Diplomacy: Two Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Putnams Model
Background
Win-Set
Ways to Impact Domestic Groups
Reverberation Strategies
Synergistic Strategies
Perspectives on the Approach
Conclusion
Work Cited

Introduction

The modern international relations could be characterized by numerous tensions between parties and the leading actors who impact the global policy and try to attain a better position for their states using diverse levers of influence. Thus, the given diplomatic crisis reminds about the high importance of negotiations as one of the most potent tools to outline a certain position and protect it by using multiple factors. Significance of this sort of dialogue could be evidenced by the events of Cold War when negotiations between the parties to the conflict were the only possible way to avoid global military confrontations and come to an agreement on specific contradictory issues.

Therefore, there have always been numerous attempts to improve this element of diplomacy by investigating factors that might impact parties to the conflict, their motifs, decisions, and solutions. Additionally, multiple researchers suggested their models of international relations and aspects that might facilitate problem resolution with the primary aim to attain better results during the negotiation and precondition their enhanced efficiency (Schoppa 353). Besides, among these ideas mentioned above, the two-level game theory remains one of the most influential ones as it is still used by specialists while analyzing particular events and negotiations between different parties. That is why, regarding the high significance of the model, its basic features and assumptions will be researched using the article by Schoppa Two Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why Gaiatsu Succeeds in Japan in Some Cases But Not Others as the background for the investigation.

Putnams Model

First of all, starting the analysis of the paper, it is central to determine Putnams model and its fundamental aspects. Thus, the two-level game theory is a model that considers international negotiations between multiple states as those which consist of simultaneous negotiations at domestic and international levels (between agents within a state and between governments correspondingly) (Schoppa 353). In such a way, in the course of negotiations at the domestic level, an agent engages in specific collaborations with the most potent authorities, gathers their support, and builds coalitions (Schoppa 354). At the same time, these aspects precondition the agents activity at the international level as negotiating, he/she tries to make an agreement that will meet requirements of interest groups presented at the domestic level, or create a win-set (acceptable outcomes) (Schoppa 355). Under these conditions, any international agreement becomes possible only if win-sets of all states involved in the process coincide (Schoppa 355). The given model encompasses a wide variety of diplomatic policies and negotiations as negotiators are not independent agents and all their actions are stipulated by specific demands and needs of domestic interest groups.

Background

Nevertheless, the paper selected for the investigation delves into the results of the U.S. – Japan Structural Impediments Initiative and makes a case for the analysis of Putnams theory as a model that could be applied to international negotiations of all types to explain their results and degree to which a particular outcome as preconditioned by the relations between domestic agents and synergistic strategies (Schoppa 353). Therefore, the author agrees that the model suggested by Putnam remains one of the central approaches to the evaluation of the international relations; however, at the same time, he assumes that the concept of synergistic strategies is not fully covered (Schoppa 354). The fact is that Putnam fails to recognize all these approaches with their analytical and empirical significance (Schoppa 354). In such a way, in the paper, Schoppa offers two more synergistic strategies that were not previously touched upon by Putnam (355). Moreover, the researcher admits the fact that Putnam and his adheres were not able to identify all conditions under which a chief negotiator will be able to use these very synergistic strategies to attain success (Schoppa 356). That is why, in the paper, Schoppa tries to fill in these gaps.

Win-Set

Starting the discussion, the author provides a brief description of tensions between the parties that appeared during the U.S. Japanese negotiations. The fact is that at the initial stage of the dialogue the demands outlined by the USA were unacceptable for Japan. In other words, using terminology suggested by Putnam, Japanese negotiators win-sets presupposed other conditions and tried to promote other terms of the agreement (Schoppa 357). For this reason, the negotiations were complex. The inability of the U.S. demands to fall within these very win-sets also meant that a particular compromise was needed to satisfy all needs. However, it was impossible without a reconsideration of relations between the interest groups, the introduction of so-called acceptability sets appropriate for all parties, and their impact on the negotiator (Schoppa 361). In such a way, the article proves the enhanced importance of win-sets as a central element of any diplomatic relations and their ability to precondition results of negotiations.

Ways to Impact Domestic Groups

At the same time, referring to the historical data, the Schoppa shows that authorities within Japan and groups participating in these negotiations were not able to make concessions and alter the terms of the agreement. The fact is that the U.S demands included significant alterations of the Japanese market, financial relations within the state, and fiscal policies (Schoppa 361). For this reason, the existence of differences in perspectives on the agreement and parties attempts to pursue their own interests complicated the negotiations. At the same time, in accordance with Putnam model, the compromise and appropriate outcomes could be achieved only if a certain win-set needed to satisfy all parties is created. That is why the ability of Americans to affect and alter the political game inside Japan became one of the central aspects of these negotiations (Schoppa 362). The author states that the USA used the international pressure to alter relations within the state and reconsider attitudes of the keiretsu and interest groups to the suggested agreement and make concessions (Schoppa 367). There are several ways in which this pressure was realized to generate decisions to cooperate and engage in beneficial negotiations.

First of all, Schoppa assumes that the USA used its power regarding the issue-areas and tried to alter attitudes within a state to the suggested agreement (359). Second, the author states that the U.S. negotiators explored informal communication strategies with the primary aim to change the dominant attitude to the proposed demands and ensure interest groups that a new agreement will become beneficial for them (Schoppa 365). At the same time, using their force and power, the USA supported every its demand with specific retaliations which meant that Japan had to respond in all areas where it did not have a choice (Schoppa 366). Finally, the author assumes that the variation in attitudes and additional concessions could be explained by the consideration of Japanese interests regarding the minimization in costs of adjustment (Schoppa 368). These assumptions coincide with the basic ideas of Putnams model stating that every international negotiation also presupposes the existence of two-level games with a chief negotiator who is obliged to communicate with representatives of other nations and domestic interest groups (Schoppa 370). In such a way, while he/she pursues national interests in the way he/she understands them, there is also the necessity to fall within the win-set to satisfy all actors inside a country (Schoppa 370). These become the central components of all international negotiations.

Reverberation Strategies

The work of the chief negotiator could also be complicated by the appearance of the opposition within multiple interest groups in the state. Schoppa states that traditionally, Level I negotiator (he/she who communicates at the international level) might count on domestic actors belonging to the opposition but who support his/her position and re ready to facilitate negotiations accepting the suggested measures (372). It obviously increases changes for acceptable outcomes and guarantees that all parties will make an agreement (Schoppa 372). If the international pressure organized by a particular country turns out to be efficient enough, these allies might become a majority which is called reverberation (Schoppa 372). In such a way, reverberation strategies are those focused on the affecting representatives of these groups of supporters with the primary aim to gather their support and ensure the success of negotiations. Regarding the case suggested in the article, reverberation strategies turn out to be an efficient tool as, under the impact of American pressure, some representatives of Japanese opposition reconsidered their attitudes to the suggested demands and agreed to concede with the primary aim to make a compromise and attain success in negotiations.

Synergistic Strategies

Participation Expansion

Speaking about strategies used during negotiations and relevant to the given case, the author also outlines participation expansion and alternative specification as two synergistic approaches not mentioned by Putnams model but still important for negotiations like this one. The fact is that in his two-level game approach, Putnam tries to take into account all factors impacting domestic policymaking such as legislation, interest groups, bureaucracy (Schoppa 374). However, he disregards the fact that outcomes depend on which potential policy actors are motivated to take part in the process (Schoppa 374).

In such a way, participation expansion becomes a new synergistic strategy suggested by Schoppa (374). It revolves around the idea that the parameters of negotiations could be altered by attracting new participants and increasing their number with the primary aim to reconsider the attitude to a contradictory issue (Schoppa 375). Using the case as the background to prove the efficiency of this strategy, Shoppa states that the expansion could occur at two levels (372). First of all, transforming a narrow domestic issue into a greater one, expanded elite-level participation could be achieved (Schoppa 376). Second, attracting media attention to some disregarded media issues, international negotiators could attain reconsideration of approaches to some aspects important for outcomes (Schoppa 376). The efficiency of this strategy is evidenced by Japans numerous concessions made under the impact of new agents that demonstrated their interest in diverse spheres.

Alternative Specification

At last, Schoppa points out an alternative specification as another strategy utilized during negotiations (378). He defines it as the chief negotiators attempt to affect policy outcomes in a particular country by influencing the process through which specific proposals might emerge in the given environment (Schoppa 380). As it can be seen from the given case, the given approach turns out to be an efficient tool of the international pressure as discussed issues become linked to recognized local problems and alter their nature (Schoppa 381). In such a way, using these two synergistic strategies, international agents acquire an opportunity to impact decision making at domestic levels and precondition the emergence of particular policies needed to attain success and make concessions that will satisfy both parties.

Perspectives on the Approach

The author concludes with the idea that the given study contributes to the further development of the two-level game approach and proves its utility regarding the global relations and their increased importance for the modern world. He also formulates conditions under which strategies suggested by him might be used by negotiators and international agents (Schoppa 385). For instance, the case demonstrates that if one of the parties to the agreement possesses specific levers of influence to organize an international pressure and alter the situation at the domestic level, it can easily explore the suggested strategies to attain enhanced results.

Conclusion

Altogether, the given article proves a significant role Putnams model plays in the world of policy. His idea of two-level game theory including level I and level II actors and specific strategies could still be applied to diverse cases to analyze all agents actions and motifs. Revolving around the same theory, Schoppa emphasizes a high utility of the given approach and its ability to assess international relations of different complexity. The concepts of reverberation strategies and win-sets remain applicable; however, the author also emphasizes the idea that additional synergistic strategies such as an alternative specification and participation expansion should be suggested. Using the case of U.S.-Japan negotiations as the background for the research, Schoppa demonstrates how using specific approaches to impact domestic group interests the USA managed to attain success and defend its position while Japan had to make concessions.

Work Cited

Schoppa, Leonard. “Two-Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why Gaiatsu Succeeds in Japan in Some Cases but not Others.” International Organization, vol, 47, no. 3, 1993, pp. 353-386. Web.

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