Framework for the Weaponization of Outer Space

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Introduction

The task of limiting an arms competition in outer space has been at the center of the international community’s attention since the really start of space activities in the late 1950s. Space exploration is a new and extremely specific area of human activity. On the one deal, as a direction of scientific and technological progress, it should objectively become one of the most potent means of determining global difficulties. On the other hand, space can become a new sphere of military confrontation and a source of threats to all humanity. In the international peace and security sphere, the problem of reducing the placement of threats of any variety occupies a special place. On a broader scale, this concerns restricting the utilization of space for the commission of any hostile acts.

A prohibition of such activities would stop outer space from becoming a danger of war and a launching pad for an armed attack against other states. There, as in any other sphere of human activity, nations must be guided by the basic universally accepted principles enshrined in the UN Charter, including the principle prohibiting the warning or application of force. Thus, under the existing general norms of international law, states are obliged in their space activities to refrain from any hostile actions and to resolve conflicts and disputes by exclusively peaceful means. Moreover, there are also other international legal norms which are regulating this sphere. Still, at the same time, they were adopted quite a long time ago and whether they can control all current issues remains unclear. Therefore, it is crucial to examine the issue of regulating activities in space, particularly the possibility to use weapons and to conclude whether the existing acts are sufficiently responsive to the challenges.

Analysis of International Agreements

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967

The main instrument of international space law is the 1967 ‘Outer Space Treaty,’ which describes this matter as ‘the province of all mankind’ (Article I), in whose exploration and use ‘for peaceful purposes’ all humanity has an interest. However, this did not contribute to a consensus on whether space could truly be practiced for aggressive targets. Outer space, customarily understood to include anything more than 100 km from the Earth’s outside, is becoming a field for demonstrations of technological power (Darwin). An example is the launching of reconnaissance satellites to test weapons (China destroyed one of its old climate satellites with a model anti-satellite rocket).

From the legal point of view, there is no specific prescription in the Treaty. The 1967 agreement regulates a wide variety of matters relating to the examination and regulation of outer space and celestial bodies. In particular, it contains a prohibition on their state appropriation by proclaiming their sovereignty and an obligation to provide all reasonable support to astronauts, ‘humanity’s messengers to space’ (Article V). However, there is no common primary injunction against the ‘militarization of space. Instead, there is only an embargo on the deployment of threats of mass killing (including atomic weapons) and a provision on the application of the Moon and other celestial bodies solely for peaceful goals. The only substantive statutory norm of the Outer Space Treaty that specifically refers to the use ‘for peaceful purposes is the second part of Article IV (Darwin). It is that paragraph that establishes the fundamental legal regime concerning the Moon and other celestial bodies. However, other articles contain a number of legally binding principles and regulate the expansion of space as a whole.

The point is, in particular, that the research and practice of outside areas should be carried out for profit and to the advantage of all nations. Article I state that they must be conducted in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter. That is, space exploration must be implemented in the interest of promoting international peace and security and advancing international cooperation and understanding. At the same time, the States Parties to the Treaty must be guided by the policy of collaboration and mutual aid. They should also manage all their projects in outer space with due consideration for the respective affairs of all other States Parties to the Treaty (Article IX) (Darwin). Article VII establishes a special regime of international liability for damage caused by a ‘space object’ of one State Party to the personalities or property of another State Party. This regime is elaborated in more detail in the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 1972. These provisions indisputably restrict the activities of countries in outer space, but the question arises whether they are sufficient.

Today the issue is becoming relevant of whether it is reasonable to stop the militarization of outer space and whether the 1967 Treaty is a suitable instrument for this purpose. There are problems associated with the interpretation of the restrictions imposed by the Outer Space Treaty on the utilization of space for aggressive goals (Darwin). To begin with, the question of their utilization in wartime must be resolved, and then the content of the above-mentioned norms must be clarified. The space law treaties do not explicitly mention their relevance in times of war. Although their drafting may have envisioned that they would regulate peacetime relations, a close examination of them reveals that their implementation does not cease even in situations of conflict. For example, the formulation of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty practically leaves no doubt about its utilization in wartime. However, most if not all the principles established by the Treaty as leading sources in exploring and using outer space can justifiably be considered general and universal. Accordingly, they are thus appropriate to all projects of States parties, including during armed hostilities.

Considering that there is no outright ban on all military activities in outer space, it is also hard to discover what these principles actually provide for. The requirement spelled out in Article IX is of a universal nature (Lyall and Larsen 87). According to this requirement, States Parties, conducted by the opinion of cooperation and mutual assistance, must manage all their actions in outer space, taking into account the respective interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty (Darwin). Although this phrasing does not convey the same sense as ‘peaceful uses,’ it can be interpreted as requiring a commitment not to use outer space to use violence against other States. At the same time, such an obligation is not absolute and does not, in fact, prohibit the very presence of military objects or servicemen in outer space. Nor does it explicitly regulate the duties of military personnel in space, which could potentially have a war mission. In this aspect, the requirement in Article III is the most significant.

In UN General Assembly Resolution 69/32, adopted in 2014, the international community appreciates that the existing legal order is not in itself a guarantee of stopping an arms competition in space. Nevertheless, the resolution repeats the view that preventing an arms competition in the outer area would eliminate a dangerous threat to global peace and security (Liu and Tronchetti 65). Thus, the significance of Articles III and IV of the Outer Space Treaty is once again noted. It then follows that the global community attaches equal importance to the extremely broad formulation of Article III and the absence of a clear interdiction against the position of threats of mass damage in space.

Problems of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty

Perhaps the main problem is not the definition of what is meant by ‘peaceful purposes,’ but preferably the definition of ‘militarization’ (the latter is also sometimes practiced in this meaning). The treaty also does not answer this question. If an outright ban on the practice of celestial bodies for aggressive goals were extended to all of outer space, it would prevent satellites from being allowed to target certain kinds of weapons on Earth. Lawyers actively campaigning for peace should be careful when campaigning for such a ban. It is because, as a practical matter, the application of satellites aimed at certain weapons could increase the accuracy of strikes. Therefore, it may lead to a reduction of ‘collateral damage’ – civilian victims (Dennerley 281). Thus, this nuance should be considered into account in the formation of new legal rules of the space sphere.

To analyze, it is very challenging to observe in the Outer Space Treaty a warning about a common prohibition on the militarization of space. However, one could argue that the militarization of outer space, especially when it comes to the deployment of threats, would threaten world peace and security under Article III (Darwin). This interpretation suggests that all participating states should avoid such acts, even in the lack of more explicit legislation. When considering the militarization of an area, its environmental impact should also be taken into account.

China has been criticized for the aforementioned weapons test, in particular, because it resulted in 800 more pieces of debris in Earth orbit. In fact, Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty requires states to avoid conflicting adjustments to space or celestial bodies. Considering that weapons testing in space could be viewed as complying with and violating this provision, this is yet another reason to hold to work on a new treaty as quickly as possible (Darwin). Today, many states no doubt want to begin negotiations on these issues. Nevertheless, the prospect of the rapid emergence of a treaty on space does not relieve lawyers of the moralistic and unquestionably humane duty to continue to investigate the acceptance of a more comprehensive interpretation of current norms.

The Environmental Modification Convention

A major step toward limiting the aggressive use of space was the 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. It enshrines the obligation of state parties not to resort to military or any other hostile use of means of influence on the natural environment that have widespread, long-lasting or serious consequences (United Nations Office of Legal Affairs 1976). It is imperative to remark that the requirements of the Convention include outer space.

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water 1963

This is an international agreement aimed at halting the arms competition and removing incentives to create and test all varieties of threats, including atomic weapons. The treaty’s signing was preceded by lengthy negotiations between the USSR and the United States, Britain, and France on completing nuclear weapons examination and by negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament in 1962-1963. As a result of negotiations through diplomatic channels, it was decided that special representatives of the U.S. and British governments would visit the USSR to exchange views on these issues (Abbas and Javaid 88). These meetings with advisors were informal, and after each meeting, a brief communiqué was published that reflected certain stages in the exchange of opinions among the conference participants.

At the opening of the discussions, the Soviet government submitted its draft treaty banning nuclear tests in three environments. Representatives of the United States and Great Britain presented their drafts. The negotiations process produced a treaty text that included the provisions of both drafts, with some new articles and clauses. At the perseverance of the Soviet party, the following phrase was incorporated in the text of the agreement. Declaring as the primary goal an early agreement on general and complete disarmament, it emphasized the future direction and the main objective in the field of arms control. An essential detail of the negotiations was the inclusion in the treaty of Article 3, which stated that it would be open for signature by all states (Abbas and Javaid 88). This formula was the first time in the post-war period that the United States and Great Britain introduced it into an international treaty. On August 5, 1963, the agreement was signed in Moscow in the attendance of the UN Secretary-General, specially invited by the three governments.

Parties to the Moscow Treaty promised to ban, restrict, and not carry out any atomic threat test explosion or any other nuclear detonation. Such actions are prohibited in the atmosphere, outside the atmosphere, including outer space, underwater, and in any other environment if such an eruption causes radioactive fallout outside that state’s borders. The Moscow Treaty effectively banned nuclear testing in three environments: the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater (Ballamudi169). The treaty rules did not apply to underground nuclear tests, for which a special decision was to be taken. The confirmation of compliance with the agreement was to be carried out through national means.

Neither were parties to the treaty to cause, encourage, or participate in any way in the conduct of said explosions. The Moscow Treaty did not eliminate all possibilities for improving nuclear weapons-underground nuclear explosions remained permitted. Nevertheless, it was a successful international agreement. The treaty improved the environment by stopping dangerous pollution. It was a step toward subsequent arms control arrangements. The three nuclear powers were not joined by France and China, which, without accepting the obligations of the Moscow Treaty, began their programs with atmospheric explosions. They mastered underground testing technology relatively quickly and began to de facto fulfill these obligations. The Three-Way Test Ban Treaty is indefinite; however, Article IV provides for the right of each party to withdraw from the treaty (United Nations Office of Legal Affairs 1963). In case a country decides that exceptional circumstances relating to the title topic of this agreement have risked the highest interests of its country. At the same time, it requirement giving three months’ notice thereof to all other parties to the treaty.

The Three-Way Test Ban Treaty includes a preamble and five articles. The goal of the parties to the Treaty, as stated in the preamble, is to achieve as rapidly as practicable the understanding of general and complete disarmament under strict observance of international control. Parties to the Treaty must not induce, encourage, or participate in any way in the conduct of explosions. Any participant may propose amendments, which shall be circulated by Governments, which have undertaken to keep the original Treaty, to all other participants to the Treaty. If one third or more of the Parties to the Treaty request to consider the submitted amendments, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference to which all Parties to the Treaty shall be invited to consider the improvement (Ballamudi 170). A majority vote approves the amendment of all States Parties, including the votes of the primary participants. This Treaty is the first global statutory tool with the principal goal of reaching an agreement on comprehensive and total disarmament under international control. Its signature contributed to a meaningful reduction of the risk of radioactive contamination of the environment.

Full Demilitarization of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

The legal structure of partial demilitarization applies only to near-Earth space. The Moon and other celestial bodies of the Solar system are subject to an international legal regime, the main feature of which is their complete demilitarization (Bernat 52). Thus, according to part 2 of article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon and other celestial bodies are exclusively utilized by all the states-parties to the Treaty for pacific purposes.

The same Treaty rule prevents the establishment of army authorities, installations, and fortifications on celestial bodies, testing any variety of weapons and aggressive maneuvers. The involvement of military personnel in scientific research or other peaceful aims is not prohibited. The operation of any material or facilities necessary for the pacific use of the Moon and other celestial bodies is not permitted. The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of December 1979 confirmed the full demilitarization regime for the Moon and other celestial bodies of the Solar System in its rules. It even slightly expanded the spatial scope of this regime (United Nations Office of Legal Affairs 1979). Thus, the Agreement extends its validity not only to the celestial bodies but further to the orbits around the Moon. Additionally, it applies to other celestial bodies and the flight paths to them, i.e., to certain areas of outer space (paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the 1979 Moon Agreement).

Paragraph 1 of this article declares that the Moon is utilized by all States Parties exclusively for peaceful goals. According to paragraph 2 of Article 3, the threat or use of force or any other hostile actions or threat to commit hostile actions is prohibited on the Moon. It is also banned to use the Moon to commit any such acts or apply any such threats against the Earth, the Moon, rocket, spacecraft personnel, or artificial space objects. States agreed not to place objects with atomic threats or any other threats of mass killing in orbit around the Moon or on any other trajectory to or around the Moon (De Man 95). The rules of the 1979 Treaty prohibit the establishment on the Moon of army bases, installations, fortifications, testing any type of threats, and the organization of armed actions.

As in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1979 Agreement contains a provision that the application of armed personnel for scientific investigation or any other peaceful purpose is not banned. The operation of any machine or facilities required for the peaceful research and use of the Moon is not prohibited (Grimal and Sundaram 55). Thus, establishing a regime of full demilitarization of the celestial bodies of the solar system should be recognized as the key achievement of international space law in forming a legal regime of demilitarization of outer space. It appears that the further progress of space law should be aimed, among other things, at establishing a system of full, rather than partial, demilitarization and neutralization of all outer space.

International Legal Regulation of State Responsibility to Comply with the Demilitarization of Outer Space

NATO wants to recognize outer space as the fifth theater of combat operations along with land, air, water, and cyberspace. In such circumstances, the question of legal responsibility for non-compliance with the demilitarization regime of outer space arises. Establishing responsibility is a preventive means of avoiding states’ self-dealing and influence that could undermine international peace, security, and stability (Johnson-Freese and Burbach 137). When considering the issue of State responsibility for failure to comply with the demilitarization regime and the principle of the nonviolent application of outer space, the main international treaties on space activities should be examined.

Thus, the first to be noted is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, specifically Article 4, which establishes a ban on placing any objects with atomic weapons or other threats of mass destruction in orbit around the Earth. There is also a standard not to put such armaments on celestial bodies and not to put such threats in outer space in any other form. Non-compliance and violation of this norm lead to applying Article 6 of the same treaty, namely, the international responsibility of countries for national space actions (Darwin). This has become a source of international space law that all States are internationally responsible for their actions in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether carried out by national bodies or non-governmental entities.

Consequently, the activities of state governmental entities in space must be carried out with permission and under the constant supervision of a specific country. It is up to those states to ensure that federal actions are carried out according to international law. When an international organization causes an injury, the states participating in such an organization are also responsible (Johnson-Freese and Burbach 139). It would seem that the treaty regulates all the provisions on space activities and liability well. Still, given the state of modern development, it has long since failed to regulate several important issues correlated to the weaponization of space.

The agreement does not prevent the deployment of weapons in space in usual, only atomic and mass destruction ones. That is, any state can place conventional weapons, missiles, or lasers in Earth orbit and will not bear any responsibility for this under this treaty or violate it in any way. The second important instrument in this area is the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (United Nations Office of Legal Affairs 1972). The launching country has the absolute obligation to pay restitution for injury produced by its space object on the surface of the Earth. It also regulates certain liability for related acts. In analyzing this convention, however, it can be seen that it deals with two cases in which joint and several liabilities arise. These occur when damage is caused to a space object by one state launching and by another country simultaneously to a third state or its natural or legal persons (art. 4) and when two or more States concurrently start a space object.

A Gap in the International Space Law

The leading nations of the world are developing their weapons and military equipment for the purpose of their use in outer space. They create lasers, hypersonic missiles, drones, and much more, making it possible to conduct combat operations in space. Registration of such objects takes place under the 1972 Convention (United Nations Office of Legal Affairs 1972). It stipulates that each state that launches a space gadget enters information about it in the appropriate national registry and reports to the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible. However, not all countries document this data because they do not want to disclose the amount of technology they have. Every developed state wants to get the upper hand in the space race while withholding information about its developments from the opponents.

According to statistics, the number of space launches per year averages about 140 (120 were successful and about 20 were damaged or destroyed). The years of the twenty-first century are becoming increasingly intense in the militarization of space, and this amount is growing at an unbelievable rate. The governments continue to improve developments and have many opportunities due to the lack of full-fledged legal regulation of the issue. For example, the United States former President Donald Trump announced the conception of a sixth model of armed force, the U.S. Space Force, in 2019 (Kim 261). China President Xi Jinping has also been discussing creating a Strategic Support Force (SSF) designed to integrate space in joint military operations since 2015, seeking to turn the PRC into a space state.

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, regulates weapons. Still, these norms do not prohibit the placement of non-nuclear armaments. That is, any country can locate conventional weapons, hypersonic missiles, or lasers in Earth orbit and will not be held liable for doing so under this treaty and will not violate it in any way (Darwin). Consequently, there is a necessity to control the use of any armaments in outer space and establish states’ responsibility for failure to comply with the demilitarization of space under international law.

Given the law ambiguities, the inhibition of potential battles between states and the assurance of the rights of actors in space relations are vital. Taking advantage of the gaps in international norms, many of the world’s leading countries are independently developing areas of legal provision for spatial relations. For example, employees of the Dubai International Financial Center of the UAE propose reforming the national judicial system in 2021 and creating a support network that can review complex commercial agreements related to space (Kostenko 57). The UAE plans to create the world’s first space court to resolve commercial disputes in the space industry. Such approaches would disrupt the established system of international law as some countries, ignoring existing international treaties, proclaim the introduction of ‘their’ regulation in the development of planets.

All this can lead to the destruction of the existing international order, the world economic system, conflicts, and a significant deterioration in humanity’s quality of life. That is why the UN should initiate a systematic review, supplementation of existing international treaties, and the adoption of a universal international legal instrument on the development of outer space (Ballamudi169). Otherwise, shortly, there may be a legal collapse in almost all issues of space relations. The lack of regulation of non-nuclear weapons is one of the most significant problems that threaten the international legal order.

Gray Zones

Under the existing norms of international law, activities related to space usage for some military purposes are usually divided into three categories: permissible, prohibited, and non-permitted. Currently, there are serious legal restraints and several international obligations protecting space vehicles from negative effects. However, no restrictive international legal norms exist for a whole range of current and potential military space activities. There remain so-called ‘grey zones’ that are not subject to legal acts, which can seriously threaten international security (Sheer and Li 103). Military space activities not covered by international agreements can be roughly divided into two types. These are primary activities related to creating and using space support systems and actions linked to weapons-usable ones.

The space operations of the first type usually include those intended for the early detection of signs of preparation and beginning of the aggression on the ground, at sea, in the sky, and in outer space. They also include those that provide operative information about a threat of aggression, control over observance of worldwide conventions and protocols in the reduction and limitation of armaments. Navigational support of military units and means of armed forces anywhere on the Earth is also under their control. These systems are aimed to provide permanent stationary and mobile monitoring to control the location of various objects.

Existing standards of international space code do not prevent the creation, experimentation, and installation of such systems. They significantly reduce the element of shock in the behavior of other countries, contribute to better predictability of the international environment and ensure the prevention of dangerous incidents related to the activities of armed forces. Collectively, they thus contribute to enhancing national and international security and strategic stability (Zannoni 87). Military space activities not covered by international agreements also include military applications and experiments in outer space that do not exceed the restrictions and prohibitions imposed by existing international treaties, agreements, and conventions.

The space systems of the second type (‘weapon systems’) should include so-called ‘strike,’ anti-missile and anti-satellite ones, as well as radio-electronic and optoelectronic suppression systems. Activities related to them may have several significant directions. The main ones are the creation and testing (not in space) of objects with nuclear weapons or any other means of mass damage, which could be planned to be ejected into space. They also aim to create, test, and deploy in outer space (except celestial bodies) shock weapons of ‘non-mass’ destruction. These unregulated issues are more dangerous and can have negative consequences.

It may not be feasible to manage all of these activities effectively from the object of the judgment of juridical norms. However, in conceptual terms, it should be recognized that space is not legally protected to the fullest extent from being a possible sphere of weaponization. As stated above, the existing international legal framework for the naval use of outer space regulates only certain aspects, and it is clearly insufficient to prevent the appearance of several kinds of armaments. In these circumstances, the international community is faced with the very urgent task of preventing space from becoming an area of armed confrontation in the future (Kim 270). Preventing the emergence of weapons is more effective than seeking to reduce and eliminate those that have already been created and deployed through negotiations.

The attitude on the preparation of global agreements aimed at preventing an arms run in space is the need to clearly define the objects or activities to be restricted. Actions and their effects should be prohibited, not how such actions can be carried out. Such activities could include those that defeat, harm or disturb the regular functioning of space objects or change their orbital parameters. At the same time, it should be recognized that space for military non-aggressive purposes (for example, to repel aggression and maintain international peace and security following the UN Charter) is not prohibited. Thus, there is a need for an instrument to narrow, ideally to eliminate, the ‘gray’ zone of international space law. Such an instrument should have near-absolute objectivity in a wide range of conditions of the politico-military situation (Dennerley 300). It is also obvious that the instrument’s capabilities should provide an assessment of the degree of military threats posed by the operation of space systems.

One of the key points informing approaches and choosing how to create such a tool is to ensure the possibility of defining permissible levels of impact on foreign space vehicles (systems). It must be recognized that a complete ban on anti-space weapons is virtually impossible. As the space powers are expanding and technologies are becoming generally available, primarily for military purposes, passive control measures alone are insufficient (Ballamudi 172). Only a set of non-military measures backed up by the possibility of forceful action can be the basis for ensuring national interests and military security in the space sphere. These conclusions are quite obvious and follow from the analysis of international space law, dynamics, and trends of development of rocket-space technology in the world and its use for military purposes.

Perspectives on Space Arms Control

The non-armament of space appears to be a problem that is difficult to solve with one comprehensive treaty, like the conventions banning chemical or bacteriological weapons. Space is a fundamentally new environment for a potential arms race and military conflict. All weapons systems are extremely complex, multifunctional, and have dense secrecy. Therefore, if space disarmament measures become practical, it will be a long and multistage process, comparable with strategic arms limitation and reduction and nuclear testing. Nevertheless, despite all the challenges of banning space weapons, significantly limiting their development is still possible. According to the point of view of absolute assurance related to aggressive and defensive armaments, the most powerful spacecraft are early-warning satellites, which support the basis of stability – the main part of a retaliatory or reactive strike.

As a way to initially address this issue, an agreement could be to prohibit further tests of anti-satellite systems that, as they improve, could threaten the preservation, including those in high orbits. At the same time, it would be necessary to prohibit tests involving precise targeting of a sputnik. They include those conducted by the USSR in the 1960s and 1980s, by the U.S. in the 1980s and 2008, by China in 2007, and by India in 2019 (Larsen 144). Such measures should, for example, reaffirm and expand the existing format of notification of all rocket launches, including space ones, and keep in mind any activities and experiments with destructive effects on space objects. Eliminating decommissioned satellites, if they pose a threat of falling, should occur beneath the guidance of the other participants and with sufficient information not to raise suspicions of covert weapons testing.

Docking operations with satellites for peaceful faiths should be ruled by the speed of approach and should occur after a notification and following the administration of the other multitudes. The agreement format could initially include the United States, Russia, and, preferably, China and India and make it possible for other powers to join later (Larsen 149). Along with the exponential growth of space activities and technical capabilities, the accelerated militarization of outer space can now be seen concerning the military auxiliary functions of orbital constellations of states. The development of space weapons is mainly connected to anti-satellite systems of ground, sea, and air basing. Judging by the tests of such means, this improvement is noticeably less intensive than during the Cold War, although it now encompasses a wider range of states. Armaments deployment in space has not yet taken place and is not expected quickly for astrodynamic and technical-economic reasons. Weapon systems for active protection of spacecraft against anti-satellite kinetic impact and directed energy transfer may be an exception.

Russia and China support an international agreement to prevent the placement of weaponry in space. However, their proposal has significant drawbacks, including the same difficulty in agreeing on what constitutes a space weapon. Most space-related capabilities, such as lasers and non-contact operations, have both peaceful and military applications. Another problem is monitoring and verification of compliance. Even if provisions could be agreed upon, ratification and implementation of the treaty could take decades, as in the matter of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. A simpler, though not easy, approach would be to agree on a code of conduct in space (Sariak 54). The structure for such an international regulation, conceptualized by the Stimson Center in 2002, already existed and was developed in detail by the European Union. The weak point is that China and Russia, and many developing countries have raised serious objections.

Developing countries disapprove of the E.U.’s attempt to avoid the UN-based drafting process. Furthermore, they opposed the draft code’s assertion of a national and collective right of self-defense, a right enshrined in the UN Charter. China and Russia would prefer to limit the regulations to civilian and commercial space activities. However, military space applications are the crux of the problem and the sense of purpose for developing the law. The draft treaty supported by Russia and China would limit only weapons in space, not their ground-based anti-satellite programs. Russia and China are not ready to reduce their anti-satellite capabilities; the U.S. is building its own (Sariak 60). Transparency and confidence-building measures can help. The same can be said of the sustainable use of outer space guidelines, which may appear in the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. However, the third round of the space competition will not end until all major powers are ready to approve a code of responsible conduct.

Conclusion

There is a universally accepted principle of non-use of force or threat of force in modern international law in international relations. Based on the acts analyzed, such prohibitions can be presumed to apply in the state’s space sphere. Besides, the induction of atomic defenses and other armaments of mass destruction in the area around the Earth, celestial bodies, and orbit throughout them are forbidden. Testing nuclear defenses, installing military bases and army tests and maneuvers on celestial bodies are also restricted. It can be argued that even though regulations in this area exist, their provisions are not sufficiently responsive to the calls of modern time. Some norms are already outdated and require revision as soon as possible.

At the same time, due to the development of technology, many other problems have emerged that are not covered by the laws. There are still so-called ‘gray zones’- unregulated international activities in space that can seriously threaten worldwide security. It is the development of a mechanism of global control of this area of military-space activities that is the highest priority at the modern time. In the preparation of any international agreement aimed at preventing an arms race in space, it is necessary to clearly define the objects and activities subject to limitations. The focus should be made on forbidding actions and their consequences rather than on the means by which such operations can be carried out. This could include activities that destroy, damage, or disrupt the normal functioning of space objects or change their orbital parameters. This approach would avoid extremely complicated discussions on the definition of terms and the development of criteria for the concept of ‘space weapons’ and would prevent irreversible consequences for humankind.

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