International Law and the ‘Non-International Armed Conflict’ in Syria

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It now became a commonplace practice with mainstream Western Media to refer to the participants of the ongoing civil war in Syria in terms of ‘good’ vs. ‘evil’. That is, while covering the recent events in Syria, these Media’s news anchors most commonly refer to the armed insurgents that strive to overthrow the government of Bashar al-Assad as ‘fighters for freedom’, and to the members of Syrian Armed Forces and Syrian law-enforcing organizations that oppose ‘fighters for freedom’, as the ‘supporters of al-Assad’s criminal regime’.

Nevertheless, the validity of such tendency, on the part of Western Medias, is becoming increasingly deprived of any rationale, whatsoever – especially in light of the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) recent decision to recognize the ongoing armed violence in Syria as such that represents the classical example of a ‘non-international armed conflict’.¹ The reason for this is apparent – the provisions of International Law, concerned non-international armed conflicts, are being procedurally ‘neutral’.

That is, according to these provisions, the extent of a particular combat-action’s legal appropriateness, on the part of either of opposing parties, represents an essentially ‘thing in itself’. In its turn, this implies that the legality/non-legality of combat-actions, as the integral part of non-international armed conflicts, is not being affected by whether these actions serve the cause of ‘promoting democracy’, on the one hand, or the cause of ‘preserving dictatorship’, on the other.

In my paper, I will aim to substantiate the validity of this suggestion at length, while also arguing that:

The ICRC’s classification of the ongoing armed clash in Syria in terms of a ‘civil war’ is not being fully adequate;
The definition of a ‘non-international armed conflict’ must be adjusted to the realities of a post-industrial/Globalized living;
The very concept of International Law can no longer be thought of as such represents an undisputed discursive value.

The foremost controversial aspect of ICRC’s classification of the currently ongoing armed confrontation between the members of the so-called ‘Free Syrian Army’, on the one hand, and the supporters of President Bashar al-Assad, on the other, is the fact that it does not take into account all of this confrontation’s qualitative factors.

For example, the classical (accepted by U.N.) definition of a ‘non-international armed conflict’ suggests that, within the context of pro-governmental and anti-governmental combatants indulging in hostilities (civil war), there can be no third-party combatants, which either directly or indirectly represent the interests of foreign states/organizations:

Non-international armed conflicts are armed confrontations occurring within the territory of a single State and in which the armed forces of no other State are engaged against the central government… should a foreign State extend military support to an armed group acting against the government, the conflict will become international in character.²

Nevertheless, there is a plenty of evidence as to the fact that the armed conflict in Syria is far from being considered ‘non-international’, as a number of Western countries and Arabic puppet-states, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, have been repeatedly exposed as such that continuing to provide financial and military support to Syrian’ freedom fighters’.³

This does not come as a particular surprise, as the idea of overthrowing Syrian government by the mean of hiring mercenaries to do the ‘dirty work’, has long ago ceased being referred to as utterly unacceptable by the America’s high-ranking governmental officials, in charge of designing this country’s foreign policies. As the former Director of strategy for the White House Homeland Security Council, Michael Barrett had put it:

Given the perceived imperative to intervene in Syria, but the countervailing duty to respect state sovereignty and the lack of United Nations sanction (due to perpetual vetoes by China and Russia), mercenaries might well be the best prescription, Neutrality Act or no. They would allow the U.S. to avoid directly arming the locals, about whose character and intent we know little.⁴

The fact that, as it was implied earlier, foreign mercenaries (Islamic fundamentalists affiliated with Al-Qaeda, the functioning of which continues to be sponsored by CIA) play a crucial role, within the context of how ‘Free Syrian Army’ goes about carrying out its attacks on the representatives of Syrian government and on those Syrian citizens that support their government’s stance in countering Islamic terrorism, there is nothing particularly odd about the ‘freedom fighters” tendency to continuously violate the most basic provisions of Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which specifies combat-rules, meant to be observed by the participants of non-international armed conflicts.

The reason for this is apparent – being en masse religious fanatics, many of whom were born in foreign countries, the representatives of Syrian ‘opposition’ are innately predisposed to refer to the basic principles of secular ethics, as such that have no meaning, whatsoever.

There is, however, even more to it – as the recent outbreaks of armed violence in the world indicated, the legally bounding provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Protocols I and II) are being discursively inconsistent with what now account for the anti-governmental insurgents’ actual agenda.

After all, in order for insurgents to be able to gain a strategic advantage over their adversaries, and to eventually overthrow the ‘dictatorship, they must succeed in: a) disrupting law and order; b) prompting citizens to indulge in a sectarian violence against each other; c) exposing the government’s ineffectiveness in combating terror; d) intimidating opponents; e) ensuring that international Medias never cease paying close attention to the insurgents’ cause. For example, Article 13 in Protocol II clearly states that:

The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.⁵

However, it appears that the members of ‘Free Syrian Army’ could not care less about trying to adjust their combat-tactics to correlate with this particular provision.

The validity of this statement can be well illustrated in regards to two suicide-bombings, carried out by Syrian’ freedom fighters’ in Damascus on 23 December 2011, which resulted in deaths of 44 people, with most of them having been identified later as innocent bystanders.⁶

Apparently, Syrian armed insurgents are being directly interested in intensifying the atmosphere of terror in the society, as the mean of weakening the extent of a society’s inner integrity. This is because it should make it easier for them to take a full advantage of a number of tactical advantages, commonly enjoyed by those who indulge in an urban-based armed guerilla against governmental forces.

What it means is that there are a number of good reasons to doubt the validity of Western Medias’ reports on situation in Syria, especially when the authors of these reports adopt a strongly defined pro-insurgent stance, while referring to the al-Assad’s government as being solely responsible for committing crimes against Syrian civilians.

The reason for this is apparent – without being able to present Westerners with his perspective on what is currently happening in the country (Western ‘independent’ Medias do not even refer to him as anything else but ‘criminal’ and ‘muss-murderer’), al-Assad has not interest whatsoever in having his reputation continuing to worsen.

In its turn, this explains why, contrary to what it is being commonly assumed by people in Western countries, Syrian Army’s units that confront ‘Free Syrian Army’, are continuing being given orders to try to refrain from returning fire, for as long as circumstances allow.⁷

The situation with ‘Free Syrian Army’, on the other hand, is diametrically opposite. It is not only that rebels are being directly interested in endowing Syrian citizens with the sensation of incapacitating fear, but given the fact that ‘independent’ Western Medias have been given a directive to refer to them as ‘freedom fighters’, these rebels are now finding themselves in a position to commit war crimes, without fearing the prospect of retribution.

Moreover, they are also beginning to realize that many Western human rights activists and a number of ICRC’s representatives in Syria are being just as ‘independent’, as it happened to be the case with Western mainstream Medias.

In its turn, this explains why, upon having discovered the evidence of a particular recently committed war-crime in Syria, these people tend to automatically assume that the al-Assad’s government should be held solely responsible for it. This, of course, gives the members of ‘Free Syrian Army’ a carte blanche to continue perpetrating war-crimes, while assigning blame for committing these crimes on Syrian Army.

The validity of this suggestion can be well shown in regards to the killing of 13 civilians in the Syrian town of Deir al-Zor (the mass-grave was discovered on 29 May 2012), which CNN, BBC and Al Jazeera immediately began to refer to as yet another proof of the al-Assad regime’s ‘viciousness’. After all, the carrying out of extrajudicial executions has traditionally been considered one of the most gruesome war-crimes, as stands in a striking opposition to Article 4 (Protocol II):

No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found guilty of an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality.⁸

However, it did not take too long for the actual truth about these killings to surface – in a week of time, rebels assumed the responsibility for this particular war-crime, while justifying it with the references to all 13 murdered individuals, as former supporters of ‘Assad’s tyranny’.⁹

Yet, the earlier mentioned Medias withheld from delivering this particular news to the viewers, as such that was quite inconsistent with the negative image of al-Assad’s regime, created by the same Medias.

Given the fact that, due many Westerners’ preoccupation with the ‘celebration of diversity’, their ability to indulge in logical reasoning continues to become increasingly undermined, it also does not come as a particular surprise that, as of today, it represents another well-established trend among Western (particularly American) politicians to refer to the war-crimes, committed by ‘Free Syrian Army’, as having been fully or partially justified.

A good example that illustrates the legitimacy of this suggestion, is the U.S. State Department’s reaction to the news report of 48 Iranian religious pilgrims/civil contractors having been taken hostages by the members of ‘Free Syrian Army’ on 6 August 2012:

The State Department tells CBS News it believes Syrian rebels’ claims that 48 Iranians they are holding hostage are members of Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guard military unit.¹⁰

Apparently, it is not only that the officials from the U.S. State Department did not think that there was anything wrong with 48 non-uniformed (as it was shown in the video, released by Syrian rebels) civilians having been kidnapped in a broad daylight, but they indirectly supported the perpetrators of this war-crime by implying that, having served as the Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in the past, these Iranian civilians well deserved to be kidnapped and tortured.

Nevertheless, as it was pointed out earlier, those who commit war crimes, during the course of non-international (as well as international) armed conflicts, can have no excuses, whatsoever – regardless of how ‘democratic’ or ‘progressive’ their causes might be. Therefore, there can be no doubt as to the fact that the earlier mentioned kidnapping of Iranian non-uniformed civilians by ‘Free Syrian Army’ does constitute a classical war-crime:

Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph I are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever:

violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
collective punishments;
taking of hostages…¹¹

Apparently, those Western politicians who act on behalf of trans-national oil/gas corporations, and who strive to turn Syria into a perpetual battleground for the never-ending tribal warfare of everybody against everybody, as they have done with Libya, consider International Law a subject of ‘bending’.

That is, for as long as ‘freedom fighters’, hired to fight for money, succeed in undermining the national sovereignty of the international plutocracy’s next victim (in our case, Syria), the war-crimes that they commit, during the course of a process, will be effectively overlooked.

After all, who is going to report these crimes, once Western mainstream Medias (owned by the representatives of the very same plutocracy), are being given an order to withhold from doing it? Alternatively, for as long as the governmental officials from a particular country continue to resist the foreign-sponsored ‘democratization by terror’, they will be continually referred to as ‘bloody murderers’ – just as it is being the case with the President Bashar al-Assad today.

The earlier outlined specifics of the ongoing armed conflict in Syria, advise what may account for a proper analytical perspective, from which the ICRC’s most recent announcement (regarding the situation in Syria) could be most adequately assessed. They also provide us with a clue as to why it is only the matter of time, before the very concept of International Law will be deprived of the remains of its former discursive legitimacy.

The fact that the ICRC’s announcement did not have even a slightest effect of the qualitative aspects of what appears to be a full-scaled civil war in Syria, suggests that the passing of international law-legislations, designed to encourage warring parties to seek peaceful solutions to the armed conflicts in question, has been effectively deprived of its de facto rationale.

This is because, as of today, the opposing parties that participate in just about any non-international armed conflict, have ceased being innately interested in observing the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In its turn, this can be explained by the fact that, due to the realities of a Globalized living in today’s geopolitically unipolar world, the applicable codes for conducting ethical warfare are being increasingly perceived not categorically imperative but rather circumstantially relative.

This simply could not be otherwise, as the concept of International Law, in the traditional sense of this word, is becoming ever more discursively outdated. The reason for this is simple – as of today, there are no geopolitical/discursive preconditions for nation-states to consider themselves the International Law’s actual subjects, endowed with rights and responsibilities.

After all, the ongoing process of Globalization deems the very notion of sovereign statehood inconsistent with the spatial vector of the process of Earth’s Globalization-induced’ flattening’:

The global economy ignores barriers, but if they are not removed, they cause distortion. The traditional centralized nation-state is another cause of friction. It is ill-equipped to play a meaningful role on the global stage. ¹²

Ever since the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. Government has been acting as the only arbiter on the arena of international politics.

This, of course, could not have resulted in anything else but in undermining the legitimacy of the concept of International Law, because in the legal sense of this word, America has assumed the mutually incompatible functions of this Law’s legislator, guarantor and enforcer (often contrary to the resolutions of U.N. Security Council) – the state of affairs closely associated with the notions of dictatorship, tyranny and corruption.

This is the actual reason why, while screaming ‘bloody murder’ about the thoroughly legal measures to combat Islamic terrorists and to restore constitutional order in the country, undertaken by the Syrian government’s officials, Western/American politicians are nevertheless turning a blind eye on the blatant violations of International Law, perpetrated by Syrian’ freedom fighters’.

Thus, the earlier mentioned ICRC’s announcement appears being essentially meaningless because due to the International Law’s de facto absence (there is now a ‘jungle law’ in the realm of international affairs instead), there can be no effective mechanism of utilizing this announcement to decrease the intensity of armed-fighting in Syria.

This, of course, implies that there is no much sense being left in the continuous existence of such international organizations as U.N., ICRC, UNESCO, etc., which by now have been effectively turned into nothing short of ‘high society clubs’ for the hordes of highly-paid but essentially useless bureaucrats.

I believe that the earlier deployed line of argumentation, in regards to what may account for the ICRC announcement’s legally-bounding implications (or rather for the absence of thereof), is being thoroughly consistent with the paper’s initial thesis.

After all, even though the ICRC’s announcement does provide a legal framework for assessing the measure of military actions’ ethical appropriateness, undertaken by both: Syrian Army and ‘Free Syrian Army’, this announcement’s theoretical and discursive provisions appear ill-adjusted to the realities of low-intensity armed conflicts in today’s world.

Therefore, this specific ICRC’s announcement should be regarded as yet another indication of the fact that, as of today, a number of formerly valid discursive notions, associated with the concept of International Law, have grown hopelessly outdated.

Bibliography

Barrett, Michael, ‘In Syria, Send in the Mercenaries’, The Examiner (Washington, DC), 2012.

Blum, William, ‘What’s Really Happening in Syria?’, The Arab American News (Dearborn, Michigan), 2012.

Brennan, Margaret & Reals, Tucker, Iran: ‘Retired’ elite soldiers among 48 hostages held by Syria rebels (2012) CBS NEWS.

Coles, Isabel, Militant Group Claims Killing of 13 in Syria (2012) Reuters HIS, ICRC Declares Existence of Internal Armed Conflict in Syria (2012).

Ohmae, Kenichi, Next Global Stage: Challenges and Opportunities in our Borderless World (Upper Saddle River: Wharton School Publishing, 2005).

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 1977, 1125 UNTS 609.

Seale, Patrick, ‘This is no Plan for Peace: The Outside Funding of Syria’s Rebels Undermines Efforts to end the conflict. Civilians are the Losers’, The Guardian (London), 2012.

Footnotes

¹ HIS, ICRC Declares Existence of Internal Armed Conflict in Syria. (2012). Web.

² Michael Schmitt, Charles Garraway &Yoram Dinstein, The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict with Commentary (2006) International Institute of Humanitarian Law. Web.

³ William Blum, ‘What’s really happening in Syria?’, The Arab American News (Dearborn), 2012, 10.

⁴ Barrett, ‘In Syria, Send in the Mercenaries”, The Examiner (Washington), 2012, 25.

⁵Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, art 13.

⁶

⁷ Patrick Seale, ‘This is no Plan for Peace: The Outside Funding of Syria’s Rebels Undermines Efforts to end the Conflict. Civilians are the Losers’, The Guardian (London), 2012, 27.

⁸Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, art 4.

⁹ Isabel Coles, Militant Group Claims Killing of 13 in Syria. (2012). Web.

¹⁰ Margaret Brennan & Tucker Reals, Iran: ‘Retired’ elite soldiers among 48 hostages held by Syria rebels. (2012). CBS NEWS. Web.

¹¹Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, art 3.

¹² Kenichi Ohmae, Next Global Stage: Challenges and Opportunities in our Borderless World (Upper Saddle River: Wharton School Publishing, 2005), 5.

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International Law and the ‘Non-International Armed Conflict’ in Syria

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