Cases Brief on Fire Scene Investigation

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Aim & Objectives
Case Briefs
Discussion
Conclusion
References

Introduction

A fire causes loss of property, sometimes lives, and it is necessary to know where to put the blame in case such a tragedy strikes. Thus, an investigation of a fire scene is routinely conducted to determine the origin and cause of the incident, with fire scene investigators generally out to ascertain if the blaze was intentionally set or not. Those unfamiliar with fire scene case law assume that fire investigators are empowered at any time to search through the ashes, seize any evidence, and once they find prima facie evidence of arson they have an open-and-shut case against the guilty parties. This paper discusses two landmark cases that show fire investigation as a difficult and complex procedure, such that the successful prosecution of what could otherwise be strong cases of arson can be frustrated by legal technicalities such as the need to secure consent and warrant before any search-and-seizure operation. The first case, Michigan v Tyler 436 US 499 (1978), is considered a landmark case in fire scene investigation when the US Supreme Court ruled that the damning arson evidence gathered after the fire had been put out is inadmissible in court. The decision in Tyler was restated in Michigan v Clifford 464 US 287 (1984) as the Court clarified its earlier ruling that even administrative searches require a warrant. In the process, the Supreme Court redefined administrative searches as a concept that allows fire investigators to enter a fire scene without a judge-issued warrant only for the purpose of determining the cause and origin of the blaze.

Aim & Objectives

A study of the Tyler and Clifford case briefs will make a valuable learning exercise on why fire investigation is considered the most difficult of forensic disciplines, which is believed more complicated than other types of a criminal investigations. In homicide, for example, investigators proceed on the knowledge that a crime has been committed whereas in fire investigation it is not known at the outset if there was arson. According to DeHaan (2006), fire investigation calls for knowledge not only of fire science but also of construction, electricity, chemistry, automotive, structural engineering, psychology, and human behavior, etc.

Discussion of the two precedent-setting cases on fire scene investigation is also expected to yield practical lessons on why entire cases of arson have been lost due to violation of a person’s right against “unreasonable search and seizure” as guaranteed under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution. The problem is especially pronounced in arson investigation, which calls for a search of the fire scene that is unnecessary in most criminal cases. Even if a fire scene search found arson evidence if it violated that right, a defendant will seek to suppress that evidence which then prevents the successful prosecution of arson. The reason is that without this evidence, the prosecutors cannot establish a corpus delicti (Burnette Jr., undated).

Case Briefs

Michigan v Tyler 436 US 499 (1978)

Records of the case show that shortly before midnight on January 21, 1970, the furniture store “Tyler’s Auction” owned by Loren Tyler and associate Robert Tompkins in Oakland County, Michigan caught fire. By 2 a.m. the responding firemen had the blaze under control and were hosing down the embers when Fire Chief See and Assistant Fire Chief Somerville arrived at the fire scene, during which they were informed that responding firefighters noticed two suspicious plastic cans in the debris. With neither the shop owner’s consent nor a search warrant, Fire Chief See and his assistant entered the shop through the haze and steam to examine the cans, which turned out to be containers of flammable material (Case Law1, online). Suspecting arson, the fire chief reported to the police and Detective Webb arrived at 3:30 a.m. While the fire chief poked around, the detective proceeded to take photographs but both activities were discouraged by the smoke and steam that still hung heavily over the scene so they gave up at 4 a.m. with the intention of returning later. The fire chief and his assistant returned at 8 a.m., looked around briefly, and left only to come back at 9. a.m. to conduct a more exhaustive search. This time they claimed to have found evidence of arson, after which they returned to the fire scene repeatedly to confirm the suspicion – four days after the blaze, seven days later, and the last visit was on February 16 or 25 days later. All these post-fire search-and-seizure operations, which were conducted without any consent or warrant, yielded pieces of evidence that were used to secure a conviction for arson against the defendants in the trial court. This verdict was later upheld by the Michigan Court of Appeals. Both the trial court and state court of appeals were reversed on appeal by the Michigan Supreme Court, which ordered a retrial after it decided that all pieces of evidence found after the fire was extinguished at 4 a.m. were unconstitutional because of the absence of consent or warrant. This decision was also affirmed by the US Supreme Court, which declares that the entire search was illegal such that the evidence taken from the furniture shop was inadmissible. In the 7-1 decision, the Court said warrantless search and seizure of arson evidence can be done only during the fire-fighting operation and soon after the flame has been doused. Thus, the subsequent re-entries to the fire scene were deemed illegal because they were not based on a consent or search warrant.

Michigan v Clifford 464 US 287 (1984)

At 5:40 a.m. on October 18, 1980, a fire broke out at the residence of spouses Raymond and Emma Clifford in Detroit while the couple was out of town on a camping trip. Responding firefighters took just three hours to control the blaze and by 7:04 a.m., the fire scene was cleared of firemen and equipment. Soon after, a team from the insurance company of the Cliffords descended into the scene to preserve any remaining valuables based on a request made by the couple upon learning of the fire. The insurance people were thus working the fire scene when two arson investigators arrived and conducted their own search. The investigators found and seized a number of Coleman fuel containers, one in the driveway and the others in the basement. Also found in the basement where a crockpot and a timer with attached wires. Suspicions of arson were also raised by what investigators saw at the fire scene – picture frames and all sorts of decorations were removed from the walls, there were only old clothes in the bedroom dressers, and there were video cassettes and tapes but no deck or machine. The search-and-seizure operations were conducted without a consent or warrant. So when the Cliffords were prosecuted for arson based on the damning evidence, the couple sought to suppress all this evidence, contending that the search for it was conducted for the purpose of gathering criminal evidence, which requires a warrant. The trial court rejected this argument and handed out a guilty verdict, after which the Cliffords went to the Michigan Court of Appeals. In reversing the trial court decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals said there were no “exigent circumstances” that could justify the warrantless search (Case Law2). The state contested this finding and filed for certiorari with the US Supreme Court, arguing that the intrusions into the Clifford residence after the fire were reasonable because it was an administrative investigation that is exempted from the warrant requirement. In effect, the state asked the Supreme Court to exempt from warrant requirement all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of a fire (Case law2). The highest court declined the request, saying that any search of the property is governed by the warrant requirement under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments except for such cases as 1) there is legitimate privacy of interests in fire-damaged property as defined in the Fourth Amendment; 2) government intrusion is justified by the existence of exigent circumstances; and 3) the search is intended to determine the cause of fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity.

Discussion

The prosecution in both cases sought to justify the warrantless searches and seizures through the administrative search concept, contending that all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of fire are exempted from the warrant requirement. This argument was shot down by the Supreme Court in Tyler as it did earlier in See v City of Seattle 387 US 541(1967), Camara v Municipal Court 387 US 523 (1967), and Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc. 436 US 307 (1978). Another legal argument invoked by the prosecution to bolster its cases but was dismissed by the Court is the theory of exigent circumstances, saying that in Vale v Louisiana 399 US 30 (1970) a warrantless search-and-seizure was allowed because it was conducted when the suspect was about to destroy evidence. In another case, a warrantless search-and-seizure was justified because the police officer involved had good reason to believe that someone might break into the suspect’s car and take or use a firearm hidden in the trunk (Cady v Dombrowski 413 US 433 (1977)). The Supreme Court indicated that the theory of exigent circumstances did not apply to the two cases since investigators returned to the fire scene at a later time for the purpose of proving the crime of arson. This is based on criminal probable cause, which requires a warrant (DeHaan, 2006). The Court then invoked the theory of reasonable privacy interests to conclude that the search-and-seizure operations in both Tyler and Clifford fall short of the legal requirement. In justifying its decision in Tyler the Court said the razed shop retained a reasonable privacy interests in that after a fire private effects remain in the damaged premises. The same argument holds in Clifford where the defendants arranged with their insurance company to secure their personal belongings that can be salvaged from the fire. Therefore, the post-fire investigations in both cases were subject to the warrant requirement.

Conclusion

Under the theory of exigent circumstances, we have learned that warrantless searches and seizures are justified when these are intended to response to an emergency. Evidence obtained without a warrant during an emergency situation is admissible in court, but if that emergency has passed and additional searches are made, a search warrant is required. In the two cases, the investigators involved never obtained a consent or search warrant for a search and seizure operation even during the actual fire. If these requirements were met, the investigators could have pinned the crime of arson on the respondents. All the efforts of the investigators would not have been wasted and the courts would have upheld such a conviction. Because of legal technicalities, the outcome of what could be prima facie cases of arson came to naught which seemed to contradict the interests of justice. As the saying goes, however, the law may be harsh but it is the law. In the two cases, searches and seizures are deemed unreasonable and illegal if done after the fact. It is important to note that in both cases the Supreme Court allowed the use of evidence gathered during the actual emergency situation except those seized after.

References

Burnette Jr., G.E. (undated). “Documentation of the Fire Scene: A Legal Perspective.” Webpage design (online).
Case Law1. “Michigan v Tyler 436 US 499 (1978).” Webpage design (online). Web.
Case Law2. “Michigan v Clifford 464 US 287 (1984).” Webpage design (online).
Dehaan, J.D. (2006). “Kirk”s Fire Investigation.” 6^th ed., Prentice Hall.

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