Leadership and National Oversight

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Background and Context
The Problems Affecting Congressional Oversight
Recommendations
Conclusion
References

Introduction

Congressional oversight helps to ensure that the Intelligence Community (IC) remains accountable to the society and abides by American laws. This paper will examine the problems that make this monitoring less effective. In particular, much attention should be given to the increasing politicization of intelligence, conflicts of legislators with the executive branch, and lack of resources. It is also essential to offer recommendations that will be useful in addressing these issues. Overall, a proper strategy for overcoming potential difficulties will emphasize the rules of information sharing as well as the ethical norms that should be followed by the members of oversight committees; moreover, it will be focused on providing resources required for monitoring the work of the IC.

Background and Context

The relationships between intelligence agencies and legislators have changed considerably during the twentieth century. In the fifties and sixties, American policy-makers were mostly reluctant to supervise the work of the IC even though they had the authority to do it (Kaufman, 2015). This authority is premised on the U.S. Constitution that describes the actions that the Congress is allowed to take (Lowenthal, 2014). They believed that that the secrecy of these organizations had been essential for their proper performance. However, the situation changed dramatically in the seventies when it was discovered that the IC agencies could often abuse their power (Kaufman, 2015).

For instance, sometimes, they could violate the constitutional rights of American citizens and break various laws. Therefore, policy-makers stressed the necessity to ensure the accountability and transparency of the IC. This tendency culminated in the adoption of the Intelligence Oversight Act that required the IC to report their actions to the Congress and the Senate (Kaufman, 2015). These legal changes helped legislators to understand the problems and needs of the IC.

While discussing the challenges to congressional oversight, one has to identify the factors that impact this process. Firstly, it should be mentioned that the IC is primarily accountable to the executive branch of the government. Moreover, the executive branch can often determine what kind of information can or cannot be disclosed. Hence, the effectiveness of congressional oversight depends on the degree of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of the government.

One should also recognize the significance of political interests affecting the decisions of people who monitor the work of different intelligence agencies. Finally, congressional oversight requires expertise, time, and personnel. If these prerequisites are absent, the cooperation between the IC and legislators will not be effective. These issues will be vital for identifying the challenges to congressional oversight.

The Problems Affecting Congressional Oversight

Unresponsiveness of the Executive Branch

Among the barriers to effective congressional oversight, one can distinguish the unwillingness of the executive branch to share information with legislators. The President can sometimes conceal certain information from the committees representing either the Senate or the Congress (Jensen, McElreath, & Graves, 2017). There are legal requirements according to which legislators are allowed to receive information about American intelligence agencies.

Nevertheless, the President can interpret this requirement in such a way that best suits the needs of the executive branch. In particular, he/she can disclose these data only to the so-called Gang of Eight or a small group of eight people representing the Congress and the Senate (Jensen et al., 2017). The main problem is that these data will not be given to the oversight committees. On the whole, the executive branch can create obstacles that will prevent legislators from learning more about the covert operations of intelligence agencies. Due to this issue, policy-makers will not gain in-depth insights into the work of the IC. More important, they will be unable to reach valid conclusions and make informed decisions.

The Politicization of Intelligence

Another important problem that should be considered is the politicization of intelligence. This term can be defined as the attempts to manipulate the work of intelligence agencies to achieve certain political objectives (Bar-Joseph, 2013). For instance, it is possible that the representatives of some parties may try to use the information from the IC to criticize their political opponents (Agrell & Treverton, 2015).

Moreover, they can apply these data to strengthen their position in the governmental hierarchy. If such practices are widely adopted, no effective oversight will be possible. In all likelihood, legislators will only focus on the details that will help them become more influential. However, they may overlook critical problems impacting intelligence agencies. In the long run, the representatives of the IC will become reluctant to share any information with oversight committees. Moreover, the Senate and the Congress will not make any significant improvements in the functioning of intelligence agencies.

Lack of Resources

Proper congressional oversight is possible only if legislators have adequate resources. At first, much attention should be paid to the presence of staffers who have the necessary security clearances. These people will help the members of congressional committees conduct research and investigate various questions related to the work of the IC. Furthermore, these people should receive appropriate training in congressional oversight. For instance, the new members of committees should be mentored by more experienced legislators. If these opportunities are not available, the work of legislators will not produce any positive outcomes. Most likely, they will not gain any real insights into important questions.

Recommendations

Potential conflicts with the President can be resolved by adopting the regulations that set the rules of information sharing between different branches of the government. In particular, policy-makers should enact the laws requiring the President to inform oversight committees about significant operations of the IC. This requirement should apply to the cases when the constitutional rights of American citizens may be infringed.

Furthermore, it should extend to the situations in which covert operations of the IC may come in conflict with existing laws. These details should not be disclosed only to the Gang of Eight; they must also be revealed to the oversight committees. Overall, this step will ensure that legislators can get a complete idea about the operations conducted by the IC. Furthermore, they are vital for making the decisions that will stop potential malpractices.

The problem of politicization requires several interventions related to the recruitment of committee members and the norms that these people should follow. Firstly, it is crucial to develop procedures for selecting the members of oversight committees. The preference should be given to individuals with a background in the military or intelligence. Such candidates are more likely to understand the problems influencing the IC.

Additionally, they are usually more willing to ensure that the political interests of certain individuals and groups do not impact the work of intelligence agencies. Finally, it is vital to establish the rules emphasizing the unacceptability of using the IC to promote certain political interests. Every person, who attempts to act in this way, should be removed from the oversight committee. Such precautions will significantly decrease the risk of politicization and make the activities of legislators more impartial.

Finally, the committees should identify what they need to monitor the work of the IC. For instance, legislators should determine how many staffers they will require to investigate various operations of intelligence agencies. Moreover, they should outline what information resources are needed. This argument is particularly relevant to those individuals who are new to the oversight committees. In their turn, the Senate and the Congress should support these initiatives. Such a step will ensure that every person, who is responsible for monitoring the IC, can quickly acquire relevant knowledge. In the long run, the effectiveness of oversight committees will improve.

Conclusion

Effective congressional oversight requires several pre-requisites, namely, clear rules of sharing information, professional integrity of governmental officials, and human resources. There are several obstacles that impair the effectiveness of congressional oversight; among these barriers, one can distinguish the politicization of intelligence, conflicts with the executive power, insufficient staffing, and lack of relevant knowledge.

Several approaches will be useful in addressing potential problems; for instance, it is vital to establish the regulations specifying the cases when the executive branch of the government is obliged to disclose confidential information to legislators. Such interventions will ensure that oversight committees can accurately assess the needs and problems of the IC. Furthermore, they will reduce the risk of political conflicts that often threaten the integrity of intelligence agencies.

References

Agrell, W., & Treverton, G. (2015). National intelligence and science: Beyond the great divide in analysis and policy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Bar-Joseph, U. (2013). The politicization of intelligence: A comparative study. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 26(2), 347–369.

Jensen, K., McElreath, D., & Graves, M. (2017). Introduction to intelligence studies (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Kaufman, S. (Ed.). (2015). A companion to Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.

Lowenthal, M. (2014). Intelligence: From secrets to policy (6th ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press.

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