1. Dennett and Davidson both claim that when we explain what a person does by ap

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1. Dennett and Davidson both claim that when we explain what a person does by
ap

1. Dennett and Davidson both claim that when we explain what a person does by
appeal to her “intentional attitudes” (her beliefs, desires, etc.), we must in general
presuppose that she is rational. Explain what exactly it means to say that intentional explanations presuppose rationality. Does this imply that such explanations would only be genuinely or wholly applicable to a subject who was perfectly rational? If not, what do such explanations presuppose? [Hint: consider Cherniak and Stich’s papers as challenges to Dennett/ Davidson view and how Dennett/Davidson could respond to these challenges]

2. Both Davidson and Tomasello argue that the capacity to communicate in language plays a crucial role in making possible the distinctive features of human cognition. Compare and contrast their accounts of the role that language plays, and the features of our cognition for which it is supposed to account. To what extent, if any, can the observations made by Tomasello about how the capacity for normative self-monitoring, conventional language, and having a conception of objective reality are related, give support to Davidson’s conclusions? Is Tomasello in agreement with Davidson when he writes, “…[T]o get to an understanding of beliefs, including false beliefs, we must have some notion of generalized perspective on an objective reality that is independent of any particular perspective.” (p. 87)?
3. According to Davidson, only a creature that possesses the concept of belief (and thus can have beliefs about its own beliefs) can have beliefs, and only a creature that can communicate in language can possess the concept of belief. According to Call, a variety of primates that are not language users show evidence of “metacognition”. Present and critically assess the arguments these authors offer for their conclusions. Do Call’s experiments show the existence of metacognition without language? Why or why not? In your view, what kinds of non-linguistic behavior, if any, could demonstrate that a creature has beliefs about its own beliefs? If you think that certain kinds of nonlinguistic behavior could demonstrate the existence of metacognition, explain what kinds of behavior would be required and why they would suffice to demonstrate this. If you think that only linguistic behavior could demonstrate metacognition, justify your view. (Hint: In writing about this topic, consider how Tomasello uses Call’s experiments to defend that even great apes have some form of metacognition. [Cf. Chapter II: Individual Intentionality])

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