Post-Communist Russian Politics

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Understanding post-communist Russian politics
Military and democracy
Conclusion
References

Introduction

It has almost been 18 years now since both the cold-war and communism came to an end.

As a way of recollecting our thoughts on this, perhaps it would be best if we could for a moment try to evaluate the relationship that both the civilians and the military have enjoyed (or failed to enjoy, for that matter) in the years following the collapse of the communist party rule in Russia between 1989 and 1991. To start with, it is important to point out here that Russia, along with the rest of the countries in eastern and central Europe, was faced with an extremely unique point of transition, from one that revolved around military power, to one that is inclined more towards democracy (Huntington 2008). As such, the issue of defense policy, the armed forces and the military-civil relations becomes paramount.

The armed forces happened to have been constituents of the communist system of government. This system of government greatly hinged upon matters of state relative to those of the party. In Russia for example, the orientation that the military underwent during the reign of communism was such that they could help escalate the tenets of the civilian-led system of government regarding the cold war, thereby resulting in ideological difference with the West (Nelson et al 1998). Not only were the military large in terms of size, they were also heavily backed in monetary terms by the system. For this reason, their spending budget by far exceeded those of the other government departments.

From such a point of view, it is not hard to see why there would result strained relations and a possible resistance on the part of the military, when the post-communist government sought to reorient the mindset of the military so that they could not face the post-cold war policies from a democratic perspective.

What this means is that the Russian government sought to replace the system of party-state with a democratic model that boasted of military-civil relations (Tolstoy et al 1998). Some of the challenges that the post-communism system in Russia was faced with include lowering of its military size, as well as a reduction on the defense budget, attempting to alter the mindset of the military personnel from mission of the cold war, to now embrace post-cold war endeavors. Then throw is the challenge of having to establish a new platform that would aid in the promotion of cordial relationships between on the one hand, the military personnel and on the other hand, the members of the society in Russia.

Understanding post-communist Russian politics

There is a widely held assumption, both within Russia as well as abroad, that the process of democratization that came about due to the crumbling of the communist regime in Russia, may have had an extensive impact on the military (Huntington 2008). So much so that for a long time now, it has even been alleged that the military, on occasion, has come close to executing a coup d’etat. These are rumors that have been circulating ever since the post-communist era started. In august 1991, hard-liners communists tried to institute a coup, an attempt that flopped.

Major General Leonid Kozhender, while being interviewed by a leading newspaper in Russia four months after the military take-over bid had been thwarted, opined that “the Army is tired of suffering humiliation, it is tired of living in near-starvation a long way from home, it is tired of serving a country that no longer exists…We think the time for simply smiling at these problems is over. Measures must be taken. Tough measures “(Cohen 2002). Six days following the interview with the General, Izvestila had already started offering suggestions to the effect that Alexander Rutskoi, the then Vice President, was on the process of “leading anew putsch” against the Russian government, with a view to salvaging the military “from its catastrophic situation “ (Betz 2004).

In July 1992, there were similar rumors about a possible military take-over, rumors that were later to be repeated in March, 1993, and in March of the following year. On the other hand, not a single soldier got engaged in this entire coup attempt. In fact, highly-ranked military personnel had to come out in the open each time to denounce these rumors. Wit such coup threats having glared in the eyes of the Russians, one would not help but hypothesize that to a certain extent, the post-communist leaders in Russia could be seen as being overly alarmists (Tolstoy et al 1998).

On the other hand, there is also a possibility that this may very well not be the case. According to a majority of the indicators on conventional military-civil theory relations, the leaders of the post-communist Russia have accorded the right to become alarmed, concerned even, as regards the possibility that the military may very well be plotting to institute a coup. There are also those who have held the argument that the threat to civilians is the key factor of concern in as far as a military intervention is concerned (Nelson et al 1997). Of course, such a take-over often comes about with a view to enhancing the military’s corporate interests.

From 1989 to 1994, the defense budgetary allocation in Russia was seen to have declined by close to 40 percent, a development that served to stir the legitimate concerns of most of the liberals in Russia. From the perspective of an individual, the standard of living of military personnel also reduced, during the post-communist era. To drive this point home, it is worth of note here that in 1986, the soviet corps happened to have been one amongst the few institutions that received, along with its officers, the highest level of pampering within the soviet society. Six years later, the standard of living of an officer corps had plummeted by about 25 percent (Tolstoy et al 1998).

A shortage of housing facilities appears to have made the situation worse and in the long-run, a majority of the officers in the military were already categorized as living below the poverty line. The financial threat that appears to have faced the corporate interests of the military seems to have been made worse by a “ a glass not-encouraged media campaign’ that sought to harm the shame a former practice by the soviet military that was referred to as dedovshchina (translated, this is a Russian terms that means ‘hazing within the ranks’).

It is alleged that about 15,000 soldiers may have lost their lives between 1985 and 1990, thanks to the “noncombatant causes” in the name of accidents and hazing. At the same time, the Russian media was also laying its spotlight on episodes of grand corruption that were taking place in the military. For example, between 1992 and 1995, it is believed that close to 28 officers within the grade of a general in both the General Staff as well as the Defense ministry, may have either been suspected or convicted for carrying out illegal activities (Strachan & Rothe 2007). In light of these kinds of attacks, as regards the corporate interests of the Russian military, courtesy of “ reformers” in Russia, it was only natural then, that the soldiers would harbor feelings of having been cut-out from the power game of democracy, as well as the nostalgic thoughts that socialism evokes.

Military and democracy

Betz (2004) has noted that the intervention of the military into the domestic politics, along with its associated level of influence and independence, are on the whole, viewed as the principal challenges towards the attainment of cordial relationships between the military and civilians. For this reason, a majority of the academic literature to be found has attempted to assess the pathways leading up to the interventions off the military into politics, along with the associated factors. In addition, there is a lot of emphasis that appears to be directed at an exploration of factors and circumstances which seek to enhance the ability of the military to have a political control over the civilians, not to mention the institution of military-civil relations that are democratic (Bruneau et al 2006).

The development of the communist system in Russia brought with it a unique relationship between on the one hand politics and on the other hand, the military. Back then, the military happened to have been under the control of an undemocratic and strict political class of communist leaders. This leadership was under the control of the civilians. As a result, the military was limited in terms of the political actions that they could execute, as an independent entity. Then again, the military could also be said to have been somewhat politicized (Chitnis 2005). This is because the military happened to have been one amongst the several vehicles that the leadership of the civilian communists used for purposes of spreading their values to the wider society.

For the most part, this role of the military was disheveled with the communist leadership via the creation of an oversight board to take care of the education within the military. Furthermore, the party cells were also used as a tool by the military, following the directions from the civilian leaders, to escalate their values to the masses. Even as the political independence of the military may have been limited then, nevertheless the high command of the military in terms of military strategy, policy on defense, and also the structure of the force, was still regarded in high esteem, and therefore sought after by the ruling leadership of the civilians (Edmunds et al 2006).

With the crumbling of communism throughout the latter part of the 1980s, and its eventual collapse in 1991, the issue of civil-military relations had already led to the raising of questions regarding the role that the military played. It was important to establish the extent to which the military was loyal to the communist system. In addition, it also became necessary that the level to which the military, whether alone or in collaboration with the leadership of the civilian communists, would seek to bear allegiance to this old regime, and thus defend it as and when the need arose. There are those who doubted that the military would always back the civilian leaders, especially after the collapse of the cold war.

Conclusion

The relationship that the military and the civilians in Russia enjoy at the moment following the end of the cold-war and communism, and the embracing of democracy may be said to be somewhat mild. This is as a result of the developments that took place following the collapse of the cold war, along with the system of communism in Russia according to Dawisha (1997). It becomes important at this point to point out that during the era of the communist rule in Russia the military was used by the civilian-led communist system to propagate their communist values to the masses. For this reason, the communist system that was characterized by a lack of democracy enjoyed a lot of financial backing from the communist system.

Towards the late 1980s however, the financial resources that were being advanced to the military seemed to have dwindled, and a majority of them were regarded as facing abject poverty (Tolstoy et al 1998). In addition, a lot of questions were also being raised on the role of the military, especially in a case whereby the civilian-led system would be faced by a threat. Would the military be ready to defend them? The end of the cold war also meant that the military had to be re-aligned so that they could now help with the development of post-cold war policies. There was also a feeling amongst the military that they were being shut out by the system, and this is perhaps the reason why there were a lot of rumors about a military take-over of the government following the collapse of communism.

References

Betz, D. J. 2004. Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe. New York: Routledge Curzon.

Bruneau, Thomas C. Tollefson, Scott D. Austin. 2006. Who guards the guardians and how: democratic civil-military relations. Texas: University of Texas Press.

Cohen, Eliot. 2002. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. New York, NY: Free Press, 200

Chitnis R. A. 2005. Literary Criticism. London: Routledge

Dawisha, K. 1997. The international dimension of [post-communist transitions. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe.

Edmunds, T, Cottey, A. & Forster, A. 2006. Civil-military relations in postcommunist Europe: reviewing the transition. New York: Francis& Taylor.

Huntington, Samuel. 2008. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of civil-military relations. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Nelson, J. M, Tilly, C. & Walker, L. 1997. Transforming post–Communist political economies. New York: National Academies Press

Strachan, Hew, & Rothe, A. H. 2007. Clausewitz in the twenty-first century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tolstoy, L, Maude, L. S. & Maude, A. 1998. War and peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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