Transnational Organized Crime in Port Security Operations

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Table of Contents

Abstract
Introduction
Literature Review
Methodology
Analysis and Findings
Conclusions and Recommendations
References

Abstract

Seaports are an essential infrastructure for the international commercial and transportation network. There are approximately 360 international ports in the United States, processing 95% of global cargo. Ports have historically been an intimate part of urban environments and a place where trade, commerce have manifested alongside theft, smuggling, and violence. Ports are closely associated with organized crime as they serve as key entry and exit points for shipments and are notoriously difficult to police and secure. Security in ports is a difficult task due to the constant flow of shipments with different infrastructure and facility belonging to various owners, each with different interests.

This paper seeks to answer the research question, to what extent is transnational organized crime present in U.S. seaports and what measures and their effectiveness have been used by port security operations to mitigate illicit activities conducted by such groups? Findings indicate a complex intertwined relationship between organized crime and modern port structures and operations. Transnational organized crime manifests in seaports across three primary trajectories of trafficking through the port, infiltration of the port structure and economy, and governance of the port management.

Security measures can be effective through targeted measures at addressing trafficking and infiltration but remains unproductive due to issues in collaboration between private and public security, structural barriers, and lack of resources. Recommendations include addressing policy towards greater inter-agency cooperation and provision of law enforcement resources as well as removing structural barriers that protect transnational organized crime in seaports.

Introduction

Seaports are an essential infrastructure for the international commercial and transportation network. There are approximately 360 international ports in the United States, processing 95% of global cargo being imported and exported into the country, worth $700 billion on an annual basis (Tomer & Kane, 2015). The importance of port security in protecting the economic stability of the country and key sources of supplies cannot be understated. However, shipping is also used in many areas for illegal operations by international and local organized crime groups. Shipping can be used for trafficking of illicit drugs, weapons and arms, and even humans or rare animals. Organized crime operates within the realm of government security agencies and port security authorities through infiltration, corruption, and even complex means such as cyber-attacks (Sergi, 2020).

In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, one of the major security measures developed and implemented were the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) which was meant to greatly increase ship and port security. The primary focus was aimed at terrorism which has been sufficiently reduced, but organized crime took the opportunity to hide illegal activities under the guise of regular functioning of maritime commerce (Lantsman,2017). The ISPS has not been effective in reducing organized crime which has used the complexity and logistics, both physical and systems, of modern seaports to avoid port security activities.

The research question for this paper states: To what extent is transnational organized crime present in U.S. seaports and what measures and their effectiveness have been used by port security operations to mitigate illicit activities conducted by such groups?

The researcher hypothesizes that transnational criminal activity in U.S. seaports is extensive, making up at least 10% of the seaport commercial traffic while port security operations are unsuccessful in identifying and persecuting illicit activity at a consistent and effective level as there are no mechanisms to mitigate the complexity utilized by organized crime.

Literature Review

Ports have historically been an intimate part of urban environments and a place where trade, commerce have manifested alongside theft, smuggling, and violence. In the modern world, ports are vital to international trade and economic prosperity of countries. However, they also serve as spaces where informal governance is shared among different actors and entities, with a net of social behaviors, both licit and illicit, forming what is known as the ‘port economy’ (Bottalico, 2019).

Ports are closely associated with organized crime as they serve as key entry and exit points for shipments and are notoriously difficult to police and secure. Security in ports is a difficult task due to the constant flow of shipments with different infrastructure and facility belonging to various owners, each with different interests. Port security must take into account the privatization of port management, and subsequently privatization of security as well. The complex intertwining networks within the port economy create pressure on operational coordination for law enforcement, national security agencies, and security providers (Sergi, 2020).

The largest commercial ports are vulnerable to smuggling and organized crime activity due to volume of container traffic processed. It reduces the possibility of contraband being identified and seized. Furthermore, ports are conduits to illicit activity as they are usually located in host cities with established and complex organized crime groups (Public Safety Canada, 2018). Organized crime has two primary uses for marine commercial ports.

The first is profit-oriented crimes which generate revenue, such as trafficking of drugs and counterfeit goods as well as cargo theft. The second is tactical support to facilitate their profit-oriented crimes, including corruption or intimidation of workers, industry insiders, and security personnel. According to Sergi and Storti (2020), there is rarely just a financial motivation behind criminality in ports, there are also socioeconomic explanations as ports are a stand-alone urban space which can be a base for a wide range of criminal and even terrorist activities.

Since 2001, a range of security initiatives and policies have been implemented in the U.S. focused on seaports and shipping security. The security frameworks include the ISPS Code, the Maritime Transportation Safety Act of 2002 (MTSA), and SAFE Ports Act of 2006.

However, the majority of these initiatives were focused on anti-terrorism measures. For example, the SAFE Ports Act provided the Coast Guard more responsibility to address port vulnerability, with a focus on risk factors which may cause attacks on facilities and major loss of life. Similarly, MTSA assessment of facilities sought to determine the extent that incidents may cause infrastructure damage and loss of life (Lantsman, 2017). As a result, the regulatory attention and policy have been pushed away from daily use of ports by organized criminal networks which primarily operate in illicit trade and do not seek to disrupt international shipment routes or cause major losses of life.

Methodology

The primary methodology used for this research was content analysis. Textual evidence from a variety of primary (government publications, news, interviews) and secondary sources (research papers, dissertations, books) was gathered, coded, analyzed, and processed. The research focused on two primary themes identified in the research question:

the extent of transnational crime and illicit activities in ports;
port security operations in preventing or mitigating illicit activity and their effectiveness.

There was also evidence explored regarding the future and actions being undertaken in policy, security measures, law enforcement activities, or otherwise to increase mitigation of transnational crime in ports. Evidence was coded by the researcher based on the scheme that best fit their research and analysis needs. No computer coding or statistical analysis was used. As used in qualitative content analysis, an inductive grounded theory approach was applied, with the research question guiding the sampling and coding of evidence (Ward, 2012).

Content analysis has a limitation of not being able to draw strong cause-and-effect conclusions. Therefore, it may be difficult to gauge on the exact relationship and interactions between transnational crime and security operations. There is also the limitation that much about the extent of the illicit activities remains unknown, only estimated based on successful operations and law enforcement investigative activities. Similarly, the full range of security operations, their effectiveness, and how compromised they may be are speculative and data may remain hidden as to the current status quo due to national security risks. In other words, one of the main limitations of the research conducted as it is purely speculative and cannot conclusively draw the connections and cause-and-effect relationships due to the many constraining factors.

Analysis and Findings

Since primarily existing research has been used for this paper, the data analysis method utilized was secondary data analysis. Secondary analysis is defined as forming conclusions or knowledge additional to or different from the already existing evidence presented in the investigation to learn what is already known and what remains to be learned about a topic (Johnston, 2014). It allows evaluating the information in terms of when, how, and what information was collected and comparing it to other studies. Qualitative secondary data analysis helps draw conclusions and offers an introspection on a topic in a meaningful and structured manner.

Through research of transnational organized crime, seaport security, and preventive measures, it helped to gain an understanding and bridge a gap in literature of the current existing status quo and potential factors which inadvertently would allow unauthorized access to restricted seaport infrastructure for illicit activities.

Findings

International government and law enforcement agencies ranging from the UN to Interpol have identified a link between organized crime and key transit points and major transportation hubs, with large seaports being particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Transnational organized crime thrives in ports as the probability of trafficked goods and illicit activities being intercepted is low due to the volume of processed traffic and complexity of structures.

International organized crime has established footholds in and surrounding seaports, using domestic influence to ensure support of their operations. Some of these activities include corruption and intimidation of workers and management critical to port operations and storage activities in port terminals (Europol, 2021). The findings indicate that international organized crime can be seen in seaports across three primary methods of trafficking illicit goods, infiltration of the port structure and economy, and governance of the management structures.

In regard to trafficking, drugs are the primary product being shipped and on which authorities focus. However, a range of other products is shipped, including excise goods such as illegal tobacco and foods. Meanwhile, outbound trafficking includes waste products shipped to avoid paying expensive duties. Counter-trafficking efforts are centered around and dependent on the layout of the port. Security plans focus on environmental design and situational crime prevention techniques to “monitor, control, and ban access” to illicit trafficking (Sergi, 2020).

For infiltration, it is important to consider that the various segments of the port economy are opportunities for organized crime. Criminal and business networks typically intercept inside the port and locally, making seaports a grey area of both legal and illegal economic activity. Organized crime attempts to infiltrate the port economy and services, using the business and private companies in the port. For example, transport companies are utilized to conceal and support trafficking by infiltration of the supply chain.

There is also the opportunity of contracts at the port ranging from construction to catering that is used for illicit activities or as cover-ups and money laundering to domestic affiliates of these large crime organizations. Policing against infiltration is difficult but involves careful oversight over contracts and considering the port economy as a space for opportunities that organized crime capitalizes on within local cities. Existing criminal networks and corrupted economic networks in harbor cities are likely connected to the port economy and ensure there is access to it (Sergi, 2020).

Similar to that of economic opportunities, ports are territories where various actors seek to gain influence for the economic and political power, thus increasing their profit through legal and illegal means. In the context of a port city, governance is exemplified in two ways. First, it can be authority over political and economic processes of the port, management, and administration (the legal way). Second, governance can mean establishing permanent control over illegal activities ongoing through the port. The relationship between private terminals governed by actors controlled or affiliated with organized crime and public authorities is confrontational when it comes to port security. Terminals seek to boost economic activity and productivity, while law enforcement seeks to disrupt crime. As private companies are tenants in ports, they perceive public law enforcement presence as a disruption and intrusion (Sergi, 2020).

Security at ports is an invisible part of daily life, as most everyone working there accepts it. Port security consists of a group of institutions which to differing degrees engage in policing and securing port territory. There are entities including security managers, police forces, special agents, special units, and sometimes outside forces such as Coast Guard being present. They have learned to work cooperatively and trust one another. For authorities, personal contacts are key to upholding the existence of a ‘port community’ where there is an informality of continuous relationships. The port community operates based on exclusion and inclusion of contacts which contributes to order, helps to adapt quickly to surroundings (Sergi & Storti, 2020).

Ports are essentially marketplaces, handling thousands of ships and containers daily, functioning under the principles of efficient productivity and fast-paced business. Ports are a space for global trade, regulated by needs of the market, which is why most are operated by private companies looking to make ports wide open and outward looking. There is an inherent push for economic growth, with recorded revenues and streamlined bureaucratized supply chains that monitor various indicators including speed and cost of loading, storage, transport, cargo handling, support services. As a result of this, security in port communities has become costs factored in by these companies.

However, at its core, security greatly slows down business. For security and government agencies, it remains a choice between facilitation of business and border protection. Security slows down all processes, and it affects the bottom line of major corporations, which can then pressure the government. The reality is that the facilitation and acceleration of movement of cargo and passengers both ways is always the most important (Sergi & Storti, 2020). Security remains a cost and a nuisance for most, and it becomes harder to find balance the two, which organized crime has deeply exploited.

Due to the sheer volume of global shipping, of over 50 million containers from the three largest shipping giants, it is difficult to even estimate the extent of illicit trafficking. At best, authorities in ports can check between 1 and 5 percent of all containers in respective seaports (Sinclair, 2021).

However, even then, tons of drugs worth multiple billions of dollars are seized each year. CBP with its Office of Field Operations is the lead agency for border security issues at and between ports of entry. In fiscal year 2020, CBP seized “42,645 pounds of cocaine, 5,222 pounds of heroin, 324,973 pounds of marijuana, 156,901 pounds of methamphetamine, and 3,967 pounds of fentanyl” (Sinclair, 2021). It is indicative that despite a majority of shipping carrying legitimate goods for global trade, illicit trafficking through seaports is at a scale that most people do not realize, and policing or customs agencies cannot realistically address on their own.

One of the primary issues to security and crime control in ports is the nature of port governance mentioned earlier. The majority of large ports are ‘land-lord’ ports, with private companies leasing the land and infrastructure from the government for decades, building up their competitive business. There are complex governance structures, with the owners of the facilities, private companies with a lease are tenants, while their clients are admissible guests (Sergi et al, 2021. For security to be effective, it requires cooperation between public agencies (law enforcement and state authority) and private companies.

The biggest challenge in the context of the complex governance structures is information sharing across various platforms and stakeholders. Law enforcement is considered ‘outsiders,’ so they struggle to establish channels of consistent and trustful communication with the private companies and their security teams (Lantsman, 2017). The three primary barriers to this are:

Cooperation issues – different or competing priorities for companies and agencies attempting to police and secure ports;
Coordination problems – overlapping jurisdictions and mandates, different approaches to investigation and policing among security or law enforcement agencies;
Privacy concerns – inconsistency or incompatibility regarding data sharing approaches or privacy protocols (Sergi et al., 2021).

Conclusions and Recommendations

It is evident based on the findings that transnational organized crime is deeply integrated into seaports at every level. The system is so deeply corrupted, benefiting a wide range of individuals and entities both legal and illegal, inside and outside the port grounds, that it is deeply concerning since eliminating organized crime is seemingly impossible. Marine ports are vulnerable to organized crime based on a wide range of factors such as traffic volume, reduced chance of inspection, and existing storage protocols (domestic, international, and empty containers are permitted to be stored within the same compound). Seaports also maintain complex and challenging physical layouts and spatial characteristics which contribute to the difficulty of security and enforcement measures (Sergi, 2020).

Organized crime activities are permanent and widespread throughout all major ports in every country in the world. The crime groups operate in illegal business, primarily illegal trafficking of drugs, counterfeit goods, and humans. These criminal organizations evolve with time as well, no longer following the traditional ethnic-cultural hierarchies (i.e. Italian mafia, Irish, etc). They have grown to be increasingly diverse and inclusive, incorporating both port workers and outside supply chain participants of various backgrounds, many of them not directly involved in the mafia (Sergi & Storti, 2020). There is also a simultaneous ongoing process of specialization in illegal markets and diversification in seaports.

Therefore, as organized crime evolves, the more sophisticated and difficult it becomes to counter through security operations. To answer the first part of the research question, the extent of organized crime presence in seaports is extensive and far-reaching, present at virtually every level of workers, management, and even security itself, utilizing multiple methods to avoid being captured and trafficking illicit goods through the seaport.

Some security and enforcement measures have been successful. These include traditional intelligence gathering and risk-based targeting. It is also possible to use technology-based inspection or manual searches, both have led to multiple seizures of trafficked goods. The primary issue is that expanding these working measures is limited by available resources and financing. To increase the availability and efficient use of resources, inter-agency cooperation is recommended. Formal and informal cooperation between law enforcement agencies, Coast Guard, customs and border control, and the private security of port-based firms can lead to successful outcomes (Public Safety Canada, 2018).

Nevertheless, research and evidence indicate that current methods and resources are insufficient in terms of the scope of organized criminal activity that goes on in seaports to make meaningful impact or mitigate illicit activity at a large scale.

Therefore, to answer the second part of the research question, the measures utilized by security operations are not effective at combatting the core of organized crime in seaports. At most, these operations can disrupt and slow down illicit trafficking and activities, causing significant financial damage to the criminal organizations. However, eliminating these criminal structures or bringing key actors to justice is an extremely rare occasion for law enforcement despite the extent of the penetration of organized crime in port structures being well-known

The primary recommendations to address this is through policy which would provide greater resources and establish formal resources of domestic interagency and international inter-governmental cooperation to focus on the issue. Policy has been effective to focus and largely eliminate terrorist threats in marine and seaport contexts (Lantsman, 2017). While this situation is more complex, frameworks for strategic interventions and missions to combat transnational organized crime at sea and in ports can be effective in the long-term with appropriate level of support and financing from government structures.

References

Bottalico, A. (2019). Towards a common trajectory of port labour systems in Europe? The case of the port of Antwerp. Case Studies on Transport Policy, 8(2), 311-321. Web.

Europol. (2020). The use of violence by organized crime groups. Web.

Johnston, M. P. (2014). Secondary data analysis: A method of which the time has come. Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Libraries, 3, 619-626. Web.

Lantsman, L. (2017). Seaport vulnerability to criminal networks: A mixed method approach to measuring criminological vulnerability in the top 30 U.S. container ports [Graduate Thesis]. CUNY Academic Works. Web.

Public Safety Canada. (2018). Organized Crime Research Brief no. 25 – Marine Ports and Organized Crime. Web.

Sergi, A. (2020). Policing the port, watching the city. Manifestations of organised crime in the port of Genoa. Policing and Society, 6, 1–17. Web.

Sergi, A., & Storti, L. (2020). Survive or perish: Organised crime in the port of Montreal and the port of New York/New Jersey. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 63, 100424. Web.

Sergi, A., Reid, A., Storti, L., & Easton, M. (2021). Ports, crime, and security: Governing and policing seaports in a changing world. Policy Press

Sinclair, M. (2021). The wicked problem of drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere. Brookings. Web.

Tomer, A., & Kane, J. (2015). The great port mismatch U.S. goods trade and international transportation. Global Cities Initiative. Web.

Ward, J.H. (2012). Managing data: Content analysis methodology. Unpublished Manuscript, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Web.

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