Ethnicity Significance in the Post-World War Conflicts

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Table of Contents

The Conflict Potential of Ethnicity
Creating a Better Conflict Resolution Framework
Conclusion
Works Cited

An effective conflict resolution strategy requires a clear understanding of the root cause of the conflict (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 15). In the past, armed conflicts were examined using the framework of religious, social, and economic struggles (Barash and Webel 19). However, a closer examination of major conflicts in the post-World War II era compelled social scientists and policymakers to reinterpret the root cause of the strife as ethnic conflict. It can be argued that some of the major conflicts in the last 50 years were the end result of the ethnic conflict phenomenon, and the ability to recognize this phenomenon will improve the effectiveness of conflict resolution strategies.

The Conflict Potential of Ethnicity

The failure to recognize the impact of the ethnic conflict phenomenon is the main reason for the slow response of the Western World in general and the United Nations, in particular to the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides. There were several factors that can be examined to explain the reason for the failure to intervene. However, it can be argued that one of the principal reasons for the failure to diffuse the tension in Rwanda and resolve the strife in Bosnia was the inability to understand the role that ethnicity played in the said conflict.

The Western world was obligated to intervene in the two instances of genocide. However, the Western world was slow to react because it was hindered by a conflict resolution framework that was far from perfect. Conflicts were interpreted using frameworks generated by European theorists. These theorists focused their attention on national security, the economy, and political instability. Little thought was given on the conflict potential of ethnicity (Young 11)

When conflict arises in a particular region, the Western world attempts to understand it from an economic or political perspective. Thus, it was easier to respond to Saddam Hussein’s forceful entry into Kuwait than to make sense of a Serbian army’s desire to annihilate a specific ethnic group. From the mind of a European or an American strategist, it does not make sense to risk reputation and goodwill for something that is non-tangible. There should always be a justification for engaging in armed conflict. There is a persistent belief that modern-day leaders and warlords fight for tangible things, such as land and resources.

It is easier to prepare or react to conflicts borne out of greed or lust for power. It is not as easy when it comes to conflicts rooted in hatred towards a specific people group. It is high time to look into the conflict potential of ethnicity to prevent a repeat of the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides.

According to one commentary: “Although it is not inherently conflictual, ethnicity has psychological properties and discursive resources which have the potential to decant into violence. No other form of social identity, in the early twenty-first century, has comparable power, save for the closely related forms of collective affiliation, race, and religion” (Young 11). When ethnicity is viewed at the same level as religion and race, it is easier to understand why it has the potential to decant into violence (Young 11).

Hard facts support the assertion that ethnicity is the root cause of several post-World War II conflicts. Consider the following report regarding conflicts that were recorded after the year 1945:

recurrent hostilities in Northern Ireland, Chad, and Lebanon;
secessionist warfare in Burma, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and the Philippines;
army killings in Uganda and Syria ad the mass civilian killings in India-Pakistan;
Sikh terrorism, Basque terrorism, Corsican terrorism, Palestinian terrorism;
expulsion of Arakanese Muslims from Burma and expulsion of Beninese from the Ivory Coast;
ethnic riots in Sri Lanka, Zaire, and Guyana (Horowitz 3).

The list comprises only the more violent instances of ethnic hostility, but there are many less dramatic manifestations (Horowitz 3).

Rwandan Genocide

Ethnic conflict is a phenomenon best understood in Lenin’s story of the cat and rat world. Lenin once chided a fellow communist leader named Luxemburg on her obsession to defeat Polish rebels in her homeland (Mamdani 132). Lenin warned Luxemburg that her preoccupation would suck her into a world of the cat and the rat, a world which no other animals matter (Mamdani 132). For the rat, there is no animal

as big as a cat; and for the cat, there is no other prey as delicious as the rat (Mamdani 132). The same world view can be applied in the study of ethnic conflict, especially when it comes to the Rwandan genocide.

As the name implies, the Rwandan genocide is a classic example of ethnic conflict. The debacle occurred in a small African nation called Rwanda. In the said country, there were three major ethnic groups. The Hutu people comprised 85% of the population, while the Tutsi people comprised 14% of the population (Fujii 12). Although the Tutsis were considered a minority group in Rwanda, they were the more affluent and more influential group compared to the Hutus. For example, the Hutus hated the Tutsis because they claimed that 70 percent of the rich people in Rwanda were Tutsis (Melvern 50). They also claimed that the Tutsis monopolized the banking system (Melvern 50). The root cause of the conflict between Tutsis and Hutus is ethnic in nature. Hutus murdered millions of Tutsis, not because of political ideologies or the need to defend their homeland from foreign invaders. The root cause of the problem is the Hutus’ profound hatred towards the Tutsis.

Genocide is a common outcome of ethnic conflict, and genocide was the terrible outcome of the ethnic feud between these two groups of people. The trigger for the violence was the Rwandan president’s assassination on April 6, 1994 (Fujii 14). The Hutus blamed the Tutsis for the assassination of President Habyarimana. A few hours after his death, soldiers set up roadblocks throughout the city of Kigali, and murdered all Tutsis they encountered (Fujii 14). They even killed those who looked like Tutsis (Melvern 53). One week later, the soldiers used a new tactic as they lured unsuspecting Tutsis into schools and churches (Melvern 53). Through the use of a new tactic, they were able to kill their enemies en masse (Melvern 54).

Genocide in Bosnia

The ethnic conflict in Rwanda was similar to the ethnic strife that was perpetuated in Bosnia. In this country, Muslims represented the largest ethnic group in the early part of the 1970s (Sells 4). However, Serbs and Croats began to emigrate in the 1980s (Sells 4). In May of 1992, a few days after the United States recognized Bosnia’s independence, separatists comprised largely of Serb soldiers launched an attack on the nation’s capital (Cushman and Mestrovic 1). After six months of intense fighting, the Bosnian Serb forces were able to take control of at least 70 percent of Bosnia (Cushman and Mestrovic 1).

However, after two years of conflict, three towns in Eastern Bosnia were still under the control of the government (Sells 4). The United Nations declared these areas as safe havens. These towns became safe havens due to the presence of international peacekeeping forces. Nevertheless, on July 11, 1995, the Bosnian Serb forces initiated a surprise attack that overwhelmed the international peacekeepers in the area. A short time later, the soldier started a systematic separation of Bosniak civilians (Cushman and Mestrovic 1). Women and girls were sent to rebel-controlled territories, and some of them were raped and sexually assaulted by the soldiers (Cushman and Mestrovic 1). The men and boys who were left behind were murdered or sent to mass killing sites (Cushman and Mestrovic 1). According to official estimates, at least 8,000 people died in the town of Srebrenica alone (Sells 4).

A commentary was made regarding the rationale of the atrocities in Bosnia. The commentator remarked that the Bosnian Serb forces did not seek to defeat an enemy army, because there was no organized army to fight a few days after the declaration of independence (Sells 5). The end goal was more sinister, because “their goal was the eradication of a people and all evidence of that people’s culture and existence” (Sells 5). Without a doubt, the Bosnian genocide is another horrifying example of ethnic conflict.

Creating a Better Conflict Resolution Framework

If a significant number of post-World War II conflicts can be described as “ethnic conflicts,” then political leaders, policymakers, and strategists are not equipped to provide an effective conflict resolution framework. This is perhaps the reason for the failure to prevent and intervene during the height of the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides.

Most of the time, ethnic conflicts are overshadowed by international warfare and military alliances (Horowitz 4). The failure to see the root cause of the conflict means inappropriate and ineffective responses when violence escalates. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, the political and military leaders behind the massacre of Tutsi civilians utilized mass media to proclaim their intention to eliminate a specific group of people who were identified through their ethnic background (Mamdani 43). In other words, the international community was forewarned about the genocide. In the same manner, the United Nations did not do anything when Bosnian Serb forces began bombarding cities and towns inhabited by Bosniaks.

The present conflict resolution framework can only be upgraded if the international community finds a way to see beyond international warfare and military alliances. Policymakers must embrace the fact that individual prejudice is as powerful as a political ideology. Communism and Nazism drove people to commit acts of terror. However, the same thing can be said of individual prejudice or hatred towards a certain group of people.

Conclusion

World War II was a good example of international warfare. Britain was at war with Germany, and later on, the United States was at war with Japan. Policymakers and international leaders crafted strategies based on this ideal. However, a closer examination of post-World War II conflicts will compel analysts to conclude that most of the strife can be described as “ethnic conflicts.” A classic example was the atrocities committed by Serbian soldiers against Bosniak civilians. The rebel soldiers were not fighting against an organized army. There was no organized army to contend with because Bosnia declared its independence a few days earlier.

In addition, Serbian soldiers concentrated their attacks on cultural centers and other cultural landmarks. It was revealed later on that the soldiers’ goal was not to fight for freedom but to eradicate a specific group of people differentiated by their ethnic background. During that time, the international community did not have a practical response to ethnic conflicts. The Western world had an obligation to intervene. Nevertheless, the mass murder of innocent civilians was allowed to continue. It is interesting to note that powerful leaders from America to Australia knew in advance that political and military leaders in that area were provoking their followers to kill innocent civilians.

A deeper understanding of the ethnic conflict phenomenon will not only improve the conflict resolution strategies of the international community. It will also help improve intervention strategies and mitigate the impact of ethnic conflicts in the area. For example, the decision to declare certain areas as safe havens was not enough to deter those who were committed to wiping out their most hated enemies. The decision to open up Rwanda’s political system was not enough to prevent the genocide. These strategies were ineffective and inappropriate, especially if the deep-seated resentments and fears towards a certain ethnic group were never addressed. International leaders must

Works Cited

Barash, David and Charles Webel. Peace and Conflict Studies. CA: Sage Publications, 2014. Print.

Cushman, Thomas and Stjepan Mestrovic. This Time We Knew: Wester Responses to Genocide in Bosnia. New York: SUNY Press, 1996. Print.

Fujii, Lee. Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda. New York: Cornell University Press, 2009. Print.

Horowitz, Donald. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. CA: University of California Press, 2001. Print.

Mamdani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killers. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print.

Melvern, Linda. Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide. New York: Verso Publishing, 2004. Print.

Ramsbotham, Oliver and Tom Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution. MA: Polity Press, 2011. Print.

Sells, Michael. The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia. CA: The University of California Press, 1996. Print.

Young, Crawford. “Explaining the Conflict Potential of Ethnicity.” Conflict and Development. Ed. Roger MacGinty and Andrew Williams. New York: Routledge, 2009. Print.

Lonsdale, John. “Ethnic Patriotism and Markets in African History.” Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability in Africa. Ed. Hiroyuki Hino. Web.

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