Confessionalism as Lebanon’s Political System

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Table of Contents

Introduction
History of Confessionalism in Lebanon
Problems of Confessionalism in Lebanon
How the policies formed the Lebanese political structure
Are the Policies Effective?
References:

Introduction

Lebanon has had a great political shake-up following the resolutions that led to the solving of the civil war that rocked the nation. This comes as a result of the deep-rooted political system that had been the norm in the country for several years. Lebanon had been governed for years under a political system called confessionalism. Consequently, this had led to a civil war that threatened to tear up Lebanon based on its religious ground.

Later, a consensus was reached which came up with policies to enable Lebanon to remain as an independent and peaceful country despite its diversity in terms of religion. This paper will, as a result, analyze the problems of confessionalism in the Lebanese political system and the effects caused by the inertia of the system about the reforms promised by the new reform-minded leaders. In addition, the paper will attempt to outline whether the policies put up to bridge the gap caused by confessionalism have been effective or not.

To have a good understanding of this topic, we will first have to understand what confessionalism is. Harb (2006) defines confessionalism as a form of a political system that “…Proportionally allocates political power among a country’s communities- whether religious or ethnic- according to their percentage of the population. In Lebanon for example, its form of confessionalism is based on the religious foundation. In this state, cabinet positions, parliamentary seats, positions in the civil service, and other government institutions are apportioned relatively to the religious populations. Other countries that have used this system of government are Netherlands, India, Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland.

CJPME 2006 further classifies confessionalism under a larger form of the political system referred to as consociationalism. The basic pillars of this system are communities receiving a proportionate allocation of leadership posts basing on their population’s numerical representation, on matters of great importance on all the communities, the system demands that leaders form a grand coalition to reach a consensus for common good, freedom for each community to determine their own affairs like the laws of personal status, and finally the availability of “mutual veto power.” In this provision, a community has the power to vote out any decision that seems to undermine their well-being.

History of Confessionalism in Lebanon

Many scholars argue that confessionalism had existed in Lebanon as early as the 13th century. Under Ottoman rule, confessionalism was also experienced in different forms. The modern-day boundaries of the “Greater Lebanon” were established in 1920 by the French government after the merging of the old Lebanon Province which included Mont-Liban a greatly Maronite region and other regions from the coast which included Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre.

The Muslim region of Bekaa Valley was also included in the merger to form the “Greater Lebanon.” (CJPME 2007). Problems resulted in the conflict of interests between the Christian Maronite regions who were supported by the French government to establish that the frontiers of Greater Lebanon were naturally marked to include the new territories while Syria and other Muslim regions preferred that the new territories be maintained under the control of Syria.

This caused a long-term turmoil whose end in 1943 marked the first understanding between the Christians and Muslims. They mutually decided to evict the French from their debate. This marked what was referred to as the National Pact, 1. In this agreement, the Muslim leaders agreed to accept the new frontiers marked by the “Greater Lebanon” and cease calling for greater control of the new territories by Syria. On their part, the Christians agreed to stop looking for help from France or any other Western nation in order to get military support. This marked an automatic entry into the political system of confessionalism.

In this pact which marked Lebanon’s independence from France, the Christian President, Bishara Al-Khouri and the Islam Prime Minister Riyadh al-Soloh who was Sunni made a pact allowing Christians and Muslims to have a 6:5 ratio in the parliamentary representation.

These agreements remained intact until 1975 when they failed subjecting the country to civil war. The country spent another 14 years in a war until the Ta’if accord brought it to an end. In the accord, the international leaders perpetuated the system of confessionalism but pointed out that soon, the system had to be abolished. In addition, they changed the first pact from a 6:5 representation ratio in the parliament in favor of the Christians to a 50:50.

Problems of Confessionalism in Lebanon

The prime minister of the State of Lebanon Salim Hoss has referred to confessionalism as an illness that rages within the body of the Lebanese political system. According to him, the taifiya, as they commonly refer to the confessional system is just but “…a symbol of ignorance and backwardness amongst the people.” (Reinkowski 1992). What has this to show on the effects of confessionalism on Lebanon? This shows that it has had a negative effect. The following are some of the effects that this form of political system had on Lebanon.

One of the most outstanding weaknesses of the confessional system of leadership is the rigidity portrayed by the different groups within the pact. This forms a basis for the failure of the system. In the Lebanon case, they developed a fear that the other sect would dominate therefore making each side strongly hold on their side of the bargain and hence causing rigidity (Barclay 2007). According to Barclay, the rigidity could not have allowed the sustenance of the system.

This was a result of the changing political and economic environment within Lebanon. Among the changes were the modernization of the economy, counter elites’ emergence, and the sectarian mobilization which was taking place. In addition, the presence and the mobilization of the Palestinian refugees contributed to the fueling of the tension that was already existent. This marked the first problem experienced by Lebanon due to confessionalism.

Another weakness that causes problems within the confessional system is that for it to succeed, there must exist cooperation between the groups involved. Achieving this cooperation can sometimes be a great hurdle to cross. As Lijphart puts it, to make a decision that accounts for all the subcultures of a diverse community is difficult and, “consociational democracies are always threatened by a degree of immobilism…” (Barclay 2007). In the case of Lebanon, the effort to maintain the Sunni and Maronite dominance simply meant suffocating Lebanon’s political system. As pointed out earlier, the social and economic changes that Lebanon experienced caused a disequilibrium that led to the collapse of the political system.

Checking on the background of the Maronite politics shows that the Maronite system was completely based on the fear of extinction due to persecution that they had undergone before (Barclay 2007). The only way they could be assured of sustenance was through dominance. This translates that most of the Maronite institutions were founded for fear of extinction and thus they are bound to be rigid and based on defensive politics. This causes a lack of cooperation and rigidity which is one cause of problems in the confessional kind of government.

Another problem experienced by confessionalism is that it leads to the manipulation of the demographic and political position of the country. The rise of counter elite groups in the Islamic community led to tension between the Christian and Islam communities. Counter elite groups come up when smaller groups start appearing with conflicting ideas and interests within the larger conflicting groups. Once this takes over, the larger elites fail to be commanding the whole group leading to radicalization (Nordlinger 1972). A certain group was formed within the larger Sh’ia Muslims who felt that they were neglected by their representatives.

This group was led by Imam Mousa and came to be known as Amal. Most of the Sh’ia Muslims who felt that they were sidelined in the established government felt that Mousa was the best option and that he had their interests at heart. This, they felt would greatly contribute to their effort to get political participation and security economically. Although it was originally meant for the Sh’ia Muslims, Mousa advocated that the movement involved all the members of Lebanon that felt sidelined and neglected. This included the Palestinian refugees.

As Barclay puts it, radical tendencies on one side of the block could trigger the same response on the other side. The Maronites having felt a threat posed by the proliferation of several counter elite Muslim groups within the Islamic community had to make sure that they made their side more stable by ensuring their less fortunate citizens security, both financial and political participation. They regarded the rising of these counter elite groups most of them engulfing Palestinians with fear. This triggered the Christian Muslim tension and led to the collapse of the Lebanon political system.

Foreign interventions and interests can easily temper the stability of this system of government. Each country with interest in the country practicing this form of government can try to tip the balance to gain the friendlier group having more command of power so that they can enjoy their cooperation and thus get their interests. In parallel to its invasion of Lebanon, Israel signed an accord with the Maronite leaders of Lebanon promising to install them to power (CJPME 2006). The Israeli occupation of Lebanon later led to the refusal of the Hezbollah to disarm making them continue to fight within the southern “security belts” and calling for the Israeli vacation from Lebanon. Other countries that have a vested interest in Lebanon include the United States of America and Iran.

How the policies formed the Lebanese political structure

The first policy that was brought up to ensure that Lebanon became a single and united country was the recognition of Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty of the people of Lebanon. In addition, the policy highlighted the importance of the state’s commitment to reform and justice to the social and economic sector. In this policy, confessionalism was given the role as the regulator of the political organization principles. In its pact of co-existence, the policy stressed the importance of coexistence between all the Lebanese people and identified any effort that contravenes this to be illegal. And finally, the policy gave the real identity of the State of Lebanon (Barclay 2007).

How effective is this policy? According to Barclay, the identification of Lebanon as a country that is not a pan-Arab or Pan Syrian but with an Arab face stands out as not well defined thus showing a point of effectiveness that could lead to an understanding. This had been one of the causes of the civil war. This issue of identity would remain in a precarious position as pertains to the Christian population of Lebanon. However, the independence of Lebanon rested on this principle thus making Christians trade between identity and peace.

Another policy called for a comprehensive inclusion of a plan to observe the needs for social security within the political system. This part of the policy provides a remedy for one of the causes of war that had rocked Lebanon. Stable economic growth is given priority through the policy’s recognition of private property and personal initiatives. This policy will be effective as it recognizes the priorities of the liberal deputies among who the Ta’if was approved.

The second section of the reforms includes a clear route through which reforms in the political sector are to be achieved. In this policy, the powers and roles of different institutions of the government were clearly defined. Among the institutions are the post of the president, prime minister’s post, the speaker of the parliament, the cabinet, the electoral institution, and the parliament as a whole.

With its effort to “right shape” the country, Barclay argues that the policy put in place must have the right tools to enhance public policy, and also address the issue of geopolitical boundaries and ethnogeography in an appropriate manner (Barclay 2007). These she argues are appropriately addressed in the policies. This position is identified in the effort to proportionately redistribute power among the executives. This effort was made in a better way as compared to the initial method that was weighed down unfairness. One of the major weaknesses that had been addressed by these reforms was the presidential powers to sack the prime minister and other special executive powers that he could exercise any time he felt like doing it.

This was one cause of the civil war that had been experienced before. Through the reduction of the presidential powers, both positions realized a point of security assurance. The Sunnis had their position of the prime minister having more powers while the Sh’ias had their position of parliament speaker having his term extended and with less pressure from the president. Even the smaller groups in the coalition which included the Orthodox, Armenians, and Druze among others shared in the benefits through the increase of powers to the cabinet and other parliamentary positions.

The third section of the policies addressed the issues like decentralization of administration, issue of courts, and education. All domestic and foreign militias were disbanded under this section (Barclay 2007). This policy defined the form of cooperation between Lebanon and Syria. It also called for the intervention of the United Nations and other allies to ensure that appropriate means were used to ensure Lebanon’s freedom from Israel’s occupation.

Are the Policies Effective?

From the views shown above, each policy identifies a problem that had led to the civil war. This, therefore, shows that the policies are effective because they address each political, social, and economic drawback associated with confessionalism. These policies also fall comfortably within Nordlinger’s conflict regulation tools (Nordlinger 1972). In his argument, he identifies six characteristics of an effective conflict resolution plan.

These are a stable coalition of governing parties, the proportionality principle and not the winner taking it all, the availability of a mutual veto, a depolarization that is purposive, a readiness to compromise, and availability of concession.

The fact that both the National pact and the Ta’if contain the characteristics has led to a debate with some scholars arguing that the new pact is as good as the old one and is bound to fail while others purport that the second pact which is the Ta’if is more flexible and is bound to last. In Krayem’s words, “The error committed in the preservation of the inadequate 1943 National Pact might be repeated with the Ta’if Agreement.” (Krayem 1997).

But then he does offer the position that gives hope in the chances of survival of Ta’if. This new Agreement is bound to survive as long as they establish a political system that is strong and which provides self-amendments that are peaceful and legal and which are ready to adjust to societal changes and thus meet new challenges. With such a political system, the Ta’if is bound to succeed and thus the policies will be effective.

References:

Barclay, Sara. 2007. Consociationalism in Lebanon. University of Pennsylvania.

College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal. Web.

Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East. (2007)Understanding Lebanese Confessionalism. Fact Sheet Series No. 28. Web.

Harb, Imad. 2006. Lebanon’s Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects. United States Institute of Peace. Web.

Krayem, H. 1997. ‘The Lebanese Civil War and the Ta’if Agreement.’ In P. Salem (ed), Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays, American University of Beirut, Beirut, pp. 411-436.

Nordlinger, E. 1972. Conflict Regulation in in Divided Societies. Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

Reinkowski, Maurus.1992. Ottoman “Multiculturalism? The Example of Confessional System in Lebanon. Orient Institute of Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft, Istanbul.

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