Great Irish Famine and British Government’s Response

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That by 1845 the population of Ireland had increased and was increasing there is no doubt whatever. But any attempt to discuss the rate of, or the reasons for this increase is seriously handicapped by deficiencies in the statistical material at our disposal. For the numbers of the Irish population in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries all we have are estimates, which range from earnest computations based on imperfect materials to wild and biased guesses.

Poverty and destitution were widespread in Ireland in the first half of the nineteenth century. The rapid industrialisation of Great Britain in the early nineteenth century provided a multitudinous and miscellaneous variety of openings for Irish labour and cheap and fast transport between the islands. By 1841 there were over 400,000 people of Irish birth resident in Great Britain, most of them being settled in London, Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow.

Given a scrap of land the Irish peasant could throw up a cabin to shelter his family and grow the potatoes which formed their staple diet. Now the Irish land system permitted a man to obtain with delusive ease the basis of a meagre and uncomfortable life. The easy-going and unenterprising methods on which most Irish estates were managed, the desire for quick returns during the great war at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the wish of the Irish farmer to secure labour without bothering about money wages, and the anxiety of many landlords to increase their political prestige and pull by multiplying freeholders on their estates, encouraged sub-division (Foster 1990).

If the most productive use was to be made of the soil, it was clear that Irish rural economy required to be reorganized. And only two forces, the state or the Irish landowners, could be expected to undertake the task. The former was inhibited partly by lack of the requisite machinery and knowledge, and partly by respect for the dominant laissez-faire outlook which assumed that if the state intervened in economic affairs it would probably blunder badly and certainly interrupt the healthy and harmonious play of natural forces.

The ramshackle, ill-balanced Irish agricultural system not only failed to provide a satisfactory and productive economic existence for the majority of those engaged in it, but in addition it exercised a crippling effect on Irish industrial development (Tuathaigh, 2007). The Irish textile industries just before the famine present a series of contrasts. Silk, after a long struggle, was almost dead, and wool which had been declining seemed to have stabilized itself at a low level, cotton after a period of feverish expansion had fallen into an intensifying depression from which it was never to emerge, and the securely established linen industry, while undergoing painful changes in organization, was at the opening of an age of expansion and success.

The Poor Law improved the situation and gave support to the population. Despite the prevailing poverty there was no poor law system in the country until 1838. A statute passed in that year divided the country into poor law unions and provided for the election of a board of guardians and the erection of a workhouse in each union. Ireland, unlike England which had a system dating from Tudor times, was looked on as an unspoiled field where a poor law in complete accord with prevailing economic theory could be introduced.

As a result a rigid system was imposed which in no circumstances allowed assistance to be given to any but those who became inmates of the workhouses. Residence in the workhouse was made ‘as disagreeable as was consistent with health’ lest anyone should desire to depend on public assistance (Morash, 1995).

The system was in operation in practically all parts of Ireland by 1843, but it lacked elasticity and was incapable of dealing with a major crisis. There was accommodation in the workhouses for little more than 100,000 people and this was the maximum that would be assisted in any way under the scheme. Private individuals were not satisfied that the government was taking sufficient precautions and on October 31 a committee was formed at the Mansion House in Dublin to examine the extent of the loss and to propose remedies. The government’s enquiries had been kept secret and it was feared that no preparations were being made to meet the danger of famine (Gallman, 2000).

The conflicting reports of the extent and effects of the potato disease in Ireland in the late autumn of 1845 complicated the problem facing Sir Robert Peel’s administration. In taking steps to meet the situation, the prime minister had no accurate estimate of the possible food deficiency to be expected. A crisis was imminent but its dimensions were unknown. It was realised that the existing poor law system could not meet the impending disaster.

That system was in operation in all but four poor law unions but relief, under the 1838 act, could be given only to inmates of workhouses. The government considered the provision in the poor law which prohibited the granting of relief outside the workhouses fundamental. To make the system capable of meeting a general scarcity it would have been necessary to change, perhaps only temporarily, the principle but it was feared that any change might (Gallman, 2000).

The main task of the relief committees, besides preparing lists of those needing employment, was the provision of food. In the instructions issued at the end of September this food was to be sold and no provision was made to allow gratuitous relief to the infirm. In the regulations laid down for the inspecting officers the principles governing the committees’ duties were more clearly stated. The regulations regarding the sale of food were, however, not relaxed and the system was unable to meet the conditions which prevailed in the closing months of 1846 (Gallman, 2000).

The dependence of families on regular wages raised the problems also of what should be done during bad weather. It was foreseen from an early stage that the people would have to be paid or fed but the government failed to give any decision on the matter. The question became serious during January and February 1847, but despite the pressure of enquiries for a direction in the matter from instance the jury agreed that as Lord John Russell and Sir Randolph Routh had combined to starve the Irish people by not taking adequate steps to meet the crisis they were both guilty of wilful murder.

The failure of the system of relief by public works was gradually made clear to the government, and a new scheme was introduced during the spring of 1847. The numerous deaths by starvation and the fact that labourers deserted agricultural employment in favour of roadwork were factors in bringing about the change.

In sum, the actions and strategies adopted by the British Government were unsuccessful and ineffective; they lacked coordination and did not respond to needs and problems of the population. The schemes were poorly introduced because of their unproductive character, and it has been suggested that all the famine works were useless. The improvement of road communications, however, was as important a part of economic development as railway building, but the limitation of this type of work meant that many useless and ill-considered projects were commenced and quite a number of them were left unfinished.

Their effect would have been felt in subsequent years and the millions of pounds which were wastefully expended would have been diverted to increasing the production of the country. The opportunity to improve the country was lost, and the effect was to increase the demands on already heavily mortgaged property by leaving a heavy debt to be repaid out of rates.

Bibliography

Foster, R. Modern Ireland, 1600-1972. 1990, Penguin Books Ltd; New Ed edition.

Gallman, M. J. 2000, Receiving Erin’s Children: Philadelphia, Liverpool, and the Irish Famine Migration, 1845-1855. University of North Carolina Press.

Morash, Ch. 1995, Writing the Irish Famine. Clarendon Press.

Tuathaigh, G.O. 2007, Ireland before the Famine 1798-1848, Gill & Macmillan Ltd.

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Great Irish Famine and British Government’s Response

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