Risk Management in the International Space Station

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Table of Contents

Introduction
ISS’s Risk Profile
ISS Destruction and Loss of Crew
Premature Abandonment
The Health of the Crewmembers
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Systems at the ISS
ISS’s Corporate Governance
Conclusions and Recommendations
References

Introduction

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is an independent agency by the US government with the mandate to conduct aerospace and aeronautics research and run the civilian space program, the International Space Station (ISS). Specifically, NASA establishes risk management processes, goals, and policies for the ISS, which are then implemented in conjunction with other international partners including member nations of the European Space Agency (ESA), Russia, Japan, and Canada. ISS is a space environment and microgravity research laboratory with researchers conducting studies in different fields, such as astronomy, physics, and human biology, among other related areas. ISS is both a pragmatically and technically complex system, as it is designed to support different payloads and missions. Additionally, it is launched via numerous launch packages, which are assembled and operated from a space where the environment is harsh. Therefore, given the nature of its operations, ISS faces many risks that should be evaluated and mitigated. The primary purpose of risk management is to identify threats and risks in a certain program early enough to develop and implement preventive measures to reduce the probability of such risks occurring in the future. This paper discusses ISS’s risk profile, identifies enterprise risk management (ERM) systems in place, and analyzes its corporate governance and the impact of all stakeholders on the risk management process.

ISS’s Risk Profile

ISS is faced with various threats and risks, which could be classified into three major categories: i) those that could cause the destruction of the Station, ii) risks that could compromise the health of the crewmembers, and iii) threats that could lead to the premature abandonment of the ISS program.

ISS Destruction and Loss of Crew

One of the major risks to ISS is the possibility of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) penetrating the Station’s critical hardware, such as the pressure wall. This occurrence would cause extensive damage to ISS and harm crewmembers. Additionally, the Station could inadvertently collide with visiting vehicles, other Station Remote Manipulator Systems (RMSs), or robotic arms leading to the loss of life among crewmembers and damage to the ISS (Smith, 2002). The Station is also prone to fire outbreaks, which could originate from different places in the work environment. Similarly, the threat of toxic spills within the Station is a major issue facing ISS. These hazards have a wide array of effects on crewmembers or the system itself, which could contribute significantly to the abandonment of the program. Another major concern is the possibility of catastrophic system failures due to various reasons, such as fire and other related hazards. However, the greatest threats associated with system failure entail critical software and hardware design flaws. The existence and safety of the ISS program rely heavily on the veracity of the hardware and software designs, and thus any compromise to these systems could lead to catastrophic incidents.

Crewmembers working in the ISS are also exposed to the risks posed by extravehicular activities. According to Holloway (2007), loss of life could be caused by “the inadvertent separation of a tethered crew member from the ISS, an MMOD strike to the EVA suit, exposure to contaminants deposited on the suit, or an EVA suit system failure” (p. 32). Additionally, ISS could be endangered by security compromise on the ground systems, specifically threats targeting computing networks and the information technology system in general. Finally, the ISS is exposed to the possibility of crewmembers or ground controllers sending errant critical commands, which could lead to the Station’s damage and loss of human life.

Premature Abandonment

The integrity of the ISS depends largely on the ability to maintain a pressurized cabin environment. However, loss of this pressure could occur due to leaks in different seals located in different parts of the cabin. The pressure shell could also be breached in cases of collision with other visiting vehicles or MMOD. Additionally, the Station is exposed to contamination due to uncontrolled “microbial growth in the water or air, a fire, or failures in the systems that control the levels of CO₂ or the generation/delivery of O₂ and nitrogen (N₂), or the temperature and humidity inside the modules” (Holloway et al., 2007, p. 36). Moreover, major system failures leading to the loss of critical functions could cause the ISS program to be abandoned prematurely. All spare parts of the Station should be maintained in good condition to ensure the viability and continuity of the ISS program failure to which could lead to premature abandonment.

The inability to ensure the continuous availability of sufficient consumables is another threat facing the ISS. The critical consumables of the crewmembers to execute their functions as expected include oxygen, nitrogen, water, food, propellant, lithium hydroxide, and the proper management of waste, among other provisions. Therefore, the existence of gaps in logistics transportation and knowledge to keep the crew supplied sufficiently could lead to premature abandonment of the project (Holloway et al., 2007). Similarly, the lack of capacity to supply critical spare parts for the efficient running of the Station could contribute significantly to the decision to shut down the program. Additionally, loss of ground support due to various factors, such as terrorist activities, sabotage, or bad weather could lead to the abandonment of the program.

The Health of the Crewmembers

Human capital, through staffing, is an important aspect of the existence of the ISS. Therefore, any threat to the health and wellness of the crewmembers onboard ISS is a major risk to the program. Turner (2014) argues that crewmembers are exposed to microgravity, which contributes to observable physiological changes due to the low gravity in space. Additionally, crewmembers might be exposed to space radiation due to particulate matter suspended in the air, especially “solar particle radiation (protons and electrons) and galactic cosmic radiation (atomic nuclei)” (Holloway, 2007, p. 47). These micro-particles travel at high speed, almost that of light, and they can cause genetic tissue damage. Another major risk facing the ISS is the threat associated with the failure to maintain a safe spacecraft environment. The ISS should be maintained at controlled temperatures, a breathable atmosphere, and regulated atmospheric pressure. Therefore, any form of failure affecting these factors could potentially pose health risks to crewmembers.

Crew fatigue is also another important risk factor in the proper functioning of the ISS. Long-duration space flights are exhausting, both physically and emotionally (Gerstein et al., 2016). In the space, the normal human circadian patterns are disrupted, and crewmembers are expected to work under strict deadlines and timelines, leading to a lack of quality and enough sleep hence fatigue (Buguet, 2007; Kahn et al., 2014). Individuals working in this Station are also exposed to long isolation and confinement sessions, which ultimately affect their behavioral and psychological wellbeing. In the long-term, the health of crewmembers is exposed to various threats, which is a major risk to the existence of the ISS.

Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Systems at the ISS

The ISS uses continuous risk management (CRM) processes to identify, analyze, mitigate, and communicate risks. Specifically, the program uses the ISS Risk Data Application (IRMA), which is “an integrated database to manage risk data throughout all ISS managing organizations” (Perera, 2002, p. 341). This system seeks to detect, prevent, correct, and give directives concerning all possible risks that the program is exposed to, both in the short and long term. The IRDA is designed to achieve specific objectives. The first goal is to embed all risk management processes into the daily activities of the program to identify and mitigate potential risks and threats. Second, the system ensures that the responsibilities of risk management are relegated to the lowest levels of the organization to ensure that almost every individual is involved in risk identification and mitigation. Third, the system defines lead program-level risk-management activities that should be accomplished by the different Program Risk Management teams, such as Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) (Grant & Lutomski, 2011), analysis integration teams (AITs), and integrated product teams (IPTs). Finally, the system provides the requisite cost analysis for the risk management exercise and the available funding sources.

Therefore, the different organizational teams involved in risk management at ISS are required to use the IRDA to assess and manage risk in different ways. For instance, they are expected to identify and document risks routinely together with assessing the probability of occurrence and the consequence of such incidents using a standardized risk tool for scoring (Perera, 2002). These teams also develop risk-mitigation plans based on the identified threats and delegate responsibilities to every crew member. In other words, as Seastrom et al. (2004) observe, the IRMA ensures that the issue of risk management is integrated into the ISS’s functioning with every crew member taking responsibility for the same.

The IRMA has a number of tools that the involved parties use to incorporate risk information into the risk management infrastructure. Each identified risk is characterized, its severity or location in the matrix identified, and mitigation tasks noted before being entered into this database. Consequently, every risk can be tracked to gain an understanding of how it impacts the entire system. Additionally, the associated costs of such risks are determined using the IRMA. This database has tiered items based on the level of threat. For instance, low-level threats without concise definitions are labeled as “concerns” (Perera, 2002). Items with detailed definitions are classified as “watch items”, while high-level issues and threats are labeled as “risks”.

Using the IRMA, each ISS managing organization reviews its identified risks by assessing whether such threats are consistent with the available data and deciding whether to elevate a particular risk to the next level. At every level, the involved teams should generate the appropriate local mitigation measures and plans giving specific tasks that need to be undertaken to prevent the risk from happening or lessen the severity of the outcomes (Malone Jr. & Moses, 2004). After completing every mitigation task, the involved management teams at their respective levels record their information in the IRMA before re-scoring the risk based on the task’s results. Therefore, IRMA is updated constantly and continuously, which makes it easy for the top management to keep abreast of the current top risks and the available mitigation measures. All the different constituents of the IRMA are compliant with the available regulations for the safety of the ISS.

ISS’s Corporate Governance

The ISS is governed by the ISS Mission Management Team (IMMT), which is tasked with making all operational decisions and problem solving to support the Station’s needs. The IMMT holds several meetings every week to report real-time operational information, discuss any arising problems and find solutions, make decisions, and communicate to all other teams involved in the day-to-day running of the ISS (Perera, 2002). Other stakeholders involved in the ISS management include the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) support, which mainly focuses on managing the program’s safety. S&MA manager reports directly to the ISS Manager after coordinating with all other NASA-wide S&MA organizations. The International Space Station Safety Review Panels review and approve reports on hazards and assess data packages needed for flight approval. The ISS also has a Program Risk Advisory Board (PRAB), headed by the ISS Program Manager, and it is involved in the overall risk management of the program.

The ISS program has crosscutting management teams, but they all work in collaboration to identify risks and provide mitigation guidelines to avoid the destruction of the Station, loss of crew members, or the premature abandonment of the program. In terms of managing risk, the PRAB is the top-level organ, and it has “representatives from each managing organization, prime contractors, other NASA centers, and international partners” (Perera, 2002, p. 342). PRAB uses the Risk Summary Card embedded into the IRMA to identify and score all risks. Additionally, decision trees in IRMA are used to structure decisions and come up with the best option based on the nature of risk present. Therefore, all stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process of risk management at ISS, but standardized tools are used to determine the best course of action in different scenarios.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The ISS employs a valid risk management approach to ensure the safety of the program. The ERM system used is IRMA, and it provides an elaborate framework that allows the management to continually identify risks and act appropriately to mitigate critical threats to the program. The main risks facing the ISS include factors that could contribute to the destruction of the Station, loss of crewmembers, and premature abandonment of the program. The corporate structure of the program is made up of crosscutting management teams, but the PRAB is the overall body involved in the risk management of the ISS.

Nevertheless, despite the robustness and soundness of the ISS Program in terms of safety and crew health, some areas could be improved as given in the following recommendations.

MMODs are a major threat to the program, thus PRAB should prioritize options that decrease such risks.
NASA should ensure that the ISS program has sufficient staffing, especially managers with critical skills and experience.
The involved stakeholders, including Congress and NASA, should ensure that proper systems are in place to supply the Station with all needed spares for its long-term operations.

References

Buguet, A. (2007). Sleep under extreme environments: Effects of heat and cold exposure, altitude, hyperbaric pressure and microgravity in space. Journal of the Neurological Sciences, 262(1-2), 145-152.

Gerstein, D. M., Kallimani, J. G., Mayer, L. A., Meshkat, L., Osburg, J., Davis, P. K., Cignarella, B., & Grammich, C. A. (2016). Developing a risk assessment methodology for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Rand Corporation.

Grant, W., & Lutomski, M. G. (2011). Applications of the International Space Station probabilistic risk assessment model. Web.

Holloway, T., Colladay, R., Jacobson, R. H., Marshal, J. C., Sieck, A. B., Voss, J., Coats, M., O’Connor, B., Roe, R., Scolese, C., Williams, R., & Gard, M. (2007). Final report of the international space station independent safety task force. Web.

Kahn, J. P., Liverman, C. T., & McCoy, M. A. (Eds.). (2014). Health standards for long duration and exploration spaceflight: Ethics principles, responsibilities, and decision framework. National Academies Press.

Malone Jr. R. W., & Moses, K. (2004). Development of risk assessment matrix for NASA Engineering and Safety Center. Web.

Perera, J. S. (2002). Risk management for the international space station. Joint ESA-NASA Space-Flight Safety Conference, 486, 339 -344.

Seastrom, J., Peercy, R., Johnson, G., Sotnikov, B., & Brukhanov, N. (2004). Risk management in international manned space program operations. Acta Astronautica, 54(4), 273-279. Web.

Smith, C. A. (2002). Probabilistic risk assessment for the International Space Station. Joint ESA-NASA Space-Flight Safety Conference, 486, 319-324.

Turner, R. (2014). Health standards for long duration and exploration spaceflight: Ethics principles, responsibilities, and decision framework. Web.

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