The Exclusionary Rule and the “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” Doctrine

NB: We do not resell your papers. Upon ordering, we do an original paper exclusively for you.

NB: All your data is kept safe from the public.

William Ellis’s lawyer will likely seek to have all evidence obtained by police from William’s bedroom excluded. Police obtained a blood fingerprint from the defendant’s room and were able to match the fingerprint to the defendant and the blood to the victim. Ellis’s lawyer will likely have several lines of attack against the physical evidence. First of all, the police never obtained permission from the defendant to search his bedroom. The argument here is that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bedrooms. People do not expect that the police will be able to search through their bedrooms without their consent. It is true that the townhouse the defendant shares with his mother was a crime scene since the deceased victim was found in a walk-in closet in the townhouse. However, there is no indication that this walk-in closet was in the defendant’s bedroom.

The prosecution will likely argue that consent from the defendant was not required (as will be discussed in more detail below) since the defendant does not pay rent for the house. However, there is no indication that the defendant’s mother ever consented to the search of her son’s bedroom either. In addition, a fingerprint is not evidence that police could have spotted it in plain view when walking by the defendant’s bedroom. If the police had seen a knife lying on the defendant’s bed, for example, they would clearly have had probable cause to search his bedroom. Here, though, police simply went into the bedroom and started searching for fingerprints.

Ellis’s attorney will likely not have any grounds to exclude evidence obtained from the Stevens home. Mrs. Stevens gave the police consent to search her house. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine will be discussed in more detail below, but for the purposes of this discussion, there is no reason to believe police needed any evidence from the defendant’s bedroom in order to obtain evidence from the Stevens home. Police would have had access to the victim’s blood for DNA purposes with or without the search in Ellis’s bedroom. It is true that they would not have been able to match the blood to the defendant’s fingerprint without the bedroom search, but the fingerprint is a separate matter. The evidence from the Stevens home stands by itself.

The prosecution will argue that it has several legal justifications to uphold the search of the defendant’s bedroom. The prosecution’s strongest argument is that it had probable cause that the search would help them obtain evidence of a crime. In this case, the victim’s wife told police that the defendant had entered her home unannounced on several occasions and that the victim appeared to be getting in her bed on one occasion. The defendant’s lawyer would likely argue that these accusations, even if believed, are evidence of burglary or attempted sexual assault rather than murder. However, probable cause only requires a “common-sense” belief that incriminating evidence may be found. Dumbra v. the United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925). Probable cause also does not require evidence that the defendant committed the exact same crime that they are accused of. It merely requires evidence that would cause a normal person to believe the defendant committed a crime. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Here, the information provided by Mrs. Stevens likely did establish probable cause that the defendant committed a crime.

The prosecution will also argue that the defendant did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom. Clearly, a person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own house or apartment. However, in this case, the defendant did not live in his own apartment. He was essentially a guest at his mother’s townhouse since he lived there without paying rent. For several reasons, this argument will likely not be successful. First of all, cases in some jurisdictions have held that adult children do have an expectation of privacy in their parents’ house. State v. Vinuya, 32 P.3d 116 (2001). Beyond that, the police never obtained permission from the defendant’s mother to search her son’s bedroom before she was taken to the hospital. Because of this, the probable cause argument is likely a stronger justification for the search than the argument that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom.

The exclusionary rule is intended to bar evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s 4^th Amendment rights from being used against that defendant at trial. The exclusionary rule applies to the states as well as to the federal government. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Evidence police obtain through impermissible searches and seizures is excluded under the rule. Police generally need either a search warrant or probable cause to believe a crime has been committed. The exclusionary rule has often been criticized. Critics contend that it makes no sense to let defendants (in many cases, obviously guilty defendants) go free because of mistakes by police. Opponents of the rule also claim that many mistakes by police are simply honest mistakes, rather than deliberate attempts to violate a defendant’s constitutional rights. On the other hand, supporters of the rule argue that it is necessary to deter police from conducting illegal searches and seizures and using that evidence against defendants at trial.

In this case, the exclusionary rule would probably not apply to the fingerprint evidence obtained from the defendant’s bedroom. Although the police did not have a search warrant or consent to search the bedroom, they did likely have probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime. The victim’s wife had accused the defendant of entering their house on several occasions and of trying to get into her bed. This gives rise to an inference that the defendant wished harm on the couple. In addition, the deceased victim was found in the townhouse that the defendant shares with his mother. These two facts combined established probable cause for the police to search the defendant’s bedroom.

The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine bars evidence obtained as a result of other evidence obtained illegally from being admitted into evidence against a defendant at trial. In contrast to the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained by the fruit of the poisonous tree is often obtained perfectly legally by itself. However, this evidence is still inadmissible if police are only led to it by previously obtained illegal evidence. For example, if police beat and torture a suspect into admitting where a murder weapon is, they will not be able to admit that murder weapon into evidence against the defendant at trial. Even if police obtain a search warrant for the area the weapon is found, they still would not have found the weapon without illegally obtained evidence. The Supreme Court has held that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply in cases where the police would have inevitably found the evidence anyway. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). It also does not apply in cases where police discovered the evidence on their own, without any connection to illegally obtained evidence.

In this case, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine probably does not apply. First of all, police obtained Mrs. Stevens’ consent to search her house, and it appears from the facts that they obtained this consent before they even searched the defendant’s bedroom. The defendant can hardly argue that police would not have thought to search the home of a murder victim for evidence without the fingerprint they obtained from his bedroom. In addition, doing a DNA analysis of the victim’s blood is something that police will normally do in any homicide case. If any evidence is to be excluded in this case, it would have to be the fingerprint obtained from the defendant’s bedroom under the exclusionary rule. The other evidence obtained by police, in this case, is evidence they would have discovered anyway. This evidence is not excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

Even if the fingerprint obtained from the defendant’s bedroom is ultimately deemed admissible at trial, investigators could have taken additional steps to ensure that there would be no 4^th Amendment issues. Police should have asked the defendant’s mother for her consent to search her entire home, as they did with the victim’s wife. It is true that they did not have much time to ask her since she was taken to the hospital shortly after they arrived. However, asking her for permission to search the house immediately after they arrived would have solved the problem. As an occupant and sole rent-payer of her house, she probably has the authority to consent to a search of her entire home – including the defendant’s bedroom. Even though police likely had probable cause to search the bedroom anyways, asking the defendant’s mother for permission to search the entire house would have saved them a lot of trouble.

Works Cited

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).

Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925).

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).

State v. Vinuya, 32 P.3d 116 (2001).

Click Here To Order Now!

The Exclusionary Rule and the “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” Doctrine

Do you need this or any other assignment done for you from scratch?

We have qualified writers to help you.

We assure you a quality paper that is 100% free from plagiarism and AI.

You can choose either format of your choice ( Apa, Mla, Havard, Chicago, or any other)