and promotes inequality, so assuming such conclusions is not universal or logical in some cases.

Conclusion

It is possible to confirm the relation of the concept of banal evil to the Rwandan genocide, but it can only explain one side of what happened. On the other hand, it denies the exact notion of human free will, thought, and action and promotes a class distinction. With this theory, it is possible to explain the capacity of authoritarian and oppressive states to impose their own opinions. However, it is impossible to accept the removal of guilt and responsibility. In doing so, the claim that exclusively among governments are the bearers of true and singular evil is illogical and looks like an attempt to exonerate all perpetrators.

Even if one considers crimes on a smaller scale, the banality of evil in the current interpretation becomes completely inapplicable. Serial killers, mass shooters, or the liars themselves who spread propaganda have little to do with power. From the perspective of advanced and sustainable humanity, their actions are inherently bad and evil, as are the many other negative agents of pain and misery in the world. This is why the visual coincidence of people’s actions, according to Arendt’s theory, should be examined more deeply. Moreover, it should be taken into account all individuals are equal members of society with their own beliefs and actions, for which each bears their own responsibility.

Works Cited

Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Penguin Publishing Group, 2006.

Lawtoo, Nidesh. “The Case of Eichmann Restaged: Arendt, Evil, and the Complexity of Mimesis.” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 74, no. 2, 2021, pp. 479–490, Web.

Owen, Leah. “False, Historical, ‘Accusations in a Mirror’? The Tutsi Colonisation Plan, Conspiracy, and Genocide in Rwanda.” International Conference on Genocide, 2020, Web.

Strand, Daniel. “Augustine’s Privation, Arendt’s Banality.” Augustine in a Time of Crisis, Springer International Publishing, 2021, pp. 409–426.

Straus, Scott. “The Limits of a Genocide Lens: Violence against Rwandans in the 1990s.” Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 21, no. 4, 2019, pp. 504–524, Web.

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