The Neglect of Strategic Intelligence

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Neglect of Strategic Intelligence
Gaps in Literature
Future Challenges
Conclusion
References

Introduction

The success of any strategic intelligence is denoted by achievement of pre-established objectives in accordance with a country’s policies. However, neglect of strategic intelligence has far-reaching effects that are unfavorable to the expected outcomes of security operations.

It is worth noting that the role of intelligence in any jurisdiction cannot be ignored owing to its critical nature. Honig (2007, 702) is quite categorical that strategic intelligence entails complicated analysis of all the prevailing factors that dictate the actual outcomes of different actions.

As part of the holistic remedial measures, the author explores all the possibilities and methodologies available for a military group to emerge victorious when handling matters related to security. Intelligence is a major factor that should be considered by a nation whenever there is need to win the tactics of an enemy. Therefore, it is evident that any slight neglect of strategic intelligence presents numerous challenges towards effective management of security issues.

Brief Background

The demand to advance national intelligence and maintain the required security competence of a nation is very critical in anchoring holistic socio-economic growth and political development. Notably, the role of the US national intelligence community has been commendable over the years (Champion 2005, 1673).

However, instances of neglect of strategic intelligence are continually creating security gaps across the nation. As a result, several tactical and military operations tend to take long before succeeding. Lillbacka (2013, 300) indicates that several years of war against terrorism and related threats are yet to be concluded. The latter has been occasioned by poor research in the assembling of intelligence information and vital data on security.

According to Champion (2005, 1675), “the history of government involvement in intelligence matters can be traced to the early days of the Revolutionary War.” The above lapse has culminated into several questions regarding the role of strategic intelligence and effectiveness in gathering relevant data for managing security affairs.

Significance of the Problem

There is a lot of doubt whether the current approach is being employed to collect intelligence data. Is the neglect of strategic intelligence the main reason for failure in successful containment of insecurity issues? What are some of the possible and available mechanisms that can be employed to seal gaps and minimize future security challenges? These are some of the questions that need urgent redress before effective management of intelligence information can be initiated (Scott 1999, 218).

Neglect of Strategic Intelligence

Legislation

The neglect of strategic intelligence is indeed tragic and can be considered to be extremely perilous in any jurisdiction. In the US, some critics lament that the National Security Act of 1947 provided one of the best mechanisms for managing strategic intelligence.

This piece of legislation outlasted many hurdles including the Cold War. However, the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 brought about amendments that negatively impacted strategic intelligence when the creation of the annual National Security Strategy took place. This provided the president with powers to produce a avail security documents to be perused by the Congress. As Lillbacka (2013, 300) notes, this officialdom unwittingly created several security gaps that ended up in a weak strategic intelligence on security matters.

Report by CIA

The report by CIA presents a report on the role and effects of strategic intelligence towards the creation of national strategy (Central Intelligence Agency 1995, par. 3). It brings out the changing approach of the United States intelligence toward defeating the rise of insurgence both at the domestic and international levels. From the beginning of the article, the need for an improved intelligence community is evident.

The Central Intelligence Agency cites that strategic intelligence should always provide the last and most viable line of action to take before a president declares war or peace. Neglecting strategic intelligence might lead to devastating impacts on national stability. Lillbacka (2013, 301) builds his arguments by pointing out that during the Cuban missile crisis, neglect of intelligence was evident.

The latter led to a rush decision by the military. Though it was considered an important step in preparing the country for any eventuality, it curved a major niche which almost drifted the globe into a state of nuclear warfare. Robert Stanberg’s conception of human intelligence model best explains the role of intelligence and its management. It observes that successful collection of intelligence involves three distinct and related approaches, which include practical, creative, and analytical thinking.

Aspects of Neglecting Intelligence

On the same note, human beings and events exist in different contests and as such call for the application of a variety of intelligence, mostly strategic to gather needed data. He compares current strategic intelligence in the US to a work of journalism that lacks adequate investigation before reporting. He cites that this is due to the much neglect in the government to advance its national security operations.

On the same note, Krizan (1999, 38) cites that the implementation of an effective strategic intelligence platform is tangential and tied closely to administrative competence. In the 2003 war in Iraq, the US intelligence failed to account for the much-taunted Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). The military wing was rushed into action at the detriment of the Iraqi people.

The aspects of neglecting intelligence, poor surveillance, and politicizing security matters are largely responsible for the overall weak nature of strategic intelligence. The discord between the United Nations inspectors and the US intelligence personnel regarding the presence of WMDs has remained a major source of commotion with no forthcoming solution.

Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan

Furthermore, appraising the security situation and conducting research to enhance awareness and attain goals that meet the interests of a nation are some of the practical intelligence measures that should be put in place. Lillbacka (2013, 302) inquires how the United States intelligence justified the advice to President Bush to take action against acts of terror in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The question has culminated into a major debate on the efficacy and actual aftermath of the Operation Iraqi Freedom. Since the beginning of the war on WMDs, justifiable evidence is yet to be tabled in public. It is apparent that several investigations have been done on strategic intelligence owing to its importance. Krizan (1999, 6) observes that “intelligence is more than information. It is knowledge that has been specially prepared for a customer’s unique circumstances.”

Outcomes

The theory and practice of strategic intelligence in the United States are still crucial areas of concern. Quite a number of the theories in strategic intelligence are hardly exercised. Moreover, there is a sharp rise of academic inquiry on issues related to intelligence.

As a matter of fact, a lot of inquiry into the subject of strategic intelligence has been carried out ever since the end of the Cold War period. According to Orton and Callahan (2008, 413), there has been an altitudinal transformation in regard to official secrecy, security functions, and intelligence matters.

It is pertinent to note that the responsibilities of Intelligence in international affairs and world politics are still below the anticipated levels. Needless to say, In actual sense, the society needs to comprehend the concept of “intelligence” and what it’s underlying meaning. Thereafter, nations need to appreciate the elements of strategic intelligence bearing in mind that it is an effective tool of defense.

Gaps in Literature

It is evident that appreciating intelligence is critical since it assists in decision-making at both the national and international levels. Many research studies ought to be carried out on a number of factors such as the input of human intelligence on technical warfare and nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is necessary to examine the aspect of collaboration in international intelligence alongside the cognitive setbacks affecting strategic intelligence (Hymans 2006, 456).

This literature review elaborates the invaluable role of intelligence in international relations and how it has transformed over the years. The transnational cooperation on intelligence issues maps a major shift in global politics (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2005, 12).

Data Collection Methods

The inefficiency of the US intelligence is perhaps a major challenge in handling acts of terror. President Bush and the intelligence team initially thought that the war in Iraq would be a good lesson to leaders supporting terrorism (Orton and Callahan 2008, 421). However, the latter led to negative effects both to the United States and victimized nations.

The extended stay of the US troops in Iraq is a costly affair. Worse still, several soldiers have lost their lives in the war-torn countries. The capacity of the intelligence community to produce requisite data relies on the methodologies used. Collection methods are vital in developing reliable results.

It is essential to mention that data collection methods ought to be accurate for the sake of obtaining desired results. In this case, the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SiGINT) methods of data collection are yet to be effectively utilized by the intelligence community. These methods may minimize inherent ambiguity during the process of collecting intelligence data on security issues.

According to CIA, “it is clear that the individual cannot expect to be helped more than halfway by systems and methods” (Central Intelligence Agency 1995, par. 23). Therefore, personal responsibility and training are crucial when collecting data.

Future Challenges

Challenges facing the US national intelligence community are immense. Some critics wonder whether the current intelligence system will ever be improved. Moreover, research has shown that there is lack of appropriate resources for gathering, translating, and evaluating intelligence.

The political leaders in the global realm lack the understanding of the value and limitations of intelligence. Evidence to back up this claim has been obtained from the surprise attack that took place in the United States in December 1941. From the attack, more than 2000 lives were lost.

This propelled the US to wage war against Asia and Europe whereas the recent September 11 twin attacks led to the US entry into war with Iraq and Afghanistan. This implies that intelligence still demands a lot of input from the global community. It is irrefutable that the various pieces of literature reviewed in this section will help to close the existing research gaps on strategic intelligence.

Conclusion

To recap it all, it is crucial to reiterate that strategic intelligence on matters related to security is a fundamental area of concern that needs to be addressed by the entire global community. In particular, the methods used to collect data should be thorough as much as possible.

Most of the lapses witnessed on intelligence issues emanate from poor data collection methods. In addition, it is pertinent for the intelligence community to realize that the current body of literature offers a large and invaluable pool of knowledge that can be put into practical use.

References

Central Intelligence Agency. 1995. “A Fresh Look at Collection Requirements”. Web.

Champion, Christopher. 2005. “The Revamped FISA: Striking a Better Balance between the Government’s Need to protect itself and the forth amendment.” Vanderbilt Law Review 58, no. 5 (October):1671-1703.

Honig, Arthur. 2007. “A new direction for theory-building in intelligence studies.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 20, no. 4 (August): 699-716.

Hymans, Jacques. 2006. “Theories of nuclear proliferation: The state of the field.” Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 3 (May): 455-465.

Krizan, Lisa. 1999. Intelligence essentials for everyone. Washington DC: Books for Business.

Lillbacka, Ralf. 2013. “Realism, constructivism, and intelligence analysis.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 26, no. 2 (February): 304-331.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. 2005. “Staff Statement No. 9”. Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and Intelligence Collection in the United States Prior to 9/11. Web.

Orton, Douglas, and Jamie, Callahan. 2008.”Important “folk theories” in intelligence reorganization.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 8, no. 4 (January): 411-429.

Scott, Rogers. 1999. “Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law.” AFL Rev 46, no 1 (June): 217-223.

Svendsen, Adam. 2009. “Connecting intelligence and theory: Intelligence liaison and international relations.” Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 5 (.October): 700-729.

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