Examining the Challenger Explosion Case

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Reasons for the Decision to Launch
Organizational Structure that Leads to Bad Decisions
Recommendations for NASA to Avoid Similar Situations in Future
Conclusion
References

Introduction

The challenger disaster in 1986 was among the greatest disasters in American history that resulted in catastrophic outcomes. The explosion that happened in 1986 shocked the world and took NASA by surprise (Harris, 2019). Every citizen in the United States was excited to see the explosion going into space after the Apollo 1 disaster in January of 1967 (Harris, 2019). The challenger explosion proved to be a historical ethics case. During the explosion, it was evident that the Space Shuttle was destroyed in a furnace shortly after taking off on 28th January 1986 (Harris, 2019). Most of the passengers on board the challenger were killed, with others being left with severe injuries. Later, after the explosion, the presidential commissioner took a different stance concerning the explosion and investigated the root cause of the accident or incident. The presidential commissioner realized that O-rings were ultimately filed, and the seals had been depicted as hazards for many years, even before the incident.

An engineer, Morton Thiokol, an acting contractor during that time, made several communications with the NASA fraternity concerning the dangers of launching the challenger. The engineer cited evidence from issues related to the seal’s performance (Harris, 2019). However, during the conference, the recommendation by Morton Thiokol was reversed with various deadly results. In a bid to warn others, engineer Morton Thiokol highlighted the various impacts that would befall the United States after the launching of the challenger. Despite NASA knowing the consequences of the launch from Morton Thiokol’s perspective, they never stopped the process, thereby losing the lives of many citizens in the Challenger explosion.

Reasons for the Decision to Launch

The decision to launch the exploded challenger in 1986 was prompted by a need to avoid a risky decision, poor culture, and deviance by NASA, which claimed that NASA’s structure and mission were not associated with the space shuttle program management. On Monday 27th, 1986, nearly 34 people were bidding to prepare for what is currently termed as the infamous telephone conferences in history (Harris, 2019). The call had been issued by a weather forecast which indicated an expected temperature drop to nearly 22-degree Faraday overnight (Harris, 2019). Therefore, during this period, NASA planned to develop a Space Shuttle Challenger on flight STS-51L and included a group of seven people from the Kennedy Space Centre (Harris, 2019). However, after seventy-three minutes of launching and traveling over Mach 3 and an altitude of 10.4, the vehicle that was being used exploded in what is being termed the challenger explosion (Vaughan, 2016). The explosion later resulted in many deaths in American history that are worth noting.

During this time, Morton Thiokol, who was then a contractor involved in the launching of the flight, had conducted a telephone with NASA officials and recommended them against the launch due to the threats associated with the launching (Vaughan, 2016). According to the presidential commissioner report, the report addressed to the president by the Presidential commission concerning the progress of the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident required the managers and engineers to understand the concept behind the O-ring danger.

However, there was a lack of communication between the management and engineers, and they adopted poor management practices. Essentially, there lacked a properly coordinated association that is vital in decisions that both managers and leaders approach. During the challenger explosion, it was evident that the Space Shuttle Challenger was destroyed in a furnace shortly after taking off on 28th January 1986 (Harris, 2019). Most of the passengers on board the challenger were killed, with others being left with severe injuries. Later, after the end of the explosion, the presidential commissioner took a different stance concerning the explosion and investigated the root cause of the accident or incident.

Organizational Structure that Leads to Bad Decisions

Managers frequently encounter time constraints, which can make decision-making more difficult. When we have limited time to collect and rationally digest information, we are far less likely to make a good non-programmed judgment. Due to time constraints, we may resort to heuristics rather than participate in deep processing. While heuristics save time, they do not always result in the optimal answer. The finest managers are continually weighing the dangers of responding too quickly against the risks of acting too slowly.

Additionally, managers routinely make decisions in the face of uncertainty as they cannot predict the result of each alternative until they choose one. Consider a manager who is deciding between two marketing campaigns. The first is more conservative but is consistent with previous actions taken by the organization. The second is more contemporary and edgy, and it may produce significantly better results or it may be a spectacular flop. The manager who makes the decision will eventually have to choose one campaign and see what happens, never knowing what the results might have been had the alternate campaign been chosen. This uncertainty can make decision-making more challenging for some managers, as committing to one choice implies foregoing others.

The managers and leaders within are often blamed in case of a bad decision in an organization. For instance, in the case of the challenger disaster, the Shuttle Disaster team was blamed for the bad decisions made. According to Harris (2019), the management team may fail to provide practical design management thus resulting in poor decisions that may affect the organization. In the case of the Challenger disaster, it was revealed that the management team failed to create a flawed rocket design while the NASA officials failed to recognize the challenge. According to one of the government inquiries that was later done, it was revealed that there was a failure in a thin, rubbery O-ring seal that is located between the two sections of the shuttle right-solid booster rocket. Similarly, the management teams failed to ensure well-strategized supervision of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, which contributed mainly to the Challenger explosion’s secondary causes.

In addition, a lack of communication between the management and other organization personnel may result in the realization of poor management practices. Essentially, a lack of properly coordinated association in decision-making between managers and leaders may result in poor outcomes for an organization. However, there was a lack of communication between the management and engineers, and they adopted poor management practices. Essentially, there lacked a properly coordinated association that is vital in decisions that both managers and leaders approach.

Recommendations for NASA to Avoid Similar Situations in Future

The entire explosion situation that happened in American history could have been effectively solved if NASA could have listened to the recommendations of the engineer and stopped their scheduled launch. One of the key recommendations for NASA concerning any possible occurrence of the same situation is to be more concerned with the temperature for a launch. There is also a need for the NASA team to understand the relationship between cold and elasticity clearly. According to Harris (2019), cold is an enemy of elasticity, while the elasticity of the O-rings enables the segments of the massive solid rocket motors to seal in the thousand-degree gases created after being ignited. There is also a need for the NASA teams to prioritize their safety concerns as this made them fail to address the safety of their crew, making the majority of them lose their lives. The NASA team is also recommended to work with the engineers and management team rather than prove to the world that they were right.

Conclusion

The organizational structure of a company is a framework that enables efficient communication and excellent work processes. In the case of business problems, various signs arise within the components or design of the organizational structure. Organizational structures may be indicators of significant challenges that may need to be addressed before making the company enters into a financial difficulty situation (Chisholm, 2017). Poor organizational structures may result in slow decision making which may further affect sale innovation and opportunities. When an organizational structure is not optimized, the managers will have poor decision-making authority (Chisholm, 2017). In addition, the ineffective organizational structure may cut the lines of communication, thus making complaints arise within the organization that further affects the performance of the employees in the workplace.

An organizational structure that is not functional makes employees feel their issue is being less addressed, thus resulting in a poor standard management path. Other examples of how organizational structures may result in lousy decision-making entail territorialism, unequal workload, and low productivity (Chisholm, 2017). However, such a situation may be improved by addressing issues related to unequal overload by ensuring equity in assigning work to employees and providing employees with technological lines of communication that will facilitate faster decision-making processes (Chisholm, 2017). The management team should also ensure excellent collaboration between the organizational sectors and departments to promote the company’s territorialism. The business may only thrive if employees and the management team feel motivated and their interests are well protected over the company’s overall needs.

References

Chisholm, R. (2017). Interorganizational decision making. Routledge.

Harris, H. (2019). The Challenger disaster, and how one phone call could have saved the crew. The Portalist.

Vaughan, D. (2016). The Challenger launch decision. Risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA. The University of Chicago Press

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