“A Forecast for the 21st Century” by G. Friedman

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Book Appraisal

In The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century, George Friedman analyzes how geopolitics, advances in technology, and demographic variables will shape the 21st-century world. The five main points that come out of Freedman’s text are analyzed below.

The American Dominance in Geopolitics and Global Economy will be challenged

Friedman asserts that although the future is hard to predict, certain trends point to the emergence of the US as the dominant power in the global scene (41). The book cites defining moments in history and dominant trends in the global economy and geopolitics to herald the dawn of a new age. It explains the US will become a dominant force in this century because of its incomparable economic, sociopolitical, and military might. In the author’s view, America’s naval might and strategic location made it a center of the Trans-Atlantic and Pacific trade (Friedman 54).

In addition, creating naval capabilities that can rival that of America would require immense resources; therefore, its military dominance has no immediate threat. Therefore, the 21st Century will be characterized by struggles between a coalition of nations that want to keep the US power in check and America employing preemptive tactics to stop any threat¹. I would agree with this assertion because, in recent years, America is increasingly facing threats to its economic and military interests from rogue countries such as North Korea.

Friedman notes that ‘declinism’ is likely to recur in America in the 21st century (127). ‘Declinism’ or slow economic growth occurred in the 1980s due to shocks in the global oil industry, the Soviet challenge, reduction in industrial capacity, and perceived decadence of the American society (62). The period, which recurred in 2007, often creates a sense of desperation over the future of the US economy. On the other hand, in recent years, economic growth in Russia and China has been on an upward trajectory.

Friedman avers that the US receives cheap credit from other countries due to the dollar’s status as the “global currency reserve” (94). This scenario has not only reduced America’s industrial might, but it is likely to lead to a debt-and-currency crisis in the near future. He notes that it is likely that America’s military dominance will go down because of the political and economic implications of the crisis (Friedman 129). I would not agree with this claim because while the US economy has remained resilient, the economic slowdown has been experienced in countries with significant military might, such as China.

The 2010s will see the Reemergence of the Russian Empire

Friedman sees Russia reinventing itself to become an empire with a significant global influence that would threaten the US position (103). He postulates that the imminent end of the US-Islamist conflict that has dominated the early decades of the 21st century will give rise to new global realignments with Russia at the forefront (Friedman 104). The Eurasian coalition will have an aggregate population of over 215 million, leading to a GDP growth of more than 50%². In the first half of the century, Russia will expand its empire westward but will meet the NATO forces led by the United States military in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania (Friedman 102).

The confrontation will result in a second cold war wherein Russia will try to challenge America’s military power. However, Russia’s “weak infrastructure, massive population decline, and deep internal problems” will limit its capacity to sustain a protracted confrontation with the US (Friedman 115). I would challenge the validity of this claim because a sudden change in demographics is unlikely to occur, and therefore, a rapid population decrease may not be possible. In addition, Mirdala indicates that Russia will spend massively in infrastructure in the 2010-2017 periods (up to an equivalent of 10% of infrastructure expenditure of the BRICs³) (61). Therefore, Russia’s military might is unlikely to be affected by demographics or insufficient infrastructure.

The book asserts that Russia will continue to be a player in global economics because of its oil reserves. The major industrial powers, including China, will seek to befriend it for a long time to come. In addition, Russia has nuclear and aerospace technologies and has made progress in nanotechnology that other countries may need. It is probable that nations like Germany and China will seek to sell their technical expertise in exchange for energy to fuel their growing demand.

In this view, Russia’s GDP levels will reach the levels of industrialized economies by 2020 (Friedman 105). Confederations and economic blocs, including Eurasia, will arise to play a military-industrial role in Central Asia. I concur with Friedman on this point because Central Asia’s large population, strategic positioning, and natural gas endowment would make the federation a significant player in geopolitics.

The Republic of China will disintegrate in the 2010s because of Internal Problems

There is a view that China will overtake the US as the global superpower, not the Russian Federation. Friedman disputes this claim, arguing that China’s location is not geostrategic, i.e., it is “an isolated country”, which limits its potential to expand (Friedman 83). Furthermore, historically, China has never reasserted its military capability, which means that it will require time and resources to build a formidable naval force that could rival that of the US. I would dispute the view that China is a military dwarf because the country is renowned for the industrial and technological capacity that could help it develop its naval capability.

Friedman further says that China has many internal problems, including poverty in inland areas, which could breed strife and instability (89). He writes that China is economically weak because of the cycle of closing it up from the rest of the world to “equalize the wealth” before opening it up again (Friedman 91). I disagree on this point because China is a leading exporter of industrial and technological goods to many countries, earning it significant revenue that would cushion it from economic shocks.

Friedman also states that unsound economic decisions will see China’s competitiveness decline (94). Inefficiency and corruption will emerge from weak economic structures and slow down economic growth. I concur with Friedman that the Chinese economy is grounded in a weak economic framework that makes it vulnerable to external shocks.

This premise would explain the recent slowdown in the Chinese economy. China also faces pressure to reduce its greenhouse emissions, an action that would potentially slow down its growth even further. Population pressure (a fifth of the global population⁴) coupled with dwindling agricultural production due to global warming is likely to make China dependent on food imports. In this regard, China will suffer from internal problems, such as resource depletion and population pressure.

An Alliance, comprising of Turkey, Japan, and Poland, will Arise to Rival America

Friedman holds that in the 2050s, a powerful alliance of countries considered geopolitically insignificant to assert their might globally (138). The three countries are Japan, Turkey, and Poland. Japan, which is the second-largest economy globally, has a military past that could drive to abandon its pacifist policy to invest in the naval force.

Although Japan has demographic challenges, I agree that it can improve its military power with robots and artificial intelligence. However, the military might may be comparable to that of the US and China that have large populations. Turkey is geopolitically suited to grow into a formidable power. It has a military past (Ottoman empire of WWI) and stands relatively stable in a region characterized by civil strife and economic crises. Therefore, I agree with Friedman that Turkey is likely to expand its influence to the Balkan and Caucasus regions.

On the other hand, Poland, a military might in the 16th century, could reemerge again for two reasons. First, the Polish economy is growing very fast despite its projections indicating a decline in population in the 2050s (Friedman 128). Second, Russia’s interest in Poland is likely to attract significant economic and military support from the United States of America, transforming it into a powerful state. Therefore, an alliance of the three countries will have the military power to challenge the US, creating an explosive confrontation.

Friedman asserts that the strengthening ties between these three nations will shape the 21st-century geopolitics and breed the third world war (129). He believes that the war will be a culmination of the present geopolitical realignments and investments made in advanced weaponry in the earlier decades of the century (Friedman 127). I would disagree with the claim that an alliance comprising of Japan, Poland, and Turkey will arise to threaten America’s supremacy on grounds that the three countries’ demographics are worse than that of the US or Russia. The dwindling population (low fertility rates) coupled with a significant elderly population will make it economically infeasible to invest in the military.

Solar Technologies will replace Carbon-based fuels

Friedman heralds that after the war between the US and the new alliance, spin-offs from the technology developed before the war will emerge to resolve the world energy crisis (139). One such hi-tech solution is the “space-based electrical generation” that will reach the earth in electromagnetic waves, leading to rapid economic growth (Friedman 142). Furthermore, solar technologies will avert the effects of global warming associated with carbon fuel exploitation. I would agree with this assertion because in recent years many countries, including India and China, have launched missions into space. They could harness electromagnetic radiation in space and transmit the energy into the earth.

Friedman posits that the aborted nuclear war between the Soviet and the US would have accelerated the search for superior technologies (145). The search for more energy would have driven nations into exploiting resources in space. The space-based technologies would enhance military capabilities and serve as a driver of industrial growth. In my view, other emerging technologies besides solar solutions could revolutionize military and industrial growth. Examples include robotics, artificial intelligence, and human genome research.

Comparison with Other Authors

Desai, in Geopolitical Economy, dismisses the idea of the global hegemony of a single nation, including the U.S (37). Instead, he predicts that the unequal development experienced today will continue to exist through the imperialism of the powerful states (Desai 44). Desai also notes that new challengers, such as Russia, will hasten their capitalist/communist development to oppose the imperialist powers. In my view, Desai concurs with Friedman on the claim that the new states will emerge to contest America’s imperialist powers. Therefore, international relations will be characterized by a contest between powerful nations fighting to maintain the current global order and emerging economies as opposed to imperialism. However, unlike Friedman, Desai does not submit to the idea of a capitalistic alliance, arguing that countries will always be in mutual competition.

Another point of departure between the two authors relates to globalization and the establishment of empires. While Friedman notes that interconnectedness between nation-states has future political and economic ramifications, Desai feels that globalization is a separate process from domestic affairs. He thinks that the economic and financial crises experienced in powerful nations and the rise of the BRICs indicate that globalization is not central to the geopolitical economy (Desai 71). Therefore, the rise of a single hegemony is unlikely due to disparities in technological and industrial growth and weaknesses inherent in a capitalist economy.

Pavel Baev, in his book, Russian Energy Politics and Military Power, claims that Russia will rise to be a powerful empire in the 21st century (12). His discussion centers on many spheres of Russia’s influence, especially natural gas provision. Russia will use its natural gas reserves to improve its relations with Asia countries and Ukraine (Baev 78). This assertion resonates with Friedman’s argument that oil reserves will be a key driver in Russia’s economic resurgence. However, while Friedman includes demographic changes and the formation of a Central Asia bloc as the force that will be behind Russia’s resurgence, Baev attributes it to natural gas, past military history, and leadership (49).

While Friedman alludes to a military-driven expansion of the Russian empire in Central Europe, Baev explains that the natural gas reserves will be the main factor that will put Russia in a dominant position (82). He notes that over the past decade, Russia has undertaken to avail natural gas to Europe and Asia, placing it in a favorable geostrategic position. Therefore, Russia will take a critical place on the world stage because of its rich oil reserves. In addition, the leadership of Vladimir Putin is committed to regaining the lost glory (Baev 82). Russia has made great strides in revamping its military power and international relations to set it on course for achieving this agenda.

Friedman’s assertion that China will disintegrate in the 21st century due to internal challenges is consistent with Fenby’s view of China’s future. Fenby theorizes that China will not achieve global domination because it has a myriad of “political, economic, social, and international” challenges that may hamper its expansionist dream (67). Therefore, structural difficulties stand in the way of China’s ascendancy to a superpower position. However, unlike Friedman, Fenby does not see the internal problems causing communist China to disintegrate or go into recession. In addition, Fenby rejects the idea of a never-ending rise of China, stating that its dysfunctional political system is the major impediment to growth (85).

Friedman and Fenby agree that China’s internal problems will prevent it from ascending to world dominance. They cite environmental issues, corruption, and institutional inefficiency as threats to China’s ability to assert its influence in international affairs. Friedman goes further to examine the effect of population pressure on China’s future (89). He contends that population pressure coupled with resource depletion will derail China’s economic growth (Friedman 93). In contrast, Fenby sees political intolerance, corruption, and pollution as the leading factors that threaten China’s growth.

Friedman sees the rise of a hegemonic alliance of Japan, Turkey, and Poland that will rival the US in the 2050s (136). He notes that America’s dominance, unlike that of the UK that arose from colonization, was a product of free trade and dollarization. However, according to Desai, no contemporary civilization will rise to a hegemonic state because of the global interdependencies (55). Therefore, based on Desai’s argument, the likelihood of the three states forming an alliance capable of dominating the world is low. In addition, nation-states compete to preserve national interests; therefore, a geopolitical alliance is unlikely to occur.

The future power trends are driven by climate change, energy resource depletion, and population growth. Evans, Vladimir, and Evans state that it will difficult to determine a country’s economic or naval prowess because of the plummeting energy resources (109). The next frontier for seeking power to fuel growth will be solar energy sourced from outer space (Evans, Vladimir, and Evans 112). While Friedman does not consider the impact of supply-demand forces on growth, Evans, Vladimir, and Evans indicates that oil demand will rise and fall over the next century in different countries. The graph showing the national power demand in the USA, Russia, China, India, Brazil, and Canada over this century is shown below. The global oil exploitation will begin to decline in the 2010s as shown in the chart below.

Works Cited

Baev, Pavel. Russian Energy Policy and Military Power. London: Routledge, 2008. Print.

Desai, Ridhika. Geopolitical Economy: After US Hegemony, Globalization and Empire (The Future of World Capitalism). London: Pluto Press, 2013. Print.

Evans, Annette, Vladimir Strezov, and Tim Evans. “Assessment of Sustainability Indicators for Renewable Energy Technologies.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 13 (2009): 108-118. Print.

Fenby, Jonathan. Will China Dominate the 21st Century?. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014. Print.

Friedman, George. The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century. New York, NY: The Doubleday Publishing Group, 2009. Print.

Mirdala, Rajmund. Financial Aspects of Recent Trends in the Global Economy. Craiova: Asers Publishing, 2013. Print.

Footnotes

See Friedman 15-18 for an insightful analysis of the preemptive tactics to protect national interests
See Friedman, especially chapter 6, for a detailed demographic analysis
See Mirdala, especially chapter 2, for more details on the proportion of GDP that countries spend on infrastructural projects
See Friedman 88-94 for an analysis of how China’s population will affect its economic growth

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